COMMENT
Iraq's recovery phase can now begin in
earnest
By Ramesh Thakur
The Iraq war roiled the world of international diplomacy as few other
issues have since 1945. Those waging war insisted that it was both legal and legitimate. Others conceded that it may have been illegal but was
still legitimate: an unflattering judgment on the adequacy of existing international law. A third group insisted that it was both illegal and
illegitimate.
Similarly, there were three views on the significance of the war for the UN-US relationship. President George W. Bush famously declared that by
refusing to support the war, the UN had rendered itself irrelevant. Others
countered that the vigour and tenor of the worldwide debate showed how central the UN still is to the great issues of war and peace; the failure
to obtain a UN authorisation robbed the war of legitimacy and legality. A third group insisted that if the Security Council had been bribed and
bullied into authorisation, the UN would have been complicit in a war of aggression.
Now the UN and the US have come together again with the unanimous adoption
of Resolution 1546. Iraq cannot be allowed to fail, not after everything that has happened. We all have a vital stake in stabilising
it, containing terrorism and moving beyond the Iraq mistakes.
The US army is not suited to a quasi-imperial vision. Built for high-intensity war-fighting, it has difficulty engaging in peace
operations and, once abroad, it lacks both staying power and nation-building skills. By contrast, the UN has credibility and legitimacy
in reintegration of former combatants, reconciliation of former enemies and reconstruction of war-torn societies.
After Abu Ghraib, the damage to US credibility and image in the Arab-Islamic world will take a generation to recover. Iraq's recovery must
start now. The following is a sketch of the tasks requiring urgent attention in Iraq.
First, stabilising the security situation. The current trends are in the wrong direction, with far too many kidnappings, attacks on and casualties
among Iraqi officials and civilians, occupying forces and humanitarian agencies. The maintenance of law and order has displaced the building of a
new Iraq as the top priority. The depressing spiral towards the breakdown of law and order has to be halted and
reversed. Insurgents must be tracked down, contained, progressively constricted to narrower operating bases,
and eventually defeated. This may require readjustments in the force mix of military units and contributors, and a better balance between
responding to provocations without alienating hearts and minds.
Resolution 1546 can provide the mandate for a new command structure. We also need appropriate force contributions from Arab, Islamic and other
countries. France is lukewarm: last year's indignation is this year's apathy. But the Organisation of Islamic Conference recently concluded a
special meeting where it called for greater contributions form members to a UN-controlled operation.
Second, the recovery of domestic, regional and international legitimacy. For all three, some form of constitutional recognition by the Security
Council was always going to be necessary. The UN has had to tread the fine
line between being seen as legitimising an illegal and unjust war by collaborating with the occupiers, and abandoning the people of Iraq who
are the true victims thrice over (of Saddam's brutality, UN sanctions and US war).
Resolution 1546 endorses the formation, by June 30, 2004, of an interim government, transparently an American creation, with qualified sovereignty
and time-limited legitimacy. A Transitional National Assembly is to be convened on the basis of direct elections by the end of 2004 if possible,
or by the end of January 2005 otherwise, to draft a constitution under which a new government will be chosen by 31 December 2005.
The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General will assist the political process. But Lakhdar Brahimi has publicly described Paul Bremer
as the dictator who calls the shots in Iraq. Domestic legitimacy will be fully recovered only with the genuine transfer of power and return of
confiscated sovereignty by the end of the process, not on June 30. Third, the reconstruction of Iraqi infrastructure.
This cannot be done as an American monopoly, but requires much broader participation by members of
the Arab, European and international community. Moreover, given the vast sums of money involved and
the need to build, not lose, legitimacy, the international aid and reconstruction efforts must be managed
transparently, without favouritism.
Finally, nation-building, state-building and economic development. Iraq's economic development has been retarded since Saddam's 1990 invasion of
Kuwait and the sequence of events set in train by that. Its political development was arrested by the collapse of the state of Iraq into the
personal fiefdom of Saddam Hussein. And its national welfare was conflated
into the welfare of his clan.
For peace to be established in Iraq, we need simultaneously to pursue the goals of establishing and consolidating liberal democracy (meaning not
just one-off elections, but representative institutions which hold elected
governments accountable to the people and the rule of law, institutions of
accountability like an independent judiciary and free press, guaranteed protection of minority rights embedded within majority rule, enforceable
contracts and property rights), a thriving market economy to underpin economic growth and prosperity, and a robust and resilient civil society
to underwrite social and political stability.
is Senior Vice-Rector of UN University and Assistant
Secretary-General of the UN. This commentary first appeared in the June 18
edition of The
Canberra Times.
These are his personal views.
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