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The archetype of southern politics - UNCTAD - was built on polarized political blocs organized around adversarial and conflict-prone economic relations between the poor and wealthy states. In the 1980s, however, the unity of the South's Group of 77 (G77) had been severely stressed already by the rise of the newly industrialized countries in Asia which heralded the end of the (third world'. The end of the second Cold War combined with the steady decline of the 'South' es a unified entity may make it easier to de-link old debates from new agendas such as climate change.
Thus, even the concepts of 'South' and 'North-South' conflict may be obsolete and irrelevant in the climate change arena. Indeed, since late 1991, negotiations over climate change have resulted in a fractured and pragmatic set of political axes. Completely new alignments of cooperation and conflict emerged that are still fluid but no longer mirror the old North-South cleavage. Thus, in 1991 Anne Kristin Sydnes identified at least five groups from the 'South' in the climate change negotiations. These were:
1 radical, like-minded activist states (eg Bangladesh and Maldives) which view climate change as a major threat to their national existence;
2 potential, like-minded activist states (eg Mexico) which see climate change as a good way to extract additional concessional aid;
3 energy-consuming, hardliner states (eg Brazil, China, and India) which support more research but object to costly commitments and actions;
4 energy-exporting, hardliner states (OPEC states led by Saudi Arabia and supported by Australia) which object to potential market shrinkage and trade impacts;
5 unpredictable 'transition' states (eg Taiwan, South Korea, and some Eastern European states) which are already ambivalent as to the North-South cleavage given their position in the world economy and international hierarchy of states.
By December 1991, the G77's unity had virtually collapsed at the greenhouse negotiations in Geneva. A breakaway Group of 24 (G24) proposed that developing countries consider acting on greenhouse issues while awaiting action by the OECD. Two other southern strains also emerged in addition to the centrist G24, namely, a group of energy exporters which backed the United States in stalling agreement; and the AOSIS island states which joined the European Community, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand in calling for a strong convention. The AOSIS states believed that the dilatory and ideological stance of the hardline, big poor states in G24 jeopardized their chance of obtaining any resources from the OECD. A fourth group of still uncommitted countries emerged, including Argentina and Mexico. These divisions continued up to the signing of the Climate Change Convention in June 1992 and are reflected in its text. It is difficult to believe that the state elites of the G77 can reconstruct their solidarity while negotiating protocols to the Convention now that they have discovered that their interests diverge fundamentally in relation to climate change.
Geoecological power?
The fragmentation of the South places developing countries in a weak bargaining position on the central issues of financing, technology transfer, and compensation payments that are still to be addressed in the Convention. The greenhouse issue exemplifies a general dilemma that developing countries face in global environmental politics. Global and regional environmental predicaments present them with new demands on scarce resources for regime and national survival as well as new bargaining opportunities with the OECD states. It remains to be seen exactly how southern elites will respond to these pitfalls and opportunities in the greenhouse arena.
On the negative or threatening side of their security, environmental problems could shift the priorities of wealthy trade and aid partners away from political and social stability in the South to global dilemmas of less concern to the southern elites. They also confront new and unruly domestic social movements often aligned transnationally with powerful counterparts in OECD states.
Vulnerable states could launch ideological campaigns against environmental issues in an attempt to wrest the political initiative away from the OECD states in the international arena. Polarization around issues such as climate change between the big, poor states and the big rich states block rather than foster international cooperation. Conflicts at a global and regional level on environmental issues could spill over into geoeconomic and geopolitical dimensions of interstate relations salient to climate change, thereby gridlocking ongoing negotiations.
Big, poor states may also use environmental issues to extract concessions from the OECD states in long-standing geoeconomic and geopolitical arenas. The greenhouse issue is unique in that the South influences a global asset that is greatly valued by the North: Earth's climate. Negotiations to date have been stalled by ideologies transposed from prior North-South conflicts into the greenhouse arena. But the elites of big, poor states have also tried to play a climate destruction card in a slow motion game of global climate change poker.
This strategy may fail, however. As Dallas Burtraw and Michael Toman have explained, most negotiations have two phases. The first phase is the bargaining over terms and content of agreement, which was partly completed at Rio. The second phase now underway is concerned with ratifying and implementing the agreement. 'Any proposed outcome that cannot be credibly implemented in the second phase of the game,' they note, 'cannot be credible in the first phase of the game.
Due to weak administrative and market institutions, states such as India, China, or Brazil may be unable to abate in accordance with global commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions - with or without transfers of resources from the wealthy nations. In addition, poor states are more vulnerable to the economic and social impacts of climate change than wealthy states. For these reasons, it is likely that the leaders of the OECD will be unmoved by implicit threats from the developing countries to destroy the earth's climate system unless the rules of international commerce are reformed.
Ironically, demands by big, poor states for massive resource transfers undermines the credibility of such threats for two reasons. First, it suggests to donors that the problems are so large that aid recipients may not be able to deliver the abatement, even if they receive additional support on a large scale. Second, to the extent that large-scale resource transfer achieved abatement and stimulated development, it would increase the dependency of southern elites on this source of external support. Recipients who defected from the regime would be sawing off one of the branches supporting them. It is not surprising therefore that the elites of the big, poor states are not persuaded that cooperating in the climate change arena helps rather than harms their prospects of staying in power.
A new power game
The potential economic impacts of mitigation and adaptation strategies have elevated environmental concerns from low to high politics, on a par with traditional economic and military preoccupations of the great powers. In contrast to the nuclear arms race, for example, no single state or group of states so predominates in emissions or abatement capability that it can impose an international regime on everyone else. The potential candidate the United States - abdicated from its potential hegemonic role in this regard at Rio by refusing to commit itself to reduction targets. Moreover, unlike the geopolitical and geoeconomic domains of interstate relations, there are as yet no widely accepted ideologies that frame geoecological issues such as climate change.
Consequently, ecological alignments in international relations remain fluid and unpredictable. No single state or group of states can lead or coerce other states to join a greenhouse regime or to build an oppositional grouping. It remains an open question whether governments will construct a meaningful greenhouse gas regime. Faced with this agnostic prognosis, there are three reasons to be optimistic about the medium- and long-term future of a greenhouse regime: technological innovation, the contribution of scientists to elite and popular understanding of climate change issues, and social movements.
Technological innovation
Rising energy efficiency is closely associated with technological dynamism, in turn an attribute of competitive firms and economies. Domestic and international competition drives technological innovation that will reduce the cost of greenhouse gas reductions, even at high levels of abatement. Governments can impede or encourage this phenomenon, but they can't stop it in the long run.
Nonetheless, an international climate change agreement that sets the ground rules for investors and states would enhance this phenomenon. Relatedly, bilateral and regional initiatives to demonstrate the technological feasibility and economic attractiveness of greenhouse gas reduction will be an important immediate step toward a greenhouse regime. It is crucial to identify the costs of abatement above the 20-30 per cent level of reduction for which data is available today. Only when the true cost of preserving the world's climate is known will political leaders be able to respond meaningfully.
Scientific research
Scientists will continue to develop a common stock of scientific knowledge on greenhouse issues out of which political elites can forge consensus on policy issues over time. Environmental regimes reflect not only interests, including the influence of domestic stakeholders in international affairs, and legal authority flowing from or ceded to international institutions, but also different world views. The smaller the common understanding and commitment to shared values, the weaker the regime. Thus, consensual knowledge is critical to overcoming the divisions of interest, authority, and belief systems that militate against international agreement.
Political scientist Peter Haas calls this influence 'epistemic' because scientists have been able to shape the images held by politicians and diplomats as to what is at stake in negotiations. He notes that scientists have already provided an ecological basis to international agreements in the Mediterranean Action Plan and the Vienna Convention to stop ozone depletion. There is little doubt that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has and will continue to play exactly this role in goading governments to grapple with the problem of global climate change.
Social movements
The inability of governments to concur in immediate stringent greenhouse gas reductions under the Convention may stimulate even greater efforts by social movements to address the issue of climate change on a global basis. In the developed countries, these organizations prefigure emerging social trends, are paradoxical in that they represent contradictions in the social order, and often transform the status quo. In many developing countries, non-governmental organizations are among the few wellsprings of social activity that are not dominated by government or administrative structures. Non-governmental organizations are able to pioneer creative and innovative solutions to many problems that stymie governments.
Although local citizen groups are the bedrock of social movements aimed at increasing accountability and participation in decision making of governments, they have invented new ways of communicating across cultural and institutional barriers, both within and between countries. Citizen groups provide a unique interface at the intermediate level of society to link national governmental policies and programmes with local realities via a host of social, economic and political organizations at the provincial and district level, including federations of cooperatives, trade unions and businesses, institutes, and churches. In many developing countries, this level of civil society is weak and must be strengthened to complement efforts to decentralize national public bureaucracies onto local, autonomous governmental institutions.
Another hallmark of environmental politics is the role of strong national, regional, and transnational social movements concerned with environment, development and social justice. The Climate Action Network exemplifies this trend. Established first in Western Europe, North America and Australia, the Network now includes vibrant and self-reliant regional networks in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. The Network marshalls scientific information to present policymakers with strong recommendations and backs up these positions with strong political pressure on national governments and in the course of climate change negotiations.
Many citizen groups are starting carbon abatement projects without waiting for governments to reach international agreement. They are the key to reaching the millions of decision makers and billions of people who must change their daily routines if greenhouse gases are to be reduced to ecologically acceptable levels. They can inspire, complement and (when necessary) circumvent governments to initiate shifts in popular and elite world views. Non-governmental networks increasingly cross national boundaries to generate common positions on issues that divide their respective governments, including the old North-South divide. They can also monitor the implementation of the agreement and trumpet loudly when governments fail to meet their commitments. The production of independent inventories of greenhouse gas emissions is an important contribution in this regard which has already had an impact on international negotiations on climate change.
An important component of an international greenhouse strategy in the short- to medium-run is to increase the participation of non-governmental organizations in private and public international financing of energy and environmental investment projects. The participation of non-governmental organizations in the project cycle of the World Bank's Global Environment Facility (GEF) is an important first step in this direction. In Mexico, the EMIR (Eficientacion Mexicana de Iluminacion Residencial) project began in l 991 when the
International Institute for Energy Conservation working with US scientists and the Comision Federal de Electricidad (the Mexican electricity utility) proposed to the GEF that it lend $10 million to Mexico to improve the efficiency of residential lighting by promoting CF (compact fluorescent) lamps. Over its life, each 16 watt CF lamp that costs $10 to install will save about $33 of electricity and $9 of incandescent lamps, and will reduce greenhouse gas emissions by about one fifth of a tonne of carbon.
Citizen groups are also pushing for a direct role in the funding decisions of multilateral banks. At the NGO Global Forum that was held at the same time as the governmental 1992 Earth Summit, they committed themselves to urge the governments of developed countries to provide adequate, new and additional funds on concessional terms to developing countries, and to ensure that they participate in expenditure decisions and implementation of funded projects to ensure that these resources are well spent.
The creation of an NGO consultative committee by the GEF is an important step in this direction, and one that other organizations, especially the regional developments banks, should emulate. Indeed, by December 1992 citizen groups had produced already a positive, even visionary reform agenda for the GEF.
Market-driven technological innovation, increased popular participation in decision-making, non-governmental mobilization for sustainable development, and the role of the scientific community in policy formation may impel governments to overcome all the barriers to agreement. The first steps toward creating a global greenhouse regime are likely to be small rather than large, bilateral rather than multilateral, and regional rather than global. The transfer of resources is likely to be pragmatic, linked closely to abatement activity, and largely additional to existing aid flows.
Initially, therefore, a greenhouse regime must be flexible enough to demonstrate what is possible rather than to strive for final policy commitments that are simply ignored. The low (or possibly negative) net cost of abatement for the next one or two decades will grant the world a breathing space in which to explore the frontiers of social and technological possibility.
As Ralph Buultjens has written, no other issue has the ability to bring together so many people and nations as does climate change. The negotiations to create a global greenhouse regime are a rare opportunity to form a global coalition of interests that transcends national boundaries and historical antagonisms. It is perhaps the first time in history that the poor in the developing countries have a powerful ally among influential citizen groups and even some governments in the developed world. Thus, Greenpeace International's greenhouse gas scenario uses a development scenario that favours the poor countries rather than simply projecting the unequal global status quo into the future, as did the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
It is conceivable, therefore, that humanity will not march over the precipice of climate change, but will stop, look down, and will head instead toward a sustainable future.
1 See J Berreen and A Meyer ,'A Package Marked "Return to Sender," Some Problems with the Climate Convention,' Network '92, Centre for Our Common Future, Geneva, no. 4, June-July, 1992, p 7
2 Michael Grubb, 'The Greenhouse Effect: Negotiating Targets,' International Affairs, volume 66, no. 1,1990, pp 82-83
3 Ghana on behalf of the Group of 77, 'Transfer of Environmentally Sound Technology,' informal paper to Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change, 4th session, December 1991, p 5
4 Ibid, p 23
5 Ibid, p 21
6 R deLucia, Sustainable development and rural poverty alleviation: evolving perspectives on needed new thinking and approaches, report to International Federation for Agricultural Development, World Rural Poverty Study, deLucia and Associates, Cambridge, Massachusetts, September 1990, p 2-7
7 G Schramm, 'Issues and Problems in the Power Sectors of Developing Countries,' in UN Department of Technical Cooperation, Report on the Stockholm Initiative on Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development (SEED): Strategies for Implementing Power Sector Efficiency, Stockholm, November 1991, p 58
8 R deLucia and M Lesser, Natural Gas and New Power Generation/Cogeneration Technologies: Implications and Opportunities for Some Developing Countries, paper to the International Association for Energy Economists' 11th Annual International Conference, Caracas, deLucia and Associates, Cambridge, Massachusetts, June 1989, p 7
9 UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Energy Policy Implications of the Climatic Effects of Fossil Fuel Use in the Asia-Pacific Region, ESCAP Symposium, Paper NR/SCE/1, September 1990, Tokyo, December 12,1990, p 122
10 G Porter, 'Reaching a Consensus on Financial Resources,' Network '92, Centre for Our Common Future, Geneva, no. 4, June-July, 1992, p 1
11 O Kjorven and A Kristin Sydnes, Funding for the Global Environment: The Issue of Additionality, Report 4, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Lysaker, Norway, 1992, provide an excellent analysis of this issue
12 O Kjorven, Facing the Challenge of Change: The World Bank and the Global Environment Facility, Report 3, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Lysaker, Norway, 1992, pp 6366; A Kristin Sydnes, Developing Countries in Global Climate Negotiations, Report 4, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Lysaker, Norway, 1991, pp 9-11
13 As stated in People's Republic of China, 'China's Principled Position on Global
Environment Issues,' chapter 5, National Report of the People's Republic of China on Environment and Development, August 1991, pp 53-54
14 See UN Centre on Transnational Corporations, Climate Change and Transnational Corporations: Analysis and Trends, ST/CTC/111, United Nations, New York, 1991
15 P Adams and L Solomon, In the Name of Progress, The Underside of Foreign Aid, Earthscan, London, 1991; and P Adams, Odious Debts, Loose Lending, Corruption and the Third World's Environmental Legacy, Earthscan, London, 1991
16 P McCully, 'The Case Against Climate Aid,' The Ecologist, volume 21, no. 6, November-December 1991, pp 244-257
17 ibid, p 248
18 On the latter issue, see P Hayes, 'Social Structure and Rural Energy Technology,' in Nautilus Inc. ed, Southern Perspectives on the Rural Energy Crisis, Conference of NGOs and the Environment Liaison Centre, Nairobi, 1981, pp 37-48
19 M Bell, Continuing Industrialisation, Climate Change and International Technology Transfer, Science Policy Research Unit, Sussex University, December 1990, pp 75-80
20 N Chantramonklasri, 'The Development of Managerial and Technological Capability in the Developing Countries,' in M Chatterji, ed, Technology Transfer in the Developing Countries, MacMillan, London, 1990, pp 38,44
21 S Lall,'Transnationals and the Third World: Changing Perceptions,' in S Lall, Multinationals, Technology and Exports, St Martin's Press, New York, 1985, p 72
22 M Bell, Continuing Industrialisation, op cit. endnote 19, p 84
23 F Stewart, 'Technological Dependence,' in F Stewart, Technology and Under development, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1977, p 123
24 F Stewart, Macro Policies for Appropriate Technology in Developing Countries, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1987
25 G Anandalingham, 'Energy Conservation in the Industrial Sector of Developing Countries,' Energy Policy, August 1985, p 338
26 R Kaplinsky, 'Technology Transfer, Adaptation and Generation: A Framework of Evaluation,' in M Chatterji, ed, Technology Transfer, op cit. endnote 20, pp 2223
27 UNCTAD Secretariat, Technology Policy in the Energy Sector: Issues, Scope and Options for Oeveloping Countries, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, June 1989, p 101
28 A Barnett, 'The Diffusion of Energy Technology in the Rural Areas of Developing Countries: A Synthesis of Recent Experience,' World Development, volume 18, no. 4, pp 539-553; and other essays on specific country or technology experiences in the same issue
29 C Freeman, Technology Policy and Economic Performance, Pinter Publishers, London, 1987, pp 64-79
30 J Granger, Technology and International Relations, W H Freeman, New York, 1979, p 62
31 M Grubb, 'Technology Transfer and the Global Environment: Motives and Mechanisms' (mimeo), Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, September 12,1991
32 A Mody, Staying in the Loop, International Alliances for Sharing Technology, World Bank Discussion Paper 61, World Bank, Washington DC, 1989, p 2
33 C Primo Braga, 'The Developing Country Case For and Against Intellectual Property Protection,' in W Siebek, ed, Strengthening Protection of Intellectual Property in Developing Countries, World Bank Discussion Paper 112, Washington DC, 1990, pp 68-87
34 L Lunde, The North/South Dimension in Global Greenhouse Politics, Conflicts, Dilemmas, Solutions, Report 9, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Lysaker, Norway, 1990, p 20
35 P Wexler, International Negotiations on Climate Change, Center for Global Change, University of Maryland, February 1992, p 18
36 Lee Jin-Ioo and .1 N Sharan, Technological Impact of the Public Procurement Policy: The Experience of the Power Plant Sector in the Republic of Korea, Geneva, July 1985, p 14
37 M Bell, Continuing Industrialisation, op cit. endnote 19, p viii
38 L Lunde, Science or Politics in the Global Greenhouse, A Study of the Development Towards Scientific consensus on Climate Change, Report 8, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Lysaker, Norway, 1991, p 127
39 E Parson, The Transport Sector and Global Warming, Paper E-90-11, JFK School of Government, Global Environmental Policy Project, Harvard University, Cambridge 1990, pp vii-viii
40 I Mackenzie and M Walsh, Driving Forces: Motor Vehicle Trends and their Implications for Global Warming, Energy Strategies, and Transportation Planning; World Resources Institute, Washington DC, December 1990, p 38
41 UNCTAD, Policies and Mechanisms for Achieving Sustainable Development, UNCTAD TD/B/1304, Geneva, August 15, 1991, p 25 and Figure 2.1
42 S Barrett, 'Free Rider Deterrence in a Global Warming Treaty', First Draft, London Business School report to Environment Directorate OECD, Paris, May 1991
43 For a general treatment of these issues, see C Russell et al, Enforcing Pollution Control Laws, Resources for the Future, Washington DC, 1986
44 W Fischer et al, A Convention on Greenhouse Gases: Towards the Design of a Verification System, Forschungszentrum Julich GmbH, Julich, Germany, October 1990. The following section draws heavily on this study
45 D Victor, 'Limits of market-based strategies for slowing global warming: The case of traceable permits,'Policy Sciences, volume 24, 1991, p 210
46 ibid, p 207
47 Using satellite data, A Setzer and M Pereira, 'Amazonia Biomass Burnings in 1987 and an Estimate of their Tropospheric Emissions,' Ambio, volume 20, no. 1, February 1991, pp 19-22, estimate Brazil's forestry related CO2 fossil fuel emissions at 1.7 gigatonnes in 1987; World Resourches Institute, World Resources, 1991, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990, p 346, estimated the emissions at 1.2 gigatonnes that year; A Agarwal and S Narain, Global Warming in an Unequal World: A Case of Environmental Colonialism; Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, 1991, p 4, argue that the figure should be based on a decadal average, not 1987, and should be reduced to between 0.38 gigatonnes. Thus, estimates for an important emitter range differ by a factor of five
48 J Lanchberry et al, Verification and the Framework Convention on Climate Change, Verification Technology Information Centre, London, May 1992, p 25
49 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Estimation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks, final report to the IPCC from OECD Experts
Meeting, February 1991, Revised August 1991
50 J Lanchberry et al, Verification and the Framework Convention, op cit. endnote 48
51 A Krass, Verification, How Much is Enough?, Taylor and Francis, London, 1985, p 94
52 B Schiff, International Nuclear Technology Transfer, Dilemmas of Dissemination and Control, Rowman and Allenheld, Totowa, New Jersey, p 113
53 See J Wettestad, 'Verification of International Greenhouse Agreements: A Mismatch between Technical and Political Feasibility,' International Challenges, volume 11, no. 1, 1991, pp 41-47
54 J Ausubel and D Victor, 'Verification of International Environmental Agreements' (mimeo), November 13, 1991, forthcoming in Annual Review of Energy and Environment
55 P Lewis, 'Experiences in Verification - What Can Be Learned for a Greenhouse Gas Convention,' in J Primio and G Stein, eds, A Regime to Control Greenhouse Gases, Forschungszentrum Julich GmbH, Julich, Germany, 1992, p 54
56 M Efinger and H Breitmeier, 'Verifying a Convention on Greenhouse Gases: A Game-Theoretic Approach,' in J Primio and G Stein, eds, A Regime to Control, ibid, p 66
57 D Feldman, 'Some Lessons of the IAEA's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime for Confidence-Building Under a Greenhouse Gas Convention,' in l Primio and G Stein, eds, A Regime to Control, op cit. endnote 55, pp 79-84
58 Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change, Climate Change Convention, UN Document A/AC.237/18 (Part Il)/Add.1, May 15, 1992, as revised at the June 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development
59 M Grubb, 'The Greenhouse Effect: Negotiating Targets', International Affairs, volume 66, no. 1, 1990, p 76
60 K von Moltke, 'International Trade, Technology Transfer and Climate Change,' in I Mintzer, ed, Confronting Climate Change, Risks, Implications and Responses, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p 302
61 P Sand, Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance, World Resources Institute, Washington DC, June 1990, pp 25-27
62 T Simmons, 'The IEA Energy Data System,,' in J Primio and G Stein, ed, A Regime to Control, op cit. endnote 55, 119-129; and discussions of IEA in annexes to Pledge and Review Processes: Possible Components of a Climate Convention, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Energy and Environment Program report, August 2, 1991, London
63 S Barrett,'Free Rider Deterrence,' op cit. endnote 42, pp 9-14
64 A Markandya, 'Global Warming, The Economics of Tradeable Permits,' in D Pearce, ed, Blueprint 2, Greening the World Economy, Earthscan, London, pp 59-61
65 Asian Development Bank, Environmental Considerations in Energy Development, ADB, Manila, May 1991, p 96
66 Ibid, p 100; see also J Topping, A Qureshi and S Sherer, Implications of Climate Changefor the Asian Pacific Region, Climate Institute, paper for the AsianPacific Seminar on Climate Change, Nagoya, Japan, January 1991
67 V V Desai, K Nyman, Industrial Energy Conservation: Notes on Three Country Studies, Energy Planning Unit, Asian Development Bank, Manila, circa 1986, pp 2-4
68 M Philips, Energy Conservation Activities in Asia, International Institute for Energy Conservation, Washington DC, September 1990, p 12-13
69 M Levine et al., Energy Efficiency, Developing Nations and Eastern Europe, A Report to the US Working Group on Global Energy Efficiency, April 1991, p 20
70 G Doyle, 'Future Coal Use in the Asia Pacific Region,' in T Siddiqi and D Streets, Responding to the Threat of Global Warming, Options for the Pacific and Asia, Argonne National Laboratory and Environment and Policy Institute, East West Center, Workshop Proceedings, ANL/EAIS/TM-17, June 21, 1989, Honolulu, p 3-21
71 World Bank, China: Socialist Economic Development, Annex E, The Energy Sector, Report 3391-CHA, June 1981, p 11
72 M Philips, Energy conservation activities, op cit. endnote 68, p 3
73 Ibid
74 International Institute for Energy Conservation, 'Factory Lost Opportunities Project,' International Institute for Energy Conservation, Asia Regional Office, Bangkok, 1990; see also A Gadgil and G Jannuzzi, Conservation Potential of Compact Fluorescent Lamps in India and Brazil, LBL-27210 Rev., Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley California, September 1990
75 R Thaman, 'Coastal Reforestation and Agro Forestry as Immediate Ameliorative Measures to Address Global Warming and to Promote Sustainable Habitation of Low Lying and Coastal Areas,' in T Siddiqi and D Streets, Responding to the Threat of Global Warming, Options for the Pacific and Asia, Argonne National Laboratory and Environment and Policy Institute, East West Center, Workshop Proceedings, ANL/EAIS/TM-17, June 21, 1989, Honolulu, pp 437-45
76 S Myers et al, Energy Efficiency and Household Electric Appliances in Developing and Newly Industrialized Countries, LBL-29678 UC-350, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley California, December 1990, p 44
77 Asian Development Bank, Environmental Considerations in Energy Development, ADB, Manila, May 1991, p 77
78 B Leach, China and Global Change, Opportunities for Collaboration, US National Academy Press, Washington DC, 1992
79 See 'Development of an Inter-American Institute for Global Change Research,' workshop report, San Juan, Puerto Rico, July 15, 1992; and 'Regional Co-Operative Activities to Support Global Change Research in ASEAN Countries as a Component of START,' October 20, 1992, annex B to 'Minutes of Second Meeting of the Southeast Asian Regional Committee for START (SARCS),' Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, October 9, 1992
80 S Krasner, Structural Conflict, The Third World Against Global Liberalism, University of California Press, Berkeley, California, 1985; M Williams, Third World Cooperation, The Group of 77 in UNCTAD, St Martin's Press, New York, 1991
81 N Harris, The End of the Third World, Newly Industrializing Countries and the Decline of an Ideology, Penguin Books, London, 1986
82 A Kristin Sydnes, Developing Countries, op cit. endnote 12, pp 7-8
83 T Hyder, 'Climate Negotiations: The North/South Perspective,' in I Mintzer, ed, Confronting Climate Change, op cit. endnote 60, p 330
84 Ibid, p 8
85 L Lunde, The North/South Dimension, op cit. endnote 34, p 2
86 Ibid, p 16
87 ECO 'Last Change for Climate Treaty, US Intransigence Still Hinders Negotiations' (New York), April 24, 1992, p 1
88 P Haas, Saving the Mediterranean, The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990, p xxii; and P Haas, 'Ecological Epistemic Communities and the Protection of Stratospheric Ozone' (mimeo), Political Science Department, University of Massachusetts in Amherst, January 1991, forthcoming in International Organization special issue on Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination
89 A Melucci, Nomads of the Present, Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society, Hutchinson Radius, London, 1989; C Jennett and R Stewart, eds, Politics of the Future, The Role of Social Movements, MacMillan, Melbourne, 1989
90 P Ekins, A New World Order, Grassroots Movements for Global Change, Routledge, London, 1992
91 J Holmbert, Making Development Sustainable, Redefining Institutions, Policy, and Economics, Island Press, Washington DC, 1992, pp 56-7
92 See International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, Economic Policies for Sustainable Development in Nepal, report to Asian Development Bank, Khatmandu, May 1990, p 373
93 l Clark, Democratising Development, The Role of Voluntary Organisations, Earthscan, London, 1991; and G Leach and R Mearns, Beyond the Fuelwood Crisis, People. Land and Trees in Africa, Earthscan, London, 1988, pp 100-122
94 N Dubash and M Oppenheimer, 'Modifying the Mandate of Existing Institutions: NGOs, 'in I Mintzer, ed, Confronting Climate Change, op cit. endnote 60, p 275; and Climate Change Network, 'A Force for Change' (mimeo), December 1992
95 See 'Atmosphere and Climate,' chapter 24 of World Resources Institute, World Resources, 1992-1993, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, pp 345-355; and S Subak et al, National Greenhouse Gas Accounts: Current Anthropogenic Sources and Sinks, Stockholm Environment Institute, Boston, 1992
96 Center for Building Science, 'Mexico Large-Scale Compact Fluorescent Lamp Project' (mimeo), Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, undated
97 'Alternative Non-Governmental Agreement on Climate Change,' in Alternative Treaty-Making Process from the International Non-Government Organization Forum, Rio de Janeiro, June 1-14, 1992, p D-3
98 'NGOs: Conventions Must Drive GEF,' ECO, December 1992, Geneva, p 7
99 R Buultjens, 'Years of Waste, Call for Action,' Earth Summit Times, volume 3, no. 2, August 27, 1992, p 14
100 Stockholm Environment Institute, Towards Global Energy Security: The Next Energy Transition, An Energy Scenario for a Fossil Fuel Free Energy Future, draft report to Greenpeace International, Boston, May 1992; J Parikh, 'IPCC strategies unfair to the South,' Nature, volume 260, December 10, 1992, p 507