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Introduction
The definition of the concept of technology
The origins of the western technological
culture
Enlightenment, the open industrial society,
and human rights
The enlightenment model of industrial
development
A critical analysis of the enlightenment
model of industrial development (technological imperialism)
Models of development and the technological
factor
Development, choice, and human rights
The "deconstruction" of
deterministic models of development
Notes
JAN BEATING
The coming of the industrial society, based on a new division of labour and on the systematic application of new technologies, was accompanied by the advent of a new image of man and society. This new image was expressed in such important documents as the Constitution of Virginia, Article I (1776), the Bill of Rights as part of the Constitution of the United States of America (1788) and the Declaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen (1789). Those documents brought to the fore the pivotal idea of human rights as universal rights, grounded on the recognition of the inherent dignity of all members of the human family.1
During the Second World War mankind experienced extreme cruelties on a large scale, both from policies based on ideologies which emphasized the supposed inequality of "races," and from the uses of new military technologies. After the turmoil of this war the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1'.,48) stressed that "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood" (Article 1). The universality of human rights is, again, emphasized in Article 2: "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status."2 Human beings, endowed with reason and conscience, are to be treated as ends in themselves, and not as passive victims of conditions and contingencies they cannot control.
Looking back on the advent of industrial society, it may come as a surprise when we see how little attention was paid, until recently, to a systematic analysis of the relationships between technological changes, on the one hand, and the development and actual implementation of human rights, on the other. We will return to this observation in the ensuing sections. In the meantime it is important to note that the question of the impact of new scientific and technological developments on human rights was brought before the United Nations in 1968 as a result of an initiative taken by the International Conference on Human Rights held in Tehran, Iran, in that year as part of the programme for the International Year for Human Rights.3 Following the recommendations of this conference the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution inviting the Secretary-General to undertake "continuous and interdisciplinary studies, both national and international, which might serve as a basis for drawing up appropriate standards to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms." Specific attention was to be paid to developments in science and technology in relation to:
(1) respect for the privacy of individuals and the integrity and sovereignty of nations in the light of advances in recording and other techniques;
(2) protection of the human personality and its physical and intellectual integrity in the light of advances in biology, medicine, and biochemistry;
(3) uses of electronics that may affect the rights of the person and the limits that should be placed on such uses in a democratic society; and, more generally,
(4) the balance which should be established between scientific and technological progress and the intellectual, spiritual, cultural, and moral advancement of humanity.4
This resolution accentuates the dangers that technological developments harbour with respect to human rights and fundamental freedoms. It should be clear, however, that in many cases technological developments offer opportunities for individual and collective choices and for the enhancement of human rights.5
Nevertheless, it is quite evident that present-day innovations in the domains of energy sciences, information technology, and biotechnology occur so rapidly and offer so many new choices for society that, as Weeramantry says in his seminal contribution to this subject: "Science and technology have burgeoned in the post-war years into instruments of power, control and manipulation. But the legal means of controlling them have not kept pace. Outmoded and out-manoeuvred by the headlong progress of technology, the legal principles that should control it are unresponsive and irrelevant." 6
Most contributions dealing with the relationship between technological developments and social and cultural life analyse chiefly the negative and positive effects of technological change on society, either directly or indirectly. The only course left to society seems to be to adjust to the exigencies of science and technology, for better or for worse. In these analyses, science and technology are considered as autonomous forces over which society has no control. In consequence of the preoccupation with their impact on society, analysis of the ways in which society shapes technological developments has been neglected.
In the next sections we shall discuss the genesis of the model of development that can be considered responsible for this one-sided approach of Western technology. It is important to understand this model of development, in which deterministic ideas regarding technology play a paramount role, if we are to reconsider Western technology's role in the context of opportunities for choice regarding our social and cultural life. After presenting this "technological imperialistic" or "technological functionalist" model of development and discussing its main shortcomings, we shall present some other models of development which have been formulated - partly at least- as a reaction to the claims of technological imperialism. The results of this analysis will be used to elucidate and elaborate the relationship between technological changes and human rights: How can choices be made in a world of technological and social constraints? In what ways can human rights play a pivotal role in the processes of decision-making?
In this contribution much attention is given to the origin, development, and socio-cultural impacts of the Enlightenment model of development. This emphasis on this Western model of development is a deliberate choice based on the following reasons: (a) the model elucidates the specific characteristics of Western technology and the impact of its diffusion throughout the world within a historical perspective; (b) the model is still a powerful instrument in the minds and hands of innovating elites in and outside the Western world, notwithstanding its theoretical and intellectual shortcomings; (c) the presentation of this model reveals, we hope, its strong ideological bias and the concomitant need to deconstruct it in order to find new courses of action; (d) it is hoped that this presentation emphasizes a contrast between the "Western view" of technological development and the models implied by the case-studies in this volume.
However, before describing models of development and their relevance to the relationship between technological change and human rights, we shall turn briefly to the question: "What do we understand by technology?"
The definition of the concept of technology
When we speak about the relationships between technology and human rights, it is evident that we have to deal with the interrelations between some very complex phenomena: technology, science, society or systems of societies, and systems of rights of a universal nature.
To begin with the concept of technology, nearly all human societies have, or have had, technologies which are often very elaborate. As we know, archaeologists have used the occurrence of characteristic technologies as the basis for the classification of prehistorical societies. These classifications are largely based on artefacts left behind by the peoples who once used them. In view of the task in hand, however, we have no use for a general definition of technology which includes only artefacts or the material products of inventions. Our definition of technology must enable us to distinguish between the use of technology in pre-industrial and industrial societies and between industrial societies and post-industrial ones in terms of such factors as flexibility, rigidity, or its pervasiveness in social life.
In a very broad sense the concept of technology may refer to those aspects of culture which relate to the manipulation of the natural environment by man or "that whole collection of ways in which the members of a society provide themselves with the material tools and goods of their society - the collection of artefacts and concepts used to create an advanced socio-politico-economic structure." 7 As we shall explain, such a definition is not adapted to our purposes, as it is too wide.
In order to clarify the questions relating to the interactions between technology and society, we distinguish between:
1. Technology as sets of physical objects, designed and constructed by man. In an industrial society this term refers especially to "artificial things, and more particularly to modern machines: artificial things tha
(a) require engineering knowledge for their design and production; and
(b) perform large amounts of operations themselves." 8
In this context the term may also be used to refer to inventions and processes with extensive potentialities for application, such as laser technology, chip technology, and DNA recombinant technology, and the applications of such technologies within existing or new machines and production processes.
2. Technology as a term which refers to human activities in connection with the utilization of artefacts. Moreover, technology implies the knowledge requisite to use these technical things. "Technological 'things' are meaningless without the 'know-how' to use them, repair them, design them and make them. As such this know-how can, partly at least, ... be systematized and taught, as in the various disciplines of engineering." 9
3. Finally, "technology" may refer to a body of knowledge that is necessary to generate new rules for the design, construction, and application of technical possibilities to different types of problems (such as, for example, the control of environmental pollution). Here the term technology refers to the theory of the application (logia), not just to "artificial things," the ways in which they are used in practice and the transmission of this practical knowledge ("technics": German, die Technik; French, la technique) as is emphasized in the first and second meaning of the concept "technology."
It could be observed that in the third meaning the development of "software" is stressed, in contradistinction to the "hardware" side of technology that predominates in the first two meanings of technology. Moreover, it is evident that when the third meaning of technology predominates, the distinction between "science" and "technology" tends to fade away. This is shown in Bell's analysis of post-industrial society when he says that "What has become decisive for the organization of decisions and the direction of change is the centrality of theoretical knowledge - the primacy of theory over empiricism and the codification of knowledge into abstract systems of symbols that, as in any axiomatic system, can be used to illuminate many different and varied areas of experience."10
Bell points to the importance of the rise of new intellectual technologies, enabling the management of organized complexity - the complexity of large organizations and systems, the complexity of theory with a large number of variables - and the identification and implementation of strategies for rational choice in games against nature and games between persons. Bell argues that "by the end of the century [a new intellectual technology] may be as salient in human affairs as machine technology has been for the past century and a half." 11
It follows from what has been said thus far that in the third meaning of technology not only does the distinction between "science" and "technology" become blurred, but also that this meaning is strongly associated with a new, emerging mode of production in which these intellectual technologies play a pivotal role. As such, the third meaning of technology goes together with specific types of artefacts (hardware) and a specific way in which the hardware of production has been laid out in a factory or other place of work. This implies, as Hill observes, "the division of labour and work organization which is built into, or required for efficient operation by the productive technique." 12 Habermas, approaching Bell's encompassing delineation of technology, states that technology means "scientifically rationalised control of objectified processes. It refers to the system in which research and technology are coupled with feedback from the economy and the administration." 13 In this context it should be remembered that the division of labour and work organization is not to be regarded as the inescapable result of the "logic" of "technology" - as is often argued - but as the result of engineering and management decisions.
This is an important observation because it means that in the debate on the relationships between technological changes and human rights we need not restrict ourselves to questions of whether the "inevitable march of technology" makes it urgent to develop measures to protect people in those cases where their fundamental rights and liberties are at stake. We can also concentrate on the values upon which decisions concerning technological developments and applications are based and on the desirability of enhancing the quality of such decisions in line with human rights. Such thinking is extremely important for many - if not all - developing countries because it highlights the role of choice and of cultural diversity in the process of economic development.
In this section we have briefly discussed some definitions of the concept of "technology." We have shown that the term is used in different ways, varying from the references to material things or artefacts to systems of control embracing complex societal processes. Moreover, the definition of the concept of "technology" is also dependent on the type of society that is being considered (e.g. pre-industrial, industrial, post-industrial). We conclude from this overview that it is necessary, when we are analysing the different ideas and models concerning societal development and technological change, to be alert to indications of altering relationships between technological change and societal change (or even societal transformation).
The origins of the western technological culture
Discussing the impact of technology on human rights is primarily a debate about the impact of Western science and technology on such rights. Before introducing the dominant model of Western development, in which science and technology have played such a pivotal and unique role since the eighteenth century, it is useful to reflect on the reason why this specific type of development took place in the West. Of course, this question cannot be answered in a systematic way, but we shall try to formulate some arguments which may contribute to a better understanding of the social and cultural circumstances which contributed to the genesis of Western technology.
An important element in the explanation of the rise of Western technology relates to the subordination of nature in the Jewish and Christian religions. This point was formulated in an original way by Archbishop Temple when he said: "Christianity is the most materialistic of all higher religions, for while they attain to spirituality by turning away from matter, it expresses its spirituality by dominating matter.'' 14 The thesis concerning the subordination of nature as a necessary precondition to the modern dynamic pursuit of technical progress seems to be generally accepted by theology, according to van der Pot.15 It relates to the view that in the Judeao-Christian religions God is conceived as being on the side of humans in the struggle between human beings and nature. This view is, in its turn, tied to the idea that God created the world - so the world itself is not God and is not to be considered to be sacred. It is tied also to the idea that God created man in his own image and elevated him above all other creatures on earth, giving him the right, so to speak, to intervene in the course of events on earth. In contradistinction to most other religious systems, the Judeao-Christian beliefs do not contain inhibitions on the control of nature by man. According to Max Weber, Christianity inherited its hostility against magical thinking from Judaism. This opened the road to important economic achievements, for magical ideas place a heavy constraint on the rationalization of economic life.16 With the coming of ascetic Protestantism this demystification of the world attained its completion.
This lack of deference towards the limits of the "natural" order was accompanied by an absence of disdain for activities directed at practical utility, as was, for example, certainly the case in ancient Greek culture.
Van der Pot concludes, after a systematic analysis of many theological, historical, and sociological sources, that Christianity contributed significantly to the origin of the modern dynamic push towards technological change, by the subordination of nature, by contributing to a hopeful attitude towards the future, and by reacting with approval to work that is directed at practical utility.17 All this had already exerted important influences on technological development in the West long before the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century.
There were major applications of technological innovations during a long period preceding this revolution. In the thirteenth century a first "industrial revolution" took place. Many of the innovations then made, such as the watermill, came from outside Western Europe but the Western Europeans showed keen judgement in assessing the opportunities for their application. Necessity was not the major drive behind this technological trend, but, according to van der Pot, the idea that human beings are creatures of God and must not be humiliated by continuing monotonous labour.18 Here we witness an important contribution of technology as provider of opportunities for the liberation of human beings from labour and for the reduction of their dependence on natural conditions.
Religious and political diversity also created conditions that contributed to the emergence of modern science and technology since the sixteenth century. The ongoing struggle between the Roman Catholic Church and the secular powers within Europe, and the fact that neither church nor state succeeded in definitely imposing its will on the other, resulted in a demarcation between the secular and the sacral powers as in the Concordat of Worms in 1122. This facilitated the development of a rational type of control by the state. The emergence of modern bureaucracy, as described by Weber, contributed in the course of Western history to the secularization of the world. Moreover, the religious wars, connected with the rise of Protestantism, broke the religious monopoly of the Roman Catholic Church and gave a strong impetus to modern science and technology, especially in Protestant modernizing nations, such as England and the Netherlands in the seventeenth century.
What has been said in the preceding pages concerning the origin of Western science and technology is certainly not sufficient to give an adequate account of these developments. The analysis of Dijksterhuis shows us, in his The Mechanization of the Image of the World (De mechanisering van het wereldbeeld),19 the long line of development of the natural sciences. This led to the emergence of modern natural sciences in the period between 1543, when Copernicus published his De revolutionibus orbium coelestium, and 1687, when Newton's Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica was published. This period represents an enormous advance of human knowledge and opportunity, and changes deeply the dominant view of life. This period determined the course of the natural sciences for centuries to come, based on a mechanistic image of material processes. This was not to be conceived of as a complex machine designed by the Creator, but as processes which can be understood by applying the concepts of mechanics: the physics and mathematics of energy and forces. Only the West witnessed the development of such a conception of science based both on rationality (especially mathematics) and systematic observation (especially controlled experiments).20
In this section we have described some elements of the origin of Western science and technology. The development of a mechanistic image of the (material) world, in connection with the social and cultural processes we referred to earlier, led to the advent of the technical culture we live in today, in the West and many other parts of the world.
In the following section we describe the model of societal development that arose in the eighteenth century, a model that is fundamental to understanding the impact of science and technology on social life and on human rights. When presenting this model we will have opportunities to elaborate on the relationship between science and technology and to discuss the link between technological-economic development on the one hand and individualism. secularization, and human rights on the other.
Enlightenment, the open industrial society, and human rights
In the preceding section we have offered a brief description of some developments in Western Europe that gave rise to the Enlightenment, in which scientific positivism played such a pivotal role. The Enlightenment made a profound impact on both the industrial development of Western Europe - also causing the sharp opposition between tradition and modernity - and on the development of the idea of human rights. As Herrera put it succinctly,
For Enlightenment, all things in nature are disposed in harmonious order, regulated by a few simple laws, in such a way that everything contributes to the equilibrium of the Universe. The same rational order is the basis of the human world and manifests itself through the instincts and tendencies of men. The main obstacle to this linear unending human progress is, for the Enlightenment, ignorance and the education of all strata of society in the light of reason and science will finally lead to a perfect and happy society.21
Indeed, the rational analysis of the physical and social world will gradually show many ideas of the established traditional order to be errors, which will be replaced by scientific truth. Moreover, in connection with these ideas, a new type of society evolved and conscious attempts were made to change political and social orders in the direction of a "rational society." It was, as Eisenstadt phrased it, the birth of "the civilization of modernity," which is, among other things, characterized by growing structural differentiation and specialization, the establishment of universalistic organizational frameworks, and the articulation of relatively open, non-traditional systems of stratification and mobility in which criteria of achievement are dominant.22
The rise of this industrial, open society, based on a specific set of values of the Enlightenment, is closely connected to the birth of human rights. Although the idea of human rights has deep historical roots - and not exclusively in the Western world -human rights, as formulated in documents such as the Bill of Rights and the Declaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen, are very much the product of both the Enlightenment and the rise of industrial society. As such the concept of human rights is strongly associated with individualism, rationalism, and universalism. Dumont states that the adoption of the Declaration marks in a certain sense the triumph of the individual.23
Because of the great importance of the connection between the rise of industrial society and the birth of human rights for our understanding of the present-day debate concerning the impact of technology on human rights, we will say a little more about this link. Some observers assume a causal link between human rights and the rise of an industrial, individualized society that is based on contractual relationships. So Sorokin states that human rights play a more prominent role in societies characterized by a high frequency of individual social mobility than in stable, closed societies. Mobility facilitates an increase of individualism, because it destroys the seclusion of life in one social niche, as is typical in a traditional society. In Sorokin's words,
Mobility awakens his personality, transforms him from the component of a group to an individual person. As he is shifting from group to group, he must now receive rights and privileges for himself, not for a specific group, because he himself does not know in what group he will be tomorrow. Hence the "Declaration of the Rights of Man," but not that of a group, the demands for liberty of speech, religion, self-realisation for a man, not for a group Hence the equality of all individuals before the law, and individual responsibility instead of that of a group, as in the case of an immobile society. A mobile society inevitably must "invest" all rights and responsibilities in an individual but not in a group.24
This seems to be a rather restricted view of the origin of human rights. Are these rights - as liberties - primarily a functional alternative in a modern world, for the security that is provided in an organic way within traditional structures? In European history we can observe several periods which bear witness to the disintegration of established social structures and the concomitant rise of individualism - for example, the period after the downfall of the Greek city-states and the Renaissance period in which the individual emerged from the communal order of the Middle Ages - without the development of a concept of human rights that is comparable to the concept as it emerged in the eighteenth century.
In the historical documents to which we referred earlier, the idea of human rights is associated with a very positive image of individualism. In the period when these documents were being produced, individualism was considered by many advocates of social change to be a pivotal characteristic of the emerging social order. It referred not only to respect for the intrinsic value or dignity of the individual human being in relation to privacy, but also to individual autonomy, the capacity of the individual to think independently, to decide for himself or herself, to control the conditions under which he - or she - lived and worked. As such, autonomy was - and is - the reverse of alienation and powerlessness. The coming social order was contrasted with the traditional order of feudal society in which an individual's opportunities in life were strongly determined by his or her position in the social order, based on birth, and the rights to which his or her estate entitled the individual.
The emerging social order was interpreted in terms of social progress, development in the direction of a better society, in which the position of every person is based, ideally, on individual qualifications and achievements, and on his or her position within a new division of labour. In this new ordering, everybody contributes according to his or her talents or skills and receives a remuneration according to the (market) value of this contribution. The development in this direction was thought to be contingent on the rise of industrial society, in which economic growth is dependent on industrial production, propelled by science and technology. It is dependent on the development of open, worldwide markets and on the adequate use of individual talents. This image of society implies increased individual occupational and social mobility together with a growing equality of educational opportunities, a fading away of traditional class differences, a concomitant growth of the middle classes as a consequence of the increasing demand for skilled and professional workers, and, consequently, a decrease in collective types of antagonism, especially class struggle. It is important to note that in this perspective of societal development, the exigencies of industrialization will generate everywhere - in the long run - this same type of social order, which will finally merge into an encompassing world system.
This connection between the birth of human rights and the rise of a new liberal, democratic order produced consequences for the contents of human rights as individual, universal rights. The origin of human rights, and the subsequent development of socio-economic rights, shed some light on the model of man that is traditionally associated with those who favour civil rights. This model is, as Campbell says, of a person somewhat beyond the "norm" in the sense of the normal: an active, rational, and entrepreneurial person for whom the life which is claimed is one in which there is a degree of self-expression, self-help, and self-defence. It is of a person who has the opportunity to have and manage property, to communicate views and pursue happiness along individually chosen lines, to share in government and freely go about day-to-day activities without the interference of officials and prohibitions of the state beyond those strictly necessary for the defence of the rights of others.25
Human rights are, as we explained, tied to an individualistic view of society and man. In this view individualism is combined with rationalism, universalism, and cosmopolitanism, and as such they stand in opposition to particularism, collectivism, and traditionalism. Human rights refer to the individual and are beyond his or her particular social relationships or roots. This primacy of reason, universalism, and the individual over the group appears to be essential in solving problems related to human rights as it develops in international law today.26
The enlightenment model of industrial development
In order to pursue our analysis of the relationship of technological development and human rights we have to elaborate on the model of development that is connected with the Enlightenment and the rise of industrial society. This is particularly important because this model of development still plays a dominant role in the thinking of many leaders in the domain of (post) industrial development. Our description of the Enlightenment model of industrial development will be, perforce, of an ideal, typical or constructed in the Weberian sense. This model was for the first time formulated in a coherent way by Saint-Simon at the very beginning of the nineteenth century.
Saint-Simon was convinced that the progress of industrialism would exert a far-reaching and overwhelmingly positive impact on society. In the final analysis, he thought, it is in industry that all the real forces of society can be found. A social order adapted to the requirements of modern industry and its technical development is the best ordering of society, and scientists will have a decisive position of power within it. This model of development has become known in modern economics and sociology as the "industrial convergence thesis" (other appellations being "technological functionalism" and "technological imperialism") and is, as we have already remarked, still a powerful model of development.27
In this model, two main forces determine the development of society:
1. The march of rationality, resulting from the inquiring human mind that follows the rules of positivist - logico-empirical - science, while analysing the physical and social world (see pp. 18-22 above) in the pursuit of truth. Moreover, this leads to the development of new technologies, which are partly at least - applications of the growth of knowledge.
2. The open international large-scale markets which compel industry to adopt quickly the best available technology in production processes. Failure to do so by an enterprise or branch of industry would result in quick deterioration of its international competitive position. The general idea is that of all the available technologies only one can be the most efficient and effective. Relative benefits will flow to that entity which succeeds in developing new technologies or in acquiring the most efficient and effective technologies at an early stage. This is, in fact, technological Darwinism: the survival of the fittest technology.
It is, however, not only the adoption of the best technology that counts, but also the successful combination of (new) technologies with the best type of organization of both the production process and the trading company or system of companies. In connection with particular types of technology, the argument runs, there is also only one type of organization which is the most efficient and effective.
Furthermore, it follows from what we have said that a specific combination of technology and organization determines the nature of the division of labour. This, in turn, determines the job requirements with which workers are confronted, requirements relating to the content of available jobs, working relations, working conditions, the organization's hierarchy, and opportunities for advancement in the organization. This model implies that the advancement of industrialism is, in modern times, strongly dependent on the educational system that has to provide individuals with the abilities and skills that meet the require meets of the economic system. The educational system has to educate and train persons both for the scientific and technological high culture - the persons who will contribute to the advancement of science and technology and fill management positions - and for the many other jobs on which a modern organization depends. Although part of the training and research and development occur within modern enterprises, the economy of a country is highly dependent on the rational organization of higher education and research and on the effectiveness of this system in fulfilling the needs of the economy. The role of the state in the process of adapting the educational and research system to these needs is an important one. The state is also very important in relation to another task: the redistribution of part of the national wealth by the agencies of the welfare state. This function of the state tends to contribute to the reduction of class conflict - a conflict which hampers the efficient and effective production of goods and services. It also enhances the capacity of citizens to play their role in the consumer market.
Industrialism has, in this way, a logic of its own, "whether under capitalism or socialism or other auspices. Much of what happens to management and to labour is the same regardless of auspices."28 Indeed, the most powerful engine of production is knowledge: "Industrialization itself began with new knowledge about steam and machinery. This is where the 'greet transformation' began." 29
This logic of industrialism implies that social life can only adapt to the deterministic line that has been described above. But this is not considered to be a disadvantage. By the march of rationality and the rationalization of economic and social life, society is pushed towards a better future. It achieves a high level of welfare and a lower degree of social inequality. Such social inequality as remains is based on differences between individual levels of achievement. There is also a strong professionalization of the workforce as a consequence of the great need for highly qualified staff in a science- and "high-tech"-based organization for the production of goods and services. Society has to adapt to this line of development, but the pay-offs are considered to be very high.
It is evident that the universalism on which the model is based contrasts with the cultural and social diversity of the world in which the industrial - and post-industrial -development take place. According to the logic of this model all of the social institutions and cultural differences that hamper the logic of industrial development are doomed. Social and cultural differences between nations, regions, and peoples continue to exist only as long as they do not stand in the way of progress or when they contribute to a nation's specific advantage, for example when traditional values help to discipline the workforce and to comply with the exigencies of organizational change.
The relationship between technological development and human rights is, within this model, not considered to be problematic. On the contrary, the way of industrialism leads to the liberation of man from traditional and limiting social and cultural bonds and thus from bondage and ignorance. Industrial development reduces class antagonism and depression by the state; it enhances opportunities for individual choice; it provides the opportunities for democratic participation and for the development of socio-economic rights. The model is also optimistic with respect to the possibilities for the solution of problems in the future, including those problems that are caused by industrial development itself. This optimism is, of course, grounded on the confidence that logico-empirical science will always find new opportunities and technologies to handle present and future problems.