Previous - Next
This is the old United Nations University website. Visit the new site at http://unu.edu
Property markets in developed areas
In addition to the development of rental housing markets, which will be discussed first, changes in social structure, economic conditions, and the circumstances of individual households result in transactions in both undeveloped land and developed property, which may change patterns of access to land and housing, modify land uses, and provide opportunities for investment to different fractions of capital. Exchange of plots and houses and redevelopment will be briefly considered below.
Where access to land and house ownership is limited, the majority become tenants. In many West African cities, for example in the eight towns studied by Peil in Ghana, the Gambia, and Nigeria in the 1970s, rents were modest (10-25 per cent of average male incomes), although demands for key money or several months' rent in advance were becoming increasingly common (Peil, 1981). Extensive renting has also emerged in areas of public housing, including municipal housing (for example in Zimbabwean towns and cities in the 1960s and 1970s) and sites and services schemes. In Nairobi by 1983 over 90 per cent of owners in Umoja I were renting out rooms and 85 per cent in Dandora (Kiamba, 1992). Renting also emerges quite early in the development of squatter and other illegal housing areas. Consolidation or upgrading in such areas often result in rent increases, even though rents may still remain more affordable to lower-income people than in areas of legal land tenure (Ondiege, 1989). Even in circumstances where the supply of land is relatively good, a substantial proportion of households may choose or be forced to rent. In Malawi, for example, 80 per cent of plots in the Traditional Housing Areas (serviced plot schemes) had tenants by 1980, while 68 per cent of the THA and 38 per cent of the total urban population were tenants (Pennant, 1990). Returns on the construction of additional rooms for rent in such areas are considerable (Lee-Smith, 1990), and letting out additional rooms may be an important element in household coping strategies in times of economic hardship. In most parts of Africa only a small minority of women are property owners and potential landlords, despite the paucity of wage employment and other income-earning opportunities open to them. However, in Gaborone, Botswana, 83 per cent of landlords are women, although almost half of these have husbands who are absent, typically working in South Africa. Although more dependent on rental income, women household heads let fewer rooms at lower rents than male landlords, because of their disadvantaged access to capital for construction (Datta, 1995).
Rent levels are affected by the location and quality of accommodation, supply in relation to demand, and general economic conditions. Rents may increase in real terms as a result of shortfalls in supply, but they may also fall over time. In Nairobi between 1980 and 1992, for example, Amis (1996) claims that rents in informal housing areas halved in real terms, as did the minimum wage, while average wages declined by one-third. The proportion of income that tenant households devoted to rent (15-20 per cent) and occupancy levels remained relatively constant, so the fall, he suggests, is explained by a combination of increased poverty (and thus what the market will bear) and an increase in supply, facilitated by state withdrawal from interference in informal housing production.
Rents may also be depressed by government-imposed rent control or rent freezes. Although a large number of countries in Africa have rent control legislation (often introduced by the colonial powers), in relatively few is it effectively enforced. It has had perhaps the most widespread effect in Cairo, where rents are set at market levels for new tenancies but then frozen, deterring mobility in the housing stock and leading to unnecessarily long journeys to work (World Bank, 1988). Initial market rents and the key money demanded by landlords to offset the subsequent decline in real rents make access to new leases costly and discriminatory against new tenants (Wikan, 1990). Thus, whereas controlled rents are just under 40 per cent of market rent levels, total payments come to nearer 70 per cent of market rents (see also Metwally et al., 1995). In Ghana, rent control has been in force since the 1940s and rent levels are periodically set for different types of property. Rents are low, accounting for 2 per cent on average of income in Kumasi in 1986 (Malpezzi et al., 1990) and 6 per cent in Accra in 1989 (UNCHS/World Bank, 1993). A variety of means of evading rent control have developed, including key money, demanding that tenants finance the construction of the room they wish to rent, and declining to let vacant rooms (Korboe, 1994). Thus rents do not, for many tenants, reflect real housing costs. Low rents can be attributed only partly to rent control legislation and, although they have contributed to low rates of new construction, increasing costs and difficulty in obtaining land and building materials have also played a role.
In Zimbabwe, rent control is only partially enforceable. It is ineffective in low-income areas of rented rooms and backyard shacks. In middle- and upper-income areas it has led to the sale of previously rented dwellings and the cessation of construction of flats for rent. Average rent increases were depressed in the 1980s, but varied between blocks owned by large landlords or employers, in which rent control was enforced, and flats let by individual owners, where, because of the shortage, tenants felt unable to appeal to the Rent Tribunal (Rakodi with Withers, 1993). In Nigeria, rent control has been unenforceable, with the result that in Benin City, for example, where 65 per cent of households are tenants and 13 per cent live rent free in family houses, rents constitute 15-29 per cent of income, the proportion increasing with decreasing income (Ozo, 1990). Nigeria is fairly typical: in the majority of cities rent control legislation is unenforceable and should be reconsidered, although there is a continued need to provide legislative protection for tenants against summary eviction and harassment.
It has generally been accepted that plots and houses sold to middle- and upper-income households will enter the private market. At independence, this, together with the indigenization of senior public sector posts, enabled indigenous residents to penetrate residential areas previously reserved for Europeans. However, penetration did not occur at the same rate in all residential areas: higher costs in more exclusive areas deterred house purchase, while settler groups such as Asian owners in Nairobi were sometimes less likely to sell (Kimani, 1972). The dynamics of these submarkets have not been examined in any detail in most cities. In Mbezi public subdivision in Dar es Salaam, three-quarters of plots have remained undeveloped, largely because of the failure to provide infrastructure, and an active informal land market has developed (Kombe, 1994). In Ismailia, Egypt, the sale prices of serviced plots, which were originally subsidized, increased in real terms, allowing sellers to realize windfall profits (Davidson, 1990).
Increasingly, serviced plots for "low-income" households are allocated freehold or on long leases, often with no or limited (and unenforceable) restrictions on resale. In some cases, inappropriate location of a scheme, failure to develop, or default on loan repayments may force allottees to sell. Elsewhere, if the plots have been subsidized, allottees soon realize that the considerable profit available on resale provides an incentive for queue-jumping in the initial allocation process, or selling out and realizing the full market value of the property and any self-help labour inputs. Whether or not allottees do sell depends on the relative returns from renting out rooms and from sale, as well as other motives for owning. If allottees are forced to sell and so do not realize the full market value, the buyer benefits from part or all of the subsidy, whereas sale at market value provides a windfall profit to the allottee (Pickvance, 1988). In Zimbabwe, sales are constrained by the lack of alternative housing, appreciation of the value of home ownership, and residual local authority controls. As a result, prices are several times the cost of construction on a newly serviced plot. The shortfall of plots and medium-cost houses attracts cash buyers who are, on average, higher income than the original allottees and include a larger proportion of absentee landlords (Teedon, 1990; Rakodi with Withers, 1993).
Similar sales occur in squatter and other unauthorized areas. In Zambia in the 1970s, a substantial minority of owner households had bought their houses, usually from the original builder. In Msimbazi in Dar es Salaam, the original occupants of plots on low-lying land allocated for agricultural use were subdividing and selling. Written agreements of sale were witnessed by an elder or relatives and the local political leader (Kombe, 1994; see also Kironde and Rugaiganisa, 1995).
Because of the maintenance burden of public sector rental housing, widespread aspirations to ownership, and the ideological backing given to ownership by international agencies and governments alike in the 1970s and 1980s, many public sector housing organizations have more recently embarked on programmes of sale. In Ghana, houses were discounted by a standard 20 per cent, eliminating the need for a down payment before issue of a mortgage (Derkyi, 1994). In South Africa, resistance to government attempts to sell to tenants inhibited take-up, but in Zimbabwe generous discounts enabled tenant purchase for payments identical to previous rent levels and most local authority houses are currently being rented-to-buy (Rakodi with Withers, 1993). Although the cost-saving rationale may be legitimate, wider issues are rarely considered. These include the effects on tenants who cannot afford or do not wish to buy, the effects on mobility, and the results (especially if no constraints are imposed on resale) of the entry of public sector housing into the open market.
In all cases, the sale of public houses or houses on publicly initiated schemes, as well as encouraging the displacement of lower- by higher-income households, provides investment opportunities for absentee landlords. In many areas, landlords live locally, have similar socioeconomic characteristics to their tenants, and own only between one and three properties (Aina, 1990; Ozo, 1990; Lee-Smith, 1990). Elsewhere, even within the same city, large-scale landlordism has also developed (Amis, 1984). However, inadequate information is available to detail the conditions under which large-scale landlordism emerges and whether petty landlordism invariably evolves into capitalist landlordism (Simon, 1992).
Trends in property markets in inner-city areas vary over time and between cities. Distinctions can be drawn between "modern" central business districts, "ancient" city centres (the medinas of North African settlements), and the surrounding inner-city areas. In some inner-city areas, constraints on sale inhibit investment in maintenance and redevelopment, resulting in poor physical environments, out-migration of upper-income groups, and a predominance of poor-quality residential use. Elsewhere, commercial and handicrafts activities (and increasingly business as well as consumer services) have been attracted to inner-city bazaar areas in greater volumes (Troin, 1993). Despite the clear attraction of medina areas for both certain categories of residents and (especially) business enterprises, and their historical significance, neither occupiers nor authorities attach much importance to conservation, except in a few cases where tourism is significant. Even then, regeneration may be confined to street frontages (Troin, 1993). In Fès, Morocco, for example, the departure of merchants for Casablanca made available a substantial supply of rental tenement housing in the medina. Increasing pressure for commercial use and overcrowding then led to an increase in peripheral illegal subdivision. However, increased demand for middle-income housing and regularization and upgrading of the suburban areas later excluded the poor, who moved back into the old town, accelerating the process of physical deterioration (Escallier, 1994). In Kariakoo, adjacent to the CBD in Dar es Salaam, since the early 1980s resistance to the sale of plots to the government because of inadequate levels of compensation has given way to commercial deals, mostly with Tanzanians of Arab and Indian origin, and redevelopment for higher-density commercial and residential development, often part-financed by capital contributed by international migrants (Kombe, 1994). In Woodstock, a residential area near the centre of Cape Town, which resisted segregation under South Africa's Group Areas Act, mixed-race gentrification occurred even before the segregationist legislation was repealed and has continued since (Garside, 1993). Beavon describes recent changes in the inner-city housing market of Johannesburg in chapter 5 in this volume.
The conversion of inner-city housing to commercial uses and redevelopment at higher densities typify CBDs and their surrounding areas. Investment booms, Bond (1991) asserts, follow overaccumulation in other sectors, which results in surplus manufacturing capital seeking speculative opportunities in property and driving up prices. He identifies investment booms, followed by slumps, in central area property markets in Harare and Johannesburg that can be explained in this way. Very little information is available on property markets in the central areas of African cities. Simon (1992) believes, largely on the basis of evidence from Nairobi, that, because no African city plays a role as a global financial centre and because, in some countries, of restrictions on foreign investment and property ownership, multinational capital has not been attracted to investment in property. However, foreign companies, governments, and financial institutions in search of offices to rent have attracted domestic capital at the expense of investment in industry, agriculture, and residential property, driving up prices. Such properties, often designed by expatriate architects, built by foreign contractors, and using a substantial proportion of imported components, resemble office blocks, hotels, and banks in cities worldwide. The role of the state in CBD commercial property markets has not been studied, although it is likely to be more than regulatory.
Conclusion
To conclude, the implications of some of the characteristics of and trends in urban property markets for future land management policies will be explored. African cities are almost invariably characterized by the coexistence of two or more systems of land supply: indigenous tenure, illegal modes, capitalist markets, and bureaucratic allocation procedures. These overlap, vary in their characteristics and interactions, and produce confused, complex patterns of land supply (Simon, 1992). Modified forms of indigenous tenure dominate only in some West African cities, but are important in many others, and have become increasingly commercialized in recent years. True squatting is generally limited and access to both privately and publicly owned undeveloped land has also become more commercialized. Commercialization of access has been paralleled by an increasing prevalence of illegal development (Simon, 1992) - over half the urban housing stock in Tanzania and Kenya (Amis, 1996; Kombe, 1994). This reflects the inability of formal urban management mechanisms, planning procedures, and housing supply to keep pace with rapidly increasing demand. It also expresses, as did indigenous and colonial tenure systems, contemporary social relations, including the relationships between residents seeking shelter, entrepreneurs seeking opportunities for profit, political forces, and the apparatus of the state, which is concerned with implementing outdated and ineffective land policy and laws.
It seems evident that the trends identified in this chapter will continue and intensify. They raise, above all, questions about the nature of appropriate public sector responses. The problems are only too obvious (Simon, 1992; Durand-Lasserve, 1993; Mabogunje, 1993):
- different systems of rights and practices, with different degrees of legitimacy and compatibility, leading to complexity and conflict;
- information on land (including mapping) that is poor, scattered, discontinuous, and opaque;
- administrative responsibility that is scattered and overcentralized, leading to poor coordination;
- policy that is incoherent and ambivalent;
- legislation that is fragmented, outdated, and only partially enforce able;
- failure to register many types of land occupancy, reducing the ability to raise revenue from property taxation.
Two views as to the best way forward can be detected.
One suggests that indigenous tenure is inefficient, encouraging wasteful use of land, discouraging infrastructure installation and improvement or redevelopment of deteriorated buildings, and complicating land administration systems. As in rural areas, it is advocated that formal individual title should be universalized, to increase eligibility for credit, encourage investment, and simplify administration. The evidence as to whether individualization of rural tenure has produced the expected increases in production is mixed. On balance, analysts suggest that it has increased inequality in access to land and credit (because the supply of credit has not increased), narrowed rights to land while improving security of tenure for some, and failed to create a well-functioning land market because customary law continues to determine sales and succession (Reyna and Downs, 1988; Fleuret, 1988; Shipton, 1988). Barrows and Roth (1990) conclude that rural tenure registration may have positive net social benefits when new economic opportunities also occur, including the potential for utilizing new farming technology previously prevented by tenure patterns, but that without such increases in markets, prices, credit, etc. no increase in production occurs.
Similarities with urban land markets are obvious: individualization of tenure discriminates in favour of those who succeed, via claiming group rights or exploiting their wealth or connections, in achieving land and house ownership, while it excludes those who previously benefited from family claims or non-commercialized access via squatting. Investment in improvement and redevelopment will occur only if capital is available and the proceeds will be widely distributed only if owners of small plots can get access to such capital. The majority of urban residents are already tenants and do not stand to benefit from individualization of tenure - indeed, if it is accompanied by increased enforcement of planning and building standards, the supply of rooms may be adversely affected, driving up rents. Lack of administrative capacity will inhibit any attempts to issue full legal titles to land universally, restricting benefits to those who can jump the queue. Nevertheless, the problems caused by unregistered tenure (conflict, opportunities for fraudulent sales, and loss of revenue) and unplanned development (loss of agricultural land, settlement of hazardous sites, and increased costs of infrastructure installation) cannot be denied.
A similar set of arguments to those used to advocate individualization of group tenure rights is used with respect to nationalized land. Because bureaucratic allocation processes have evidently failed, land, it is argued, should be denationalized. Simon (1992) suggests that such a move would probably encourage international capital to move into property because the rate of return in this sphere exceeds that in directly productive sectors. Whether or not such an influx is prevented by legislation prohibiting foreign ownership of property, denationalization combined with the issue of legal title is likely, just as is individualization of communal tenure, to be largely regressive. It has echoes of the blind faith in market forces that, reflected undis-criminatingly in policy conditionality, has caused such problems for African countries undergoing structural adjustment.
The alternative view is that the ability of the state to tackle urban problems depends above all on the financial resources available to it. Ability to subdivide and service land will increase its legitimacy, especially of local government, in turn enabling it to embark on improving its regulatory activities. The priority then is to improve revenue generation from land. Durand-Lasserve (1993) advocates the establishment of simple fiscal land registers (cadastres) based on the occupier of land, and including both regular and irregular development, as a first stage. Benin's experience with the establishment of land registers and Burkina Faso's with new techniques for plot subdivision and allocation as well as the introduction of property tax are promising (Oloudé, 1995; Bagre et al., 1995). Although control of the process should be retained by the public sector, private sector organizations can be used in many of the operations involved. At a later stage, such a cadastre could evolve into a multi-purpose one, including registration of title and not merely occupancy. Mabogunje (1993) calls for working with the traditional administrative structure as it has evolved today into, for example, a mixture of chiefs and neighbourhood organizations in west African cities, or neighbourhood councils focused on mosques in Khartoum. Neighbourhood organizations should, he argues, be integrated into urban local government and be used to help in establishing and administering a fiscal cadastre. Other analysts, while not advocating the abolition of indigenous tenure in urban areas, suggest that its operation can be improved by simplifying procedures, improving documentation, and imposing requirements for infrastructure installation (Asiama, 1989). Measures to deter speculation and ensure the sale and subdivision of land ripe for development are also seen as urgent in many cities, although appropriate measures may be facilitative (e.g. land readjustment) rather than penal (e.g. higher taxes) (Acquaye and Asiama, 1986; Rakodi with Withers, 1993). This second approach is based on minimal interference with either bureaucratic procedures or market processes, at least initially. It recognizes that incremental improvements to existing systems of land supply are both more realistic and safer than radical changes, especially given the political and administrative difficulties of reform, where ethnic and class conflict over property is prevalent (Simon, 1992).
Experiences of regularization demonstrate that it must be handled with care. Regularization that results in major disruption to existing houses and employs bureaucratic and cumbersome procedures and attempts to register full legal titles, as in Benin's earlier experience (Oloudé, 1995) and Cameroun's attempts to regularize and upgrade Nylon in Douala (Kanga et al., 1995), is undesirable. Although some re-planning may be needed, disruption should be minimized, participation encouraged, and procedures kept simple (for example, Botswana issues Temporary Occupancy Permits, which are converted to Certificates of Rights when the area is gazetted). Infrastructure provision may signal de facto regularization, even while progress with legal regularization is delayed by its complexity, as in the Côte d'Ivoire (Ajavon et al., 1995). Arrangements for cost recovery are also often problematic.
It is very clear that the house construction sector has considerable capacity to produce large numbers of dwellings, even without state backing. There are, however, constraints on housing supply other than land, and, for the supply of dwellings of an appropriate standard and cost to keep pace with need, attention is needed in most places to the supply of building materials and credit and to revisions to planning and building regulations, while in some places support to the construction sector is needed to ensure small firms in particular can get access to working capital, skilled labour, and equipment. In addition, measures to extend infrastructure and improve service delivery must be planned, if not implemented, by the public sector, both to most existing areas (whether illegally occupied or not) and to guide future patterns of land subdivision and occupation. Even here, Guinea's experience in Conakry with a joint public-private development company responsible for implementation shows that informal subdivision is likely to overtake the formal process once minimal infrastructure is installed, making cost recovery difficult (Bourdon, 1995).
The overriding importance of land in the process of urban development has been reflected in the attention paid to it in this chapter. However, housing and other property are produced by the assembly of a variety of components, the supply of none of which should be considered in isolation either from each other or from the political, social, and economic context.
References
Acquaye, E. and S. O. Asiama. 1986. Land policies for housing development for low-income groups in Africa. Land Development Studies 3: 127-143.
Acquaye, E. and Associates. 1989. Study of Institutional/Legal Problems Associated with Land Delivery in Accra. Report to the Government of Ghana, UNDP, and the UN Centre for Human Settlements, Kumasi.
Aina, T. A. 1990. Petty landlords and poor tenants in a low-income settlement in metropolitan Lagos, Nigeria. In: P. Amis and P. Lloyd, eds., [lousing Africa's Urban Poor]. Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp. 87-102.
Ajavon, A., P.-C. Kobo, and C. Nado. 1995. Côte d'Ivoire. In: A. Durand-Lasserve, R. Pajoni, and J.-F. Tribillon, eds., Urban Land Management, Regularisation Policies and Local Development in Africa and the Arab States: Summaries of the Case Studies. GDR Interurba-CNRS and Association Internationale des Techniciens, Experts et Chercheurs, Paris, for the World Bank/UNCHS/UNDP Urban Management Programme, pp. 43-46.
Ameur, M. 1995. Morocco. In: A. Durand-Lasserve, R. Pajoni, and J.-F. Tribillon, eds., Urban Land Management, Regularisation Policies and Local Development in Africa and the Arab States: Summaries of the Case Studies. GDR Interurba-CNRS and Association Internationale des Techniciens, Experts et Chercheurs, Paris, for the World Bank/UNCHS/UNDP Urban Management Programme, pp. 9-11.
Amis, P. 1984. Squatters or tenants: The commercialization of unauthorized housing in Nairobi. World Development 12(1): 87-96.
Amis, P. 1990. Key themes in contemporary African urbanisation. In: P. Amis and P. Lloyd, eds., Housing Africa's Urban Poor. Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp. 1-34.
Amis, P. 1996. Long run trends in Nairobi's informal housing market. Third World Planning Review 18(3): 271-285.
Andreasen, J. 1987. Rented Rooms and Rural Relations: Housing in Thika, Kenya 1969-1985. Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts, Copenhagen.
Asabere, P. K. 1981a. The price of urban land in a chiefdom: Empirical evidence on a traditional African city, Kumasi. Journal of Regional Science 21: 529-539.
Asabere, P. K. 1981b. The determinants of land values in an African city: The case of Accra, Ghana. Land Economics 57(3): 385-397.
Asiama, S. O. 1989. Land Management in Kumasi, Ghana. Report to the World Bank, Kumasi.
Asiama, S. O. 1995. Ghana. In: A. Durand-Lasserve, R. Pajoni, and J.-F. Tribillon, eds., Urban Land Management, Regularisation Policies and Local Development in Africa and the Arab States: Summaries of the Case Studies. GDR Interurba-CNRS and Association Internationale des Techniciens, Experts et Chercheurs, Paris, for the World Bank/UNCHS/UNDP Urban Management Programme, pp. 67-69.
Assess, T. 1994. Source of housing finance for the urban poor in Ethiopia. Paper presented to the European Network for Housing Research 2nd Symposium, "Housing for the Urban Poor," Birmingham.
Bagre, A. S., D. Belemsagha, D. Guiebo, and G. Kibtonre. 1995. Burkina Faso. In: A. Durand-Lasserve, R. Pajoni, and J.-F. Tribillon, eds., Urban Land Management, Regularisation Policies and Local Development in Africa and the Arab States: Summaries of the Case Studies. GDR Interurba-CNRS and Association Internationale des Techniciens, Experts et Chercheurs, Paris, for the World Bank/UNCHS/UNDP Urban Management Programme, pp. 29-36.
Barnes, S. T. 1979. Migration and land acquisition: The new landowners of Lagos. African Urban Studies 4: 59-70.
Barrows, R. and M. Roth. 1990. Land tenure and investment in African agriculture: Theory and evidence. Journal of Modern African Studies 28(2): 265-297.
Bond, P. 1991. Geopolitics, international finance and national capital accumulation: Zimbabwe in the 1980s and 1990s. Tidschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 82(5): 325-337.
Boumedine, R. S. 1995. Algeria. In: A. Durand-Lasserve, R. Pajoni, and J.-F. Tribillon, eds., Urban Land Management, Regularisation Policies and Local Development in Africa and the Arab States: Summaries of the Case Studies. GDR Interurba-CNRS and Association Internationale des Techniciens, Experts et Chercheurs, Paris, for the World Bank/UNCHS/UNDP Urban Management Programme, pp. 1-2.
Bourdon, D. 1995. Guinea. In: A. Durand-Lasserve, R. Pajoni, and J.-F. Tribillon, eds., Urban Land Management, Regularisation Policies and Local Development in Africa and the Arab States: Summaries of the Case Studies. GDR Interurba-CNRS and Association Internationale des Techniciens, Experts et Chercheurs, Paris, for the World Bank/UNCHS/UNDP Urban Management Programme, pp. 47-50.
Bruce, J. W. 1988. A perspective on indigenous land tenure systems and land concentration. In: R. E. Downs and S. P. Reyna, eds., Land and Society in Contemporary Africa. University of New England Press, Hanover, NH, pp. 23-52.
Canel, P. and C. Girard. 1988. Un paradigme a l'épreuve des faits: l' "autoconstruction" en ville Africaine. Revue Tiers Monde 29(116): 1121-1133.
CASS (Centre for African Settlement Studies and Development). 1991. Women in Urban Land Development in Africa: Case Studies from Nigeria and Ghana. Report to the UN Centre for Human Settlements, Ibadan.
Chabbi, M. 1988. The pirate subdeveloper: A new form of land developer in Tunis. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 12(1): 1 -7.
Chabbi, M. 1995. Tunisia. In: A. Durand-Lasserve, R. Pajoni, and J.-F. Tribillon, eds., Urban Land Management, Regularisation Policies and Local Development in Africa and the Arab States: Summaries of the Case Studies. GDR Interurba-CNRS and Association Internationale des Techniciens, Experts et Chercheurs, Paris, for the World Bank/UNCHS/UNDP Urban Management Programme, pp. 13-17.
Coquery, M. 1990. Autopromotion de l'habitat et modes de production du cadre bati: l'apport de recherches récentes en Afrique noire francophone. In P. Amis and P. Lloyd, eds., Housing Africa's Urban Poor. Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp. 55-71.
Datta, K. 1995. Strategies for urban survival? Women landlords in Gaborone, Botswana. Habitat International 19(1): 1-12.
Davidson, F. 1990. Lessons from implementation: The impact of an active land management policy on integrated land development in Ismailia, Egypt. In P. Baross and J. van der Linden, eds., The Transformation of Land Supply Systems in Third World Cities. Avebury, Aldershot, pp. 277-294.
Derkyi, E. 1994. Providing affordable and sustainable housing loans to lower income earners: Ghana's experience. Paper presented to the European Network for Housing Research 2nd Symposium, "Housing for the Urban Poor," Birmingham.
Dickerman, C. 1988. Urban land concentration. In: R. E. Downs and S. P. Reyna, eds., Land and Society in Contemporary Africa. University of New England Press, Hanover, NH, pp. 76-90.
Dubresson, A. and A. Yapi-Diahou. 1988. L'état, "le bas", les cours: exclusion sociale et petite production immobilière à Abidjan (Côte-d'Ivoire). Revue Tiers Monde 29(116): 1083-1100.
Durand-Lasserve, A. 1993. Conditions de mise en place des systèmes d'information foncière dans les villes d'Afrique sud-Saharienne francophone. UMP 8, World Bank, Washington D.C.
Durand-Lasserve, A. 1994. Researching the relationship between economic liberalization and changes to land markets and land prices: The case of Conakry, Guinea, 1985-91. In: G. Jones and P. M. Ward, eds., Methodology for Land and Housing Market Analysis. UCL Press, London, pp. 55-69.
Durand-Lasserve, A. and J.-F. Tribillon. 1995. Suggestions for debate. Paper presented to the World Bank/UNCHS/UNDP Urban Management Programme Seminar on Urban Land Management, Regularization Policies and Local Development in Africa and the Arab States, Abidjan.
El Kadi, G. 1988. Market mechanisms and spontaneous urbanization in Egypt: The Cairo case. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 12(1): 22-37.
El Kadi, G. 1990. L'articulation des deux circuits de la gestion foncière en Egypte: le case du Caire. In P. Amis and P. Lloyd, eds., Housing Africa's Urban Poor. Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp. 103-122.
Escallier, R. 1994. Morocco. In J. D. Tarver, ea., Urbanization in Africa: A Handbook. Greenwood, Westport, Conn., pp. 246-261.
Fleuret, A. 1988. Some consequences of tenure and agrarian reform in Taita, Kenya. In R. E. Downs and S. P. Reyna, eds., Land and Society in Contemporary Africa. University of New England Press, Hanover, NH, pp. 136-158.
Frishman, A. 1988. The rise of squatting in Kano, Nigeria. In R. A. Obudho and C. C. Mhlanga, eds., Slum and Squatter Settlements in Sub-Saharan Africa: Toward a Planning Strategy. Praeger, New York.
Galaup, A., Z. Lakew, and T. Tigabu. 1995. Ethiopia. In: A. Durand-Lasserve, R. Pajoni, and J.-F. Tribillon, eds., Urban Land Management, Regularisation Policies and Local Development in Africa and the Arab States: Summaries of the Case Studies. GDR Interurba-CNRS and Association Internationale des Techniciens, Experts et Chercheurs, Paris, for the World Bank/UNCHS/UNDP Urban Management Programme, pp. 63-65.
Garside, J. 1993. Inner city gentrification in South Africa: The case of Woodstock, Cape Town. Geo-Journal 30(1): 29-35.
Gayiiya, E. N. and W. M. Walaga. 1995. Uganda. In: A. Durand-Lasserve, R. Pajoni, and J.-F. Tribillon, eds., Urban Land Management, Regularisation Policies and Local Development in Africa and the Arab States: Summaries of the Case Studies. GDR Interurba-CNRS and Association Internationale des Techniciens, Experts et Chercheurs, Paris, for the World Bank/UNCHS/UNDP Urban Management Programme, pp. 85-88.
Kanga, M., A. Logone, and J. Yango. 1995. Cameroun. In: A. Durand-Lasserve, R. Pajoni, and J.-F. Tribillon, eds., Urban Land Management, Regularisation Policies and Local Development in Africa and the Arab States: Summaries of the Case Studies. GDR Interurba-CNRS and Association Internationale des Techniciens, Experts et Chercheurs, Paris, for the World Bank/UNCHS/UNDP Urban Management Programme, pp. 37-42.
Kiamba, M. 1992. Regeneration of low-income housing and squatter settlement areas in Nairobi, Kenya. In: L. Kilmartin and H. Singh, eds., Housing in the Third World: Analyses and Solutions. Concept, New Delhi, pp. 231-250.
Kimani, S. M. 1972. The structure of land ownership in Nairobi. Canadian Journal of African Studies 6: 379-402.
Kironde, J. M. L. and D. A. Rugaiganisa. 1995. Tanzania. In: A. Durand-Lasserve, R. Pajoni, and J.-F. Tribillon, eds., Urban Land Management, Regularisation Policies and Local Development in Africa and the Arab States: Summaries of the Case Studies. GDR Interurba-CNRS and Association Internationale des Techniciens, Experts et Chercheurs, Paris, for the World Bank/UNCHS/UNDP Urban Management Programme, pp. 81-83.
Kombe, J. W. M. 1994. The demise of public urban land management and the emergence of informal land markets in Tanzania: A case of Dar-es-Salaam city. Habitat International 18(1): 23-43.
Korboe, D. 1992. Family-houses in Ghanaian cities: To be or not to be? Urban Studies 29(7): 1159-1172.
Korboe, D. 1994. A policy-sensitive analysis of low-income urban housing in Ghana.
Paper presented to the European Network for Housing Research 2nd Symposium, "Housing for the Urban Poor," Birmingham.
Lee-Smith, D. 1990. Squatter landlords in Nairobi: A case study of Korogocho. In P. Amis and P. Lloyd, eds., Housing Africa's Urban Poor. Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp. 175-188.
Mabogunje, A. L. 1993. Perspective on Urban Land and Urban Management Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa. World Bank Technical Paper 196, Washington D.C.
Macoloo, C. 1994. Land price changes and residential development in Kenya: What future for the urban poor? Paper presented to the European Network for Housing Research 2nd Symposium, "Housing for the Urban Poor," Birmingham.
Maina, B. C. and C. Macoloo. 1995. Kenya. In A. Durand-Lasserve, R. Pajoni, and J.-F. Tribillon, eds., Urban Land Management, Regularisation Policies and Local Development in Africa and the Arab States: Summaries of the Case Studies. GDR Interurba-CNRS and Association Internationale des Techniciens, Experts et Chercheurs, Paris, for the World Bank/UNCHS/UNDP Urban Management Programme, pp. 71-73.
Malpezzi, S., A. G. Tipple, and K. G. Willis. 1990. Costs and Benefits of Rent Control: A Case Study in Kumasi, Ghana. World Bank DP 74, Washington D.C.
Metwally, M. with M. El Bahran, M. Madcouly, and M. Khairy. 1995. Egypt. In: A. Durand-Lasserve, R. Pajoni, and J.-F. Tribillon, eds., Urban Land Management, Regularisation Policies and Local Development in Africa and the Arab States: Summaries of the Case Studies. GDR Interurba-CNRS and Association Internationale des Techniciens, Experts et Chercheurs, Paris, for the World Bank/UNCHS/UNDP Urban Management Programme, pp. 3-7.
Musandu-Nyamayaro, O. 1994. Procedural impediments to the low income housing land delivery process in cities of Zimbabwe: A case study of Harare. Paper presented to the European Network for Housing Research 2nd Symposium, "Housing for the Urban Poor," Birmingham.
Navarro, R. 1988. Irrégularité urbaine et invention de la ville Africaine au Cap-Vert (Sénégal). Revue Tiers Monde 29(116): 1101-1119.
O'Connor, A. 1983. The African City. Hutchinson, London.
Okolocha, C. F. 1993. The evolution of a land policy. In: R. W. Taylor, ea., Urban Development in Nigeria. Avebury, Aldershot, pp. 189-195.
Okpala, D. C. I. 1982. The Nigerian land-use decree revisited. Habitat International 6(5/6): 573-584.
Oloudé, B. 1995. Benin. In: A. Durand-Lasserve, R. Pajoni, and J.-F. Tribillon, eds., Urban Land Management, Regularisation Policies and Local Development in Africa and the Arab States: Summaries of the Case Studies. GDR Interurba-CNRS and Association Internationale des Techniciens, Experts et Chercheurs, Paris, for the World Bank/UNCHS/UNDP Urban Management Programme, pp. 23-26.
Ondiege, P. 1989. Urban Land and Residential Market Analysis in Kenya. Report for UNDP, UN Centre for Human Settlements and World Bank, Nairobi.
Osondu, I. N. and A. Middleton. 1994. Informal housing finance in Nigeria. Paper presented to the European Network for Housing Research 2nd Symposium, "Housing for the Urban Poor," Birmingham.
Ozo, A. O. 1990. The private rented housing sector and public policies in developing countries: The example of Nigeria. Third World Planning Review 12(3): 261-279.
Peil, M. 1981. Cities and Suburbs: Urban Life in West Africa. Africana Publishing Co., New York.
Peil, M. with P. O. Sada. 1984. African Urban Society. Wiley, Chichester.
Pennant, T. 1990. The growth of small-scale renting in low-income urban housing in Malawi. In: P. Amis and P. Lloyd, eds., Housing Africa's Urban Poor. Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp. 189-203.
Pickvance, C. 1988. Introduction: Land and housing development in Middle Eastern and North African cities. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 12(1): 1-7.
Rakodi, C. 1991. Developing institutional capacity to meet the housing needs of the urban poor: Experience in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia. Cities 8(3): 228-243.
Rakodi, C. 1995. From a settler history to an African present: Housing markets in Harare, Zimbabwe. Society and Space 13(1): 91-115.
Rakodi, C. with P. Withers. 1993. Land, Housing and Urban Development in Zimbabwe: Markets and Policy in Harare and Gweru. Occasional Paper in Planning Research, Department of City and Regional Planning, University of Wales, Cardiff.
Reyna, S. P. and R. E. Downs. 1988. Introduction. In: R. E. Downs and S. P. Reyna, eds., Land and Society in Contemporary Africa. University of New England Press, Hanover, NH, pp. 1-22.
Shipton, P. 1988. The Kenyan land tenure reform: Misunderstandings in the public creation of private property. In R. E. Downs and S. P. Reyna, eds., Land and Society in Contemporary Africa. University of New England Press, Hanover, NH, pp. 91-135.
Simon, D. 1992. Cities, Capital and Development: African Cities in the World Economy. Belhaven Press, London.
Soliman, A. 1988. Housing the urban poor in Egypt: A critique of present policies. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 12(1): 65-86.
Stambouli, F. 1990. Tunis: crise de logement et réhabilitation urbaine. In: P. Amis and P. Lloyd, eds., Housing Africa's Urban Poor. Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp. 141-156.
Steinberg, F. 1990. Cairo: Informal land development and the challenge for the future. In: P. Baross and J. van der Linden, eds., The Transformation of Land Supply Systems in Third World Cities. Avebury, Aldershot, pp. 111-132.
Sule, R. A. O. 1994. Land as a constraint on urban housing development. In R. W. Taylor, ea., Urban Development in Nigeria. Avebury, Aldershot, pp. 196-203.
Teedon, P. 1990. Contradictions and dilemmas in the provision of low-income housing: The case of Harare. In P. Amis and P. Lloyd, eds., Housing Africa's Urban Poor. Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp. 227-238.
Tipple, A. G. and S. E. Owusu. 1994. Transformations in Kumasi, Ghana, as a Housing Supply Mechanism. Centre for Architectural Research and Development Overseas WP2, Newcastle upon Tyne.
Tipple, A. G. and K. G. Willis. 1991. Tenure choice in a West African city. Third World Planning Review 13(1): 27-45.
Troin, J.-F. 1993. Urbanization and development: The role of the Medina in the Maghreb. In H. Amirahmadi and S. El-Shakhs, eds., Urban Development in the Muslim World. Rutgers University Centre for Urban Policy Research, New Brunswick, NJ, pp. 94-107.
UNCHS (United Nations Centre for Human Settlements)/World Bank. 1993. The Housing Indicators Program, Volume II: Indicator Tables. UNCHS/World Bank, Nairobi and Washington.
UNDIESA (UN Department for International Economic and Social Affairs). 1990. Population Growth and Policies in Mega-cities: Cairo. UNDIESA, Population Policy Paper No. 13, New York.
Van den Berg, L. 1984. Anticipating Urban Growth in Africa. Land Use and Land Values in the Rurban Fringe of Lusaka. Zambia Geographical Association Occasional Study No. 13, Lusaka.
Wellings, P. A. 1988. The squatters of Lesotho: A case of mistaken identity. In R. A. Obudho and C. C. Mhlanga, eds., Slum and Squatter Settlements in Sub-Saharan Africa: Toward a Planning Strategy. Praeger, New York, pp. 261-280.
Wendt, S., S. Wahning, K. Mathéy, and M. Scaramella. 1990. Ethiopia. In: K. Mathéy, ea., Housing Policy in the Socialist Third World. Mansell, London.
Westen, A. C. M. van. 1990. Land supply for low-income housing. Bamako, Mali: Its evolution and performance. In: P. Baross and J. van der Linden, eds., The Transformation of Land Supply Systems in Third World Cities. Avebury, Aldershot, pp. 83-110.
Wikan, U. 1990. Changing housing strategies and patterns among the Cairo poor, 1950-1985. In: P. Amis and P. Lloyd, eds., Housing Africa's Urban Poor. Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp. 123-140.
World Bank. 1988. Weighing the benefits of rent control. Urban Edge 12(7): 1-6.
Yahya, S. S. 1990. Residential land markets in Kenya. In: P. Amis and P. Lloyd, eds., Housing Africa's Urban Poor. Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp. 157-174.