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3. Stimulating development from the bottom up" :economic growth with social equity policies
Analyses undertaken during the early 1970s of the performance of developing economies over the previous quarter of a century reinforced emerging arguments that aid must be channelled more directly to the poorest groups in developing societies if they were to benefit from and contribute to economic development. In a review for the World Bank of the trends in economic development from 1950 to 1975, Morawetz found that growth had been uneven among developing nations and that statistics indicating overall progress in Third World countries often masked serious disparities.48 Although the average annual growth rate in GNP for 80 developing nations had been a respectable 3.4 per cent and exceeded the growth rates of GNP in the industrialized countries (3.2 per cent a year), performance in individual developing nations varied widely. The developing countries' average had been raised by high GNP growth rates in oil-rich Middle Eastern countries (5.2 per cent) and by rapid industrialization in a few of the East Asian economies (3.9 per cent). But poor countries in Africa and Latin America could increase their GNP by only an average of 2.5 per cent a year, and Southeast Asian economies grew at an average rate of only 1.7 per cent a year.49 Many of the poorest countries were completely bypassed by economic progress; Honduras, Chile, Ghana, and Bolivia, for instance, hardly increased their economic output at all (less than 1 per cent a year in the 1960s and early 1970s). Others, such as Bangladesh, Rwanda, and Upper Volta, registered negative growth rates.50
Thus, statistics showing substantial progress in economic development blurred the fact that disparities between rich and poor countries had actually increased over 25 years. Although growth rates remained stable for the 80 countries analyzed by Morawetz, absolute disparities between industrialized and developing nations in per capita GNP increased threefold. Average per capita GNP in industrialized nations was $2000 greater than that in developing nations in 1950. By 1975 the differences more than doubled to nearly $5000.51 Even the fastest growing economies, such as the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, were unable to reduce the gap substantially during the 1960s and 1970s. Differences in per capita GNP between these nations and the developed countries doubled over a quarter century. By the early 1970s there remained at least 37 countries, with a combined population of over 1.2 billion, that had a per capita GNP of less than $300 a year. Fifteen other countries, with an additional 270 million people, had a per capita GNP of less than $500. Nearly three-quarters of the population in less developed nations lived in relative or absolute poverty (income equivalents of less than $75 and $50 a year respectively). Less than half the population in the 37 least developed nations were literate. Average annual population increases in these countries were more than double those in developed countries; life expectancy averaged less than 50 years; and child mortality rates were 18 times higher on average than in industrialized countries.52
Critics of the previous decades" growth maximization and sectoral development strategies pointed out that although natural resource exporting countries had been supplying the developed countries with large amounts of raw materials that enriched multinational corporations and industrialized nations, their own economies and the living conditions of the vast majority of their people either remained stagnant or continued to deteriorate. Reflecting on the conditions in Caribbean countries - Jamaica, Surinam, Guyana, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and others - that had been exporting their rich bauxite resources during the 1960s and noting that these countries had been supplying North American aluminium producers with over 90 per cent of their ore requirements, Philip Reno asked: "What of the Caribbean countries that produce the ore for half the capitalist world's aluminium?" He pointed out that "not one has a Gross National Product of all goods and services as large as Alcoa's sales and operating revenues. The total expenditure of all combined for health, education, and welfare is far less than the big four laluminium companies net profits."53 Not only did the benefits of natural resource exportation fail to spread, generate widespread economic growth in other sectors, and trickle down to the poor, but resource exploitation often caused new or more severe social and economic problems for the poor in exporting countries. Of the bauxiteproducing Caribbean countries, Reno noted:
Out of every four of their urban workers, at least one is unemployed. In their countrysides, underemployment is universal and chronic. On the islands, refugees from eroded highlands have flooded the already overcrowded cities. General population growth will double their working force in fewer than forty years, so that a large part of the increase in their national incomes must go just to hold their own.54
The emphases on exploiting natural resources, on expanding industry rapidly and on concentrating investment in the large metropolitan centres of developing countries created increasingly severe environmental hazards and led to the destruction or deterioration of those countries' natural resource base. Before the mid-1970s, however, few international assistance organizations or governments in developing countries were seriously concerned with either the overexploitation of natural resources or with the rapid deterioration in environmental quality. A survey of USAID missions in 1971 concluded that people in developing nations, and their governments, had little awareness of environmental problems. The missions reported that "many countries are preoccupied with the development of their natural resources and, to the extent that concern does exist for the environment, there appears to be apprehension that social and economic costs of environmental protection may very well outweigh the benefits."55 Surveys conducted by United
Nations agencies found that policy-makers believed that environmental protection and natural resource conservation programmes would inhibit rapid economic growth. They thought that such programmes would be more feasible only after developing countries reached a level of economic development attained by Western industrial countries.56
But the evidence of environmental deterioration and depletion of natural resources in developing nations began mounting in the early 1970s. In Asia, for example, decades of agricultural land clearing, scavenging for fuelwood and logging had seriously depleted forests. Nearly one-quarter of the forests in Nepal had disappeared between 1964 and 1975. Deforestation in Northern Luzon in the Philippines reduced the useful life of recently-constructed dams by more than half because of increased silting. Following the deforestation of the Indus Plains in Pakistan. severe flooding caused widespread crop destruction and the death of thousands of villagers.57 Coastal zones along the shores of large metropolitan centres throughout Asia became heavily polluted during the 1960s and 1970s. The dumping of raw sewage, industrial waste and chemicals into rivers and bays was disrupting marine ecosystems, raising the levels of harmful chemicals in seafood and increasing the incidence of dysentery, typhoid and hepatitis among those who consumed contaminated fish and shellfish. Nitrogen oxide and carbon monoxide levels far exceeded the World Health Organization's recommended levels in most large Asian cities by the mid-1970s, and the pollution of nearby rivers and underlying water tables of these cities severely reduced their sources of safe drinking water.58
The problems of resource depletion were especially burdensome for the poor. Their poverty not only made them particularly dependent on local renewable resources for survival, but forced them to over-exploit and rapidly deplete those resources on which their future survival depended. Foraging for fuelwood by the poor was a major contributor to the deforestation of large tracts of land in highland areas of nearly all East and Southeast Asian countries. In India, Sri Lanka and the Philippines the lack of alternative forms of cheap fuels forced the poor to forage for wood and continue to denude forests. The use of inappropriate or outmoded technology, intensive fishing in shallow coastal waters and the increasing demand for fish products by growing populations in coastal regions combined to threaten or destroy once-abundant nearshore fishery resources in much of Southeast Asia.59 Without careful management, the renewable resources that had sustained the poor, even at subsistence levels, was severely threatened. Moreover, the inability or unwillingness of governments in developing nations to use abundantly available resources - such as sago palms- for local development, deprived villagers of commerciallyviable renewable resources that could have increased their income and improved their living conditions.60
It became increasingly apparent during the late 1960s and early 1970s that the number of people living in dire poverty in developing nations was increasing rather than diminishing. The conditions of many living at or near subsistence levels in the developing world had been progressively worsening rather than improving. It was also recognized more widely among economists, development theorists and aid officials that high rates of economic growth - with all of the inherent constraints on spread effects and trickling down - would not ameliorate poverty in most developing countries. In all but a few nations that had achieved high rates of economic growth, the conditions of the poor grew worse rather than better. Studies done in the late 1960s and early 1970s indicated that the spread effects from sectoral development policies were as sluggish as those produced by macroeconomic strategies. In a study of 43 developing nations, Adelman and Morris found that in all but the very rich and the poorest nations, income distributions became more skewed as their economies grew .61 In many of the developing nations they analyzed, the highest income groups (the top 20 per cent of the population) received more than 65 per cent of the income and the lowest 40 per cent of the population received as little 10 per cent of the nation's income. A good deal of the evidence they amassed cast doubt on the validity of the Kuznets curve concept. Adelman and Morris found that in many developing nations the richest groups had indeed benefitted from initial economic growth, but that even after the economy broke out of extreme dualism, the benefits went mainly to middle income groups, with little or nothing trickling down to the poorest. The position of the poorest 40 per cent of the population worsened both relatively and absolutely.62
The accumulating evidence suggested that equitable and sustained economic growth required the creation of an extensive base of participation in productive activities in developing nations. The vast numbers of people living at or near subsistence levels had to be absorbed into the national economy through what Adelman called a "humanresource-intensive development strategy." In a study for the World Bank, Chenery also found that the majority of the poor had been excluded from the benefits of economic growth "by a number of specific disabilities that can be summed up as the lack of physical and human capital and lack of access."63 These disabilities could only be overcome, he noted, by designing policies that would promote a more equitable distribution of income and that took account of the specific social and economic characteristics of the poor.64 Adelman argued that few, if any, single sector development policies, in isolation, would have a real impact on reaching the poorest groups in developing societies. But those nations that had achieved growth with relative equity had certain characteristics in common that provided clues to the kinds of policies that could have a beneficial effect. They had political leaders who were strongly committed to economic development through widespread participation in economic activities; they received massive amounts of foreign assistance that allowed them to tackle a wide variety of social and economic problems in combination; they instituted and successfully carried out strong programmes of asset redistribution that allowed for widespread sharing in the benefits of growth and placed great emphasis on human resources development in the pre-growth period. From these lessons, Adelman and others concluded that "asset redistribution and the redistribution of opportunities for access to asset accumulation are a necessary first step for the initiation of equitable growth."65 But, they also argues that growth and equitable distribution policies could not be separated. In countries where sluggish growth followed asset redistribution, the value of redistributed assets declined, leaving the poor no better off. The richest 20 per cent of the population captured the windfall profits.66
The changes that came about in international assistance strategy during the early 1970s were the result of a confluence of forces. For nearly a decade the purposes of, and approaches to, foreign assistance had been reevaluated, as had the directions and objectives of development policy. A steady process of learning by scholars, practitioners and policy makers in both industrialized and developing nations brought many conventional assumptions of development theory into question, as had the frequent attacks on mainstream economic theories by radical and socialist thinkers. The rationale for "targeting" benefits to constituent groups of the poor reflected the influence of social scientists who were more concerned with the nature, direction and implications of social change than simply with the level or pace of economic growth. The changes underway also reflected the thinking of many economists critical of the conventional approaches used to aid developing nations during the 1950s and 1960s. A belief earlier prevalent among development economists that economic growth and equitable distribution of income were conflicting goals was largely displaced during the 1970s by evidence that deliberate efforts to distribute income and wealth more equitably in countries such as Taiwan, South Korea and Malaysia did not impair high levels of economic growth and, in fact, created a broader base of participation in economic activities that reinforced and accelerated growth processes. 67 It was also recognized that "automatic" mechanisms rarely produce the expected spread and filtering effects in poor countries and that policies must be deliberately designed to incorporate peripheral areas and marginal groups into the economy if poverty is to be ameliorated.
Moreover, political leaders and scholars from developing nations had begun asserting their own interests and views in international forums. The "North-South" confrontation that was manifested most visibly during the early 1970s had been building up for almost two decades. Third World demands for greater equality in international economic relations had been advanced at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development meetings since 1964 and expressed in the Cocoyoc Declaration, in UN resolutions on the Rights and Duties of States, and in statements of the Colombo Non-Aligned Summit Meeting and in the Manila Declaration of the "Group of 77" in 1976. In May 1974, a resolution on the New International Economic Order was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, giving global legitimacy to the demands of the poorer countries for greater benefits from international trade.68
About the same time, the Arab oil embargo and the unified position of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) succeeded in quadrupling oil prices and providing the Third World with an example of the gains to be achieved from collective action to press their demands for higher prices for their natural resources. Although Western industrial countries had resisted these demands, a growing awareness of their own fragile interdependencies led to a greater recognition of the need for stabilized raw material and energy prices, for more settled and predictable trade relationships with Third World nations, and for more intensive "North-South" negotiations.
The steadily-growing realization that problems in developing nations differed drastically from those faced by industrialized nations brought about a fundamental rethinking of development policy that led to new, more pragmatic, approaches to international assistance in the early and mid-1970s. Although these strategies identified the poorest groups in developing nations as the primary beneficiaries of aid, the new policies were not conceived of, or intended to be, welfare programmes. In its report accompanying the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US House of Representatives argued that "we are learning that if the poorest majority can participate in development by having productive work and access to basic education, health care and adequate diets, then increased economic growth and social justice can go hand in hand."69 The president of the Overseas Development Council insisted that "greater equality of opportunity to participate, rather than more aid of the welfare variety, is the most urgent need of the poor within countries (and of the low income states within the community of nations)." He noted that "this equity can be more efficient than inequity and 'trickle down' in advancing growth in both rich and poor countries. "70
Thus, the new development assistance policies recognized that economic growth and equitable distribution of income were not incompatible. An analyst for the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US Congress, examining the UN International Labour Organization's call for an employmentgenerating, basic-needs, approach to development, noted the differences between the development theories emerging during the early 1970s and conventional thinking. He pointed out that the debate was not "between advocates of growth and advocates of no growth or slow growth; it is between advocates of maximum growth in GNP regardless of how it is achieved and advocates of a growth path which puts to productive use the now underutilized labour of the poor."71 World Bank president Robert McNamara, in his 1973 speech to the Board of Governors in Nairobi, justified the Bank's new emphasis on reaching the poorest groups in terms of their productive potential and the contributions that the poor could make to national development.72
New Approaches to Equitable Growth from the Bottom Up
The international development assistance strategies that emerged during the early 1970s began (for the first time) to focus technical and financial assistance on an identifiable group of beneficiaries in Third World nations. The "absolute poor" "poor majority," the "poorest 40 per cent" of the population, or the "marginal groups" in developing societies, as they were variously referred to by international assistance organizations, were to be the "target groups" of the new assistance policies. International assistance agencies initially faced the problem of identifying and defining these beneficiaries and then of finding means of chanelling aid to them. Three basic targeting strategies emerged during the 1970s to channel aid to the poor majority: 1) aid was channelled to the places where the majority of the poor lived through integrated rural development programmes or rural-oriented service and production projects; 2) aid was focused on overcoming deficiencies in the living standards of the poor through basic human needs programmes; and 3) aid was focused on groups with common socio-economic characteristics that created or maintained them in poverty through projects designed for "special publics."
1. Integrated Rural Development. One means of reaching the poor majority was to channel assistance to those places where the poor were concentrated. In 1973 World Bank President McNamara. noting that the benefits of development had not filtered down to the majority of the poor in developing countries, challenged the Bank's board of governors to increase investments in those sectors and areas of the world where they would have the greatest impact on reducing poverty among the "nearly 800 million individuals - 40 per cent of a total of two billion [who] survive on income estimated at 30 cents a day and in conditions of malnutrition, illiteracy and squalor."73 The Bank's staff estimated that 80 per cent of those people subsisting in absolute or relative poverty lived in rural areas.74 The rural poor primarily included the families of small-scale farmers, tenants, sharecroppers and landless labourers. McNamara challenged the Bank's staff to design "new style" projects for overcoming rural poverty and called for a rapid expansion of lending for agricultural and social projects made to the Bank's poorest members. A new emphasis would be placed on loans for multi-purpose, integrated, low-cost, replicable projects designed to benefit the poorest groups in rural areas by increasing the productive capacity of small-scale farmers and rural industries. The alleviation of poverty would require an integrated and comprehensive programme that included, among other things, more rapid land and tenancy reform, greater access for the poor to credit, expansion of potable water supplies, extension of technical assistance to subsistence farmers, greater access to public services, and. according to McNamara, "most critical of all, new forms of rural institutions and organizations that will give as much attention to promoting the inherent potential and productivity of the poor as is generally given to protecting the power of the privileged."75 In their rural sector policy paper, Bank officials asserted that "a special effort is needed to provide appropriate social and economic infrastructure for the rural poor and it is important to integrate these components into rural development projects. Without a concerted effort, "Bank officials insisted. "rural poverty will remain pervasive."76 The World Bank sought - by providing "minimum packages" of inputs, organizing area development programmes and combining sectoral investments in rural areas - to increase agricultural productivity, expand off-farm employment and increase entrepreneurial opportunities for the rural poor.
Much like the World Bank's lending strategy, USAID's programme of assistance to the rural poor sought to increase productivity and income and to extend access to services and facilities to rural families who had previously been excluded from participation in productive economic activities. USAID officials, responding to the "New Direction" mandate from Congress, recognized in the early 1970s that traditional forms of aid for roads, irrigation, public works, and rural electrification, although necessary, were far from sufficient to increase the productivity and income of the poor. During the 1960s such investments had primarily helped large-scale farm owners but had done little to extend the benefits to landless labourers, tenant farmers and small holders and the rural unemployed. Thus, it was these latter groups who became the primary beneficiaries of AID programmes in the 1970s.77 AlD's Working Group on the Rural Poor contended that traditional projects had to be redesigned to reflect the needs of new beneficiaries and to be combined with programmes for human resource development, education, health, family planning, smallscale industrialization and labor-intensive agroprocessing. The access of small-holders to appropriate technology, new production inputs and markets for their products had to be increased. The Working Group on the Rural Poor insisted that USAID's strategy must include programmes for creating and strengthening local institutions such as cooperatives, farmers organizations, municipal and district governments and regional planning units, in order to facilitate and coordinate service delivery. Moreover, the group saw the relationships between urban and rural economies in new perspective and called for projects that would create or strengthen linkages between rural villages, market centres, smaller cities and regional urban centres to integrate the settlement and spatial systems of developing regions.78 They pointed to the need for projects that would contribute to the "creation of market areas and market towns complete with services and amenities designed to make rural life productive and satisfying. " 79
2. Basic Human Needs Strategies. A second approach to chanelling aid to the poor emerged in the mid-1970s. United Nations Specialized Agencies. such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), began calling for a new emphasis on employment-generating projects that would help the world's poor to overcome basic deficiencies in their standards of living and to satisfy their "basic human needs." In its Declaration of Principles, the World Employment Conference, organized by the ILO in 1976, argued that "past development strategies in most developing countries have not led to the eradication of poverty and unemployment." Major shifts would be needed in both national and international development strategies to "ensure full employment and adequate income" for the poor as quickly as possible. 80
The ILO defined basic needs as, first, minimum family requirements for basic consumption such as adequate food, shelter, clothing, household equipment and furnishings; and second, as essential community services such as potable water, sanitation, health services, educational facilities and public transport. The ILO insisted that programmes for satisfying basic needs be carried out as much as possible through self-reliant development and internal resource mobilization.
The objectives of basic needs strategies were defined in two ways. The World Bank and other assistance organizations saw the provision of basic goods and services as a precondition for increasing the productivity and income of the poor, enabling them to contribute more effectively to national development Others, such as Burki, argued that the aim was to "ensure the access of the poor to a bundle of essential goods and services" as a basic human right. 81The distinctive features of a targeting strategy for meeting basic needs in the latter sense were outlined by Streeten and Burki as follows: (a) this strategy is concerned with meeting the needs of the poor as a legitimate goal per se. aside from its contribution to productivity; (b) it stresses the importance of alleviating absolute poverty; (c) it emphasizes the need for supply management so that the increased income of the poor is not offset by rising prices for basic goods and services that they must purchase; (d) it emphasizes the restructuring of production so that the poor have greater access to basic goods and services despite their disadvantages in the market; (e) it is defined by "characteristics" of the goods and services needed by the poor rather than in terms of the goods themselves (nutritional needs rather than specific types of foods); (f) it seeks to divorce production decisions directly from market-based consumers' choices in situations where income distribution is extremely uneven; and (9) it encompasses a variety of nonmaterial needs, such as sense of purpose in life and work, that are often satisfied as the result of obtaining material needs.82
Much of China's development policy during Mao's regime was aimed at providing for such basic needs. creating a "floor" of income under which families would not fall, and increasing access to productive inputs through communal organization of agriculture and small industry. The success of China and some smaller socialist countries such as Cuba, Burma and Sri Lanka in this aspect of development provided evidence that basic needs approaches could be effective in alleviating or eliminating absolute poverty. They provided less impressive evidence, however, that basic needs strategies could, alone, increase productivity or stimulate economic growth. 83
3. Assistance to "Special Publics." A third approach to channelling aid to the poor emerged, during the late 1970s, from the realization that those living in poverty were heterogeneous groups with special and different characteristics. Their problems would not be alleviated entirely by general anti-poverty policies. Unless the productivity and income of these groups were raised, overall economic growth would be difficult to attain. World Bank officials, in their World Development Report for 1980, pointed out that the high levels of human development in industrialized countries were a cause as well as a result of economic growth. Developing nations, they contended, must be able to incorporate the poor into productive activities through special educational, health and social services projects. "People who are unskilled or sick make little contribution to a country's economic growth," Bank analysts noted. "Development strategies that by-pass large numbers of people may not be the most effective way for developing countries to raise their long term growth rates."84 The report underlined the importance of programmes and projects that are tailored to the needs of special groups of the poor to ensure their participation. Special programmes for constituent groups of the poor were necessary because, as Griffin and Khan found in their extensive studies in Southeast Asia, "poverty is associated with particular classes or groups in the community, e.g., landless agricultural laborers, village artisans, plantation workers, etc." Yet most of the development policies and programmes that had been proposed previously were "couched in terms of atomistic households in a classless society." This neo-classical assumption, they contended, "is closely associated with an assumption of universal harmony of interests.''85
But experience with development policies aimed at alleviating poverty continued to demonstrate that their success was often jeopardized by conflicts among groups with very different interests. Many groups living at subsistence levels had characteristics that continued to exclude them from the benefits of integrated rural development and basic needs programmes. Esman and Montgomery called these groups "special publics" and described the circumstances that made their participation unlikely:
These "special publics" often live in remote or hard-to-reach areas or suffer their greatest privations during the wet season, when they cannot be approached by ordinary overland routes; a few even make it a point not to be seen at public facilities set up for supplying family planning and health services, nutritional supplements, or even primary nonformal education 86
Government bureaucracies that administered programmes for the poor were rarely'organized and equipped to deal effectively with these special publics. As Esman and Montgomery noted, "for their part, the end-of-the-line field workers in a human development service are rarely motivated to break the cognitive, social and physical barriers that separate them from the special publics.''87 The supply lines and flows of information to those working with special publics were continually interrupted; and because these groups lacked political power, their needs and demands were rarely considered in the formulation and implementation of national development policies. The only effective way of reaching these groups was to design projects which were tailored to their specific needs and which accounted for their special characteristics - a task with which international agencies and governments in developing countries are still attempting to come to grips.
In summary. the evaluations of international assistance and development policies that were carried out during the late 1960s and early 1970s indicated that neither growth maximization and trickle down nor sectoral development policies were sufficient to overcome the growing disparities between rich and poor countries and to stimulate economic growth with social equity in developing nations. Even where conventional strategies had been successful in promoting growth in GNP, they often did little to meet the needs of the majority of the poor living at or near subsistence levels who had previously been excluded from participation in economic activities. The numbers of people living in dire poverty were increasing rather than diminishing. In countries that had achieved respectable levels of economic growth with relatively equitable distribution, substantial efforts had been made prior to their period of growth to satisfy basic human needs, redistribute productive assets and intervene in market processes to assure widespread distribution and access. By 1973, international aid agencies were not only rethinking their policies and strategies but also reformulating basic theories of development and fundamental goals of international economic assistance. The need for more precise development policies and for more effectively targeted aid strategies that would reach specific groups of the poor had become widely accepted by the beginning of the 1980s.
Notes
1. This chapter is derived in large part from Dennis A Rondinelli. Development Projects as Policy Experiments An Altemative Approach to Development Administration. London and New York Methuen and Co, 1983
2. See Raymond F Mikesell, The Economics of Foreign Aid, Chicago Aldine, 1968, and Edward Mason and Robert Asher, The World Bank Since Bretton Woods, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1973
3. A general review of the literature of early economic development theory is represented in D.E Novack and R. Lekachman (eds ) Development and Society, New York St Martin's Press, 1964; and A N. Agarwala and S P. Singh (eds.) The Economics of Underdevelopment, New York: Oxford University Press, 1970
4. For a review of World Bank lending priorities see Sonia S Gold, "The Shifting Emphasis on Macro- and Micro-Levels in Development Planning: The IBRD Experience 1946 1973," Journal of Developing Areas, Vol 11 (1976), pp 13-38
5. See W Arthur Lewis, The Theory of Economic Growth, London : Allen and Unwin. 1955; W Arthur Lewis, "Economic Development with Limited Supplies of Labor," Manchester School (1954), reprinted in Agarwala and Singh. pp. cit. pp. 400 499, Theodore W Schultz, Transforming Traditional Agriculture, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964, Lachlin Currie, Accelerating Development, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966
6. Albert O Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development, (New Haven Yale University Press, 1959), quotes at pp.66, 72
7. Ragnar Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries, London: Oxford University Press, 1953
8. P.N Rosenstein-Rodan, "Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe," reprinted in Agarwala and Singh, op cit. pp 245-255
9. See W W. Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth, New York: Norton, 1952
10. Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
11. Conventional theories of economic development are described in Benjamin Higgens, Economic Development Rev Ed., New York: Norton, 1968.
12. K.B Griffin and J.L. Enos, "Foreign Assistance: Objectives and Consequences," Economic Development and Cultural Change Vol. 118 (19701, pp. 313-327.
13. Dudley Seers, "The Limits of the Special Case." Bulletin of the Oxford Institute of Economics and Statistics, Vol 25, No. 2 (1965), pp. 77-98.
14. Bert F. Hoselitz, "Advanced and Underdeveloped Countries: A Study in Development Contrasts," in W B Hamilton (ed.) The Transfer of institutions, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1964), pp. 27-58
15. Lewis, op. cit.
16. H. Myint, "An Interpretation of Economic Backwardness," originally published in Oxford Economic Papers (June 1954), reprinted in Agarwala and Singh, op cit. pp. 93-134; quote at page 130
17. Ibid. p. 98.
18. Paul Streeten, Frontiers of Development Studies, New York: Halsted, 1972.
19. Gunnar Mvrdal, Rich Lands and Poor: The Road to World Prospenty New York: Harper and Row, 1957.
20. Gunnar Myrdal, The Challenge of World Poverty. (New York: Vintage, 1970), chapter 7.
21. See Higgens, op. cit.
22. For a review of the literature on this point see Dennis A Rondinelli and Kenneth Ruddle, Urbanization and Rural Development: A Spatial Policy for Equitable Growth, New York: Praeger, 1978.
23. See Charles Abrams, Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Unbanizing World, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1964
24. Myint, op cit. pp. 129-130.
25. Milton Friedman, "Foreign Economic Aid: Means and Objectives," Yale Review (1958), reprinted in Gustav Ranis (ed.) The United States and the Developing Economies, Rev. Ed. (New York: Norton, 1973), pp 250 263, quote at p. 253
26. Ibid, p 256.
27. Griffin and Enos, op. cit., p. 325.
28. Schultz, op cit. Bruce F Johnston and John W. Mellor, "The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development," American Economic Review, Vol. Ll, No. 4 (1961), pp. 571-581
29. The combination of improvements usually prescribed by agricultural economists is outlined by Clifton R Wharton, Jr, "The Infrastructure for Agricultural Growth, " in H.M. Southworth and B F Johnston (eds ) Agricultural Development and Economic Growth. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), pp 107-142
30 .Doreen Warriner, "Land Reform and Economic Development," in C. Eicher and L. Witt (eds.) Agriculture in Economic Development (N Y: McGraw Hill, 1964), pp. 280-290.
31. The major approaches to administrative reform were outlined in United Nations, A Handbook of Public Administration: Current Concepts and Practice with Special Reference to Developing Countries, New York: Technical Assistance Bureau, 1961.
32. Frederick H. Harbison, "Human Resources Development Planning in Modernizing Economies," International Labor Review, Vol 85, No 5 (1962), pp 2-23; quote at p 3.
33. Ibid; and F.H Harbison and C A. Meyers, Education, Manpower and Economic Growth, New York: McGraw-Hill. 1966, C.A Anderson and M J Bowman (eds.) Education and Economic Development 2nd Ed.. Chicago: Aldine, 1965
34. Detailed studies were done in developing nations during the 1960s and published subsequently by ILO See International Labor Organization, Toward Full Employment: A Program for Colombia (Geneva: ILO, (1970), and A Strategy for increasing Productive Employment in Kenya (1972), Employment and Unemployment in Ethiopia (1973), Total Involvement A Strategy for Development in Liberia (1972).
35. See Gold, op. cit., and Mikesell, op. cit.
36. Albert Waterston, Development Planning. Lessons of Experience, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1965) provides a detailed description of the problems.
37. Albert Waterston, "An Operational Approach to Development Planning," International Journal of Health Studies Vol 1, No. 3 (1971), pp. 233-252, quote at p. 240
38. Quoted in Gold, op. cit., p. 29.
39. See Mikesell, op cit. Chapter 6 for details
40. U S. Agency for International Development. Latin America Bureau, "Comments on Sector Analysis and Sector Loans in Latin America." (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1972), mimeo., pp. 1-2
41. U S. Agency for International Development, "Sector Lending in Latin America," (Washington: U.S Department of State, 1972), mimeo.
42 For a review see Dennis A. Rondinelli, "International Assistance Policy and Development Project Administration: The Impact of Imperious Rationality," International Organization Vol. 30, No 4 (1976), pp. 573-605.
43. Findings of many of the evaluation studies are summarized in United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Economic Survey, 1969-1970, (New York: United Nations, 1971), pp 9 34; and G.M. Meier, "The Record of the First Development Decade," in Meier (ed.) Leading Issues in Economic Development, 2nd Ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp 34 44.
44. Lester B. Pearson, Partners in Development New York: Praeger, 1970.
45. Ibid., p. 169
46. Sir Robert Jackson, A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations System, Vol. 2 (Geneva: United Nations, 1969), p 171.
47. Pearson, op cit., p. 29
48. David Morawetz, Twenty-Five Years of Economic Development 1950 1975 (Washington: World Bank. 1977), pp 11 22
49. Ibid pp 26 27.
50. World Bank's world development reports during the late 1970s provide profiles on economic and social conditions in developing countries.
51. Morawetz, op. cit., pp. 26-30.
52. See, for instance, the statistical tables in World Bank, World Development Report 1979, (Washington: World Bank, 1979), pp. 123 174.
53. Philip Reno, "Aluminium Profits and Caribbean People," originally published in Monthly Review, (October 1963), reprinted in Robert I. Rhodes (ed ) Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Reader (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), pp. 79 88, quotes at pages 79 80.
54. Ibid., p 81
55. U.S. Agency for International Development, "Environmental Problems in Selected Developing Countries" (Washington: USAID, 1971) quoted in U.S. Agency for International Development, Environmental and Natural Resource Management in Developing Countries. A Report To Congress. Vol. l, (Washington, USAID, 19791, p. 16
56. United Nations, Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment Stockholm 1972 Doc. A/CONF. 48/14; quoted in Ibid., pp. 16 17.
57. USAID, Environmental and Natural Resource Management in Developing Countries, op cit pp. 68 71
58. Ibid., pp 79-81.
59. Ibid. p. 71,
60. Ibid., passim.
61. Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973.
62. Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris. Society Politics and Economic Development Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967.
63. Hollis Chenery, "Introduction," in H. Chenery, et a/., Redistribution With Growth, (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp XIII-XX; quote at p xv.
64. Hollis Chenery and John H Duloy, "Research Directions," Ibid.. pp. 245-249; and C.L.G Bell and J.G. Duloy, "Statistical Priorities." /bid pp. 236 244.
65. Irma Adelman, "Growth, Income Distribution and Equity-Oriented Development Strategies," World Development Vol 3, Nos 2 and 3. (1975), pp 67-76, quote at p 71
66. Ibid., p. 70.
67. D C. Rao, "Economic Growth and Equity in the Republic of Korea," World Development, Vol 6, No. 3 (1978), pp 383-396, Gustav Ranis, "Equity with Growth in Taiwan: How 'Special' is the 'Special Case'?" World Development Vol 6, No. 3 (1978), pp 377 409.
68. United Nations, Report on Intemational Definition and Measurement of Standards of Living, New York: United Nations, 1954.
69. U.S Code Congressional and Administrative News, Vol 2 (19731, p. 2818
70. James C. Grant, "Development: The End of Trickle Down?" Foreign Policy No 2 (Fall 1973), pp. 42-65; quote at p 65.
71. Charles Paolillo, A Basic Needs Strategy of Development: Staff Report on the World Employment Conference (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976), p 5
72. Robert S McNamara, Address lo the Board of Governors, Nairobi: World Bank Group, 1973.
73. Ibid., p 10
74. World Bank, Rural Development Sector Policy Paper, (Washington World Bank, 1975)
75. McNamara, op cit.
76. World Bank, Rural Development Sector Policy Paper, op. cit.. p. 5
77. U.S Agency for International Development, Working Group on the Rural Poor, "Conceptual Overview of Rural Development," Working Paper No. 1 (Washington: USAID, 1973), mimeo, p 1.
78. U.S Agency for International Development, Working Group on the Rural Poor, "An Approach to Spatial Planning for Rural Development," Working Paper, (Washington: USAID, 1974), mimeo
79. Ibid, p. 17
80. Tripartite World Conference on Employment. Income Distribution and Social Progress and the International Division of Labor, Declaration of Principles and Program of Action, (Geneva International Labor Organisation, 1976), Document WEC/CW.E 1.
81. Shahid Javed Burki, "Sectoral Priorities for Meeting Basic Needs," Finance and Development, Vol. 17, No. 1 (March 1980), pp 18 22; quoted at p. 1 B
82. Paul Streeten and Shahid Javed Burki, "Basic Needs: Some Issues," World Development, Vol 6, No. 3 (1978), pp 411 421
83. Suzanne Paine, "Balanced Development Maoist Conception and Chinese Practice," World Development Vol. 4, No 4 (1976), pp. 277-304; Eddy Lee, "Development and Income Distribution: A Case Study of Sri Lanka and Malaysia," World Development, Vol 5, No 4 (1977), pp 279-389; and Jan S Pnybyla, "Changes in the Chinese Economy: An Interpretation," Asian Survey, Vol XIX, No 5 (May 1979), Pp. 409-435
84. World Bank, World Development Report, 1980, (Washington: World Bank, 1980), p. 36.
85. Keith Griffin and Azizur Rahman Khan, "Poverty in the Third World: Ugly Facts and Fancy Models," World Development, Vol 6, No 3 (1978), pp. 295-304
86. Milton J. Esman and John D Montgomery, "The Administration of Human Development" in P T Knight (ed ) Implementation Programs of Human Development, (Washington World Bank, 19801, pp 185 234; quote at p 190
87. Idem.