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III. Principles

The principle of equal ecological security is, to a certain extent, analogous to the principle of equal security that had been formed in the military-political sphere, but the content and prerequisites of the former are different. In the military field, security can be achieved and is often achieved, though temporarily, at the expense of the opponent's insecurity. This makes equal military security somewhat disputable. Ecological security, especially in its global dimension, can be greatly enhanced through a combination of the ecological security of individual states. Environmental instability in one part of the globe undermines the ecological security on a planetary scale.

This is genetically related to one of the fundamental (jus cogens) principles of international law - the principle of sovereign equality, which envisages equal rights and obligations of states. All states have an equal right to ecological well-being. Thus, the principle of equal ecological security bans the achievement of ecological well-being by one state or group of states at the expense or to the harm of the legitimate interests of other states. A similar idea was formulated in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment (principle 24): "International matters concerning the protection and improvement of the environment should be handled in a cooperative spirit by all countries, big and small, on an equal footing."75

Such a view is also shared by legal scholars. O. Hugler and R. Müller write that the first principle that is valid in the system of comprehensive security and can be applied to ecological security is the principle of equality and equal security for all.76 R. Boardman stresses that "the pursuit of security, if it is not to be self-defeating, is inextricably bound up with the search for conditions assuring the security of adversaries. Security, in other words is interdependent."77 The aide-mümoire, "Concept of International Ecological Security," submitted in July 1988 by the former East European countries to ECOSOC emphasized that "... all States, without exception, and concerned international bodies and organizations could and should join in developing the concept and the ensuing system of international ecological security to be built up on the basis of full equality of rights."78

Besides not complying with the general principles of international law, the attempts to achieve ecological well-being unilaterally also contradict the objective indivisibility of global natural processes. Of course, unilateral actions of states aimed at betterment of the environment within national boundaries, provided they do not cause negative transfrontier effects, do not break the requirements of the principle of equal ecological security. However, experience has proven that these measures cannot help against global environmental deterioration.

The material content of the principle includes, inter alia a prohibition to transfer polluting or other ecologically harmful industries and technologies to other countries, to dispose of there hazardous and toxic wastes, and to rapaciously exploit natural resources of other states. An example of such a prohibition was experienced by the Mobro garbage barge that travelled for 162 days and 6,000 miles looking for a place to dump its 3,100 tons of garbage - it was believed to contain hazardous materials.79 The garbage was rejected by three developing countries and several states in the United States before returning full circle to New York.80

The principle banning ecological aggression was essentially formulated in the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.81 Along this line, special attention might be drawn to Article Y of the Convention that entrusts states to complain to the UN Security Council if they believe that the provisions of the Convention have been broken, and to have recourse to joint actions that may be interpreted as mutual assistance according to Article 49 of the UN Charter, or even collective self-defence (Art. 51 of the Charter). To a certain extent, the illegal character of deliberate military damage to the environment was indicated in the UN General Assembly resolution on the "Historic Responsibility of States for the Protection of the Nature of the Earth for the Benefit of Present and Future Generations.''82 Reference to the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment (Principle 26) and the 1982 World Charter for Nature are also appropriate.83

In Soviet international law doctrine, a deliberate hostile impact on the environment - ecocide- has for a long time been qualified as an illegal act and even more has been reckoned in the category of international crimes.84 The principle was endorsed when previous acts of ecocide in Vietnam and other S.E. Asian countries were condemned by world public opinion. It is also essential that the International Law Commission in its Draft Articles on State Responsibility (Art. 19) attributed mass pollution of the biosphere to international crimes.85

It is obvious that for practical implementation, the principle needs further elaboration. A better sense of what qualifies as ecological aggression and the juridical consequences for violating the principle must be developed. In particular, the definition of aggression adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1974 is no longer adequate. The existing definition of aggression refers exclusively to the use of armed force in Article 1.86 In Article 3, the same assumption lies as the basis of the list of acts of aggression.87 The definition should be expanded to include deliberate environmental modifications for military and other hostile purposes aimed at incurring damage to the environment of other countries.

Control measures, such as monitoring state compliance with treaty provisions, are essential to any security system. The control measures are accepted as fundamental in the military security field. The principle of controlling and monitoring the observance of agreed upon requirements of ecological security is just as important. Only by using a developed system of monitoring and controlling can we guarantee the enforcement of international norms, which are of vital significance. Besides the relevant national instruments, the control system should include international control procedures: international requests on state observance of ecological security obligations, on-site inspections and investigations, consultations, creation of permanent international control institutions, and the participation of competent international organizations.

The current stage of verification of implementation of international obligations shows that predominant is the interaction of states through the ad hoc mechanisms created under individual legal instruments. This form of verification has almost exhausted its potential. The participation of competent international organizations would strengthen further development of control procedures. Some UN agencies participate in verification of selected environmental legal instruments, according to their specific competence. But the only UN body with comprehensive competence and coordinating responsibilities in the environmental field is the United Nations Environment Programme. Thus, strengthening the role of UNEP, utilizing to the fullest extent its potential provided by its constituent act, is a way to develop and strengthen the verification process in the field of ecological security, transforming it into a system of coordinated measures and mechanisms.

Another option might be the creation of a special international body with functions of monitoring, surveying, and controlling compliance with the ecological security regime. It could be analogous to a similar international agency in the disarmament field that was proposed by former Soviet foreign minister Eduard Schevardnadze at the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament in 1988. 88

The principle of control is inseparably linked to the principle of the exchange of information on national and regional ecological situations. Such informational feedback would create a minimal material basis of verification of state observance of ecological security requirements. The linkage between informational and control functions is so close that some scholars name informational functions control functions.89

The significance of the informational support of environmental protection policies on the national and international levels clearly follows from existing practice. It was reflected in the general definition of the information goal given in the 1972 Stockholm Action Plan: specifically, "to ensure that decision-makers at all levels shall have the benefit of the best knowledge that can be made available."90 In the field of transboundary natural resources, the exchange of information is regarded as an established principle of international environmental law.91 The great importance that is given to the infor

En mational support of control functions is clearly identifiable in the European Community environmental protection practice.92

The systematic exchange of information was identified as an essential part of international environmental cooperation by the 1990 Siena Forum on International Law of the Environment, which gathered highly qualified legal experts from all over the world.93 The conclusions of the Siena Forum recommended a "systematic exchange of data and information on the state of the environment and levels of pollution."94 Moreover, the Forum recommended assistance to developing countries upon their request, and in full respect of their sovereignty, for collecting such data and information required, particularly through environmental-auditing mechanisms. Transmission of data and information to competent international organizations must be performed in order to make the information available to governments, local authorities, and individuals.95

In the ecological security field, the permanent availability of environmental information is directed to minimize tension that usually occurs in the security sphere due to the insufficiency of relevant data. This exchange of information would permit an adequate evaluation of the national and regional input into strengthening or weakening global ecological security. Practical implementation of the principle would require legally binding international agreements on the regularity and periodicity of the exchange, on the amount of information provided, and on mechanisms and channels of information transfer. An aide-memoire of the eastern European countries in the "Concept of International Ecological Security," proposed inter alia that such forms of information exchange as "annual reporting by Governments on their activity in the field of environmental protection and notification on ecological accidents, including those prevented" should be available.96

Certain technical questions should also be settled when organizing a standing system of information exchange. Compatibility and a correlation of the data received from different countries should be provided. In order to attain this goal, a unified methodology is needed for environmental data evaluation, assessment, an inter-calibration of measuring instruments, etc.

Among the ecological security principles recruited from international environmental law, the most important is the principle preventing transboundary environmental harm. The significance of the principle follows from the necessity to change major conceptual orientations, dictated by the security approach: specifically to shift regulating environmental protection from a "react-and-correct" model (the principle way in which international environmental law has been forming) to a "foresee-and-prevent" model.

A prevention policy is fundamental for any branch of security, in particular, military security. The importance of a preventive approach achieves its utmost degree in the ecological security field for two major reasons. First, the damage incurred in natural ecosystems is, in most cases, irreparable. Second, many environmentally harmful processes are irreversible. Once anthropogenically triggered they can be slowed down or more rarely stopped, but never turned back. An excellent example of such an assumption is global climate change.

The principle of prevention of environmental harm has been introduced in a number of international instruments whose juridical nature varies. The major reasons for this are the impossibility of adequately evaluating ecological damage and subsequently providing full compensation, and the even less probability of restoring environmental quality. Back in 1972, the UN General Assembly recognized the importance of having activities within national jurisdiction carried out "with a view to avoiding significant harm that may occur in the environment of the adjacent area."97 The final act of the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) pointed out that damage to the environment was best avoided by using preventive measures.98 A special section was devoted to preventive measures in the Nairobi Declaration of 1982, which said in particular: "Prevention of damage to the environment is preferable to the burdensome and expensive repair of damage already done."99 The final document of the 1989 Vienna Follow-up Meeting begins the environmental section with "recognizing the need for preventive action."100 The Brundtland Commission, consisting of legal experts, referred to authoritative international judicial decisions, treaty practice, and numerous international recommendations identified in the "prevention principle" as "the well-established basic principle governing transboundary environmental interferences."101

Along with recognition that the prevention of environmental harm is a fundamental principle of international environmental law, similar sectoral assumptions can be quoted. The World Climate Conference (Geneva, 1979), defying the traditional approach of reacting to global climate as an already quantifiable problem, emphasized the need "to foresee and prevent" the effects of human activity on the climate. Philippe Sands, a legal scholar from the UK, based on the analysis of international practice, suggested that the obligation to prevent transboundary environmental harm caused by nuclear pollution has emerged as a universally accepted rule.102

Regional experience has demonstrated the viability of the preventive approach to environmental protection. The First EEC Action Programme on the Environment of 1972 set out 11 general principles of a community environmental policy,103 which were applied throughout the Second and Third Programmes and remain valid under the Fourth.104 The first of the 11 principles reads as follows: "Pollution or nuisances should be prevented at their source, rather than subseguently trying to counteract their effects.105 The Single European Acte106 introduced three fundamental principles that called for preventive measures against environmental pollution.

One may conclude that an international consensus has been forming on the preferability of preventive measures as the most ecologically expedient method for environmental protection on both the national and international levels. The preventive nature of international environmental law has been thoroughly investigated by Professor Toru Iwama in chapter 4 of this book.

The principle of prevention is of a generalized character. In turn, the principle includes a number of independent elements, such as environmental-impact assessment, notification on any activity that may cause transboundary environmental harm, providing necessary information on such potentially harmful activities, and relevant international consultations.

Environmental-impact assessment (EIA) should be considered as the most important element within the prevention principle. It is deeply rooted in the national environmental legislation of many countries and forms a part of positive international environmental law.107 The institution of environmental-impact assessment is mainly aimed at implementation of the first half of the formula, "foresee and prevent." The governing bodies of UNEP and the ECE have both commissioned special expert groups to elaborate on the elements of an international impact-assessment mechanism.108 Senior advisers to the ECE governments on environmental and water problems have recommended the drafting of a European convention on this matter.109 The UNEP special expert group has also been researching uniform international procedures for EIA. These procedures are aimed at the assessment of both short- and long-term ecological consequences. Impacts on all categories of natural objects, both within and outside of national jurisdictions, should be assessed.

Preventive policy becomes more and more evident also with regard to national protection of the environment, since corrective measures have proved to be ineffective. "There is a growing recognition," said William K. Reilly, Administrator of the US Environmental Protection Agency, "that traditional approaches, which stress treatment and disposal after pollution has been generated, have not adequately dealt with existing environmental problems.110 A preventive strategy was the basis for restructuring environmental legislation and management in the former Soviet Union. Examples included the prevention oriented functions of the former USSR State Committee on Nature Protection, the strong preventive provisions proposed in the former All-Union environmental legislation, and the position of the standing Committee on Ecology in the former USSR Supreme Soviet. A similar approach prevails in Russia today.

Experts all over the world indicate that there is a growing number of industrial catastrophes that are tending to have serious environmental impacts. On the other side, natural disasters can result in the destruction of industrial and energy installations (chemical, nuclear, or other types of hazardous activities), which could cause significant damage to the environment. The third source of ecological emergencies is certain long-lasting processes of environmental degradation (global climate change, ozone depletion) whose quantitative characteristics may at any moment convert into a sudden qualitative change. Chernobyl in Ukraine, the Sandoz plant in Switzerland, the Exxon Valdez in Alaska are but a few examples - the complete list of environmental emergencies that happened recently could be much longer. All the above conditions lead to the inclusion of the principle of cooperation during environmental emergencies into the ecological security system.

The formation of the principle has been indicated by certain developments in the law of the sea, space law, conventions on notification and assistance in case of a nuclear accident, adopted in 1986 under the aegis of IAEA.111 When referring to the marine environment, the Siena Forum on International Law of the Environment listed only two treaties112 - the Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties (Brussels, 1969)113 and its Protocol Relating to Pollution by Substances Other than Oil (London, 1973)114 - that allow states injured or threatened by pollution to take emergency measures on the high seas. There is not, however, a universal treaty establishing cooperative measures in drawing up and putting contingency plans into action.

More developments in the practical implementation of the principle of cooperation in environmental emergencies can be expected on global and regional levels of international environmental cooperation. After a number of chemical industry catastrophes,115 the UNEP Governing Council took initiative to elaborate on two international conventions, thereby creating a mechanism of international cooperation in case of serious chemical accidents.116 Using the recent IAEA conventions as a model, the UNEP conventions on chemical accidents would impose legal obligations of early notification and international assistance in case of chemical catastrophes.

A rather comprehensive approach to emergency situations was proposed at the 1989 Ottawa Meeting of Legal and Policy Experts on the Elements of a Global Convention on the Protection of the Atmosphere.117 The proposal included obligations "to immediately take appropriate measures... to control the cause of the emergency situation and immediately notify other states affected or likely to be affected,.. to provide those states and organizations with such pertinent information as will enable them to minimize the harmful effects and cooperate with them, in order to prevent or minimize the harmful effects of an emergency situation," and "to develop contingency plans in order to prevent or minimize the harmful effects of such an emergency situation."118

Regionally, the relevant activities of the ECE should be referred to. Following the recommendations of the CSCE Meeting in Sofia (1989), the ECE initiated elaboration of elements for an international convention (code of practice or other appropriate legal instruments) on the prevention and control of the transboundary effects of industrial accidents.119 On the basis of the relevant provisions of the ECE Regional Strategy for Environmental Protection adopted in 1988,120 the former Soviet government proposed to establish a Centre for Emergency Environmental Assistance in Europe.121

Similar institutional proposals have been recently placed before the UN General Assembly by Austria, to create special environmental emergency assistance forces- a sort of "Green Cross" or "U.N. Green Helmets" - and by the former USSR, to establish a World Centre for Emergency Environmental Assistance.

The political will is sufficient to declare one's devotion to the idea and principles of ecological security.122 But practical implementation of an ecological security regime requires adequate scientific and technological potential. To introduce a global ecological security regime, it is necessary to apply the latest achievements in the field of environmental control and monitoring, low-waste and resource-saving technology. The results of scientific and technical progress in this field shall be easily and widely accessible. There is also a need to provide optimal conditions for integrating scientific and technological potentials of all members of the world community towards development of ecologically safe technology.

The unevenness of economic and technological development of individual countries is well known. From this unevenness emerges the specific needs and interests of developing countries that were already articulated during the preparation of the 1972 Stockholm Conference as one of the serious obstacles for uniform international environmental behaviour. Certain steps had been taken to harmonize the interests of developed and developing countries both before the Stockholm Conference123 and at the Conference itself.124 Scientific and technological cooperation and transfer are crucial for integrating efforts of different countries towards environmental protection. Principle 20 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration proclaimed that the free flow of up-to-date scientific information and the transfer of experience must be supported and assisted to facilitate the solution of environmental problems: "Environmental technologies should be made available to developing countries on terms which would encourage their wide dissemination without constituting an economic burden on the developing countries."125

Regretfully, no acceptable mechanism for implementing the formula of Principle 20 has ever been developed. Instead certain concepts about the "basic needs," "intermediate" or "appropriate technologies" were proposed126 to single out the developing countries as second-rate partners in world technological development. The problem of full involvement by the developing countries in the concerted efforts to save the natural environment still exists. In order to resolve the problem, radical economic and political measures should be undertaken. It becomes evident that a possibility to stop Brazilians from cutting tropical forests lies in offering them adequate economic or technological substitutes.

The acuteness of the necessity to secure universal environmental protection has been evidenced by the global degradation of the environment. This dictates that the principle of scientific and technological cooperation be incorporated into ecological security principles. The principle acquires a new content under an ecological security regime. Its major element should be the creation of the most favourable conditions for international exchange of ecologically safe technologies, and utilization of the latest means and methods of environmental control and monitoring. This will require substantial change in the system of international technical assistance. Implementation of the principle, given its new understanding, would fully activate the mechanism of an international division of labour for the purposes of ecological security and also involve the developing countries, which possess the largest resource potential of the planet.

Radical improvement in the economic and ecological conditions of developing countries will not be feasible without massive financial or technical assistance from the well-to-do countries. An international consensus has been forming such that developing countries should be assisted in their efforts to redress the conditions of underdevelopment that are causing local environmental disruption. This consensus lends support to claims by developing countries that there is a need for financial or technical assistance in order to protect resources of global significance.127 A similar position was held by the former East European countries, which proposed that for the achievement of international ecological security, inter alia there must be "intensification of international economic and ecological cooperation, including cooperation in exchange of technology, for purposes of protecting the environment; attention should be given in this area to the specific situations of developing countries."128

The UN General Assembly at its forty-third session commented more explicitly on the matter. In its resolution, "A United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development," the Assembly recognized "the importance of international co-operation in the research and development of environmentally sound technology and the need for an international exchange of experience and knowledge as well as promoting the transfer of technology for the protection and enhancement of the environment, especially in developing countries."129 It also reaffirmed "the need for developed countries and the appropriate organs and organizations of the United Nations system to strengthen technical co-operation with developing countries to enable them to develop and strengthen their capacity for identifying, analysing, monitoring, preventing and managing environmental problems."130 The exchange of science and technology should not be limited to the North-South dimension. An integrated environmental revolution technology is required that would integrate environmental goals into the basic design of transportation, manufacturing, energy, and other systems. Its potential must be fully developed and available from East to West and North to South.131

The principle of scientific and technical cooperation has found a certain reflection in treaty law. Comprehensive examples are the provisions of Art. 202 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which include such cooperative measures as the training of scientific and technical personnel, facilitating the participation in relevant international programmes, supplying the necessary equipment and facilities, enhancing the capacity to manufacture such equipment, developing facilities for research, monitoring, educational, and other programmer, providing appropriate assistance for the minimization of the effects of major accidents and for the preparation of environmental assessments.

Another scenario of deeper environmental involvement of developing countries is not directly linked to scientific and technological exchange, but if properly realized it could enhance ecological security in the world. The scenario, the so-called "debt-for-nature" exchange, has already proven to be useful in biodiversity conservation and needs a wider application. At the Conference on the Global Environment and Human Response to Sustainable Development (Tokyo, 1989) it was stated that one innovative approach would be the transformation of debt obligations to support environmental programmes. A similar statement was included in the Declaration of Brasilia on the Environment, adopted in 1989 at the Latin America and Caribbean Summit. James Speth indicates that the global environment would receive triple benefits if the public funds needed to purchase discounted debt from commercial banks were to come from taxes levied by industrialized-country governments on greenhouse gas emissions.132 This arrangement is but one of many ways that large-scale debt relief can be tied to long-term agreements to conserve forests and other natural resources for sustainable production.133 A wider view of the North-South "debt-for-nature" bargain might be offered. To complete the "global bargain," which links debt relief to change toward policies encouraging sustainable development, the North would have to agree to put its own house in order regarding pollution, emission of gases, and so on.134

Peaceful settlement of international disputes is covered by the provisions of the UN Charter.135 Meanwhile, conflict resolution in the environmental field is obtaining a certain degree of specificity. This may induce states to attempt to elaborate on their specific mechanisms of environmental-dispute settlement. The growing threat of transboundary damage resulting from violations of international environmental law, caused by regular lawful activities, or ecological accidents may, once again, threaten global ecological security.

The principal aim of ecological security is to prevent hostility between man and the natural environment. Yet another security aspect should be added: that of preventing hostility between men because of environmental disruptions. Experts consider transboundary environmental impacts to be a potential impetus for inter-state conflict, including military retaliation.136 These conditions point to another principle of ecological security - that of peaceful settlement of international environmental disputes.

An attempt to delineate the basic features of international environmental conflict resolution was undertaken while elaborating upon the guiding principles of conservation and harmonious utilization under the aegis of UNEP. The code of the guiding principles,137 adopted in 1979 by the UNEP Governing Council and supported at the UN General Assembly,138 included provisions on the peaceful settlement of disputes resulting from shared natural resources utilization (Principle 11). Having referred to the relevant provisions of the UN Charter, the principle proposes the adoption and utilization of any other procedure for peaceful settlement that would be mutually agreed upon. The procedure should satisfy at least three requirements: it should be speedy, effective, and compulsory. The parties to the conflict should refrain from any action that would worsen the situation under dispute.

One of the traditional methods of dispute settlement has been judicial proceedings. Experts in international conflict resolutions evaluate highly the role of such international judicial bodies as the International Court of Justice.139 The ICJ has recently emphasized its suitability for and willingness to deal with disputes related to environmental matters. The idea to establish a special ICJ chamber for environmental disputes was proposed in 1980 by ICJ Judge Manfred Lachs.140 The statement of the former president of the International Court of Justice, Naghendra Singh, on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Court, in 1986, also confirmed the continued relevance of establishing a special ICJ chamber for considering such disputes.141 Another argument in favour of such an institutional development would be the growing recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.142 Another model of the mandatory jurisdiction includes the provisions of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.143 Thus, in the environmental sphere, there would be an autonomous judicial body that is analogous to the judicial mechanism provided by UNCLOS 1982 (Art. 286 et seq.).144

However, the existing ICJ practice in environmental disputes is still limited and disputable. The 1974 Judgements by the ICJ (Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases and Nuclear Test Cases) gave rise to disappointing commentaries regarding the ability of the Court to handle environmental disputes. It is also noteworthy that the ICJ still has not established a special chamber for environmental disputes, though it has been repeatedly advocated by some members of the Court.

At the same time, international practice indicates that the specificity of certain areas of international cooperation dictates specific institutional arrangements for conflict resolution. Again, one may refer to provisions for the creation of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea under the 1982 UN Convocation on the Law of the Sea as to a useful precedent. Analogous is the GATT practice that established special judicial procedures for dispute settlement in the field of international trade law.

These indicate that some innovative approaches to environmental dispute settlement should be looked for. One of the options could be a closer involvement of the United Nations Environment Programme in this process. It should be noted that after almost 20 years of existence, UNEP has acquired a unique and voluminous experience in dealing with a wide variety of environmental problems. The UNEP Executive Director, in accordance with his responsibility pursuant to the UN General Assembly Resolution 2997 (XXVII), "to secure the effective cooperation of, and contributions from, the relevant scientific and other professional communities in all parts of the world," has created an impressive corpus of independent, top-quality experts on all aspects of environmental protection and resource use. It is widely accepted that fact-finding either in the form of inquiry or as an element of conciliation or arbitral or judicial settlement may be expected to play a role of growing importance. According to WCED legal experts, compulsory resort to conciliation involves an impartial investigation of the facts, followed by recommendations for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. This clearly indicates that there are many crucial stages in the environmental dispute settlement process, for which UNEP has obtained the necessary technical means and organizational skills that must be utilized.

A violation of ecological security shall result in legal consequences based on the principle of international responsibility for environmental harm. Strong international sanctions shall provide stability for the ecological security regime. The principle of international responsibility for environmental harm was strongly recommended at the 1972

Stockholm Conference: "States shall cooperate to develop further the international law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction. "145

Despite the recognition that the principle of international responsibility cannot be effectively implemented without a detailed body of eco-norms, the cooperation of states in developing this important area of international environmental law has been minimal. Thus, the International Law Commission tackled this problem only along the lines of the general codification of international responsibility norms. Environmental harm was expressly mentioned only in the context of international crimes.146 A timid attempt by UNEP to elaborate in 1976-1977 upon certain norms of ecological responsibility failed to work out any substantial recommendation.147 A similar discussion by OECD experts resulted in an elaboration of definitions of state obligation in the environmental field.148

Existing treaty practice does not give ground for optimism. The majority of environmental treaties do not contain provisions regulating responsibility. In rare cases a treaty includes a very general formula, usually referring to future arrangements on responsibility procedures. The 1976 Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution might serve as an illustration.149 Article 13 of the Convention bears the title "Liability and Compensation" but contains only a general obligation "to co-operate in the formulation and adoption of appropriate procedures for the determination of liability and compensation for damage resulting from the pollution of the marine environment deriving from violations of the provisions of this Convention and applicable Protocols."150 A provision of similar generality can be found in the 1974 Helsinki Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area. "151

Even if the international community acknowledges the existence of a general principle of international responsibility for environmental damage, there are still many uncertainties about the exact content and limits of such a principle. In particular, the most important problems concern the scope of the application of the principle of responsibility, the forms of responsibility, the relationship of the wrongful act, and the subjects who have the standing to bring legal actions.152

All that has been said stresses the growing necessity for a precise and explicit formulation of the principle of international responsibility for environmental harm. Firstly, it would provide an additional stimulus for the elaboration of a relevant institution of international environmental law. Secondly, it would strengthen the prevention mechanism by determining the illegality of significant transboundary environmental harm and by providing appropriate sanctions. At a minimum, the principle should require the termination of harmful activities and compensation for their damage.153

The principle of sustainable development perfectly fits the ecological security regime, since both concepts have ecologically safe development as their nucleus. Moreover, both demand shifting the resources from the military security section to the ecological and development sectors. State of the World 1990 points out that "sustainability cannot be achieved without a massive shift of resources from military endeavors to energy efficiency, tree planting, family planning, and other needed development activities."154

The roots of the sustainable development conception go down to the "eco-development" doctrine,155 which calls for the harmonization of socio-economic interests with ecological imperatives. However, if "eco-development" was dictated primarily by the interests and needs of developing countries, the scope of "sustainable development" would be broader, as it seeks to meet the interests of all states. The latter concept requires states to conserve those ecosystems and ecological processes that are critical to the normal functioning of the biosphere. States must also conserve biological diversity and observe standards of optimal sustainability while using biological resources and living ecosystems.156

A major premise of sustainable development is similar to that of ecological security: the prevention of environmental harm is economically more advantageous than post factum corrective measures.157 While being implemented, sustainable development has turned from a mere conceptual idea into multiple programmes and organizational structures and should be reinforced with relevant legal instruments. This was acknowledged at the 1986 Ottawa International Conference on Conservation and Development, which produced a set of principles and measures for promoting sustainable development and, in particular, recommended an elaboration of national and international sustainable development codes.158 The World Commission on Environment and Development has also commissioned much of its work for elaboration of the whole complex of legal and organizational measures for achievement of environmental protection and sustainable development.159

A workable theory of ecological security is not confined to state activity: it begins with the interests and participation of individuals. Indeed, human beings and/or private persons are primary subjects of ecological security. The major form of achieving ecological security is then the preservation of the human environment and not of the environment in general terms. In other words, the fundamental principle of ecological security should be the principle of the human right to a favourable environment. To benefit from that right, however, individuals must recognize the corresponding obligation to observe the requirements of the ecological imperative.

It is well known that the principle in question was not included in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and related documents. However, a certain inherent linkage with the provisions of the 1966 UN Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights can be revealed.160 The 1972 Stockholm Declaration (Principle l) did not explicitly provide for the "right to a favorable environment" but rather described the environmental protection problem in terms of human rights: "Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being..."161

Such ambiguity can be traced down from the 1966 UN Covenant, which included among the guarantees of the right to physical and mental health "the improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene."162

One cannot explain why current national legislation and international laws do not handle the problem of one's human right to a favourable environment. Though formulated very differently, the relevant provisions are found in a number of national constitutions and such international acts as the 1981 African Charter for Human Rights and Peoples163 (Art. 24), the 1988 Protocol to the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights164 (Art. 11), or the Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms adopted by the European Parliament in April 1989.165 Despite certain normative acknowledgements, there is not evident opinio juries for the right to a favourable environment, neither can it be interpreted as "a general principle of law recognized by civilized nations." In the view of WCED legal experts, it remains "an ideal which must still be realized." But to a certain extent, this definition can equally refer to ecological security itself.

Since the legal formation of the human right to a favourable environment has yet to be concluded, one may question the substantive and procedural categorization of this right.

The importance of inherent interrelatedness of human rights and environmental protection issues has induced Judge Pathak and Professor Cançado Trindade to dedicate to these problems special chapters in this book (respectively, chapters 8 and 9).

The approach of Cançado Trindade was to transpose the whole or at least a significant part of environmental law to humanitarian law by giving an expanded interpretation to Art. 60(5) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. One may easily subscribe to these arguments since, from the 1972 Stockholm Conference, protection of the environment has been explicitly understood as protection of the human environment. Discarding the principle of reciprocity in implementation of environmental treaties has been the result of the deepening understanding that without protecting human rights and preserving a favourable environment, the governmental structures of modern states could hardly survive. The relevance of the right to a favourable environment to the context of ecological security can be further supported by Cançado Trindade's assumptions of a clear correlation between the right to life, the right to a healthy environment, and the right to peace and the right to disarmament.

The majority of scholars relate this point to the category of "solidarity," "collective," or even "peoples'" rights. Like other solidarity rights, the right to a favourable environment has both individual and collective dimensions. An individual right means the right of an individual, being the victim of environmental damage, to file a claim for termination of the harmful activity and relevant compensation. The collective aspect means the obligation of states and other social actors to regard all-human interests as superior to national or individual interests and to participate via international cooperation in resolving global environmental problems.

The substantive content and procedural connotations of the right to a favourable environment include the obligation of the state to (1) provide to individual human beings, groups, and other nongovernmental entities free access to veracious and complete environmental information and (2) grant them the right to participate in environmental decision-making and relevant administrative and judicial proceedings. Regrettably, the statement that was made by W. P. Gormley in 1986 is still valid: "international (and regional) law has not yet evolved to the level where injured individuals and environmental associations have the necessary locus stand, to defend their own legal rights or those rights of the international community."

However, there are persuasive indications that a new actor in legal environmental relations, both national and international, has been born. The ECE Regional Environmental Strategy stresses the importance of public participation for its implementation: "... The public must understand how and why the decisions are made, and they must have opportunities for meaningful input into the decision-making process. The public should also be properly informed and should have available information about the state of the environment."166 The CSCE Vienna (Third) follow-up meeting pointed out that "the participating States acknowledge the importance of the contribution of persons and organizations dedicated to the protection and improvement of the environment, and will allow them to express their concerns. They will promote greater public awareness and understanding of environmental issues. "167 These developments in environmental law correspond with the general trends in international law. The emergence of new subjects of international law, such as international organizations, nations, and national minorities, all include individuals as having been one of the major characteristics of the modern international legal order.

The emerging principle of the human right to a favourable environment must be considered as a poly-system entity. It trans-pierces environmental law, ecological security, and humanitarian law. This principle can and shall be the key element in the ecological security system, as an inalienable part of basic human rights and freedoms, included in the future Declaration of Peoples' Rights.

1. V.S. Vereschetin and R.A. Mullerson, "New Thinking and International Law." Soviet State and Law, n. 3 at 3-4 (Moscow, 1988).

2. See, for example, the scenario of possible flooding of part of the territory of Bangladesh resulting from sea-level rise in World Resources 1988-89, 173-174 (Basic Books, 1988).

3. Pravda, 16 July 1989.

4. Pravda, 18 July 1989.

5. Id

6. See, e.g., E. Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity (Transnational/United Nations University, 1989).

7. L.K. Caldwell, International Environmental Policy: Emergence and Dimensions (Duke Univeristy. 1984), pp. 258-259.

8. J.T. Mathews, "Redefining Security," 68 Foreign Affairs, 162 (1989).

9. G.S. Khozin, "Ecological Security: International Aspects," in Ecology: Means for the Survival and Development of Humanity: Scholarly Position, 32 (Association of Ecology and Peace, 1988).

10. "From Common Concern to a Common Future." Statement by Dr. Mostafa K. Tolba, Executive Director, United Nations Environment Programme, to the convocation of Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts, 15 Sept. 1990.

11. State of the World 1990, 5-16 (Worldwatch and W.W. Norton, 1990).

12. Id.

13. Id.

14. Id.

15. Id. at 174.

16. Declaration of the Hague, 19 Envt'l Pol'y & L., 78 (1989).


18. Our Common Future: The World Commission on Environment and Development. 16 (Oxford, 1987).

19. V. Legasov, "Iz segodnja v zavtra" (From today to tomorrow), Pravda, 5 Oct. 1987.

20. V. Vukasovic, Razvoj nauke i technologije i medunarodno pravo, 271-278 (Belgrade. 1978).

21. Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 16 June 1972 11 I.L.M. 1916 (1972), Principle I (hereinafter Stockholm Declaration).

22. See, e.g., A Declaration of Interdependence: A New Global Ethics (endorsed by the Tenth World Congress of the International Humanist and Ethical Union, 1988); Earth Covenant - A Citizens' Treaty for Common Ecological Security (Global Education Associate's Publication, undated); American Bar Association Initiative for International intergenerational Environmental Rights, 413-414 Intern'l Env't Rep.. August 1989; Soviet-American Citizens' Treaty on Ecological Security (adopted by the Soviet-American Forum on Life and Human Rights in San Diego, Cal, on 29 Sept. 1989).

23. La Nazione 3 Rome, 22 April 1990.

24. L. Bjorkbom, "Resolution of Environmental Problems: The Use of Diplomacy," in International Environmental Diplomacy: The Management and Resolution of Transfrontier Environmental Problems, 136-137 (J.E. Carroll. ea., Cambridge University, 1988).

25. For example, one of the most important international conferences dealing with climate change treats it as a threat to global security. See Conference Statement, "The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security," International Conference held in Toronto, 27-30 June 1988. For similar doctrinal positions, see A.S. Timoshenko, "Global Climate Change: Implications for International Law and Institutions," in Addressing Global Climate Change: The Emergence of a New World Order?, 15-36 (Environmental Law Institute, 1989); A.S. Timoshenko, "Ecological Security: Global Change Paradigm,'' Den J. Int'l L. & Pol'y.

26. Pravda, Moscow, 30 May 1987.

27. Pravda, Moscow, 30 June 1987.

28. Pravda, Moscow, 17 Sept. 1987.

29. UNGA Doc. A/C.2142/L.34,

30 Oct. 1987. 30. Id.

31. Pravda, Moscow, 8 Dec. 1988.

32. Pravda, Moscow, 28 Sept. 1988.

33. L. Timberlake, "The Greatest Threat on Earth," The Independent, 19, 12 Sept. 1988.

34. L. Caldwell, supra note 7 at 12; T.W. Wilson, "Global Climate, World Politics and National Security," in World Climate Change: The Role of International Law and Institutions, 71-77 (Westview, 1983); H. Taubenfeld, "The Atmosphere: Change, Politics, and World Order," in World Climate Change, supra, pp. 145-166.

35. A. Westing, "An Expanded Concept of International Security," in Global Resources and International Conflict: Environmental Factors in Strategic Policy and Action, 183-200 (Oxford, 1987).

36. J.G. Speth, "Environmental Security for the 1990's," in Six Not-So-Easy Steps, WRI Issues and Ideas (World Resources Institute, January 1990).

37. J. Cuth, International Legal Aspects of International Ecological Security (Working paper, submitted to the 32nd plenary assembly of the World Federation of the United Nations Associations), 9-14 Oct. 1989.

38. O. Hugler, R. Müller, "Des Konzept der ökologischen Sicherheit und seine völkerrechtlichen Aspekte," 393-395, no. 10 (1988) Neue Justiz.

39. A. H. Westing, "The Military Sector vis-a-vis the Environment," Journal of Peace Research, September 1988.

40. A. H. Westing, "Towards Non-Violent Conflict Resolution and Environmental Protection: A Synthesis," in Cultural Norms, War and the Environment, 151-157 (Arthur H. Westing, ea., Oxford, 1988).

41. N. Mayers, "Environment and Security," 74 Foreign Policy, 41 (Spring 1989).

42. R. Boardman, Ecological Security, the Oceans, and Common Security (Paper presented at the Pacem in Maribus XVII International Conference. Moscow, June 1989).

43. R.N. Gardner, "Global Topics on the Superpower Agenda: Not So Utopian After All," International Herald Tribune, 8 May 1989.

44. 13 Int'l Env't Rep., 413 (October 1990).

45. Interview with Maurice Strong, Options, 12-13 (September 1989).

46. F.M. Bernthal, U.S. Climate Change Policy. Current Policy, n. 1216, United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.

47. E.D. Junkin, "Environment as National Security - Buzzword." I Envt'l J., 38-41 (Summer 1989).

48. A.R. Drengson, Beyond Environmental Crises: From Technocrat to Planetary Person (P. Lang, 1989).

49. J. Rifkin, Entropy: Into a Greenhouse World (Bantam, 1989).

50. The Register Guard, Eugene, Oregon, 6 Dec. 1989.

51. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972 (United Nations, New York, 1973), p. 3.

52. Taking a Stand: From Stockholm 1972 to Nairobi 1982: Declarations on the World Environment (UNEP, 1982).


54. See, e.g., Vienna Meeting (1988), Sofia Meeting (1989).

55. J. Cuth, supra note 37 at 5.

56. U.N. Resolution 35/8 (1980).

57. U.N. Resolution 42/93 (1987).

58. Concept of International Ecological Security (aide-mémoire, E/1988/105. reflecting the views of the countries of eastern Europe. Submitted by Ambassador Milos Viejvoda [Czechoslovakia] at ECOSOC, Geneva, 6-29 July 1988), reviewed in 18 Envt'l Pol'y & L., pp. 189-190.

59. U.N. system-wide programme for 1990-1995, p. 17 ad hoc60. Id.

61. Our Common Future, supra note 18 at 291-307.

62. Id. at 19.

63. For more details, see, e.g., A. Cassese. International Law in a Divided World (Clarendon, 1988)

64. Environmental Security (Report from a Conference in Moscow. 28 Nov. - I Dec. 1988. co-sponsored by the USSR Academy of Sciences [Moscow], the International Peace Researeh Institute in Oslo, the United Nations Environment Programme [Nairobi], and the Ecoforum for Peace [Sofia]) (PRIO/UNEP Programme on Military Activities and the Human Environment, 1989).

65. Id.

66. Environmental Problems: A Global Security Threat (Report of the 24th UN of the Next Decade Conference sponsored by the Stanley Foundation, 18-23 June 1989, convened at Hamilton Parish, Bermuda).

67. Id. at 67.

68. Introductory Document Prepared by the Italian Government for the Forum on International Law of the Environment, Siena, 17-21 April 1990 (Rome, January 1990) (the document was prepared by the Italian government in collaboration with Professors Gian-domenico Caggiano, Francesco Francioni, Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi, Mauro Politi, and Tullio Scovazzi).

69. Id.

70. Id. at pare. 4.

71. "International Law," in Perestroika and International Law, 31-40 (W.E. Butler, ea., Kluwer 1990).

72. See supra notes 42, 45.

73. Pravda, Moscow, 17 July 1988.

74. Among other such treaties are: Moscow Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963), Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), Tlatelolco Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (1967), USSR-USA SALT treaties.

75. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, supra note 51 at 5.

76. O. Hugler, R. Müller, supra note 38 at 393.

77. R Boardman, supra note 42 at 2.

78. Concept of International Ecological Security, supra note 58 at p. 190.

79. "The End Begins for Trash No One Wanted." N. Y. Times, 2 Sept. 1987. When the trash was finally incinerated in New York, officials discovered that the garbage contained no hazardous materials

80. Id.

81. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, 18 May 1977, 16 I.L.M. 88 (1977).

82. G.A. Res. 35/8 (1980).

83. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 21 at Principle 26. "Man and his environment must be spared the effects of nuclear weapons and all other means of mass destruction. States must strive to reach prompt agreement, in the relevant international organs, on the elimination and complete destruction of such weapons." Id. World Charter for Nature, 28 Oct. 1982, 22 I.L.M. 455 (1983). "Article Y. Nature shall be secured against degradation caused by warfare and other hostile activities. Article XX. Military activities damaging to nature shall be avoided." Id

84. See, e.g., V.A. Vasylenko, Otretstrennost' Gosudarstva za Mezhdunarodnve Pravonarusheniia (State responsibility for international offenses) §192 (Vishcha Shkola, 1976).

85. 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/31/10 (1976).

86. Id. at Art. 1.

87. Id. at Art. 3.

88. "Intervention of the U.S.S.R." Foreign Minister E.A. Schevardnadze at the Third Special Session of the UNGA on Disarmament, Pravda, Moscow, 9 June 1988,.

89. See, e.g., W. Morawiecki, Funicje Organizacji Miedzynarodowej (Functions of international organizations), part 3, §§275-292 (Kaiazka i Wiedza, 1971).

90. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, supra note 51 at 23.

91. Such a view, expressed by the legal experts assigned by the Brundtland Commission, was augmented with numerous examples from international treaty practice. See, Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development, Legal Principles and Recommendations Adopted by the Experts' Group on Environmental Law of the World Commission on Environmental and Development (Graham & Trotman, 1987) pp.95-98

92. N. Haigh, EEC Environmental Policy and Britain, 5 (Longman, 1987).

93. Conclusions of the Siena Forum on International Law of the Environment, pare. 15 (Siena, Italy, 17-21 April 1990).

94. Id.

95. Id. at pare. 15.

96. Concept of International Ecological Security, supra note 58 at 190.

97. "Co-operation Between States in the Field of the Environment," UNGA Resolution 2995 (XXVII), 2112th Plenary Meeting, 15 Dec. 1972.

98. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1 Aug. 1975, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975).

99. Taking a Stand, supra note 52. The Nairobi Declaration was adopted by 105 governments at the UNEP Governing Council Special Session, commemorating the tenth anniversary of the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment.

100. 19 Envt'l Pol'y & L., 31-32, (1989).

101. Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development, supra note 91 at 75. 102. P. Sands, Chernobyl: Law and Communication, 7-15 (Grotius, 1988).

103. First Action Programme on the Environment, OJ EEC, N.C. 112173, p. 2 and p. 6 et seq.

104. Fourth Action Programme on the Environment, OJ EEC, N.C. 328/87 p. 1, pare. 1.1 and Annex 1.

105. First Action Programme, supra note 104.

106. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement, Feb. 1986.

107. For details, see A.S. Timoshenko, `'The Problem of Preventing Damage to the Environment in National and International Law: Impact Assessment and International Consultations," 5 Pace Envt'l L. Rev., 475-486.

108. See U.N. Doc. UNEP/WG. 107/2 (1984); ECE Doc. ECE/ENV/52 (1987).

109. ECE Doc. ECE/ENVWA/9 (1988).

110. "With Pollution Control Costs Rising, Many Take a New Tack: Prevention." N. Y. Times, IS Nov. 1989.

111. IAEA Convention on Early Notification in the Case of a Nuclear Accident, 26 Sept. 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1370 (1986); IAEA Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, 26 Sept. 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1377 (1986).

112. Introductory Document for the Siena Forum on International Law of the Environment (Siena, Italy, 17-21 April 1990), p. 15.

113. Brussels International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Case of Oil Pollution Casualties, 29 Nov. 1969, 26 U.S.T. 765, T.I.A.S. 8068.

114. Protocol Relating to Pollution by Substances Other Than Oil, London, 2 Nov. 1973, T.I.A.S. 10561, 34 U.S.T. 3407, 13 I.L.M. 605 (1974).

115. The best-known cases of massive chemical pollution are Minamata (Japan), Love Canal (USA), Seveso (Italy), Bhopal (India). Sandoz Co. Plant (Switzerland).

116. UNEP News 3-4 (1987).

117. 19 Envt'l Pol'y & L., 79/2 (1989).

118. Id.

119. See ECE Doe. ENVWA/R.26, 22 Dec. 1989.

120. According to pare. 112(b) of the Regional Strategy for Environmental Protection and Rational Use of Natural Resources in ECE Member Countries up to the Year 2000 and Beyond (ECE/ENVWA/5), the ECE governments agreed to, inter alia, "consider the possible role of ECE with regard to... possible development of programmes to prevent and mitigate chemical accidents which could have transboundary impacts as well as the exchange of information on such accidents.... Id.

121. ECE Doc. ENVWA/R.34, 24 Jan. 1990.

122. Though the disappointing results of the Bergen Conference (May 1990) demonstrated the current insufficiency of the political will of the international community to radically improve environmental policies.

123. See Founeaux Report, U.N. Doc. GE 71-13738 (1971).

124. More than one-third of the Stockholm Declaration, supra note 21 (Principles 8-16), were dedicated to specific needs and interests of the developing countries.

125. Id. at Principle 20.

126. See, e.g., J. McHale, Basic Human Needs: A Framework fo rAction: A Report to the U.N. Environment Programme (New York, 1976); E. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful (Harper Collins, 1973).

127. G. Handl, "Environmental Protection and Development in Third World Countries: Common Destiny -Common Responsibility," 20 N. Y. U.J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 608 (1988).

128. Concept of International Ecological Security, supra note 58 at 190.

129. Supra note 51.

130. 19 Envt'l Pol'y & L., 28 (1989).

131. J.G. Speth, Environmental Security for the 1990's, at 2 (mimeo).

132. J.G. Speth, "Coming to Terms: Toward a North-South Bargain for the Environment," WRI Issues and Ideas, World Resources Institute, June 1989, p. 4.

133. Id. at 4.

134. "The Debt Crisis and Conservation," The Leaf, Newsletter of the IWLF, August 1989, p. 5.

135. U.N. Charter at Art. 33.

136. "Not only is it true that conflicts, be they internal or international, destroy the environment, but it is also true that a ruined environment creates conflicts." Introductory Document for the Siena Forum, supra note 112 at 8.

137. U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC. 9/2/Add. 5 (1979).

138. UNGA Resolution 34/186, 18 Dec. 1979.

139. A.H. Westing, Towards Non-Violent Conflict Resolutions and Environmental Protection, at 155.

140. M. Lachs, The Revised Procedure of the International Court of Justice - Essays on the Development of the International Legal Order, 42 (The Hague, 1980).

141. ICJ Communique, N. 86/5, I May 1986, p. 8.

142. For example, the former USSR came out in favour of mandatory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. See Gorbachev, "Realities and Guarantees for a Secure World," New Times, Moscow, n. 39, 1987, p. 6.

143. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 Dec. 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982). 144. Id. at Art. 286.

145. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 21 at Principle 22.

146 See Article 19 of the ILC draft articles on state responsibility, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
10), U.N. Doc. A/31/10 (1976).

147. See UNEP Governing Council Decision 66 (IV). 13 April 1976; U.N. Doc. UNEP/WG.
8/2 (1977).

148. OECD, Observations on the Concept of the International Responsibility of States in Rela tion to the Protection of the Environment (Note by the OECD Secretariat, 1977).

149. 15 I.L.M. 290 (1976).

150. Id. at Art. 13.

151. 13 I.L.M. 1291 (1973).

152. Introductory Document for the Siena Forum, supra note 112 at 50.

153. An analogous interpretation of the principle of state responsibility for environmental harm was given by the WCED legal experts. See Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development, supra note 91 at 127-130.

154. State of the World 1990, supra note I I at 189.

155. See generally P. Maldoon, The International Law of Ecodevelopment: Emerging Norms for Developing Assistance Agencies (1987).

156. The concept was first introduced by the IUCN in the World Conservation Strategy, proclaimed in 1980. The three main objectives of the Strategy as stated in its executive summary are: "(a) to maintain essential ecological processes and life support systems, (b) to preserve genetic diversity and (c) to ensure the sustainable utilization of species and ecosystems." See World Conservation Strategy: Living Resource Conservation for Sustainable Development (IUCN, UNEP, WWF, 1980).

157. It is calculated that the pollution damage in the developed countries equals approximately 3-5 per cent of the gross national product (GNP) and the cost of its prevention should be around 1-2 per cent of GNP. In the developing countries, it is sufficient to spend 0.5-1 per cent of the GNP for water-supply and sewage facilities to effectively prevent infectious diseases and raise health and productivity levels. See J. Dillowav, Is World Order Evolving? 88 (Pergamon, 1987).

158. Conference Recommendations, Conference on Conservation and Development, Ottawa' 31 May - 5 June 1986.

159. Our Common Future, supra note 18 at 30-348.

160. See, e.g., P. Kromarek. Le droit à un environnement sain et equilibre. Rapport prepare pour le Colloque sur les nouveaux droits de l'homme: les "droits de solidarité," Mexico, 12-15 Aug. 1980.

161. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 21 at Principle 1.

162. 1966 UN Covenant, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 16 Dec. 1966, 993 U.N.T S.3, 6/. L. M. 360 (1967).

163. 1981 African Charter for Human and Peoples' Rights, 27 June 1981, 21 I.L.M. 59 (1982), at Art. 24.

164. 1988 Protocol to the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Nov. 1988 25 I.L.M. 161 (1989), Art. 11.

165. The Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms adopted by the European Parliament in April 1989.

166. Economic Commission for Europe, Regional Strategy for Environmental Protection and Rational Use of Natural Resources, (United Nations, 1988), pare. 126 at 48.

167. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Concluding Document from the Vienna Meeting, 281. L M. 521, 540 (1989).

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