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The industrialization strategy

Generally, relations between agriculture and industry exist in a framework either of an industrialization strategy with an internal dynamic directed toward economic self-development, or a strategy with an external dynamic, tending to integrate the economy into the international capitalist system.

For African countries, Gerard Destanne de Bernis,13 Samir Amin and Albert Tévoedjrè among others, favour the former strategy. Thus, de Bernis starts from the basic idea that after political independence, industrialization is vital for development of a Third World country. But because these countries are predominantly agricultural, especially Africa. 'the essential issue is thus to increase agricultural income which is linked to raising the productivity of agricultural labour'. Agricultural productivity can be increased in two ways: 1) by improving already existing structures thus increasing production and incomes by economic, administrative and social advances in organization: 2) through the creation upstream from the agricultural sector of basic industries such as steel-making, chemicals, cement and so on, in order to supply agriculture with the production tools necessary for increased productivity, implying increased agricultural incomes, partly for the purchase of industrial goods.

For mini-states, however, the application of de Bernis' model poses major difficulties. In such cases he proposes planning and co-operation among, or regroupings of states: states that seek to apply the model individually must have substantial economic and human potentials.

Algeria has opted for this type of internally driven industrialization but it is, perhaps, too soon to assess its performance.14 Nevertheless, it seems that the country has been enabled to: 1) develop a production goods industrial sector supplying agriculture with 60% of its machinery; 2) create a large number of jobs for both rural and urban populations; and 3) substantially increase rural wages and peasant incomes.

This strategy has not, however, been problem free. The Algerian state successfully equipped, even over-equipped the rural areas by heavily subsidizing agricultural production goods, but it has failed either to avoid substituting machines (and hence capital) for labour or to adequately increase agricultural productivity, because production techniques have remained more or less unchanged. The priority given to industry has been partly responsible for massive food shortages and imports and, finally, the high cost of this strategy has, despite its oil wealth, put Algeria among the world's biggest debtors.15

Some African countries, including the Ivory Coast, have opted for a 'light industrialization' strategy based on both a policy of import substitution and adding value to natural resources for export.

In fact, it is generally thought that for most underdeveloped countries: light consumer industries require less capital than heavy industries; by producing for domestic demand goods that can replace previously imported goods, light industries enable our countries to save foreign exchange while helping to mop up under-employment in the urban areas; by establishing links with agriculture, these light industries can accelerate agricultural development since they provide the peasants with consumer goods and some production goods such as pipes, irrigation pumps and sprayers.16

Once properly established and well organized in African countries, it is thought that light industries can yield an abundant surplus both for self-financing and for national economic development. Most light industries in underdeveloped countries, however, do not achieve these objectives. Investments are smaller than for heavy industry, but underdeveloped countries are obliged to resort to external capital, technology and senior staff, which leads to the repatriation of a substantial proportion of any surplus these enterprises may yield. Furthermore, in their import-substitution form, light industries are soon confronted with the problem of the market open to them being too small: the population, especially the working population, is small, incomes are low and usually unequally distributed, and imports from developed countries compete with locally manufactured goods.

Light industries' effect on agriculture is limited because agricultural production goods are not manufactured locally, and import costs are excessively high for underdeveloped countries. Finally, the articulation between agriculture and industry which seeks knock-on effects through an external dynamic not only makes modernization of agriculture impossible but may also lead to incomes stagnating and the transfer abroad of most of the surplus.

But what has been the practical experience of such industrialization in the Ivory Coast, a country with an obvious agricultural vocation, which has exploited its numerous food and agricultural export resources to promote import-substitution industries and industries to add value to natural resources for export? Such a strategy has been facilitated by the existence of a variety of raw materials, and an abundant labour force comprising both nationals and immigrants from neighbouring African countries. The development strategy's liberal character favoured the import of Western capital, technology and senior expatriate staff. Consequently, as we have already noted, the Ivory Coast has experienced exceptionally rapid industrial growth, reaching a rate of 12% per annum despite the negative effects of the world economic crisis since the early 1970s.

We have already looked at the degree of local processing of raw agricultural products and noted that some advances have been made in the 1980s, but what would be the possibility of exporting these products if the Ivory Coast succeeded in locally processing larger quantities? These possibilities are, in principle, rather limited for processed cocoa and coffee products, as the developed capitalist countries, which have a monopoly of processing, will ensure that their market is protected, and additionally will seek to control the creation of processing structures in underdeveloped countries, especially in Africa. Thus, currently the processing of 5% of the Ivory Coast's production of unrousted coffee into Nescafé, is undertaken by CAPRAL (Compagnie Africaine de Produits Alimentaires), a subsidiary of the Nestle group. The primary and secondary processings of undergrade cocoa beans, representing 25% of the country's production, are carried out by three subsidiaries of the Cacao-Barry group and a subsidiary of the Swiss group Interfood.17 Consequently, that the Western multinationals have a monopoly of the industrial processing, the marketing, and demand for coffee and cocoa, leaves little scope for the Ivory Coast to seek to secure most of the economic surplus of its coffee and cocoa production, especially as the African market for these products is limited (average consumption of chocolate per person in the Ivory Coast, for example, is 100g per annum; in Switzerland it is 10 kg).

A significant potential does exist in the Ivory Coast for processing timber and cotton, particularly as there is the possibility of local and wider African demand, owing to co-operation agreements between such bodies as ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States).

The processing of such products as bananas, pineapples, oil palm and copra, for example, as has already been noted, is carried out by enterprises in which most of the shares belong to either the Ivorian state (Palmindustrie), Ivorian private interests (pineapples) or foreign interests (bananas), and the packaged and processed products are almost all exported to the West; and, as Western countries provide much of the investment, senior personnel and the technology of agricultural holdings and processing industries, their socio-economic grasp is strong.

Without the necessary technological input the autonomous capacity of underdeveloped countries for local production of capital goods to modernize their industry and agriculture is seriously limited. The Ivory Coast is, in fact, obliged to import most of its industrial and agricultural capital goods. It, nevertheless, has units producing cement and concrete, iron rods, fertilizers.18 and cutlasses for the agricultural sector.

In producing cement, however, Ivorian industry exercises very little dynamic effect on agriculture. The country's peasants cannot afford to use cement to build either rural shops or housing, and if they buy cutlasses and dabas, it is to maintain their traditional farming techniques rather than to increase their productivity. Some peasants do use fertilizers, at prices, long subsidized by government, they can afford. To encourage cotton production the government used to give fertilizers to peasants, but this policy has ended.

The government organizes the structures of incentives for agronomic research (in the hands of IDESA, Institut de la Savane), production techniques (CIMA. Centre Ivorien de Machinisme Agricole) and the use of machinery in agriculture. Thus, in order to speed up the effects of the food self-sufficiency policy, the Ministry of Rural Development, through Motor-Agri (a large stock of machinery to intervene effectively in the agricultural sector), has been carrying out free clearings to enable the peasants organized in 'groupements à vocation cooperative' (G.V.C.) to expand their production and incomes. Thus, in order to make up for the economic deficiencies of the association between agriculture and industry the Ivorian government is obliged to grant more and more costly subsidies whose effects do not seem to guarantee the expected development.

In every country and under every form of government, the relationship between industry and agriculture is economically deficient. This is especially true for developing countries. The industry that is established exercises a structural hold over agriculture. It develops only the profitable crops or those vital to its functioning. For economic reasons (technology, productivity), industry has a superiority over agriculture. The industries themselves and industry as a whole must be organized so that the dynamic effects benefit the whole population of the developing country.19

This statement sums up the immediate contemporary history of the principal economic and social facts of all underdeveloped countries. Temporarily, a good relationship between agriculture and industry can result in economic and social benefits for the whole population: a bad relationship may result in dependency, stagnation and impoverishment of the underdeveloped economy compared to the industrialized economies. Perroux explains that 'in the developing countries, finance is interested in activities that serve industry and, in the absence of corrections by the government, it pays far less attention to agriculture... and even less again to farmers'.20 Despite certain 'corrections' made by our planners, the Ivorian development model still involves the domination of export over food agriculture and of the industrial over the agricultural sector as a whole, (as is evidenced by the priority granted to factors of industrial production by the state and external interests) although agriculture remains both 'the base and the motor' of development. In respecting this sectoral ranking of the fact that 'finance makes industry and industry makes the economy',21 relations between agriculture and industry have a particular economic and social significance in the Ivory Coast.

As already noted, the 'factors' supplied by the agricultural to the industrial sector are agricultural labour, agricultural raw materials, and financial surplus. Initially labour was recruited by industry mainly from the rural areas and neighbouring African countries. The situation has, however, been complicated because not only has labour been made available to industry by the rural-urban migration, but also is available from the original urban population.

The majority of the economically active population in the food agriculture sub-sector is Ivorian, that in the export agriculture sub-sector is probably only half Ivorian and half Africans from neighbouring countries. In seeking better working conditions and pay, agricultural workers either opt to move from food to export agriculture, or migrate to urban areas, where the growth rate, as already observed, averages 10% per annum. The subsequent flow of job-seekers cannot be absorbed by industry with an average annual growth 12%, but only a 5% average annual increase in jobs.

At the level of population movements, the economy is increasingly experiencing distortions that militate against integration between agriculture and industry. On one hand, there is a shortage of manpower in the agricultural sector, hence the call for a 'return to the land' on the other, at the industrial level there is competition between Ivorian and other African manpower and between Ivorian and expatriate managers. (The escalating unemployment in the Ivory Coast led an agreement with France (1985) to repatriate 2.000 French technical assistants within a few years.)

The wages of migrants (African and expatriate) are likely to be partly repatriated outside the Ivory Coast; those of Ivorians may be partly saved and hence accumulated within the country's borders. As early as 196922 with approximately the same ratios among the groups (63.36% Ivorians: 32.48% migrant Africans: 4.15% non-African), 5% of expatriates collected 35% of the total wage bill, a substantial part of which was repatriated by European managers and obviously unavailable for accumulation in the Ivory Coast.

Historically, agricultural development has not proceeded in the same way for all cash crops. The main agricultural export crops such as coffee and cocoa were for decades labour-intensive with minimal capital needs, and enabled agricultural workers to earn substantial incomes and the state to acquire substantial surpluses - 40% of the international prices.

But the use of more and more capital to rehabilitate old, unproductive plantations, and the worsening of the outcome of the deterioration of trade terms, mean that the reduction of surplus acquired by the state is particularly problematic since the state faces a socio-political necessity to maintain, even increase the producer purchase prices of these products each year. Virtually all the coffee and cocoa is processed in Western factories, therefore, cultivation of these major export crops is fundamentally linked to the developed capitalist countries' industries. And the relatively advanced local processing of coconut and oil palm products, pineapples and sugar-cane is even more dependent on the West because that is the source of vast amounts of vitally essential capital, personnel and sophisticated technology.

The Ivory Coast's agricultural sector has a large potential demand for industrial consumer and capital goods. But the peasants' purchasing power, and food agriculture peasants in particular, as well as that of the majority of the population, is limited, therefore, they cannot afford to purchase these goods that, locally produced or imported, carry a high price.

An analysis of the Ivory Coast's external trade tables for 198323 shows: 1) that for exports, over 50% of the total value of 796.8 billion Francs CFA derived from the sale to developed countries of agricultural and forest raw materials; 2) for imports, with a total value of 704.3 billion Francs CFA, were for the following items: steel products, fertilizers, mechanical, electrical, and transport equipment 173.55; cereals, milk products and fish 96.24; plastics, rubber and synthetics 34.90: chemical and pharmaceutical products 35.64; petroleum products 130.45: others 233.52.

The structure of exports, essentially of agricultural raw materials, and the structure of imports, of which the first two items particularly concern industrial development, reveal a fundamental structural disarticulation between agriculture and industry. This can be partially imputed to the agricultural sector's low productivity and the downward trend of its financial surplus, due to the deterioration of the trade terms. Nevertheless, this sector still provides sufficient 'factors' of production (especially financial surplus) not only to industry but to the whole economy, for which it still provides 'the base and motor' of development.

The same can hardly be said of the industrial sector's role in the economy. Since its creation in 1960, its average annual growth rate has been around 12%: its turn over rose from 13 billion Francs CFA in 1960 to 1,170 billion in 1983: its total wage bill rose from seven billion Francs CFA in 1960 to 105.77 billion in 1983 and so on, but it is not only handicapped by certain structural imbalances.24 but its dependence on external sources, and growing indebtedness, militate against it becoming an active force in the development of the agricultural sector.

Industrial indebtedness, greatly increased by crude petroleum imports (72.413 million Francs CFA in 1980, 78,892 in 1983), refined in Abidjan and partly re-exported, must have been greatly reduced since the take-off in recent years of the exploitation of two petroleum deposits. 'Belier' off Grand-Bassam, and 'Espoir' off Jacqueville,25 which are about to give the Ivory Coast oil self-sufficiency. At the level of the economy as a whole and of the agricultural and industrial sectors in particular, the Ivorian authorities are attempting to move towards a number of reforms in order to give the development of the country a stronger impetus.

The structural nature of the difficulties encountered by the Ivory Coast over the last decade in pursuit of its development, imply that the reforms envisaged must be toward a transition from extraverted to autocentred capitalism, or auto-development: development organized and administered essentially by and for nationals. And, as formerly for the currently industrialized countries, auto-development must be based on the principle of 'self-reliance', not excluding multifacted, fruitful co-operation with most foreign countries. For the Ivory Coast the transition to auto-development necessitates structural reforms at both the sectoral level and at the level of nationals so that expanded capital accumulation can gradually render the national economy self-dynamizing and self-sustaining.

This restructuring must first aim at establishing an adequate balance between agricultural production for export, which is relatively abundant, and food agricultural production which is still insufficient, followed by promoting increasing productivity in both forms of agriculture. Concretely, the dominance of export over food agriculture must be gradually reduced by transferring a proportion of the factors of production (land, labour, capital and technical back-up) from the former to the latter; export agriculture benefits substantially from these factors which, until recently, were unavailable to food agriculture.

Raising the productivity of the two agricultural sub-sectors must be done in conformity with national socio-cultural requirements but in the light of the irreversible demands of scientific and technical progress; the Ivory Coast already has a number of research institutes that have achieved valuable results. This will enable both agriculture sectors to be internationally competitive while freeing land at the national level: part of food agriculture's products, once it has become self-sufficient, can be exported to other African countries whose food needs are not always being met. When well developed, both sectors will provide a solid basis for the development of the agro-industrial sector and the industrial sector.

As in most underdeveloped countries, the ills that plague Ivorian industry are numerous: excessive concentration in the city of Abidjan and the surrounding area; high costs of intermediate goods and imported raw materials, which account for some 40% of all raw materials used in the industrial sector;26 the relatively low proportion of local raw materials processed within the country: the small national market; unequal relations between the 'dominating' exterior and the apparently 'consenting' nationals on the desirability, or otherwise, of control and national accumulation of a large proportion of the industrial surplus.27

Generally, it is accepted that whoever holds the majority capital of a firm has a commanding voice in all big decisions involving the firm. Thus, in 1960, faced with the weakness of Ivorian private capital, the state decided to participate on a provisional basis in financing most big firms: later to grant back its shares to the private sector when it was in a position to take over efficiently. The result was a distribution of the capital of industrial firms as is shown in Table 7.3.

Table 7.3
Distribution of capital in industry by country of origin (%) (Ivory Coast)

Year Ivory Coast France Other capitalist countries African countries
1974 35.80 39.17 23.36 1.67
1975 39.97 36.49 18.16 5.38
1981 61.81 21.29 14.31 2.63
1982 64.42 20.51 12.75 2.32
1983 66.31 19.43 12.05 2.21

Source. Special issue of Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens, op, cit.. p. 117.

In 1983 total capital was estimated at 367.4 billion Francs CFA. Table 7.3 illustrates how the Ivory Coast (state and Ivorian private capital) became the majority share-holder by 1975 and by 1983 held 66.31% of total shares. Theoretically, since 1975, the Ivory Coast has a dominant voice in the direction, management and distribution of their surplus. But, in practice, it is not as simple. In addition to control of the capital there is the effective and overriding control of industrial firms' principal strategic structures, which is achieved through current investments, technology and senior management. In the Ivory Coast these factors of production are largely supplied by international financial institutions and developed market economy countries who, therefore, ultimately have the preponderant voice in most important decisions on the choice and nature of investments, and the balance of relations between wages and profits. They are thus able to appropriate a substantial proportion of the overall surplus of these firms,28 while remaining the favoured creditors of African countries in general and of the Ivory Coast in particular.29 It thus appears vital that Ivorians should attempt to contribute actively to the restructuring of their economy in order to be able to participate more and participate effectively in the process of accumulating the national surplus.

Share percentages in the private and public sectors have changed between 1980 and 1983: private sector shares were, 7.9% in 1980: 13.4% in 1981: 12.4% in 1982; and 16.7% in 1983; public sector shares for the same years were 92.1%. 86.6%. 87.6% and 83.3% respectively.30

Although there has been an increase in the private sector's involvement it is not sufficient to permit the state's disengagement. (Disengagement by the state and accelerated national privatization are, however, conditions contained in the Ivory Coast's Structural Adjustment Plan.) In this situation any policy to increase privatization of the Ivory Coast's economy will strengthen the hold of the outside world on it. On the other hand, for African countries as for the Ivory Coast, the quest for even minimum autonomous national economic development implies strengthening and rationalizing the economic role of the state and the national bourgeoisie.31 Thus, what is needed is for the state 1) to declare and apply the political will; 2) to conceive, prepare and follow through planning and 3) to ensure proper and profitable management of its sector. Additionally, the Ivory Coast's state must act as arbiter between the outside world and the private sector in which the bourgeoisie, conscious of its national responsibilities, must become more a producer than a consumer. But such a policy will be successful only if it meets the basic needs of the population: food, housing, health, education and adequately paid jobs. Such a policy of giving responsibility to nationals in a liberal economy is not incompatible with a real and equitable international co-operation that would enable both the developed and underdeveloped countries to benefit.

The strategy of extraverted industrialization, adopted by the Ivory Coast since political independence, initially enabled its economy in general and industry to particular to experience rapid growth, but this same strategy is partly responsible for the economic and social difficulties the country has encountered for about a decade. Consequently, a restructuring of the economy, toward even minimal autonomy, by strengthening the role of nationals, is inevitable.


Agriculture, up to the present, remains 'the base and the motor' of Ivorian economic development, while industry, despite some undeniable successes, has been unable to consolidate agriculture's leading role in the economy.

Despite far from adequate means of production, the food agriculture sub-sector has on the whole adequately fed the Ivorian people, but it still remains only potentially able to speedily achieve food self-sufficiency, strengthen its foodstuff industry and increase its foreign exchange receipts through exports of processed food products.

Export agriculture, despite its valuable financial surpluses, is affected internally by drought and externally by deterioration of the trade terms. A decisive policy of diversification, and local processing of its products, may enable it to continue to sustain the Ivorian economy.

Finally, only by establishing an adequately balanced relationship between the productions of the two agricultural sectors, and significantly improving their productivity can they constitute a solid starting point for establishing relations between agriculture and industry, without which there is no real autonomous development. And, in accordance with the Ivory Coast's liberal option, a rigorous industrial restructuring under state leadership, with its nationals fully in the control of the economy and the process of accumulation, are vital for embarking on autonomous growth, and resolving financial and social problems if the Ivorian people's essential needs are to be fully met.


1. Summit Conference of African Heads of State in Lagos. 28-29 April 1980, in the Lagos Plan of Action. ECM/ECCR/9, (XIV). Rev. 3, 163 pp.

2. Oil was discovered in the 1970s; two deposits are currently being exploited: the 'Bélier' off Grand-Bassam, on stream in 1980: and the 'Espoir' off Jacqueville, on stream in 19%2. In 1984, combined total production was estimated at 1,100,000 metric tons against national consumption in the same year of 1,146.000 metric tons, indicating a move towards oil self-sufficiency.

3. Diawara, M. T. 'Quelques réflexions sur la stratégie du développement économique.' PDCI-RDA seminar, Abidjan 21-22 May 1971. Mimeo.

4. See my 'Le problématique de l'autosuffisance alimentaire en Côte d'lvoire'. Annales de l'Université d'Abidjan. Série K (Sciences Economiques), Vol. Vl, pp. 56-57,

5. Ibid.. p. 54.

6. Estimated from two tables in Livre vert de l'autosuffisance alimentaire, Abidjan. Edition de 'Fraternité Hebdo', February 1983.

7. See estimates in the Five-year Economic and Social Development Plan for the Ivory Coast 1981-85. Vol. 1, Table 21, p. 143 which places the value of food agriculture at 334.9 billion Francs CFA in 1980 and 430.8 billion Francs CFA in 1985.

8. Raymond Déniel. De la savane à la ville. Essai sur la migration des Mossi vers Abidjan et sa région. Paris. Aubier-Montaigne 1968.

9. See Oupoh Oupoh's doctoral thesis 'Le processus d'industrialisation dans une économie à croissance agricole. Le cas de la Côte d'lvoire'. University of Clermont 1, 1979, pp. 131 ff.

10. Bulletin d'Afrique Noire. 1251. 29 November 1984, p. 6.

11. See Palmindustrie. Bilan, 1985.

12. Ibid.

13. Gérard Destanne de Bernis, 'Contribution à l'analyse des voies africaines du socialisme', course at the IEDES. Paris. 1964-65: Samir Amin. L'Accumulation àl'échelle mondiale, Paris. Editions Anthropos 1970: Albert Tévoedjrè. La Pauvreté, richesse des peuples. Paris. Editions Economie et Humanisme, 1978. De Bernis. (op, cit., p.4) defines industrialization as 'the structuring of a whole social set under the influence of an ordered complex of machines'. See also Marc Raffinot and Pierre Jacquemot. Le Capitalisme d'état algérien Paris. François Maspero 1977. 396 pp.. pp. 142-7, 'La théorie de l'intégration de G. Destanne de Bernis'.

14. See, however. Marc Raffinot and Pierre Jacquemot, op, cit.. which analyses the Algerian experience, its successes and shortcomings.

15. In 1983. Algeria was the ninth most indebted country in the world and the first in Africa, with a total debt estimated at $19 billion. See Mamadou Alpha Barry and Jacques Gautrand. 'Dette du Tiers-Monde, qui doit le plus?' Jeune Afrique Economie. No. 31. 19 January 1983, pp. 53 ff.

16. Jean-Louis Lacroix, L'industrialisation du Congo (Zaïre). Paris. Mouton et Cie 1967.

17. Cacao-Barry group subsidiaries: SACO (Société Africaine du Cacao). API (Agricultural Products Industry) and CHOCODI Chocolaterie Confiserie de Côte d'Ivoire). Of the finished (Chocodi chocolate) and semi-finished products (cocoa butter and cake) 90% are sold on the European and American markets by the Cacao-Barry group and Interfood's subsidiary through their international trading networks.

18. In 1980 cement production was 1,l56,000 metric tons, falling annually to only 500.000 metric tons in 1984. This continuous fall was due to the rise in price of clinker (wholly imported from the CIMAO (Ciment d'Afrique de l'Ouest) in Togo) and the economic crisis that seriously affected the construction and public works sector. See Bulletin d'Afrique Noire, 1263. 7 March 1985, pp. 10. 11.

Siveng (Société Ivoirienne d'Engrais), established in 1965, produces multinutrient fertilizers, with a capacity of 170.000 metric tons per annum. Production is state-subsidized but domestic demand fell from 100.000 to 50.000 metric tons in 1984: 50.000 metric tons per annum is exported. See Bulletin d'Afrique Noire, 1263. 7 March 1985.

19. François Perroux, 'Les couplages entre industries et agricultures dans la dynamique d'un développement multidimensionel', Revue Monde en Développment. 31-32. 1980, p. 22.

20. Ibid., p. 241.

21. Ibid.

22. Louis Rousell, 'Problèmes et politique de l'emploi en Côte d'Ivoire). Revue Internationale du Travail 104, 6, December 1971.

23. Bulletin d'Afrique Noire. 1251. 29 November 1984, pp. 5-8.

24. See Bernard Conte. 'Côte d'Ivoire), réorientation de la stratégie industrielle', Jeune Afrique Economie, 53-54. December 1984-January 1985.

25. See Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéns (special issue) 2094, op, cit.. p. 38, which deals with the development of oil production from these two deposits.

26. See Bernard Conte, in Jeune Afrique Economie, 53-4. December 1984-January 1985.

27. See Jean-Jacques Le Cat: 'Côte d'Ivoire), point de vue sur le nouveau Code des Investissements, plus d'avantages, mais moins de protections'. Jeune Afrique Economie, 53-54, December 1984-January 1985, pp. 126-7.

28. Officially available information is insufficiently adequate for fixing precisely all the elements of industrial value added, but we know, for example, that in 1982 it amounted to 277.8 billion Francs CFA against a total wage bill of 100,007 billion Francs CFA. See Bulletin d'Afrique Noire. 1223, 12 April 1984, p. 6.

29. The Ivory Coast's external public debt - 326,839 billion Francs CFA in 1975; 1.074,483 billion in 1979; was 2,626.100 billion in 1983. Debt servicing- 29,786 billion Francs CFA in 1975 - increased to 344.900 billion in 198.1. See Bulletin d'Afrique Noire, 1306. 20 February 1986, p. 7.

30. Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéns (special issue) op, cit.. p. 117.

31. See my doctoral thesis: 'L'importance des grands produits agricoles d'exportation dans le développement économique et social de la Côte d'Ivoire), et rapports agriculture-industrie dans la perspective d'un développement autocentré dans les conditions de l'Afrique Tropicale.' Paris 1974, especially Vol. 2, pp. 496-523.

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