

From international to global governance: Actors, collective decision-making, and the United Nations in the world of the twenty-first century

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The central challenge we face today is to ensure that globalization becomes a positive force for all the world's people, instead of leaving billions of them behind in squalor
Kofi Annan 2000: 6

Introduction: Why discuss global governance?

Secretary-General Kofi Annan identifies in his millennium report to the United Nations some of the pressing challenges that the world's peoples face and that fall within the UN ambit. He proposes new initiatives (such as a disaster-response initiative or a health internetwork) and enumerates priorities that people should address (such as to halve, by 2015, the proportion of the world's people with an income of less than one dollar a day). Kofi Annan states that "all these proposals are set in the context of globalization, which is transforming the world as we enter the twenty-first century" (Annan 2000: 6).

The Secretary-General is not alone in referring to globalization as a challenge to, and driving force for change of, existing international governance systems. It is widely accepted that globalization not only alters the relationship between governments and market forces but also has important implications for the identities and activities of transnational social actors (Lynch 1998). Thus, instead of states only, a triad of actors

comprising (1) states and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), (2) market forces and (3) civil society actors play important roles in existing international and evolving global governance.

International governance is the output of a non-hierarchical network of interlocking international (mostly, but not exclusively, governmental) institutions which regulate the behaviour of states and other international actors in different issue areas of world politics (Rittberger 2000: 198). *Global* governance is the output of a non-hierarchical network of international *and transnational* institutions: not only IGOs and international regimes but also transnational regimes are regulating actors' behaviour. In contrast to international governance, global governance is characterized by the decreased salience of states and the increased involvement of non-state actors in norm- and rule-setting processes and compliance monitoring. In addition, global governance is equated with multilevel governance, meaning that governance takes place not only at the national and the international level (such as in international governance) but also at the subnational, regional, and local levels. Whereas, in international governance, the addressees and the makers of norms and rules are states and other intergovernmental institutions, non-state actors (in addition to states and intergovernmental institutions) are both the addressees and the makers of norms and rules in global governance.

International governance, which has grown in the past 150 years, particularly after the Second World War, is confronted by three different challenges leading to governance gaps with which international governance systems cannot cope adequately and which, arguably, prompt a move toward global governance. First, the technological revolution, especially in information and communication technologies, not only has been a precondition of globalization but also enables, *inter alia*, citizens and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to enter the stage of world politics. Owing to this technological revolution (especially the Internet), these new actors can gather and process information more easily and rapidly and are able to formulate more timely and persuasive political appraisals. In addition, the Internet is helpful in distributing individuals' and non-state actors' statements instantaneously and inexpensively around the world.

Second (and most important), globalization has altered the relationships within the triad of actors. In order to govern effectively (i.e. to fulfil the several tasks of governance [see below]) it is necessary, first, to ensure a well-balanced relationship within the triad of actors and, second, to make it possible for these actors to participate in governance processes adequately and equitably.

Furthermore, globalization, which has accelerated since the 1990s, has given rise to heated arguments about the distribution of gains and losses

resulting from it. Today, most observers agree that there is no basis for an over-optimistic assessment of the impact of globalization. Instead of a steady increase and a fair distribution of wealth, we notice an ever-widening gap between rich and poor people in industrialized and developing countries alike (UNDP 1999). Reducing, or even closing, this gap by working toward a more equitable balance between shareholders and stakeholders in the world economy (and the national economies) is one of the formidable tasks of governance at the national, international, and global levels.

The third challenge to international governance has been the end of the cold war as a historical turning point that has enlarged the scope of action of all actors in the triad mentioned above. For example, global institutions such as the UN system have no longer been blocked by the vetoes of one or both of the two superpowers. International organizations of the UN system, such as the World Trade Organization, have been given expanded jurisdiction and are tested in their capabilities by their own success. In a similar vein, the remarkable growth of peace-keeping operations in the 1990s has exacerbated the UN budgetary predicament. Finally, the emergence of “new wars” (Kaldor 1999) and the spread of “old wars” make it more difficult for the United Nations to fulfil its task of maintaining peace.

Although these three challenges (technological revolution, globalization, and the end of the cold war) differ considerably in character, they are all contributing to, first, the emergence of *new problems or governance tasks*, such as regulating the uses of the Internet and ensuring security of information; in addition, existing governance tasks, such as the new quality of intrastate conflicts or the increasing disparities within and among nations, have become more pressing. Second, *new actors* have entered the world stage as a result of these three challenges. This heterogeneous set of new actors includes, *inter alia*, transnational corporations (TNCs) and business associations, as well as transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) (Smith, Chattfield, and Pagnucco 1997), transnational advocacy networks (cf. Keck and Sikkink 1998), and other coalitions of NGOs capable of running transnational political campaigns (cf. Boli and Thomas 1999).

Existing international governance systems fail to respond to these new problems and to deal adequately with the new actors' aspirations. Therefore, demands for more effective and responsive governance systems have arisen. International governance is reacting to this need by transforming itself (cf. Commission on Global Governance 1995; Messner and Nuscheler 1996, 1997). In order to design more effective and responsive governance systems, it is an important task for both policy makers and scholars to analyse the ongoing transformation of governance and, as far

as possible, to recommend what governance on a global scale could (or, even, should) look like. This book tries to contribute to these analyses by addressing several key questions.

The most important question is about the roles that states, IGOs such as the United Nations, and non-state actors will play in a future world order. Will they cooperate in global governance systems and, if so, how? To what extent will states still be able to attain their governance goals, such as providing security, protection, and social welfare (see Zürn, chap. 2)? Are international institutions at the regional level, such as security communities, more effective in providing security for the peoples of their respective regions? If that is the case, how can security communities be promoted where they do not yet exist (see Peou, chap. 3)? Non-state actors, such as NGOs or business corporations, seem to be increasingly important in the evolving global governance systems, both as addressees of rules and as rule makers. Thus, governing arrangements beyond the state require adjustments such that global governance resting on the triad of actors (states and IGOs; market forces; civil society actors) can substitute for international governance. To what extent can IGOs influence or even regulate these non-state actors, especially the activities of market forces (see Higgott, chap. 4)? How do NGOs interact with, or even participate in, the policy-making process of intergovernmental institutions (see Tussie and Riggirozzi, chap. 5)? In addition to studying these specific questions, some more general considerations are in order. How can global governance best be organized in order to improve on the attainment of governance goals? Is a democratic world republic the best model of global governance (see Höffe, chap. 6)? Last but not least, how can social justice be attained or furthered by a transition from international governance systems to global governance (see Tandon, chap. 7)?

In this chapter, we present some general reflections on international as well as global governance. First, we analyse international governance as it has taken shape in the past and sketch the three challenges that have contributed, and are contributing, to its current transformation. Thereafter, the deficiencies of international governance are highlighted. Next, the emergence of global governance at the beginning of the twenty-first century is analysed and evaluated. In the concluding section, we provide an overview of the book's content.

International governance at the end of the twentieth century

Before the structure and the main actors of international governance in the form in which it has existed up to the end of the twentieth century are analysed, it is necessary first to clarify the notion of governance.

The term *governance* refers to purposive systems of rules or normative orders apart from the regularities (natural orders) emerging from unrestricted interactions of self-interested actors in a state of anarchy. This implies that the actors recognize the existence of certain obligations and feel compelled, for whatever reason, to fulfil them (Mayer, Rittberger, and Zürn 1993: 393). In other words, “governance is order plus intentionality” (Rosenau 1992: 5). Governance includes the existence of a political process which “involves building consensus, or obtaining the consent or acquiescence necessary to carry out a programme, in an arena where many different interests are in play” (Hewitt de Alcántara 1998: 105).

Governance is sometimes confounded with government, although these are different concepts. The term *government* refers to formal institutions that are part of hierarchical norm- and rule-setting, monitoring of compliance with rules, and rule enforcement. Governments have the power both to make binding decisions and to enforce them; thus, governments may allocate values authoritatively (Stoker 1998: 17), although not without limitations in regard to ends and means. In contrast, *governance* is more encompassing than government (Rosenau 1992: 4). As “the capacity to get things done” (Czempiel 1992: 250), governance may take different forms: whereas at the state level it is mostly exercised by governments (governance *by* governments), above this level it needs to take the form of governance *with* (multiple) governments or governance *without* governments. The latter is defined as the exclusive regulation of social behaviour in an issue area by non-state actors, and is based on normative institutions involving a stable pattern of behaviour of a given number of actors in recurring situations. So far, governance without governments does not seem to play a paramount role in world politics, although the amount of “private regulations” is increasing (Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999). In comparison, governance with (multiple) governments (or, to be more specific, governance without a world government, but with national governments and international institutions) is defined as governance by both states and non-state actors. Although institutions of hierarchical norm- and rule-setting (governments) are involved in this form of governance, non-hierarchical norm- and rule-setting is predominant (Zürn 1998: 169–170).

It has been mentioned that governance is a purposive mechanism that is steering social systems towards their goals (Rosenau 1999: 296). These governance goals are neither constant nor exogenously determined, but, rather, are time and place specific. Governance goals are at the same time “normative goods” (as they are generally regarded as valuable and desirable) and “functional goods” (as the non-attainment of one or more of these objectives may, in the long run, lead to political crisis) (Zürn, chap. 2). However, there is no consensus on the content of core gov-

ernance goals. In a narrow sense, there are three main goals of governance, mostly pursued by governments on the state level: these are (1) to provide the population with physical security, (2) to guarantee the stable reproduction of their natural environment, and (3) to ensure their livelihood, i.e. the production and distribution of needed goods and services. In a broader and more differentiated sense, core governance goals encompass (1) security in its defence function (safeguarding the population and the territory in question against the risk of war in general) and its protective function (safeguarding individuals against the risk of crime and the destruction of the environment). Furthermore, governance is expected to provide (2) legal certainty (rule of law) and (3) channels of participation and to produce a symbolic system of reference and the communicative infrastructure within which a sense of collective civil society can develop. Finally, a goal of governance is (4) to correct inequalities that result from markets (Zürn, chap. 2).

As long as national governments were able to attain these core governance goals independently (“governance by governments”), the need for international governance was not pressing (Rittberger 2000: 192). Owing to several factors, however, the ability as well as the willingness of the separate states to pursue these governance goals on their own has constantly decreased. The experience of the economic depression of the 1930s, of the Second World War and the cold war, as well as the decolonization of the third world, have enhanced the states’ readiness or capability to cooperate and have thus strengthened the demand for international governance. In addition, international interdependence has intensified as a result of the extending exchanges and transactions among individuals and collective actors. Therefore, individual states, more often than not, cannot handle the problems arising from interdependence (or, to be more precise, from the costly effects of these interactions and transactions) independently (Keohane and Nye 1977, 1987). As a result of interdependence (and of constraints on autonomous decision-making resulting from interdependence sensitivity and vulnerability), the need for political regulations “beyond the nation-state” has increased dramatically (Mayer, Rittberger, and Zürn 1993: 393). This has prompted the states to consider the option of pooling or delegating sovereignty more frequently. Sovereignty is pooled when governmental decisions are made by common voting procedures other than unanimity; sovereignty is delegated when supranational organs are permitted to take certain decisions autonomously, without an intervening interstate vote or unilateral veto (Moravcsik 1998: 67). Delegating sovereignty rarely takes place in world politics, because most states do not readily accept an authority above themselves. Thus, delegating sovereignty may be observed more often in regional integration schemes, such as the European Union (EU). Here,

the European Commission enjoys the right of initiative in most areas of legislation coming under the jurisdiction of the EU, and to a more limited extent in external trade and accession negotiations. In world politics, the establishment of international courts, such as the International Court of Justice or the future International Criminal Court, are a result of delegating sovereignty. In contrast, pooling sovereignty is more frequent, as, for instance, in the main UN organs including even the Security Council, where decisions are taken by common voting procedures other than unanimity.

In general, the demand for international cooperation and international governance has increased during the last decades. Since the 1950s, and even more so since the 1970s, this demand has contributed to the establishment of international institutions in general and of IGOs and international regimes in particular (see Rittberger 1995: 72; Beisheim et al. 1999: 325–353). In addition, already existing international institutions have constantly gained higher attention and importance. These IGOs and international regimes have become part and parcel of the international system (“regulated anarchy,” cf. Rittberger and Zürn 1990) and have constrained the states’ behaviour. Although most international institutions have been predominantly intergovernmental, governments still have played an outstanding role in international governance. In comparison to “governance by governments” at the state level, however, international governance is less backed by formal authority, since most international institutions do not have strong monitoring, let alone enforcement mechanisms.

The following section highlights the challenges to international governance more closely.

Three challenges to international governance

The technological revolution

Over the last twenty years, a revolution in information and communication as well as in transportation technologies has taken place. This revolution has at least three different dimensions: first, the capacity of information and communication technologies has increased in qualitative as well as quantitative terms; second, common limitations in space and time have been progressively overcome, thus dramatically enhancing connections between peoples and places; third, existing information and communication technologies have been much more effectively connected and integrated in the last decades, thus stimulating the growing practice of “computer matching” (Frissen 1997: 112–115).

The technological revolution – and, with it, the heightened availability of information and communication channels, especially through the Internet – challenge national governments as well as international governance in at least four different ways:

- The progress in information and communication technology increases, in particular, non-state actors' ability to influence international politics.
- International negotiations change drastically, owing to the increased availability of information.
- The concept of citizenship is being transformed following technological developments contributing to the skill revolution.
- The Internet, being governed (mostly) by private authority, is one of the new realms of governance without governments.

Reduced transaction costs, as well as a minimized time lag, simplify communication between different actors around the globe. This enables, for instance, civil society actors to build up transnational alliances, to formulate joint statements, and to develop joint strategies in regard to issues of common interest, thus exerting influence on international political processes. By opening the public dialogue to citizens all over the world, the Internet is contributing to the establishment of more egalitarian international relations. This democratizing effect in the sense of giving voice to individual opinions in international processes, however, does not hold for *all* citizens, since in some states the openness of the Internet and its public accessibility is under state control (Shapiro 1999: 24).

At least three examples illustrate the enhanced international political role of international NGOs [(I)NGOs] arising from the achievements of the technological revolution. First, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), launched in October 1992 in New York City, has been extremely successful in building public awareness and contributing to the political resolve necessary to bring about a landmine ban (cf. Cameron, Tomlin, and Lawson 1998). As an outcome of the Ottawa Process, 122 states signed a treaty banning the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines. The ICBL, which was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997, consists of more than 1,200 (I)NGOs in some 60 countries around the world. It united national and international initiatives to achieve its goal. Since the ICBL operated without a secretariat, member organizations were free to pursue the campaign's goals as it best fitted their respective mandates and resources (Williams and Goose 1998: 22). Thus, communication among the member organizations was highly important. Although two members of the coordination committee of the ICBL observe that "a bit of mythology has developed surrounding the ICBL and its reliance on electronic mail" (*ibid.*), they admit that the use of new media has had a major impact on the ability of member organizations from diverse cultures to exchange

information and develop integrated political strategies. In particular, communication with campaigners in developing countries was improved by electronic mail (e-mail), and it did allow the campaign to share information, jointly to develop strategies more effectively, and jointly to plan major activities and conferences (ibid. 24). Without the technological revolution, these (I)NGOs could never have worked so closely together.

The second example of effective collaboration of (I)NGOs from all over the world that is based on using new technologies is the NGO Coalition for an International Criminal Court (CICC). This Coalition consists of over 800 (I)NGOs. Its main purpose has been to advocate the establishment of an effective, just and independent International Criminal Court (ICC). In order to attain this goal, the Coalition is maintaining a World Wide Web site and e-mail lists to facilitate the exchange of (I)NGOs' and experts' documentation and information about the ICC negotiations and the ad hoc War Crimes Tribunals in Arusha and the Hague between both non-state and state actors. Certainly, the compilation and distribution of reports on governments' positions concerning key issues during the ICC negotiations in Rome was among the most effective actions undertaken by the CICC. Publishing national "votes" and stances in regard to certain proposals kept the delegations, (I)NGOs, and the press informed about which positions were supported by the different countries, and thereby pinpointed where additional lobbying by (I)NGOs was necessary (Pace and Thieroff 1999: 395).

The third "success story" of (I)NGOs' activities that influenced world politics is the "Anti-MAI campaign". More than 600 (I)NGOs in more than 50 states defeated a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) by the world's 29 richest states. The talks between the members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in Paris eventually broke down after the draft agreement had been published by the international NGO network and, as a result of adverse publicity, key member states such as France changed their positions and withdrew from the negotiations (cf. Smythe 2000).

Apart from (I)NGOs, IGOs also profit from these enhanced communication possibilities. Via the Internet, the public can easily be informed of their tasks and programmes. Furthermore, both knowledge of, and compliance with, international norms (such as the protection of human rights or of the human environment) can be improved considerably, since civil society actors can refer to these norms and demand their states' compliance with them (cf. Keck and Sikkink 1998).

At first, one might conclude that the technological revolution moves the international system in the direction of being more democratic by providing better access to information and by enhancing communication flows (cf. Gellner and von Korff 1998). On further appraisal, however,

it appears equally true that the recent technological achievements may also have some negative effects on access to, and dissemination of, communication. The most important argument against the democratic qualities of contemporary information technology (IT) is, of course, that only a small (though growing) part of the world's population has access to and knowledge of it. Whereas in the OECD countries in 1998 approximately 255 personal computers and 37.86 Internet hosts per 1,000 people existed, there were only 0.26 Internet hosts per 1,000 people in developing countries (the number of personal computers was negligible). In comparison, the number of personal computers per 1,000 people (12 and 15) in the Arab states and East Asia was considerable (UNDP 1999: 201). In January 2000, 72 per cent of all Internet hosts were located in the United States but only 3 per cent in the developing countries (Afeman 2000: 430). This problem has entered UN discussion under the heading of the "digital divide." In his millennium report, Secretary-General Kofi Annan observes that the problem arises for various reasons: these include lack of resources and skills, inadequate basic infrastructure, illiteracy and lack of language training, and concerns about privacy and content (Annan 2000: 34). Thus, he announced two "bridges over the digital divide": the first is the Health InterNetwork for developing countries, which will establish and operate 10,000 on-line sites in hospitals and public health facilities throughout the developing countries in order to provide access to up-to-date health and medical information; second, the United Nations Information Technology Service (UNITEs) will train groups of people in developing countries in the use of IT. Although both initiatives certainly are a step in the right direction, they will probably not be able positively to bridge the "digital divide."

The second aspect of the challenge to international governance deriving from the technological revolution refers to international negotiations which, as a result of the heightened availability of information, have undergone profound changes. As is generally assumed, even important and far-reaching decisions often have to be made through a haze of uncertainty (Young 1994: 101–102). These informational gaps not only impair adequate assessment of the problem given but also make it difficult to find an acceptable – let alone optimal – solution. Additional information, of course, reduces this uncertainty. On the other hand, new and supplementary information may complicate a situation even further, as the number of possible arguments in favour of, or against, a policy increases and the spectrum of outcomes widens. Thus, the surplus of information may foster the decision makers' uncertainty with regard to their individual preferences instead of allaying it, and negotiations may become prolonged rather than eased and curtailed. Some authors suggest that the pace of technological progress not only influences the time-frame of

international negotiations but also has even outstripped governments' ability to structure political processes and make use of the new technologies (Reinicke and Deng 2000: 2).

The third aspect of this challenge to international governance is on a "micro-level": the technological revolution is contributing to a transformation of citizenship due to the skill revolution. Skill revolution means that people have become "increasingly more competent in assessing where they fit in international affairs and how their behavior can be aggregated into significant collective outcomes" (Rosenau 1997: 58–59). The effects of the skill revolution are not necessarily positive in terms of leading to the evolution of globally shared values or a less self-centred and more humane mankind; on the contrary, the skill revolution also leads "to more selfish conduct, in which the welfare of larger systems is ignored" (Rosenau 1995: 4). It has both widened and narrowed people's consciousness and thus has altered the concept of citizenship. "In some parts of the world people have raised their sights above the nation-state and shifted their responsiveness to authority 'upward' to transnational or supranational entities; others have shifted in a 'downward' direction and become responsive to their subgroups ..." (Rosenau 1995: 4).

Another, fourth, aspect of the challenge to international governance posed by the technological revolution is provided by the Internet as a realm largely governed by private authority. In the late 1980s, the US Department of Defense and the US National Science Foundation began to privatize the Internet. Originally designed for the exchange of military data, the Internet was mostly used by university researchers, government scientists, and outside computer engineers before the late 1980s. Ever since, commercial interest in the Internet has constantly been growing. Although, initially, it was used mainly by private business to offer infrastructural services, it was soon conquered by commercial providers who offered Internet access to a large group of private and commercial users (Spar 1999: 34). Though anarchy in the Internet probably has to be tolerated to a certain extent, many users demand a stricter regulation of conduct. Their arguments for a higher degree of control in the Internet are (a) that serious business has to be based on a set of fundamental rules (i.e. reliability and predictability), and (b) that the amount of information with "objectionable content"¹ (i.e. pornographic, violent, blasphemous, dissident, or hate-mongering) should be reduced drastically. Thus, a new governance task, namely to regulate the uses of the Internet and to assure security and safety of the information infrastructure, has arisen (Florini 2000: 21).

So far, international governance has failed to establish these rules. The initiative of regulating the Internet could be taken by separate national governments according to their own legislative traditions and spe-

cific national interests, if the uses of the Internet could be confined to national territories. This, however, is not entirely feasible, owing to the Internet's decentralized technical structure. Neither would international organizations be capable of governing the Internet, since the processes of reaching agreements and making decisions on an international level run much too slowly to match the rapid-fire rate of technological change (Spar 1999: 47). Thus, the private sector has been prompted to develop the rules for regulating its conduct all by itself. An example of this self-coordination of private actors is the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the technical coordination body for the Internet. Created in October 1998 by a broad coalition of the Internet's business, technical, and academic user communities, ICANN has assumed responsibility for a set of tasks, such as coordinating the assignment of Internet domain names and protocol parameters. ICANN is an example for the establishment of private authority (Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999), where non-governmental entities tilt the delicate balance between the private sector and government closer to the side of the former (Spar 1999: 32).

To sum up, the technological revolution has had both positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, the Internet in particular contributes to strengthening democratizing trends by enabling citizens and civil society actors around the world to participate in public dialogues. On the other hand, the Internet facilitates the dissemination of objectionable information and may also be utilized by criminal and terrorist organizations. Because of the decentralized structure of the Internet, both traditional methods of exercising jurisdictional authority (by national governments and international governance) and alternative models of cooperation among international information disseminators are faced with the risk of failure in regulating the use (and the content) of the global information flows (Hurley and Mayer-Schönberger 2000). In addition, the technological revolution increases the capacity of non-state actors relative to states to take part in international political processes, thus creating a much larger number of players in the international system (Florini 2000: 21).

Globalization

Globalization has become a "fashionable concept" (Hirst and Thompson 1996: 1), although there is neither a consensus definition nor a common understanding of the sources and consequences of globalization (Beisheim and Walter 1997: 153). Thus, Richard Higgott asserts that globalization is "the most over-used and under-specified concept since the end

of the Cold War” (see Higgott, chap. 4 as well as Devetak and Higgott 1999: 483).

In general, there are two major ways of defining the concept of globalization.² In a narrow sense, globalization denotes a continuous process of increasing cross-border economic flows, both “financial and real,”³ which are conducive to greater economic interdependence among formerly distinct national economies (Reinicke 1998: 6). It can thus be defined more precisely as the “tendency towards international economic integration, liberalization and financial deregulation beyond the sovereignty of the territorial state” (Higgott, chap. 4). In this context, globalization is interchangeable with economic interdependence. This implies that globalization is not an entirely new phenomenon, for economic interdependence among states has been observed as a characteristic of the international system since the beginning of the 1970s (and may date even further back, as some authors claim, e.g. Hirst and Thompson 1996).⁴ As interstate and transnational interactions and exchange relationships have accelerated since the 1970s and 1980s, interdependence has deepened.

In its broader sense, the term globalization is not restricted to the mechanisms of cross-border *economic* transactions. Instead, it means the extension of cross-border *societal* exchanges and transactions (Zürn 1995: 141)⁵ in a wide range of non-economic areas such as communication and culture (interaction of signs and symbols), mobility (transboundary movement of persons), security (exchange of, or jointly produced, threats), and environment (exchange of pollutants and the joint production of environmental risks) (Beisheim et al. 1999; Walter, Dreher, and Beisheim 1997; Zürn 1998: 73–95) as well. Globalization thus denotes the “widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all types of contemporary social life, from the cultural to the criminal, the financial to the spiritual” (Held et al. 1999a: 2). It is not restricted to the economic realm, but includes a general accumulation of links across the world’s major regions and across many domains of social activity (Held et al. 1999b: 483). In that broader sense, globalization has a historical dimension (Keohane and Nye 2000a). Probably the oldest form of globalization is environmental: “[C]limate change has affected the ebb and flow of human populations for millions of years” (Keohane and Nye 2000b: 3). Globalization in a military context dates from the times of Alexander the Great’s expeditions of 2,300 years ago (ibid.: 4). These different dimensions of globalization have appeared and disappeared again over the centuries. These historical manifestations of globalization can be characterized as “thin” globalization. For example, the Silk Road provided an economic and cultural link between ancient Europe and Asia, but the road was plied by a small group of traders and the goods primarily had a direct impact on a small group of consumers along

the road only (ibid.: 7). In comparison, today's globalization is "thick," being more both intensive and extensive.

As mentioned above, theoretical approaches to globalization differ widely and there is no consensus yet whether globalization is indeed a *global* or rather a *regional* or *interregional* phenomenon. Whereas some scholars suggest that globalization mostly, though not exclusively, takes place among the OECD countries (see e.g. Zürn, chap. 2), others claim that it has a worldwide effect. Robert Cox, for example, observes that globalization "implies a progressive integration of all people into the world economy ... [and] implies, in consequence, an increasing homogenisation of global culture, with the development of common patterns of consumption and common aspirations as to the nature of the 'good life'" (Cox 1997: xxii).

It is important to note that globalization, in all cases mentioned, has emerged not accidentally but as the result of political strategies of the world's leading states, aiming at the "neo-liberal" goal of establishing an advantageous political-economic order on both the national and the global level (cf. Higgott, chap. 4). Deregulation, economic liberalization, and privatization are preconditions of globalization that have been implemented first in the United States ("Reaganomics") and Great Britain ("Thatcherism") (cf. Altvater and Mahnkopf 1996; Scherrer 1999). Thus, the shift from state intervention to market self-rule, the so-called "retreat of the state," has been in large part the consequence of governmental policies in leading OECD countries (Strange 1996: 44). Apart from the national governments mentioned above, intergovernmental organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, have for some time played a major role in supporting globalization since their work has been determined by the same principles, namely deregulation, liberalization, and privatization (see Higgott, chap. 4 for the Washington Consensus).

Globalization depends on commonly accepted norms and rules that ensure competition, such as "rules of property," "rules of exchange," and "rules of enforcement" (Spar 1999: 32). More generally speaking, the market as an institution is dependent on a set of external (i.e. non-market) institutions such as property rights or public mass education in order to function effectively and efficiently. Without non-market mechanisms to coordinate collective action, these public goods tend to be underproduced. Therefore, it is important for the functioning of market economies that the provision of these public goods is ensured (Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern 1999a: xx). Some specialized agencies of the United Nations (such as the World Trade Organization [WTO] or the World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO]) contribute to the establishment and protection of this kind of stable (commercial) order by provid-

ing, maintaining, and usefully extending the “soft infrastructure” (Zacher 1999: 6). In general, however, the output of international norms and regulations to ensure the provision of these public goods on a global scale has not kept pace with the rising demand for them (Väyrynen 1999).

Globalization challenges international governance systems in at least three ways. First, it tends to contribute to a widening of the gap between rich and poor, which indicates that international governance systems fail to attain one of the primary goals of governance, i.e. to provide for social welfare. Second, owing to deregulation, economic liberalization, and privatization, transboundary market forces (most importantly, TNCs) are increasingly participating in international affairs. As a consequence, the balance within the triad of inter- and transnational actors has changed and needs to be (re-)adjusted. Third, civil society actors react to this failure of international governance and to the changed balance within the triad by forming alliances and protesting against this development and other unwelcome effects of globalization (cf. Nye 2000).

Social welfare on the global level has become an increasingly important governance task in the era of globalization. At first glance, this statement may surprise, as it has been widely believed that globalization would open up new opportunities and increase the welfare of all peoples. Some analysts point out that free trade has contributed to improving the world economic situation in the last decades (e.g. WTO 2000). The per capita incomes, for instance, have more than tripled as global gross domestic product (GDP) increased nine times in the past 50 years; the share of people enjoying “medium human development” had risen from 55 per cent in 1975 to 66 per cent in 1997 (UNDP 1998: 25). At the same time, however, the gap between poor and rich, both worldwide and within states, has not narrowed but has widened: the top fifth part of the world population in the richest states capture 82 per cent of the expanding exports and 68 per cent of foreign direct investment; the bottom fifth capture hardly more than 1 per cent (UNDP 1998: 31). The difference between the incomes of the richest and poorest states has grown from 35:1 in 1950 to 71:1 in 1992 (UNDP 1999: 6). Formulating and implementing appropriate policy responses to contain these gaps seems to be imperative, especially because citizens of states generally referred to as “winners of globalization” also suffer from its negative effects. In the United States and the United Kingdom, the inequality of income distribution, measured by the Gini coefficient,⁶ has risen by a rate of more than 16 per cent from the 1980s to the early 1990s (UNDP 1999: 6; cf. also Tandon, chap. 8; Stewart and Berry 1999). Countering the negative effects of globalization by appropriate public policy, and thus preventing global social disparities from progressing even further, seems to be one of the foremost tasks of governance. Nevertheless, existing international governance sys-

tems have not been able to redistribute wealth or to provide compensatory mechanisms that underwrite social cohesion (Devetak and Higgott 1999: 488).

The second aspect of the challenge to international governance systems resulting from globalization is the altered relationship between business actors and states (cf. Higgott and Phillips 2000). Owing to deregulation, economic liberalization, and privatization on both the national and the international level, not only the number of TNCs but also their influence in world politics has risen. Today, TNCs control financial capital, technology, employment, and natural resources to an unprecedented extent. Their transnational production has grown in scale, scope, and intensity (Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999: 14). TNCs use their power resources in world politics both by trying to influence governmental and intergovernmental policy-making and by cooperating with other market actors: private actors are increasingly involved in authoritative decision-making that was previously the prerogative of national governments or intergovernmental institutions. For instance, TNCs have displayed a remarkable prominence in the Uruguay Round negotiations of the GATT. Besides TNCs' activities in trade negotiations, they play a prominent role in environmental and even security issues (ibid.: 16). Additionally, they have intensified their cooperation with other market competitors. The result of this "interfirm cooperation" is the establishment of private authority over transnational affairs (ibid.). This "industry self-regulation" seeks to attain four major aims: these are (1) to establish international standards to increase efficiency in global transactions; (2) to ensure the security of these transactions; (3) to maintain industry autonomy by preempting or preventing government regulation; and (4) to respond to societal demands and expectations of appropriate corporate behaviour ("good corporate citizenship") (Haufler 2000: 126). In order to reach these goals, industries agree to international standard regimes (such as those initiated and monitored by the International Organization for Standardization) or to codes of conduct (such as the Responsible Care programme) (cf. Haufler 2000).

The protests of civil society groups against the negative effects of globalization highlight another aspect of this challenge to international governance. The civil protests have coalesced in an "antiglobalization movement", a heterogeneous network of (among others) labour unions, environmentalists, and churches. Lory Wallach, one of the organizers of the protests in Seattle, summarizes the common ground of the movement members as follows:

- All of them query "the democratic deficit in the global economy," which tends to undermine the credibility and legitimacy of international (economic) institutions.

- They all “feel directly damaged by the actual outcomes of the status quo, albeit in different ways” (Wallach 2000: 47).

Protest activities of civil society groups at important international conferences have attracted an unexpected amount of public attention. When the “No New Round Turnaround” campaign organized the protests at the WTO meeting in Seattle 1999, neither the city administration nor the police were in the least prepared for the number of participants. One year later, in Prague 2000, the officials were already expecting mass demonstrations to accompany the IMF and World Bank Annual Meeting, and the UN Millennium Summit in New York City in fall 2000 brought about protest activities of civil society groups as well. The so-called “S8 Mobilization campaign” demanded a “truly democratic United Nations” and queried the role of global business in world affairs, especially in the UN system (Crosette 2000: 4). These joint activities of heterogeneous civil society groups have been described as “globalization-from-below” (Falk 1999: 131; cf. Mittelman 2000: 26; Tussie and Riggiozzi, chap. 5).

These three aspects of globalization – the widening gap between poor and rich and the growing relevance of both market forces and civil society actors – profoundly alter the states’ performance in international governance systems. Nation-states have lost their position as the paramount loci of governance, yet they continue to play a significant role in the evolving global governance (see Zürn, chap. 2; Messner 1998; for a detailed discussion see also the sections on the limits of international governance systems and towards global governance, pp. 19–35).

The end of the cold war

The main problems of international politics in the cold war period with regard to governance systems can be summarized as (1) unstable cooperation between East and West at best and conflict brinkmanship at worst, and (2) the dramatically reduced scope of action of most international organizations, especially the UN system.

With the end of the cold war, the structure of the international system began to change. This transformation challenged the international governance systems in several ways. Most importantly, bipolarity no longer limited the international organizations’ scope of action, as a consequence of which they succeeded in gaining greater salience in world politics. After the Security Council’s ability to act ceased to be blocked by the antagonism of the two superpowers, the way to peaceful conflict management seemed to be open (cf. Betts 1994). Thus, in the early 1990s, an extraordinary increase in the number of peace-keeping operations can be observed: whereas the United Nations initiated no more than 15 peace-keeping operations in the long period between 1945 and 1989, the Secu-

rity Council authorized 18 between 1989 and 1994 alone (Peou chap. 3).⁷ The intensified action of the Security Council is a result of the re-definition of what is seen as a threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression according to Article 39 of the UN Charter, and of a revised notion of what is considered to be sovereign national activity (Doyle 1998: 4).

This remarkable new trend has caused two major difficulties, however: first, the deployment of troops acceptable to all conflict parties has become increasingly problematic (Armstrong, Lloyd, and Redmond 1996: 130); second, the apparently endless demand for peace-keeping has compounded the United Nation's financial problems. The expenditure for peace-keeping operations rose from 31.04 per cent of the total budget in 1990 to 49.92 per cent in 1997. At the same time, the budgetary shortfall due to unpaid contributions by several member states, above all the United States, amounted to about US\$3 billion in 2000.

In addition to being confronted with these two difficulties, the United Nations faces novel, grave obstacles to fulfilling its task of maintaining international peace and security. This results from the fact that the features of war have changed drastically in the last decades. Today, most wars are intrastate instead of interstate (Hippler 1999: 422; cf. also Rohloff and Schindler 2000). In the 1980s and 1990s, this new kind of war evolved especially in Africa, the Balkans, and in the south of the former Soviet Union (Daase 1999; Kaldor 1999). "New wars" differ from "old wars" with regard to their goals and the methods of warfare, and in the way that they are financed. Whereas "old wars" served geopolitical or ideological goals, most "new wars" are concerned with identity politics (national, clan, religious, or linguistic identity). New warfare draws on the experience of both guerrilla warfare and counter-insurgency: the military units combine different groups with a decentralized organization. In old, conventional wars, battles were the decisive encounters: here, the actors were typically vertically organized units. The war economies of "old wars" were centralized and autarchic; in "new wars," they are decentralized and heavily dependent on external resources (Kaldor 1999: 6–8).

So far, the United Nations has failed to prevent (sometimes, even to mitigate or speedily to terminate) these "new wars." This is partly due to the constraints of institutional mechanisms: they were created in order to deal with "old wars" and are thus less capable of handling this new kind of armed conflict effectively (cf. Ropers and Debiel 1995). Thus, it might be helpful to include new actors in conflict-resolution mechanisms. Since "unofficial actors," such as NGO representatives or citizens' groups (so-called Track Two diplomacy), nowadays perform a range of supplemental or parallel functions to the official interstate relations

(Track One diplomacy), they may help to improve relationships between different actors at various levels and among different individuals and groups. However, up to now Track One and Track Two diplomacy have not been coordinated adequately. The United Nations should thus consider establishing such coordinating mechanisms (Rasmussen 1997: 43; cf. Zartman 1999) or to react otherwise by adapting its institutional structure to the new characteristics of war.

In addition to this institutional adaptation of the United Nations to the “new wars,” the United Nations should rethink its “paradigm of intervention.” The limited effectiveness of some UN missions, such as those in Congo, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia, suggests the need for a new approach in peace-keeping (cf. Mockaitis 1999). A new “paradigm of intervention” should take into account, *inter alia*, the fact that, more often than not, a consent of the parties is missing (Annan 1998b: 172). Thus, a consensus as to what the ultimate goals of a mission shall be is even more important. The United Nations appears to be the agency of choice for developing and implementing this new “paradigm of intervention,” as it has conducted peace missions of various kinds for the half-century of its existence (Mockaitis 1999: 138).

Limits of international governance systems

The (non-)attainment of governance goals at the end of the twentieth century

In the previous sections, three different challenges (technological revolution, globalization, and the end of the cold war) to international governance systems have been outlined. Under these altered circumstances, the effectiveness of the present international governance system, which is part of governance legitimacy, turns out to be insufficient in at least two regards.

First, it has been suggested that new governance tasks have arisen – such as, for instance, the regulation of the Internet. In addition, long-term problems have grown more pressing. Today’s international governance systems have not been able adequately to meet these demands on their policy-making capabilities. This is especially true for “trans-sovereign problems” (Cusimano 2000), i.e. problems extending across state borders in an almost uncontrollable way. Examples are environmental threats, refugee flows, nuclear smuggling, or international criminal activities. In the last decades, the number and extent of these problems have clearly risen.

Second, new actors have entered the world stage and other non-

territorial actors, such as international (governmental and non-governmental) organizations, have multiplied. The examples of the ICBL, the NGO CICC, and the Anti-MAI campaign show that non-state actors' exertion of influence on international politics is facilitated by the achievements of the technological revolution. Additionally, the influence of transnational corporations and business associations on world politics has risen as a result of deregulation, economic liberalization, and privatization.

A critical assessment of the work of international governance systems clearly demonstrates that they fail to deal adequately with these new problems and the new actors' aspirations. Thus, the attainment of governance goals by international governance systems, in which states play a paramount role, seems to be extremely difficult, if not impossible.

1. The defence function of governance (safeguarding a certain population and territory against the risk of war) cannot be sufficiently fulfilled by most states. In many regions of the world, people are suffering from war. With the number of wars having increased since the end of the cold war, the number of people affected by war has multiplied correspondingly (Peou, chap. 3). Furthermore, most states are even less able to fulfil their protective function adequately (safeguarding individuals against the risks of crime and destruction of the environment) as global "evils" (e.g. terrorism, drugs, diseases) cross borders more easily. The most prominent examples of this type of transnational security problem are terrorist organizations and transnational criminal organizations (cf. Rittberger, Schrader, and Schwarzer 1999; Williams and Savona 1996; Williams 1999).
2. The important governance goal of ensuring legal certainty (rule of law) cannot generally be fulfilled. This is most obviously demonstrated by states such as Somalia and Sierra Leone. With the number of "failed states" having increased in the last decades, this governance goal is even less likely to be met in many regions of the world than ever before.⁸
3. Many citizens criticize their limited opportunities to participate in, or at least to influence, public policy-making as insufficient (see below).
4. Finally, the growing gap between rich and poor, both all over the world and within individual states, shows that the governance goal of correcting socio-economic disparities that result from the functioning of markets also cannot generally be attained.

The continual non-attainment of governance goals by international governance systems calls for more effective governance systems. As a consequence of the limitations of international governance systems, efforts to overcome them will orient themselves towards global governance. In order to develop concepts of more effective and responsive governance

Table 1.1 Limits of international governance systems

Output legitimacy	Input legitimacy
Jurisdictional gap Operational gap Incentive gap	Participatory gap

systems, the causes for the failure of international governance systems to attain governance goals must be analysed in more detail.

Four governance gaps undermine the governance systems' legitimacy

The failure of international governance systems to attain their governance goals, and thus the reduction of their legitimacy, mainly originates from four governance gaps. As the following section suggests, these four gaps considerably impair the capacity of international governance systems to deal with urgent problems (output dimension of legitimacy) and impede some actors' opportunities to participate in public policy-making (input dimension of legitimacy) (table 1.1).

The previous sections have indicated that the attainment of governance goals by international governance systems has become increasingly difficult. This is particularly true for transsovereign problems. This lack of effectiveness has been referred to as the governance systems' reduced output legitimacy (Zürn 2000: 184; Scharpf 1998a; cf. also Keohane and Nye 2000c). In general, output legitimacy is achieved or maintained whenever "collectively binding decisions ... serve the common interest of the constituency" (Scharpf 1998b: 3). Obviously, international governance systems have not been sufficiently effective in dealing with existing problems and have thus failed, for the most part, to achieve output legitimacy.

Three major governance gaps have contributed to the undermining of the output legitimacy of international governance systems, as follows.

1. *A jurisdictional gap* (Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern 1999a: xxvi): Even though many political challenges are global today, public policy-making is still predominantly national in both focus and scope. The most prominent example of this kind of border-crossing or globally relevant problems are the transsovereign problems already mentioned above, e.g. environmental degradation. Global threats such as the greenhouse effect, for example, cannot effectively be countered by uncoordinated national policies and thus call for a global climate policy to regulate the behaviour of all states as well as non-state actors.

2. *An operational gap*: Policy makers and public institutions lack the policy-relevant information and analysis as well as the necessary policy instruments to respond to the daunting complexity of policy issues (Reinicke and Deng 2000: vii). This is especially true in environmental politics. Since clear-cut causal chains are rare in this issue area, decision-making is often impeded by informational uncertainty. Furthermore, the management of current problems is often interrupted by the advent of even more pressing new ecological problems. To meet these requirements, a permanent process of learning and adjustment is necessary (Brühl and Simonis 2000: 8). Therefore, scientific experts as well as NGOs play an important part in the processes of decision-making in this issue area by providing scientific analysis, transforming it into policy-relevant knowledge, and proposing adequate policy responses.
3. *An incentive gap* (Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern 1999a: xxvi): Since international cooperation has become more salient in international relations, the implementation of international agreements has become essential. Today, the operational follow-up of international agreements remains underdeveloped; moral suasion, or shaming, frequently is the only mechanism available to induce states to comply with international obligations (Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern 1999b: 451). This compliance problem makes it difficult for international institutions (as parts of the existing international governance systems and evolving global governance) to contribute effectively to the attainment of governance goals as they continue to depend on the willingness of individual states to implement international regulations.

In addition to these three governance gaps, which undermine the output legitimacy of international governance systems, a fourth, *participatory* gap has opened up (Reinicke and Deng 2000: viii; Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern 1999a: xxvi). As more and more public policies are made by or within international institutions, the general public or particular stakeholders are frequently excluded from their deliberations and decisions. Thus, input legitimacy is reduced as well (cf. Kohler-Koch 1998).⁹ Input legitimacy is given when collectively binding decisions derive from the constituents' active consent (Scharpf 1998a: 85). Participation and consent thus are essential elements of input legitimacy (Rittberger 2000: 210). The addressees' acceptance of norms and rules as binding hinges on their participation in creating and implementing them. According to Seymour Martin Lipset (1960: 79), effective governance depends both on the invention of beneficial solutions to pressing social needs and on general access to the political process. The subjects' loyalty can be obtained only by preserving their right to participate actively in political decision-making processes. Input legitimacy may be undermined by several fac-

tors: (1) new social forces with the power to revolt against the established order are denied access to the political process; or (2) participation is devalued for recognized actors who still have sufficient power to hamper a smooth functioning of the governance system (Rittberger 2000: 210). In both cases, these actors feel deprived of their part in influencing rule creation and rule management affecting their interests. Being kept away from the political process, they tend to ignore the established order whenever feasible.

From the vantage point of a state-centric approach focusing on the horizontal self-coordination of sovereign states, input legitimacy of international governance systems is not likely to be undermined as long as states remain the dominant actors in world politics (Young 1994: 99–100). The participation of states' representatives in institutional bargaining mechanisms is ensured by the fact that these bargaining processes themselves are structured by a consensus rule. Owing to the principle of state sovereignty, no state can be bound to certain norms and rules against its consent; generally acceptable solutions for collective-action problems thus have to be formulated. The consensus rule for international negotiations therefore guarantees mutually acceptable results in processes of horizontal self-coordination of states, i.e. international governance systems (Rittberger 2000: 211).

However, international governance systems have increasingly come under pressure on both theoretical and practical grounds. The difficulties derive from at least two basic developments. First, owing to the ever-expanding and ever-deepening transnational connections, national governments are successively losing their monopoly of representing their societies in international political processes. As suggested in the previous sections, influential new actors with a growing ability to affect the authoritative allocation of values have emerged in the global arena. These new actors challenge the input legitimacy of purely intergovernmental policy-making (Rittberger 2000: 212). Second, as a result of the growing need for international or global solutions for formerly national problems, the subjects of democratic states, having minimal influence on the processes of collective decision-making on the international level, feel increasingly alienated from the political process (cf. Scharpf 1993).

The United Nations may serve to underpin this argument. Like other international institutions, the UN system is state-centric. Even if the governments of the member states are elected democratically (and many of them are not), the input legitimacy of public policy-making within these institutions is rather low because of the distance between decision makers and the people affected by these decisions (Bienen, Rittberger, and Wagner 1998). "The Peoples of the United Nations," to which the opening paragraph of the UN Charter refers, have had few, if any prom-

ising avenues open to them for making themselves heard by the UN policy-making bodies.

Towards global governance

Finding ways to close these governance gaps is one of the most prominent tasks of politicians and political scientists. In this section, we first present three different models of international or global governance. In terms of desirability and feasibility, however, only one model remains. We then outline and discuss some reform proposals and the ongoing change in global governance, such as the opening of the UN system towards non-state actors. To conclude this section, we ask whether these changes are contributing to more effective and legitimate global governance.

Three models of global governance

With the end of the cold war as a historical turning point that had triggered a moment of euphoria (Young 1997: 273), a discussion about the future structure(s) of world politics has begun. In the first years after the end of bipolarity, the discussion centred on the question of whether the world would be structured in a uni-, tri-, or multipolar way. Since then the main emphasis of the discussion has changed, and more general questions are being asked, such as what effective global governance looks like and, in particular, whether hierarchical or non-hierarchical governance systems are more effective and legitimate.

At least three different models of global governance can be distinguished. Whereas protagonists of a hierarchical model argue that a world state (or at least a hegemonic power) would be necessary to ensure the effectiveness and legitimacy of global governance, advocates of a non-hierarchical governance system suggest that horizontal self-coordination would suffice to achieve effective and legitimate global governance just as well as, or even better than, the hierarchical models (cf. Rittberger, Mogler, and Zangl 1997; Rittberger 2000).

Authoritative coordination by a world state

The first model associates global governance with various conceptions of a world state. Advocates of this model hold that mutual respect for norms and rules cannot be expected under conditions of anarchy. As long as states have to worry about their national integrity and as long as they are afraid that others will break their promises, cooperation and joint institution-building will be the exception in world politics. Following

this line of reasoning, the mutual fear of being attacked or exploited by others can be effectively reduced only by installing a “Leviathan,” – i.e. by creating a central authority with the capacity to make and enforce norms and rules. Only if it is commonly realized that the benefits of rule-breaking are outweighed by the inescapable negative sanctions that it provokes, can states risk relying on public institutions that are designed to manage collective-action problems or the problem of distributing the gains from cooperation. With “Leviathan” on their side, no other state will dare to exploit them.

However, as long as rational actors pursue their interests in an anarchical environment, they are trapped in a state of insecurity about their survival and well-being. In such a situation every state has to take care of itself and to base its strategies on worst-case scenarios. Therefore, nobody expects others to abide by rules that are not sanctioned by a power that keeps them all in awe. The basic idea underlying the model of the world state is thus that rational actors (even when their interests are not strictly opposed to one another) are unable to cooperate unless their freedom of action is restrained by a central authority above them. At the same time, the creation of a central authority would fundamentally alter the structure of the international system. The anarchically organized society of sovereign states would cease to exist and would give way to a centralized, though multinational, polity where the monopoly of the legitimate use of force is vested in a supranational institution possessing the requisite powers of governing.

The emergence of a world state is sometimes conceived of via analogy with the process of state-building in post-medieval Europe. According to German sociologist Norbert Elias (1976), there were two crucial elements driving the civilizing process that involved the formation of the territorial state: the first was the increased interdependence among social actors as a result of extended exchange relations and the second was the monopolization of the legitimate use of physical force. During this civilizing process, humans learned to control their innate drives and subordinated themselves to, or internalized, norms and rules of social conduct. The monopolization of the means of physical force that has accompanied the formation of modern states reflects, according to Elias, a general process toward concentrating the control over the means of physical force in world history. Consequently, one might expect a similar development to occur at the international level. At the end of this process, the concept and the function of the modern state would find its replication on a global scale.

The world state does not need to have a centralized structure with a unitary world government that governs by centralized “top-down” mechanisms. In contrast, one could also think of the world state organized ac-

according to the principle of subsidiarity (cf. Höffe 1997). Large intermediary regional units of continental or subcontinental size could be the basis of a world state (Höffe, chap. 7; cf. also Höffe 1999). A world republic would be governed by a federal world government. The scope of a world state's tasks is limited to issues that cannot be dealt with by the individual state. The federal world republic thus does deny the state's authority (Höffe, chap. 7).

Although a world state may be most effective in ensuring compliance with international norms and rules, it may not be feasible or desirable. As to the feasibility of this model, one is left to wonder whether there is any sign of a world people or citizenry in the making. In addition, nothing indicates that the United Nations or another institution will be transformed into a world federal government at any time in the near future (Falk 1995: 6). As to the desirability of a world state, one has to contemplate the prospect of creating a world state requiring, by definition, the establishment of a worldwide legal monopoly of physical force, which could be accomplished only by restraining powerfully various forces of local and national resistance against this project of global governance.

Hierarchical though not authoritative coordination: Governance under the hegemonic umbrella

The second model of global governance also assumes that compliance can be achieved only through a hierarchical sanctioning power. International governance under the hegemonic umbrella substitutes the world state by a hegemon, i.e. a very powerful state that might be considered a functional equivalent to a supranational authority (Lake 1993). Owing to the overwhelming power resources that it controls, the hegemon has the means to create international norms and rules and to secure compliance with them. These norms and rules are tailored to the interests of their maker; however, the particular national interests of the hegemon, to a great extent, converge with the interests of the system (Waltz 1979: 189). The subordination of other states to the hegemonic order, and their compliance with the rules that constitute this order, is guaranteed by the superior power of the hegemon. However, this power-based explanation is just one side of the coin: non-hegemonic states can also have an interest in fostering a hegemonic order, because it provides benefits, such as economic gains and security, for them.

According to this model, the effectiveness of international institutions is held hostage to the hegemon's continuing ability to maintain order. The model of hegemonic governance implies hierarchy, but the hegemon is not equivalent to a world (or regional) government. The hegemonic system is still composed of sovereign states. The hegemonic order most likely could, and would, cover only a much smaller range of international

activities, leaving those (global or regional) cooperation problems unattended that are not vital from the point of view of the hegemon. Another difference between the hegemonic order and the world state model is that a hegemonic order can, but need not, be global.

Governance under the hegemonic umbrella is not desirable because hegemony is a temporary phenomenon (although one that, according to some theories, recurs in a cyclical manner). This type of governance system would be unstable, and the rise and fall of hegemons does not take place without major conflicts (or, sometimes, even wars) in world politics. Therefore, the model plays a minor role in discussions on future governance systems, even though it attracted much attention in the early 1990s (Group of Lisbon 1996).

Order as a result of horizontal self-coordination: Governance without world government

The third model, governance without world government, does not assume that the effectiveness of international institutions depends, in one way or another, on hierarchical rule-making and rule-enforcement, and therefore, on the concentration of the means of physical force on the global level. As a consequence, the civilizing process, with its concomitant growth of transactions and interdependencies, may continue without some monopoly of physical force emerging on the world scene. Indeed, increasing interdependence, especially mutual vulnerability, improves the prospects for horizontal self-coordination by and among equals (Keohane 1993: 35).

In this model, the coordination of international activities is affected by states agreeing, for their mutual benefit, upon norms and rules to guide their future behaviour and to create mechanisms which make compliance with these rules and norms possible (i.e. in each actor's self-interest). One of the premises of this model is that rational actors are assumed to be aware of the fact that, under circumstances that are increasingly present in today's world, collective action will lead to outcomes which are individually, let alone collectively, preferable to the results of unilateral action. To break an agreement will necessarily entail a loss of reputation as a reliable partner. A reputation of untrustworthiness would exclude a government from future cooperative ventures. Thus, one could expect that the higher the density of international transactions in an issue-area and the longer the shadow of the future, the more likely is the establishment and the maintenance of international institutions if collective-action problems arise and persist.

This third model varies with regard to its state-centrism. Some scholars argue that nation-states will remain the most important actors (Cox 1997: xvi). According to this notion, governance without world government is

more or less the same as the model of international governance that was predominant in the late twentieth century, in which states and inter-governmental institutions attempt to regulate the behaviour of states and other international actors. Others predict that states will disaggregate over time into separate, functionally distinct parts, and that these parts will network with their counterparts abroad, thus creating a dense web of relations that constitute a transnational order (Slaughter 1997: 185). This model is even more far-reaching than global governance as defined at the beginning of this article, since it suggests that states remain important, though not paramount, actors in evolving global governance.

Research shows that governance without governments is widespread in industrially developed societies. The model proved to be quite helpful in understanding the success and the failure of attempts at institution-building in both military and political-economic relations (Axelrod and Keohane 1985: 227; Young 1989: 375; Zürn 1992: 505–506). In addition, governance without world government is entirely suitable to close the governance gaps discussed in the previous section. As long as states (and non-state actors) recognize that problems and conflicts can best be regulated through cooperation, governance legitimacy in its output dimension is likely to be secured. To be more precise, the jurisdictional gap is closed as transsovereign problems are dealt with through international or transnational institutions. The incentive gap is narrowed because states are interested in complying with international norms and rules (at least as long as they consider that existing problems could best be dealt with at the international level). The operational gap is narrowed inasmuch as non-state actors play an important role in this governance model, thereby bringing their knowledge and resources to bear on the international and transnational policy-making processes. In addition, the participatory gap is also narrowed since non-state actors, such as civil society groups, have access to (or are even participants in) decision-making bodies. In sum, this model is desirable as well as feasible.

From international to global governance

The three models depicted in the previous section are not currently implemented, nor can any one of them serve as an outline for the future. Current international governance and evolving global governance have to be regarded, rather, as a patchwork of heterogeneous elements deriving from governance under the hegemonic umbrella (e.g. in security communities, cf. Peou, chap. 3) as well as governance without world government (e.g. international regimes). As governance without world government appears to be the most desirable and feasible of possible governance models, it is discussed in this section in more detail.

To gain a foothold in the future, global governance will have to overcome the governance gaps (jurisdictional, operational, incentive, and participatory gaps) that curtailed the effectiveness and legitimacy of twentieth-century international governance systems. However, there is no general consensus about how these gaps can and should be narrowed or even closed. Several reform proposals, especially concerning the structures and functions of international organizations have been put forward.¹⁰ The following section summarizes these reform proposals and discusses the prospects of these reform endeavours. As the UN system plays a central role in global governance, we especially focus on its contributions to the closure of the governance gaps.

Closing the jurisdictional gap

The jurisdictional gap results from the discrepancy between a globalizing world and separate national units of policy-making. Although it is generally acknowledged that international or transsovereign problems are most effectively handled on the international level, national policy makers in many countries still partly recoil from institutionalized international cooperation (Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern 1999b: 467).

In general, there are three conceivable ways of closing the jurisdictional gap (cf. Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern 1999b: 466–478).

1. To ensure an acceptable solution to pressing global problems, all decision-making could be transferred to the international or global level. This *modus operandi* would call for the establishment of a world state or global governance under the hegemonic umbrella. As suggested in the section on the three models of global governance, however, neither of these two governance models is feasible or desirable.
2. All decision-making could be transferred back to the state level. There is no need for international regulation unless global “evils” cross state borders and collective action problems need to be solved. In the twenty-first century, however, such a perspective seems to be highly unrealistic as interactions and transactions between international actors have never been more lively than today.
3. A so-called “jurisdictional loop” “that runs from the national to the international and back to the national – by way of several intermediate levels, regional and subregional” could be established (Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern 1999b: 466).

This kind of loop is sometimes equated with global governance (cf. e.g. Commission on Global Governance 1995). Whereas in international governance the most important loci of governance have been the states (and intergovernmental institutions), in global governance other actors on different levels, such as local, subregional, and regional, influence public policy-making as well. The actors’ relevance and influence varies with the

issue-area and topic. Global governance thus is a wide-ranging dynamic process of complex interactive decision-making which is subject to continuous development according to the frequently changing circumstances (ibid). In some cases, there might be “scope for principles such as subsidiarity, in which decisions are taken as close as possible to the level at which they can be effectively implemented” (ibid. 5; cf. Messner 1998; Messner and Nuscheler 1997).¹¹ In these networks of actors and institutions, however, individual states will remain salient participants since they still have “the capacity to raise taxes [and] the ability to hurl force at enemies” (Held et al. 1999: 495). Yet, one may also think of states as “sandwiches between global forces and local demands” (ibid.; cf. Messner 1998; Zürn 1998).

In these networks, the UN system can play a leading role. “With its universality, it is the only forum where the governments of the world come together on an equal footing and on a regular basis to try to resolve the world’s most pressing problems” (Commission on Global Governance 1995: 6). To narrow the jurisdictional gap, the United Nations may extend its cooperation with regional organizations; it would, thereby, contribute to putting the principle of subsidiarity on a firm basis.

Strengthening the regional organizations’ role in the UN system, and in world politics in general, is frequently proposed by scholars (cf. for the issue area peace and security Peou, chap. 3) as well as diplomats. As early as 1992, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali already acknowledged this necessity in his “Agenda for Peace,” and the current Secretary-General Kofi Annan has repeatedly confirmed Boutros-Ghali’s view (e.g. Annan 2000).

However, a “regionalization” of the United Nations has not yet taken place and is not very likely to occur in the near future. One reason is that there are few regional organizations that can be considered “acceptable” regional counterparts of the UN system with regard to their effectiveness and legitimacy (cf. Peou, chap. 3). Even if more effective and legitimate regional organizations existed, establishing a division of labour between them and the United Nations would be problematic.¹²

Closing the operational gap

In the last decades, a profound lack of necessary information, analysis, and policy instruments has prevented policy makers and public institutions from responding effectively to the daunting complexity of policy issues (Reinicke et al. 2000: vii).

By working more closely together with non-state actors, policy makers could narrow the operational gap. Global public-policy (GPP) networks, or public–private partnerships (PPP) in general, may help to bridge the operational gap (Reinicke and Deng 2000).¹³ These (trisectoral) net-

works connect individuals and institutions with common interests across borders and different sectors of activity: these include local, national, and regional governments, transnational corporations, and other business actors, as well as their associations and civil society. This wide range of members from different backgrounds enables the networks to collect a wide range of information and expertise and thus to provide “a more complete picture of particular policy issues and giving voice to previously unheard groups” (Reinicke and Deng 2000: viii).

The United Nations has recognized the usefulness of global public policy networks. In his millennium report, Secretary-General Kofi Annan refers to centralized hierarchies of governance as anachronistic in the world of the twenty-first century, “an outmoded remnant of the nineteenth century mindset” (Annan 2000: 13). He points out that effective governance can be achieved only by the widening of participation possibilities as well as of accountability; the United Nations “must be opened up further for the participation of the many actors whose contributions are essential to managing the path of globalization” (ibid). The United Nations could serve as the platform for global public policy networks, thus playing an intermediary role between states, business, and civil society. By facilitating the emergence of these networks and contributing to their effective operation, the United Nations will increase its own effectiveness and credibility (Reinicke and Deng 2000: 78).

Since the 1990s, the United Nations and its specialized agencies have been active in such networks (e.g. the World Commission on Dams, which presented its guidelines for dam-building in November 2000, or the Roll-Back Malaria Initiative, initiated by the World Health Organization). These networks differ in the topics with which they are dealing. All GPP networks, however, share the function of developing and disseminating knowledge that is crucial for addressing transnational challenges. Thereby, they successfully contribute to the closure (or at least the narrowing) of the operational gap (ibid. 93).

The most prominent example of a public-private partnership in the making is the Global Compact between business and the United Nations. In the past, Secretary-General Kofi Annan and his team have emphasized that they consider UN-corporate partnerships a promising new way to gain political and financial support for the United Nations. In his declaration of the Global Compact’s basic guidelines, he challenged business leaders to help achieve the realization of nine UN core principles in the areas of environment, labour, and human rights within their corporate domains. These principles derive from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, from the Rio Declaration of the UN Conference on Environment and Development, and from the Four Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work adopted at the World Economic and Social Summit

in Copenhagen in 1997 and reaffirmed by the International Labour Organization in 1999.¹⁴ The Global Compact serves as a frame of reference to stimulate best practices and to bring about convergence around universally acknowledged values (Kell and Ruggie 1999; Paul 2001). It was formally launched at a meeting of almost fifty corporations, the International Chamber of Commerce, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, and some NGOs (e.g. Amnesty International, WWF International) at UN headquarters on 26 July 2000.

The major aim of the Global Compact is to strengthen the “social pillars” upon which every market, including the global market, depends. It seeks to facilitate the tension-free functioning of the global markets and to overcome (or at least to mitigate) resistance to globalization. By entering a partnership with business actors, the United Nations may additionally attain both informational and even financial support, and thus narrow its operational gap.¹⁵

NGO activists have harshly attacked the Global Compact.¹⁶ They criticize especially its lack of monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms. In particular, they point out that there is no independent agency to collect information about the signatory corporations’ compliance with the nine UN principles. At present, apart from an annual report of their progress and the problems in implementing the UN guidelines posted on the Global Compact website, member corporations do not have any obligations. Corporations may simply pay lip service to the Global Compact’s objectives (cf. Paul 2001). In spite of the Global Compact’s deficits as it is currently set up, however, public–private partnerships in general are – and will remain – a promising medium for contributing to the closure of the UN system’s operational gap.

Closing the incentive gap

Global governance has been defined as the output of non-hierarchical networks of international and transnational regimes. To work effectively, global governance is strictly dependent on the performance of these institutions. An incentive gap (i.e. a malfunctioning of the operational follow-up of international agreements) severely threatens this effectiveness. A primary task among the efforts towards the establishment of global governance is thus the closure of the incentive gap.

The closure of the incentive gap (i.e. the establishment of effective compliance mechanisms) can be achieved by different strategies. As a first step, institutions may enhance compliance in a cooperative, problem-solving approach (Chayes and Chayes 1995: 3). This approach is based on the assumption that non-compliance frequently does not derive from a conscious decision to disregard norms and rules but from the member states’ inability to abide by them, as well as from a certain incompre-

hensibility of the norms and rules themselves (ibid. 22). “Active management,” i.e. capacity building, dispute settlement, and the adaptation and modification of norms set forth in treaties, may thus be a useful tool for improving compliance (ibid. 197). The actors’ efforts towards complete fulfilment of their obligations can be effectively supported and organized by institutions (ibid. 227).

The ozone regime, for instance, has implemented this managerial strategy for enhancing compliance. If a member state fails to comply with the Montreal Protocol’s rules, the Implementation Committee submits recommendations to the Meeting of the Parties to agree on suitable measures. Hitherto, the Implementation Committee has mostly recommended offers of assistance to non-complying states. The Russian Federation, for example, received additional funding through the Global Environmental Facility in order to speed up the conversion of chlorofluorocarbon (CFC)-production facilities (Brühl 1999).

If the managerial model of compliance does not positively influence the actors’ behaviour, a second measure of closing the incentive gap is required – namely, authoritative dispute settlement. Compliance with the agreed norms and rules can be enhanced by hauling deviant actors before a court of law or a body akin to it. In fact, more and more international institutions tend to establish specific compliance mechanisms based on judicial or quasi-judicial dispute-settlement procedures, thus taking an important (though not universal) step towards the legalization of world politics. Legalization is defined as “the degree to which rules are obligatory, the precision of those rules, and the delegation of some functions and interpretation, monitoring, and implementation to third parties” (Goldstein et al. 2000: 387). “Legalized institutions” adopt precise rules and delegate authority to a neutral entity for implementation of the agreed rules (ibid.). Typically, compliance in these legalized institutions is higher than that in non-legalized institutions.

The WTO is an example of such a legalized institution. WTO members have agreed that, if they believe that a state is violating the WTO’s rules, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) will deal with these violations on the basis of clearly defined rules with definite timetables for reaching a decision. Once a decision has been handed down, the DSB also has the power to authorize retaliation against a state that does not comply with a ruling. Since 1995, the DSB has authorized five suspensions of trade concessions.

The majority of international and transnational institutions have not yet implemented an adequate compliance follow-up. In institutions without any compliance follow-up, such as the climate-change regime, agreements on at least one or another compliance mechanism will be necessary to ensure an effective follow-up.

Closing the participatory gap

The participatory gap emerged from the primarily state-centric orientation of international governance. As state-centric international institutions were still crucial to international governance systems at the end of the twentieth century, non-state actors have been kept at arms' length from decision-making. Both NGOs and intergovernmental organizations have criticized this fact, the latter having finally recognized the important function of NGOs (both advocacy and service organizations) in formulating and implementing international public policies (Rittberger and Breitmeier 2000; cf. Tussie and Riggiozzi, chap. 5).

Numerous proposals to expand the role of non-state actors in global governance have been made, including, for instance, the establishment of a Second UN Assembly.¹⁷ Apart from certain differences in both electoral mode and general mandate of a possible Second Assembly, all proposals aim at strengthening the role of societal actors in the United Nations. In contrast to the present diplomatic UN representation, members of a Second Assembly would be accountable not to their governments but to their popular constituencies. Furthermore, any national group of deputies would represent their polity in its political, social, and cultural diversity (Bienen, Rittberger, and Wagner 1998: 297). The distance between rulers and addressees of public policies would thus be minimized.

Because of its all-encompassing nature, a complete implementation of this reform proposal is not very likely. Less far-reaching reforms of the participation of civil society actors in international institutions, however, already have been implemented and even more are to come. Most international organizations have initiated a process of opening-up toward NGOs (Tussie and Riggiozzi, chap. 5); thereby, they are adapting their internal structures and processes to meet the challenges to their legitimacy.

The relationship between the United Nations and NGOs has been changeable, especially in the course of the cold war and its periods of rising and decreasing tension. With the waning of the cold war, NGOs have gained more influence in the UN system (Tussie and Riggiozzi, chap. 5). Starting from the International Conference on Environment and Development in Rio in 1992, NGOs have been more actively involved in world conferences than ever before: they were granted observer status and even active participation in most of the negotiations. However, the UN system's willingness to open up during the 1990s went far beyond the area of world conferences. In 1996, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) adopted a resolution (Res. 31/1996) that redefines the criteria for NGOs to be accredited to the ECOSOC. This resolution is the first to take into account the full diversity of NGOs at

different political levels. Thus, apart from (I)NGOs, regional, national, and subregional NGOs can be accredited to the ECOSOC as well. Moreover, various specialized agencies and special programmes have granted greater access to NGOs.

During the last decade, arrangements for consultations with NGOs have been revised, improved, and extended across the UN system, allowing NGOs decisively to influence international political debates. The notion that the United Nations obviously profits from the involvement of NGOs, especially in agenda setting and implementation, is confirmed by Secretary-General Kofi Annan who observes that the advantages of the increased NGO participation cannot be overestimated (Annan 1998a).

Although the revision of the UN system's arrangements for NGO participation will narrow the participatory gap, the efforts will not be sufficient to close it. There are two reasons for this. First, the different bodies of the United Nations still vary in their openness towards NGOs. Diana Tussie and Maria Pia Riggiozzi suggest that the differences in international organizations' openness relate to the functional performance of these institutions (chap. 5). They argue that what they term service organizations, e.g. the World Bank, are more open toward civil society actors than those that they term forum organizations, e.g. the UN General Assembly. Second, for closing (or narrowing) the participatory gap, balanced representation of the global civil society in international organizations is necessary; this calls for the incorporation of southern NGOs in addition to northern NGOs. Ngaire Woods (2001: 97) suggests that (particularly) transnational NGOs with their predominantly northern membership distort the inequalities of power and influence in world politics even further: these NGOs are only adding yet another channel of influence to those people and governments who already are powerfully represented.

Closing the participatory gap thus remains an important objective for the UN system for a long time to come.

Overview of the content of this volume

We have suggested that international governance is confronted by three different challenges: these are the revolution in information and communication technology, globalization, and the end of the cold war. As a consequence, new problems have arisen and a variety of non-state actors have entered the world political stage. For international governance systems, the attainment of governance goals has become increasingly difficult. Their failure results from four major gaps that have opened up – the jurisdictional, operational, incentive, and participatory gaps. Owing to

these gaps, governance legitimacy in its output and input dimensions is reduced. The limitations of the effectiveness and legitimacy of international governance systems call for the establishment of more adequate governance systems, i.e. global governance. Although several proposals for narrowing (or even closing) the four governance gaps have been made, none of them has yet been implemented, apart from minor adjustments of the United Nations and its associated international organizations.

Whereas this chapter serves to outline the major trends of the transformation of governance beyond the nation-state, the following chapters analyse the shift from international to global governance in more detail. The authors discuss the various aspects of this transformation, extrapolate its trends, and provide suggestions about possible forms of global governance.

In chapter 2, Michael Zürn investigates the political systems in the national and postnational constellation. Political systems in the national constellation are characterized by a convergence of recognition, resources, and the realization of governance goals in one political organization, the nation-state. In a globalizing, or denationalizing, world this convergence of the three dimensions of a political system in one political organization dissolves and a new multilevel system of governance takes shape. Governance in the postnational constellation will approximate complex arrangements between governing institutions “with and without national governments.” In the postnational constellation the attainment of the governance goals of security and the rule of law will be at least as likely as in the national constellation. However, the governance goals of providing effective participation channels and social welfare will be much more difficult to attain.

In chapter 3, Sorpong Peou claims that international peace and stability cannot be attained by the UN system alone. Regional security communities could help the United Nations to promote peace and stability. “Stable” security communities are defined as those whose members develop dependable mutual expectations of peaceful change. Today, variations in regional stability and peace can be observed: North America and Western Europe have become the most stable regions, whereas non-Western regions have proved to be far less effective in maintaining stable peace than their Western counterparts. The variation in regional stability and peace follows from the fact that regions and their member states do not meet equally the conditions that are considered essential for building security communities. These conditions encompass democratic performance of the member states, the presence of a democratic leader in the security community which possesses adequate material capabilities for effective democratic intervention, experience of the member states in managing conflicts, and membership size of the security community.

In chapter 4, Richard Higgott discusses the relationship between globalization and governance. In the 1980s and early 1990s the Washington Consensus (WC), with its buzzwords “liberalization,” “deregulation,” and “privatization,” has governed international economic thinking and practice. As a result, financial markets have expanded rapidly. The financial crises of 1997 have made policy makers aware of the need to rethink the relationship between the market and the state. As a result of rigorous debates about the policy successes and failures of the WC, a Post-Washington Consensus (PWC) is emerging and has added another set of buzzwords – such as “civil society,” “social capital,” “capacity building,” or “transparency,” to the WC. In short, the PWC is an attempt to embed and humanize globalization institutionally. Therefore, the major financial and economic international organizations and regimes will be a potentially greater source of the promotion of social justice than they have been in the past.

In chapter 5, Diana Tussie and Maria Pia Riggiozzi examine the relationship of different IGOs and (I)NGOs. The former are found to be increasingly open toward civil society actors. The authors suggest that the variation in openness depends on an IGO being more like a forum or a service organization. This distinction relates to the way in which IGOs perform their function. Service organizations, exemplified by the international financial institutions, provide specific in-country services and disburse funds to “clients.” These service organizations were first in broadening their collaboration with NGOs. Forum organizations are established to provide a venue or framework for negotiations and collective decision-making, ranging from consultations to binding commitments. These organizations, such as the UN General Assembly or the WTO, are still less open towards NGOs. Governments of member states are the main actors, leaving civil society organizations with a secondary role in the process of negotiations and decision-making.

In chapter 6, Otfried Höffe develops the core ideas of a subsidiary and federal world republic, arguing that such a world republic is the adequate response to the challenges of globalization. The world republic needs to rely on the constitutive principle of federalism, since “only a federalist unity can be a morally dictated and legitimate world republic.” In this scheme, the individual states remain responsible for enforcing the law. The territorial states have the rank of first-order states, while the world republic is no more than a second-order or (where there are intermediary polities at the continental or subcontinental level) even a third-order state. Citizenship in the world republic is therefore understood as complementary citizenship. Global civil rights do not take the place of national civil rights, but the former supplement the latter.

In chapter 7, Yash Tandon examines to what degree existing interna-

tional governance conforms to criteria of social justice. This provocative chapter consists of three parts. First, Tandon observes that the contemporary world is “pathological”: it is ruled by profits, as, for instance, “health is subordinated to the demands of profit” or the protection of plants takes precedence over the protection of human lives. Second, the author presents and discusses three different conceptions of justice: “justice as fairness” (Rawls), “justice as charity,” and “justice as welfare.” Finally, he asks which of the wide variety of actors on the world political stage are able and willing to pursue social justice. Since neither northern nor southern states nor TNCs are purveyors of justice, only civil society organizations can be relied upon to be agents of the Rawlsian concept of “justice as fairness.”

Notes

1. However, it is important to note that, to a certain extent, additional information at a certain time or in a certain context may be harmful, and at another time and place this same increment of information may have a neutral or even beneficial effect (Hurley and Mayer-Schönberger 2000).
2. Since the main purpose of this section is to discuss the challenges posed by globalization to international governance, and not the analysis of globalization itself, we refer only to the two extreme views on globalization. For a more differentiated view see Held et al. (1999a: 2–16).
3. For data and analysis cf. Albert et al. (1999).
4. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr (2000a: 105) distinguish globalization and interdependence. According to these authors, globalization, first, refers to networks of connections rather than single linkages and, second, includes multicontinental distances, not simply regional networks. (For their concept and analysis on interdependence see Keohane and Nye 1977, 1987.)
5. These scholars prefer the term “denationalization” to “globalization,” as the latter is mostly understood as a process resulting in a status of globality. Because most trans-boundary interactions take place within the OECD world, and not on a global level, “globalization” appears to be a misnomer. “Denationalization,” in contrast, refers only to the extension of societal transactions beyond the national level, no matter what the actual scope of the transactions (see Zürn, chap. 4; Zürn 1998; Beisheim et al. 1999).
6. A value of 0 signifies perfect equality; a value of 1, perfect inequality. The world Gini coefficient deteriorated slightly from 0.63 in 1988 to 0.66 in 1993. In the Russian Federation, the Gini coefficient rose markedly from 0.24 to 0.48 between 1987–1988 and 1993–1995 (UNDP 1999: 6).
7. However, in the second half of the 1990s the UN started to wane in global influence. The number of Blue Helmets decreased to 27,000 in 2000 after it had peaked in 1993, when 80,000 peace-keepers were deployed (Peou, chap. 3).
8. Kalevi J. Holsti (1996: 119) defines “failed states” as follows: “Leaders become increasingly isolated and inhabit make-believe worlds concocted by their cronies and dwindling sycophants. Government institutions no longer function except perhaps in the capital city. The tasks of governance, to the extent that they are performed at all, devolve to warlords, clan chiefs, who are well armed. The state retains the fig leaf of sov-

- ereignty for external purposes, but domestic life is organized around local politics. The national army . . . disintegrates into local racketeering, or hires itself out to local rulers.”
9. Input legitimacy is more difficult to achieve in international governance than in governance by national governments, because neither an international public nor a transnational collective identity has yet come into existence (cf. Brock 1998; Wolf 2000: 213–242; Zürn 2000: 192).
 10. In his Presidential Address to the American Political Science Association, Robert Keohane (2001: 3), for instance, has proposed that each political institution in global governance needs to meet the three criteria of accountability, participation, and persuasion. We discuss these criteria under the headings of closing the jurisdictional gap (accountability), the participation gap (participation and accountability), and the incentive gap (persuasion).
 11. At first glance, this idea looks very promising but its further analysis shows that it remains unclear who is to decide on the appropriate level of public policy-making in distinct areas (cf. Brand et al. 2000, also Mürle 1998). For a different point of view see Höffe (1997).
 12. In addition, UN member states apparently do not favour implementing far-reaching reforms in general. This reluctant attitude is indicated by their recurrent inability to agree on less important reform proposals. Thus, the closure of all governance gaps will be difficult to achieve. For different UN reform proposals cf. Alger 1998; Hüfner and Martens 2000. Whereas most of the far-reaching reform proposals have not been implemented, Kofi Annan has implemented a “Quiet Revolution” (Annan 1998a) by reforming the UN Secretariat.
 13. Global public policy (GPP) networks are one set of arrangements of public–private partnerships. GPP networks are institutional innovations as not only do they combine the “voluntary energy and legitimacy of the civil society sector with the financial muscle and interest of business and the enforcement and rule-making power and coordination and capacity-building skills of states and international organization,” but also they create new knowledge as consensus emerges over often contentious issues. They thus ensure constant learning of all participants (Reinicke and Deng 2000: 29–30).
 14. The Secretary-General asked the business community to support and respect the following:
 1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) Principle 1 (protection of international human rights within their sphere of influence) and Principle 2 (make sure their own corporations are not complicit in human rights abuses).
 2. The Declaration of the International Labour Organization on fundamental principles and rights at work Principle 3 (guarantee freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining), Principle 4 (support the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour), Principle 5 (assist the effective abolition of child labour), and Principle 6 (support the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation).
 3. The Rio Declaration of the UN Conference in Environment and Development (1992) Principle 7 (support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges), Principle 8 (undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility), and Principle 9 (encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies).
 15. Cf. the modalities of the guidelines “Cooperation between the United Nations and Business Community” issued by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 17 July 2000.
 16. “Think-tank NGOs” such as the Transnational Resource and Action Center have published various short articles on this topic, cf. Paul (2001). Other NGOs have written a

“coalition letter” to Kofi Annan [www.corpwatch.org/trac/globalization/blast1tr.html] (23.11.2000).

17. For an overview of these reform proposals see Bienen, Rittberger, and Wagner (1998).

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