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II. The view from without

I now conclude this quick and selective characterization of the view from within by underscoring certain elements of the science and technology scene in the developed world, since we consider "First," "Second," and "Third" Worlds as components of the same system (p. 4) and since problems in one cannot be discussed in isolation from those in other parts of the world. I will now list briefly those elements thought to be of particular relevance to my next discussion.

First are the conflicting views of S e T as a promise and a threat. I cite here two considerations that have a direct impact on the scientists on the periphery, on their attitude to their own societies, and on the general public itself. First, there is the desperate stand - in the face of the devastating onslaught of social scientists - by some natural scientists who still maintain that theirs is a neutral and dispassionate pursuit of knowledge for its own sake and who disclaim any social responsibility for the consequences of their actions. Next comes the crippling distortion of S e T activities particularly in developing countries - under the pressure of so-called "defence" requirements. The proper order of national priorities is no longer reflected in such activities, and a very unhealthy and self defeating stratification is imposed on the S e T system. An elite now enjoys better working and living conditions, and, imprisoned within false security considerations, is now separated from the bulk of its own community. The latter is deprived of the tools of the trade, the satisfaction of active involvement in an effective manner in national development, and, finally, a reasonably good life. This is but a reflection of the astronomical rise in expenditures in the centre on R e D for military and "security" purposes. This, together with the seemingly endless build-up of more arms of continuously increasing complexity and sophistication, has siphoned hundreds of billions of dollars away from "transforming the world" through the application of available scientific knowledge and technological know-how and from financing further effort where it is most needed.

Next comes the emergence of "big science" and the large-scale, multidisciplinary R e D establishment that is very expensive to establish and to run, but also cost-effective within the organizational framework of industrialized societies. This has resulted in extreme polarization of S e T activity and its concentration in the centre, bringing with it a whole string of critical problems for the periphery.

There also is the rise of the transnational corporation as the most efficient form of integrated techno-economic activity and the main investor and promoter of technological innovation. The serious asymmetries in dealings with TNCs have been analysed extensively. However, the latent contradictions between their interests and those of their mother countries are beginning to emerge and are receiving more attention now.

Next is the emergence of global problems that call for world-wide analysis and treatment. Deterioration of the environment, the threat of drastic changes in climatic conditions, scarcity of resources (ranging from water to energy sources), and space exploration are all problems that transcend national and regional organizational frameworks of S e T and will, in all probability, bring about new forms of international co-operative effort. It is important that such forms do not exclude or discriminate against the periphery.

Two more points are to be made. The first concerns a growing feeling that practically all Third World initiatives to transform the prevailing world order have been thwarted and frustrated. One could almost go as far as saying that they have boomeranged and in the near future are most likely to become the means for entrenching dependence and subordination.

This calls for some elaboration. The Group of 77, as the representative of the Third World in the United Nations system, has come to rally around a number of causes in which they see the way out of the present situation of technological dependence and asymmetric relations with the industrialized world. Prominent among these are the efforts to modify the Paris Convention of 1883 governing the patent system, and the call for an international code of conduct for technology transfer pioneered by Pugwash and now actively negotiated in UNCTAD. Furthermore, it is generally accepted that building a base of heavy industry for example, metallurgical and petrochemical - and the development of engineering industries (the so-called industrializing industries) and national constancy services are recommended courses of action for building up indigenous technological capabilities that would eventually break through the tight grip of technological dependence of the centre.

There is growing concern nowadays¹⁰ that revision of the patent system would lead to more subtle ways of protection and avoid unnecessary conflicts. An internationally recognized code of conduct for the transfer of technology would considerably help the TNCs in long-term planning of their world-wide activities without some of the high risk levels involved in their operations nowadays in certain parts of the world. Contrary to original expectations, this would weaken the bargaining position of developing countries. Even the building of indigenous technological capabilities along the lines mentioned above might well lead to further qualitative intensification of technological dependence and subordination by increasingly monopolizing the decisive elements of R e D, engineering, finance, maintenance, and so on, leaving developing countries with control over the relatively low levels of the productive system.

The second and last point in this section stems from a strong temptation, if not a conviction, of the necessity of drawing attention to the rather bleak political prospects the eighties seem to bring with them. The dialogue between "North" and "South's is grinding to a halt and is now replaced by confrontation and open threats to use force to settle global problems. While the West seems incapable, or unwilling due to internal conflicts of interest, to grapple effectively with inflation and energy problems, the socialist camp is divided and at war. Détente has been degraded, and the price for SALT II seems to be more armaments. Local wars have become daily occurrences in the Third World. Any serious attempt at transforming the world and any prescription for action must analyse these symptoms, take full account of them, and look beyond them to future long-term global prospects.

III. Toward a clearer definition of the role of science and technology in transformation

The last decade witnessed an increasing interest in prospective studies under the influence of the threats of global problems such as food and energy shortages, discrepancies in growth and income in different parts of the world, and environmental deterioration. Experience with these studies has emphasized the suitability of the regional approach. Within the Arab region, studies were carried out both on a sectoral basis (population, food, industry, energy, and so on) and for the prospects of economic development. In almost all of these studies a view of the role of S e T in development is tacitly assumed.

Appendix 1 outlines a multidisciplinary and systematic approach for understanding and influencing the processes of transformation and, hence, for a clearer definition of the role science and technology should play in bringing about a basic transformation that would permit realization of the objectives referred to in the previous sections.¹¹

This rests on five basic considerations:

1. The search for complementarities and bridges that are acceptable to the parties concerned.

2. An alertness to the pitfalls of attempting to bridge unbridgeable gaps, that is, an insistence on internal consistency of the options presented - a requirement that is sadly absent now in a good deal of loose thinking and some romantic proposals for directing transformation.

3. An awareness of the realities of the world in which we live and of the political situation.

4. An insistence on maintaining our cultural identity and heritage, which is thought to have positive value in bringing about a desirable transformation.

5. A specific concern with the role of S e T in transformation perhaps with more emphasis on the latter. Another consideration is that in the majority of cases there is an obvious shortage of data and information on many decisive issues. Particularly absent are an accurate assessment of the scientific technological potential (now and in the future), a clear definition of the existing and possible future relations between science, technology, and production, as the three basic elements of the technology sub-system, and the other elements of the overall socioeconomic system, as well as its interactions with the rest of the world (the flow of ideas, values, scientific knowledge, technological know-how, end the influx of foreign capital, goods, and services).¹²

Apart from this serious lack of specific and reliable information on basic issues and our still inadequate knowledge of the operation and mechanisms of the complex socio-economic political systems (p. 270), there also is the lack of a clear definition of social objectives and development patterns. Under such circumstances, a scientific effort to help map the future must consider more than one alternative (or scenario) and ensure that these are at least internally consistent and possible¹³ - two conditions that are often lacking in emotional and loose thinking about the future. Specifying a limited number of consistent and probable scenarios, rasher than cumbersome models that call for a multitude of non-existent data, will thus reduce the amount of information called for and leave the choice of a clear stand on the multitude of issues and questions involved, which form a societal policy decision, to a later stage when internal contradictions have been removed.

It is needless to emphasize here that all this hinges on a theory of the sequence of development stages, and the international division of labour, so as to ensure the consistency of social and economic factors as well as of the conditions inherent in the scenarios. Such theories exist and differ appreciably. They generally fall between two opposing views. Stated in very general terms, the first sees the problem as one of backwardness, primitiveness of economic structures, and low return of labour. This leads straight to adoption of technological solutions concerned with the importation of modern technology compatible with cultural development in the West and hence to adoption of the West's consumption patterns. It then concentrates on favourable contractual conditions or optimum adaptation procedures. The other sees the historical development of colonialism, subordination, monopolistic practices, and economic penetration as the cause of the alienation of human labour from the technological environment. The economic structures that were originally dedicated to satisfying the needs of the citizenry have been distorted to comply with production and consumption needs from without and to operate to the advantage of the stronger colonialist power. This prompts the search for technological solutions that would end this alienation through a new economic structure capable of satisfying, first, the basic needs of the whole population.

Once more, we see that the role of S e T in transformation depends on objectives for the future, the definition of which has to be guided by a theory and a concept of development. Three basic scenarios, each representing an integrated and consistent alternative, were chosen as indicators of the overall picture of the socio-economic system and from which, or from combinations of which, a clear definition of the role and content of technological activity can be deduced as society moves from one to the other.

1. The "consumer" society. This adopts a cultural and consumption pattern derived from the "western" model, and in it technology is imported according to the criteria of commercial profitability of certain groups in society. A primitive economic structure would still prevail, as well as the phenomena of the "extended" family and the weak local market. Some improvement in living standards could be achieved by exporting raw materials and primary goods based on production processes involving a rather low level of division of labour.

2. The "productive" society. In this the cultural and consumption pattern is the same as before, but technology imports are based on appropriate choices, efficient operation, and successful adaptation. The economic structure is now more varied and improvements in living standards come from a higher level of division of labour. Dualism of the economy, rapid expansion of the local market, and closer links with "superior" industrialized societies are now common.

3. The "pioneering" society. This is characterized by an independent cultural and consumption pattern. In it, technology is the natural environment for human effort or the production technique necessary for a "productive" society and an economic structure that meets the demands of the people.

I illustrate these ideas through an example of a hypothetical development for the Arab region through these and an intermediate scenario of collective self-reliance. This is graphically represented in Figure 1, and is based on the original premises of complementarily, consistency, political realities, and maintenance of cultural identity. In each one of the phases depicted it should be possible to deduce specific tasks for S e T.

In conclusion, I should address myself to a seemingly glaring contradiction in this presentation. I have characterized the current view of science in society as bigoted and oppressive (p. 275). Obviously none of these seemingly attractive scenarios for transformation would come about in such a social climate. However, hope for the future lies in a rebirth of the original attitude of the culture of the region toward science. After all, the scientific method as we know it today is a product of our cultural heritage, closely intertwined with a religion that clearly recognized the universe around us as a source of knowledge and which exhorted people to seek knowledge even in China.

One might well think that the road to desirable transformation is an assimilation of our cultural heritage on a new - or is it an old level.

Appendix I. A systematic approach to the definition of the role of s e t in transformation

I have chosen to embark on an exercise in prospective analysis which starts by analysing the subsystems in a manner that does not ignore the overall view in attempting to understand the changes in these subsystems and their relations, and which differentiates between the dynamics that are influenced by outside forces or those beyond direct control, and those that are known with certainty. It also will be necessary to identify - even though tentatively - basic projects, leading sectors, and "germs of the future." The next step would be to pull these subsystems together in one consistent overall view.

The proposed sequence of steps (Figure 2)¹⁴ includes:

- elaboration, through brain-storming and questionnaires, of all the visions and objectives that society could be striving to achieve.
These are used for guidance on the long-term of transformation.

- survey of available studies in the different fields and evaluation and definition of the basic issues and problems whose treatment will formulate the overall picture of the future. Also included is an investigation of theoretical and statistical relations between these issues and variables, first by specialized analysis of each one separately, and next in a multidisciplinary group effort to define such relations.

- through these studies, a check is made on the consequences of the objectives and visions elaborated in the first step, that is, an assessment of the extent to which the observed policies serve to achieve the objectives.

- linking up of the elements of accumulated knowledge in a reference scenario - once as extrapolation of present policies and courses of action, and a second time through simulation models, for defining those conducive to fulfillment of objectives.

FIG. 2. Procedure for Prospective Analysis

- charting the time paths implied by each of these so far static scenarios and defining the points in time when basic decisions have to be made to implement new policies in technology choices and structural changes. This would be deduced from the simulation models and completed by scenario-writing.

- next would come presentation, before a wider multidisciplinary group, revealing weaknesses and contradictions necessitating return to any of the previous steps, in a process of successive approximation.

- completion of qualitative and quantitative forecasts leads to definition of the prerequisites of technology that permits the structural changes envisaged and that would be sustainable economically, keeping in mind available and forthcoming technology, its problems and development tendencies world-wide, and the specificity of local natural and human resources, and size of productive units.

The outcome of the activities outlined above would be the desirable "model" for transformation which would have specified:

- the material structures to be achieved.

- other non-material aspects of a coherent and integrated system, admittedly in an approximate manner.

- some overall indicators of the technological content of this system.

Elaboration from this leads to the scientific-technological requirements and their time-phasing so that the required structures are achieved, bearing in mind the length of gestation periods and unavoidable delays.

Figure 3 represents a procedure for this elaboration which takes into consideration a number of elements that are decisive in defining the role of science and technology. Some of these are:

1. Linking-up with development objectives and the search for relative advantages and appropriate technology.

2. Rational rates of expenditure on R e D that take account of world tendencies, gaps in basic scientific knowledge, and reduction of the brain drain.

FIG. 3. From Objectives to R e D Plan

3. Mobilization of resources for fulfilling the above two elements and the creation of a regional basis that would provide greater chances for attaining development objectives in the primary stages and permit admission to the world of "big science" later on.¹⁵

4. Reasonable awareness of future tendencies in science and technology. This is necessary background for long-term planning, for defining gaps to be compensated by transfer, and for development of educational training systems.

I conclude by attempting to clarify some ideas in Figure 3.

In moving from objectives to technological content (marked (1) on Figure 3), I use models (national, sectoral, or regional) to ensure the maximum possible consistency between the different variables. To define the role of S e T. such models¹⁶ should allow considerable personal judgement and non-quantifiable variables, since these are closely related to the long-term and overall view of the future of S e T. Appendix II discusses this matter at some length.

Should I choose, however, not to use models and to resort to exploratory techniques, it will be necessary to use questionnaires for brain-storming and scenarios for definition of the main variables and the important relations without resorting to statistical techniques or mathematical formulations. Appendix III sketches these activities which refer to the step marked (2) on Figure 3. If we rely entirely on such methods, then action would start from "Objectives and Policies" directly and not through "The Model.''

In either case, the end product is a definition of actions, in the scientific-technological domain, called for to bring about desirable transformations. These actions are derived primarily from society's objectives and policies. The end product is based on a proper evaluation of the present state of society which considers the international scene and its implications and possible useful inputs, is dynamic and time-conscious, and is unfettered by the inappropriate rigour of quantifying the unquantifiable. It accounts for this crucial element through human judgement and foresight. It also is coherent and internally consistent, as well as related to other decisive factors outside the domain of S e T.

Appendix II. Relation between mathematical and non-quantifiable experiences (for achieving consistency between model s e t requirements)

Relation between mathematical and non-quantifiable experiences (for achieving consistency between model S e T requirements)

A Selection of a group of consistent assumptions for one round of calculation (input).

B Choice of model output.

C Channels for consideration of elements (objectives or constraints) ignored in mathematical model-building, either by means of choice of suitable scenarios (C¹) or modification of model after discussion of results (C²).

D Flexibility of imposing constraints on model during solution.

E Determination of degree of aggregation of model.

F In choosing a set of consistent assumptions in a scenario, note also their consistency with a selected set of constraints, particularly limitation of resources.

Thus an outline of the proposed methodology would be:

a) For non-quantifiable objectives and constraints in the model, results - as well as other consequences not formulated within it will be discussed so as to modify scenarios (C¹) or model structure (C²).

b) For quantifiable objectives and constraints not formulated in model - for various reasons - an overall indicator outside the model will serve to indicate tendencies due to time changes in model (e.g., one for income distribution within a country, or between countries, another for collective security).

c) Methodology permits interaction between man and computer, allowing for personal judgement and a normative element in directing path of results with time.

d) Remaining variables neglected - due to length of forecasting period or other reasons - will still have a place in policy implications.

e) All these are primary features of simulation models.

As applied to S e T sector, we note

1) Rates of technological development - not embodied in value of capital - in production functions are clearly expressed in the model.

2) Cost of utilization of resources - particularly natural resources - in the long term is clearly expressed in objective functions and investment input in industry, agriculture, and education.

3) Social cost of environmental pollution - due to utilization of a natural resource or a prevailing technology - and for which an approximate estimate of negative effects can be made, will be included in a general indicator outside the model.

4) There will remain many other factors related to S e T - mainly sociological - which are difficult to quantify. These are left to personal judgement in discussing model results and lead to modification in scenarios or model formulation.

Appendix III. Analysis of the relative importance of factors relating to s e t (from questionnaire to scenario-writing)

The questionnaire is seen as a preparatory phase, the results of which would help in:

- brain-storming defining elements of experience of experience and human judgement for unquantifiable elements so as to ensure the normative aspect.

- defining technological options, their economics, and timings for application and points for modifications in the economic structure on the basis of technological options.

- linking with educational system development in the long run.

The questionnaire includes questions on:

- prerequisites and a method (a proposal is presented).

- a method of assessing S e T potential on the basis of available information, as well as its performance, economic and social impact, and future requirements.

- fields of joint Arab R e D action.

- assessment of future technology and its social and environmental impact.

- optimum conditions for "freedom" of scientific research and serving national needs.

- achieving exponential growth of S e T and necessary percentage expenditure of GNP, as well as a means of achieving such expenditure.

The scenario aims at ranking the following factors, distinguishing between those that are directly linked and those that have indirect linkages and Impact on the future of technology (tendencies, relative importance, time lags between change and effect, and so forth):

- Indicators of well-being and satisfaction of basic needs.

- Resources: human (population, education, health, employment), material (energy from various sources, soil, water, minerals, capital).

- Infrastructures and environment: material infrastructures, social considerations, distribution of resources, environmental damage, habitat, and so on.

- Production: agricultural, industrial and service sectors, distribution of product.

Notes

1. UN University SCA project paper on "The Transformation of the World," February 1979.

2. ALECSO's "Prospective Study on the Role of Science and Technology in the Arab Region," for which the author is co-ordinator and the research team is headed by Dr. Aly Nassar of the Institute of National Planning in Cairo.

3. A wealth of such studies in various sectors has accumulated in the region, as a result of work of academic institutions and regional organizations.

4. I. S. Abdallah sees this as specifically the reason for establishing the "Third World Forum." See Contemporary Egypt, vol. 66, no. 359, Cairo, 1975.

5. "Towards a New Being," Al-Arabi, 24, November 1978 (in Arabic).

6. Compare with The Bariloche World Model Report, which refers to capitalist experiences that reduce social goals to economic growth measured by the total production of material goods and subordinate all other aspects of social life to it, thus ignoring the specificity of cultures and all qualitative features of life that cannot be expressed in economic terms. At the individual level, personality is manipulated through education, information, and the mass media. The new and more subtle instrument of domination has become scientific-technological superiority.

7. El-Kholy, "Science Policy and Long-term Planning," a paper presented to a seminar organized by the Federation of Arab Research Councils, Baghdad, May 1977.

8. El-Kholy, "The Structure and Functioning of Technology Systems in Developing Countries," UNIDO document ID/WG. 301/2, a paper prepared for the Expert Group Meeting on Technology Development and Self Reliance in Developing Countries, Vienna, June 1979, pp. 19-20.

9. El-Kholy, "Science, Technology and the Future! An Arab Perspective," paper presented to the World Conference on "Faith, Science and the Future," organized by the World Council of Churches, MIT, July 1979.

10. D. Ernest, "International Transfer of Technology, Technological Dependence, and Development Strategies," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, vol. 2, Oslo, 1979.

11. ALECSO's "Reference Document on the Requirements for a Prospective Study of Science and Technology in the Arab Region by the Year 2000" (in Arabic).

12. El-Kholy, "The Structure and Functioning of Technology Systems in Developing Countries," figures 1 and 3.

13. I use the adjective "possible" here to mean imaginative thinking coupled with a will to break out of present constraints, rather than mere extrapolation of the present.

14. Reference should be made here to the work of the Swedish Secretariat for Future Studies.

15. El-Kassas and El-Kholy, "Science and Development in the Arab Region" (in Arabic), ALECSO, 1976, pp. 101-110.

16. Reference should be made here to the work of the "Cairo Group," headed by I. H. Abdel-Rahman in the Institute of National Planning, on an Arab development model. This can be considered as representative of movement from the present situation to "The model," marked (3) on Figure 3.

Science, technology, and politics in a changing world

José A. Silva Michelena

José A. Silva Michelena

I. What kind of transformation?
II. The nature of the crisis
III. World political trends
IV. The role of science and technology
V. A proposition
Notes

I. What kind of transformation?

Very few people today, among social scientists, will oppose the notion that time and space are both social realities, the meaning of which only can be apprehended in the context of specific social formations. From a long perspective, the process of change that the world is undergoing today can be regarded as another episode, an important one, in the long process of transition from a capitalist to a socialist mode of production. Many will probably raise their eyebrows at reading such a statement, perhaps bewildered by what seems to be a commonplace. However, it is a fact that most analysts of the present world crisis, whether Marxists or not, tend to concentrate on what is happening in the capitalist world, thus leaving aside the unity, although a contradictory one, of world history today. We have argued elsewhere that the basic dynamics of the present transformation of the world are determined by the dialectic between capitalist and socialist camps which, without ignoring the internal contradictions within each, is mainly determined by the specific objectives of the great powers of the capitalist and socialist blocs:

In short, the consideration of the objectives of great powers, both capitalist and socialist, leads to the conclusion that the bourgeoisie, as the hegemonic class of the capitalist system, has a primarily economic interest when it tries to prevent the expansion of the socialist camp, and from that the need to combat it politically, militarily, and ideologically derives. In contrast, as socialist powers try to expand their influence to other countries, their primary objective is a political one.¹

Such a process, of course, is not a unilinear one, nor even can it be said that the outcome is inevitable or predetermined. Options are open to the point that it is not possible to say what final form the socialist mode of production will adopt. The so-called socialist societies of today, from a long perspective, can only be regarded as incipient historical experiments from which a more definitive form will gradually emerge. It is as if we were writing in 1450 and trying to guess what would be the specific form of what was only much later called capitalism. We cannot pursue further this argument in the present paper for it will take us far away from its specific objective, which is to highlight the main points of relationships between science, technology, and politics in the present world crisis. However, the preceding remarks were necessary both in putting the problem in a wider context and in laying the groundwork for comments which will be made later in this paper.

II. The nature of the crisis

We share the view of many social scientists who regard the present world crisis as a structural one.² Basically, the world division of labour, which began early in the present century but accelerated after the crisis of the 1930s, reached its limit - namely, the impossibility of increasing profitability for private enterprises - by the end of the 1960s. History shows that the ways out of such crises have been: (1) technological breakthroughs, which provide both new levels of profitability and new opportunities for capital accumulation, and (2) furthering the proletarianization of the world by means of organizational innovations which facilitate the exploitation of low cost labour.

It is true that after the beginning of the 1950s a new thrust in the international economy was provided by the process of transnationalization of the world economy. This later resulted in (1) expansion of the social division of labour to a transnational scale and (2) further concentration of the means of production in a few gigantic enterprises.

However, the impact of this process was not enough to counteract the structural factors which provoked the world economic crises. It may be that the process of transnationalization is just beginning, if one is to judge by the fact that only seven or eight underdeveloped countries are fully incorporated into it; that is, most of the worlds underdeveloped countries are in yet earlier phases of world capitalist development.

It is necessary to point out some of the main features associated with the process of transnationalization: first of all come technological innovations in the organization of the labour process, particularly the breaking down of complex tasks into simple ones so that new masses of non-qualified cheap labour can be hired. Second, a new partnership is being formed between the state, local bourgeoisie, and transnational corporations in order to further the process of industrial redeployment.

Third, due to the energy crisis, huge -funds are increasingly being invested with the aim of producing technological breakthroughs in that field. A critical evaluation of the probabilities of achieving success within the next decade reveals that they are very low. Nevertheless, new sources of capital accumulation are being created.

The main consequences for the underdeveloped countries of the process of transnationalization are:

1. An increased role for the state in the economy, which is not only performing the traditional functions of the state but also assuming the function of producing material goods in leading sectors of the economy.

2. The reconcentration of income in the privileged strata of the population. This phenomenon is determined by (1) the need to expand the demand for the products of the leading transnationalized sectors of the economy, which usually produce goods which can only be purchased by the capitalistic sectors of the economy, and (2) the need to keep down the real salary of the workers in order to make things more profitable for the transnationals, which otherwise could invest somewhere else.

3. Relative deterioration of the capacity to produce both industrial and agricultural products oriented to the satisfaction of the needs of the impoverished masses of the population.

The last two consequences inevitably lead to the discontent of the masses, which sooner or later may explode in violent reactions, strikes, or even revolutionary movements. Presently, the fact that there is a world crisis obviously determines a deepening of class struggle in the developed countries. This, in turn, functions as a demonstration effect for the underdeveloped countries' labour class.

The Latin American experience reveals two basic sets of policies to control such social movements: (a) establishing or reinforcing a social and political pact among labour organizations, government, parties, the military, and the bourgeoisie. This is the case in Venezuela, Mexico, and Colombia, where more or less democratic governments exist and where social democratic or Christian democratic parties have great influence both in government and in labour organization; (b) establishing authoritarian regimes such as those in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil.

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