
Introduction

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Man without law is the lowest of animals – *Aristotle*

As the Western world enters a new millennium, the seemingly settled parameters of a global politics based on the interaction of sovereign states appear increasingly threatened. On the one hand, processes of globalisation, especially in the economic sphere, have limited the freedom of action of those political elites who do not wish to bear the costs of pursuing autarkic policies. The debate between free traders and protectionists, which so marked the politics of democratic states at the beginning of the twentieth century, has for the moment been resolved – in international agreements if not always in the practice of strong states. On the other hand, however, processes of fragmentation have led to the disruption of a significant number of states or proto-states. Whether in Kosovo or East Timor, Somalia or Afghanistan, Cambodia or Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sierra Leone or Zimbabwe, the instrumentalities of the state have been compromised. Yet in a curious twist, another form of globalisation – this time a globalisation based not on market exchange but on a spreading sense that the rule of law, human security, and the ability of ordinary people to change their rulers without bloodshed are all values worth protecting – has drawn what is loosely called “the international community” into the internal affairs of these territories. It is with some key dimensions of that involvement that the essays in this book are concerned.

This involvement marks a significant departure from what one might call the Westphalian ideal. In 1648, the Peace of Westphalia, comprising the Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück, concluded the Thirty Years War by entrenching the state as the principal form of political organisation in Europe. This put an end to the hopes of an undivided Christendom, which is why the Pope denounced the Peace of Westphalia as “null, void, invalid, iniquitous, unjust, damnable, reprobate, inane, and devoid of meaning for all time”.¹ Recent works, particularly the writings of Stephen D. Krasner,² have challenged the interpretation of the Peace of Westphalia itself as providing the constitutive framework of a system of sovereign states; indeed, the treaties that made up the Peace of Westphalia contained no specific reference to sovereignty.³ However, few deny that “Westphalia” has become a metaphor for one particular type of world politics, one in which the principal actors are “sovereign states”, enjoying the undisputed right to manage their “internal affairs” free from outside interference.

This was of course a predominantly European conception. Indeed, the first Secretary-General of the League of Nations, Sir Eric Drummond, resented the presence of Abyssinia in the League on the grounds that it was not a state fit for membership; in his eyes, it was attempting, as one writer ironically summarised it, “to seek shelter in the League against the legitimate interests of the great powers”.⁴ The Second World War put paid to most such thinking, not simply because of US President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s hostility to colonialism, but also because the evils of the Holocaust killed off the notion of the moral superiority of Europe in general. However, this did not guarantee that the wave of decolonisation in the two decades which followed the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 would establish political units that would fit readily into the Westphalian ideal of statehood. Although it was widely assumed that Westphalian statehood was the natural and desirable end point to which all political communities would evolve, many did not. Herein lie some of the challenges by which the world is still confronted.

The sense of relative stability of the international system in the nuclear age is belied by the change in the number of actors. The United Nations, with 189 member states, has nearly four times as many member states as it had in 1945. Some of these are longstanding, highly institutionalised states, but a great many others reflect the tensions inherent in the notion of *sovereignty*.⁵ In one sense, sovereignty refers to the accepted membership by a particular territory in a community of states, marked most notably by diplomatic recognition and by membership of international organisations, of which the United Nations is the most important. This has been labelled “juridical” or “external” sovereignty. In another sense, sovereignty refers to the capacity of the instrumentalities of “the state”

to exercise effective control over the particular territory. This has been labelled “empirical” or “internal” sovereignty. These two senses sit, somewhat uncomfortably, alongside a third and more recent sense, “popular sovereignty”, which refers to the extent to which a particular pattern of rule embodies the ideal that the ruled should be able to determine *by whom* they are to be ruled. It will immediately be apparent that the connections between these different senses of sovereignty are contingent rather than necessary. Some states which enjoy unquestioned external or juridical sovereignty – Somalia and Afghanistan come readily to mind – suffer from severe deficits in the realm of internal or empirical sovereignty.⁶ The reverse can also be true, as demonstrated by such territorial units as Taiwan and the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”. Furthermore, despite a recent wave of democratisation, there are still states with high levels of internal and external sovereignty but low levels of popular sovereignty. As media of communication heighten the capacity of peoples in such states to realise what they are missing, the internal or empirical sovereignty of their rulers may also come under threat, as the Tiananmen Square massacre revealed.

The 1990s have frequently been depicted as the decade in which intra-state conflict entered the agenda of international politics. This was always an exaggeration,⁷ as those who recall the Congolese crisis of the early 1960s can affirm, and perhaps a product of particular influences, which could fade as time passes, or be better managed by concerned powers.⁸ But it would be as well not to take too sanguine a view of the prospects. Although the United Nations has striven mightily to address these problems, it has not always done so with any great success, as the dead of Rwanda, Srebrenica, and East Timor remind us.⁹ Is it possible to develop better diagnoses of the problems of state disruption and of ways in which they might be addressed?

Formulating the issues

Speaking of state *disruption*, rather than of state “collapse”, “failure”, or “disintegration”, is one step towards a more nuanced exploration of the challenges posed by these problems. Terminologies of failure or collapse sound rather too absolute and/or judgemental, and run the risk of detracting from the complexities of the problems with which it may be necessary to deal. In Kosovo, the Yugoslav state neither collapsed nor failed, but rather was effectively ejected through open warfare, allegedly for the betterment of the local residents. In East Timor, the Indonesian state did not fail or collapse; it quit the territory in flames and ashes. The result in East Timor is a proto-state under United Nations tutelage. The result in

Kosovo is an ill-defined form of international “protectorate” pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999. In order to appreciate the range of responsibilities by which the international community can be confronted, it is necessary to consider these kinds of cases as well as those of complete state breakdown, and the middle ground of “quasi-states” in which the instrumentalities of the state are increasingly enfeebled but still constitute a potential partner for international actors.

Speaking of *civil* and *military responsibilities* also carries us further than does simple discussion of “peacekeeping”. What one might call “traditional” or “classical” peacekeeping evolved as a creative response to particular needs for confidence-building which the United Nations Charter had not explicitly addressed: hence Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld’s famous description of peacekeeping as “Chapter Six-and-a-half Operations”. The peacekeeping operations of the Cold War era largely involved the deployment of troops under UN authority, with the consent of the combatant parties, mandated to discharge specific confidence-building tasks in a strictly neutral fashion, and to use force only for self-defence.¹⁰ Operations tended not to occur in areas where the vital interests of permanent members of the UN Security Council were engaged, and peacekeeping troops tended to be drawn from the armed forces of “middle powers”, some of which rightly took pride in the contributions they made to peacekeeping. With the waning of the Cold War, peacekeeping under UN auspices took a more complex form, with emphasis on the integrated discharge of a range of tasks necessary to restore order in societies that had somehow become dysfunctional. In such “complex”, “multidimensional” or “second-generation” peacekeeping, refugee repatriation, the holding of free and fair elections, demining, and movement towards “development” all figured as important responsibilities.¹¹ None was in itself an entirely new form of activity for the United Nations, but the bundling of the activities to form a comprehensive package was. In all these cases, however, there was at least some reality of consent to the presence of international forces on the territory in point. By contrast, in a case such as Kosovo,¹² the work of the international community is greatly complicated by the lack of any real consent to its activities from a significant party to the dispute, which makes the maintenance of an image of neutrality extremely difficult. Should further such interventions occur, the world will need to learn the skills of building political, legal, social, and civil order in potentially unwelcoming climates.

Speaking of *civil society* highlights the importance of a long-term perspective on what such operations should aim to achieve. In a world of states, it is too easy to conceive the role of peace operations as being simply to reconstitute the instrumentalities of a functioning state, as fast as possible. This, unfortunately, can be a recipe for renewed turmoil as

groups struggle to control what may be an important resource, and may do little to foster other mechanisms of governance with much to commend them.¹³ The reconstitution of civil society certainly involves the development of appropriate political frameworks, but it also crucially requires the consolidation of the Rule of Law, attention to the material needs of ordinary people, and the beating of swords into ploughshares.

Addressing the issues

Detailed discussion of these elements of the transition from civil strife to civil society makes up the core of this book. Given the vast range of issues that can arise in the context of sociopolitical transitions, the contributions make no claims to being definitive. Rather, they offer explorations of key points, and build foundations upon which further work can be conducted.

Amin Saikal examines various forms that states might take, and notes five different types of disrupted state: those scarred by conflict but still accepted as states; those whose very existence is contested; embryonic states; those being punished for violating international law or norms; and those gripped by strong undercurrents of instability and held together by coercion. He goes on to discuss internal factors that can contribute to disruption: elite fragmentation; ethnic antagonisms; ideological struggle; confessional or sectarian divisions; loss of the revenue base of the state; a specific legitimacy crisis; or separatism. These can be aggravated by external factors: direct foreign intervention, creeping invasion, or unintended destabilisation. He concludes by surveying three abstract models of appropriate international responses to the problems of state disruption.

These issues are taken up more concretely by Paul Diehl. He opens by discussing the range of interests – humanitarian interests, human rights interests, and security interests – which can underpin the various dimensions of international action. He argues that the international community has choices of how to proceed in terms of timing (when), actions (what) and organisation (by whom). Actions can take a diverse range of forms: preventive deployment; humanitarian assistance; pacification; protective services; traditional peacekeeping; sanctions enforcement; election supervision; state/nation building; and arms control verification. In mobilising action, however, a number of difficulties can arise: galvanising action; coordination; coping with the specific perils of internal conflict; and striking the right balance between sustaining action and implementing an exit strategy.

Simon Chesterman and David M. Malone seek to advance the troubled discussion of prevention and intervention by arguing that it is necessary

to shift the focus from seeing prevention as an alternative to intervention, to seeing intervention as a consequence of failed prevention. They offer a survey of prevention strategies, both in the abstract and as practised by the United Nations, and argue that humanitarian action is not synonymous with military intervention. Prevention – by now a much-discussed topic¹⁴ – depends not so much on better early warning as on political will. Kosovo was long foreseen as a likely venue for bitter conflict. So were a host of other conflicts on which this book touches. “Last time”, said Winston Churchill in his famous 1946 Fulton speech, “I saw it all coming, and cried aloud . . . but no one would listen and one by one we were all sucked into the awful whirlpool.”¹⁵ Mobilising political will so that the peoples of states can be spared the grief that so often accompanies state disruption remains one of the most troubling issues of our times.

The United States of America, as a globally dominant power, is frequently the target of demands for action to help overcome the problems of state disruption.¹⁶ Thomas E. Seal discusses the roles of the United States Marine Corps as the cutting edge of American power, given its forward presence, multiple capabilities, capacity for rapid response and its historical and cultural affinity for dealing with disrupted states. He argues that a range of constant factors – human nature; the nature of states; the nature of war; geography; national character; and resistance to attempts to disrupt the status quo – shape America’s outlook, while variables such as globalisation, migration and urbanisation, and the changing character of military operations create new challenges. He goes on to examine how the Marine Corps has been structured to optimise its capacity to respond to these challenges, noting, however, that there are limits on one’s capacity to predict what the future might bring. He concludes by noting some obstacles to civil–military cooperation: a plethora of actors; mission clash; communications problems; and institutional inertia.

The diversity of the challenges posed by state disruption is emphasised by Frederick M. Burkle, Jr, in his discussion of “complex emergencies”. The complexity of complex emergencies, he notes, lies in the multifaceted responses which the international community initiates in reacting to the simultaneous emergence of political and social decay, high levels of violence, catastrophic threats to public health, population shifts and competition for resources. After examining the political, legal, socio-economic and environmental security factors that underpin such emergencies, he goes on to discuss the involvement of Western militaries in responding to what are profound public health crises, and specifically the architecture put in place to attempt an integrated response to the emergency in East Timor.

Observing that civil war is not unique to our times, Raimo Väyrynen notes its disappearance from modern industrialized societies and links it to the decline of interstate wars among them. He finds examples in Latin America and East Asia of various security regimes and limited security communities with mutually reinforcing internal stability and external peace. By symmetric contrast, in Africa, where the informal political and economic map differs substantially from the formal boundaries, the internal and external dimensions of crises are often linked. On the basis of this survey, Väyrynen concludes that the institutionalisation of sovereignty contributes substantially to the internal and external stability of a region through building identity, political authority and legitimacy. In regions that have been ravaged by wars, including disrupted states, the best route to peace may lie, therefore, in the re-establishment of sovereign states whose mutual relations are regulated by international law. This leads Väyrynen to question the merits of external intervention in situations of humanitarian emergency, for it is very difficult to import external solutions to protracted civil wars underwritten by self-sustaining political economies. Efforts to alter the balance of incentives in favour of viable peace accords founder because of the great variety of actors and interests entangled in protracted conflicts.

Cees de Rover too takes up the question of how violence might be brought to an end in those countries wracked by civil strife. Dissatisfied with explanations of violence that simply identify patterns of social differentiation, he draws on Maslow's theory of needs to argue that one must take account of historical developments which create differential access to the resources by which needs can be satisfied. It is therefore important to address economic and social issues as well as civil and political rights if one is seeking a durable end to violence. The current collective security system is unable to do this. International intervention also has its limitations, as NATO's actions over Kosovo demonstrate. A reinvigoration of law is vital, to govern both the circumstances in which intervention can occur and the actual conduct of intervention. Finally, waging war to resolve a conflict can simply entrench the conflict itself. It is necessary also to "wage peace", by bringing parties together with a focus on the well-being of people.

Civil strife has many victims, and an issue which invariably arises as part of the transition to civil society is how the perpetrators of past evils should be held to account. Helen Durham investigates this issue in her chapter. Mercy, she argues, has a role to play in reconstituting society after trauma, but not a foundational role. Justice, on the other hand, has a range of fundamental roles to play – bringing wrongdoers to account; acknowledging the suffering of victims; educating the public as to the evils

of the past. She then explores a range of institutional options for meeting the demand for justice. Domestic prosecutions may lack impartiality or legality; Truth and Reconciliation Commissions are an important alternative. But the burden may well fall on the international community, as it did with the famous Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. Some important steps have been taken by the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda; and the proposed tribunal to try the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia may play a similar role. But the most striking recent development was the adoption in Rome in 1998 of a Statute for an International Criminal Court, which came into existence on 1 July 2002. A key challenge now will be the gathering of evidence, and here there are differences between the roles that can be played by human rights actors, on the one hand, and by humanitarian agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, on the other.

Justice in this sense is concerned with creating a basis for moving forward. This is taken up by William Maley, who discusses more generally the issues of institutional design and the rebuilding of trust. Distinguishing anonymous trust from face-to-face trust, he argues that the breakdown of trust leads to unworkable political communities and disunited political elites. Ways of addressing these problems include the provision of neutral security, the resocialisation of antagonists and the design of institutions to mute the effects of political conflict. Institutional design should not be overlooked, or rushed, and it benefits from expert input. A range of abstract features mark institutions that are likely to be effective, but issues such as the nature of political authority, the distributive capacity of the state and the nature of military power will need to be addressed, as will the question of how new institutions should be legitimated. Architects will need to address questions such as whether power should be apportioned or alternated, and how offices should be structured and their occupants chosen. He concludes by noting that effective institutional design does not offer magic solutions to complex problems, but reduces the risk and costs of political conflict.

Reginald Austin addresses a range of problems associated with democratisation. He notes a growing rhetorical commitment to democracy, but sees this as compromised by the reality of state decay or corruption. The international community, through bodies such as the United Nations, the Commonwealth, and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), has been heavily involved in seeking to give practical support to a nascent right to democratic governance. However, “electoral democratisation” is subject to a number of serious limitations. What works in the short term may face problems in the long term, and an appropriate balance between internal and external involvement in the performance of key “democratic” tasks needs to be struck.

The case of Zimbabwe points to the perils of settlements that paper over significant conflicts that need to be addressed. The case of Cambodia points to problems arising from a reluctance to regard democratisation as a comprehensive and ongoing process. Some lessons have been learned from these experiences, but others are yet to be properly absorbed.

Mark Plunkett is concerned with the practicalities of restoring the rule of law in disrupted states. Lawlessness, he notes, is one of the most pressing problems arising from the spread of civil strife, and two broad models are available to assist the reconstruction of a legal system: an enforcement model and a negotiation model. The enforcement model involves the establishment of a functioning criminal justice system and a Criminal Justice Commission to permit both exposure of misdeeds and reintegrative shaming. Plunkett offers a range of specific proposals relating to the staffing, organisation and functioning of such mechanisms of justice delivery. The negotiation model seeks to engage the local population in bringing about fundamental shifts in population consciousness, directed against toleration of impunity for violence. The heart of this model is to be found in two types of work technique: the Rapid Participatory Rule of Law Appraisal and the Rule of Law Participatory Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation. The former is designed to assess the real needs of locals so that they can be properly addressed; the latter involves the setting of baselines for performance by which the achievements of institutions set up pursuant to the enforcement model can be evaluated. Together, these two models can deliver the foundations for the creation of a new state and ultimate peace.

The particular tasks of external military forces in the delivery of justice in disrupted states are investigated by Michael Kelly. Where peace operations are conducted by the military, it is vital from the earliest phases that appropriate frameworks for the delivery of justice be put in place, lest the legitimacy of the mission be compromised. The law of occupation, as embodied in the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, offers an appropriate general regime for such forces. In other circumstances – of pacific occupation by agreement – it is important that the terms of the agreement facilitate an effective approach to the maintenance of public security. In particular, the use of force must be properly regulated: the experience of the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group in Somalia highlights how badly things can go wrong if this need is overlooked. Civil affairs capabilities should be developed by those states that are likely participants in peace operations, but the staff must be flexible and imaginative, rather than committed to the rigid application of “laboratory solutions”.

The peoples of disrupted states are typically confronted by daunting social and economic problems, and a range of mechanisms exist by which

they might be addressed. Lorraine Elliott examines the performance of the United Nations. Social reconstruction, she argues, must confront issues of human security, taking into account individuals, the rehabilitation of communities and the rebuilding of civil society. It also needs to recognise the roles played by local institutions. In discharging the tasks of social reconstruction, a range of UN agencies are normally involved, but the United Nations has a grim record with respect to operational efficiency, coordination, accountability, transparency and competence. She goes on to consider four specific problem areas in detail: the nature of intervention and consent, which too often is taken to exclude ordinary people; the need for integration of political-military and social humanitarian goals; the need for better coordination of UN programmes and agencies; and the need for long-term support of development activities as part of wider peacebuilding.

Fiona Terry, in her exploration of the activities of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), argues, however, that improved coordination is not a panacea for the problems surrounding humanitarian action. These problems are more fundamental and deeply rooted, arising from the paradox that humanitarian action has the potential to prolong conflict and thus the suffering of its victims. Some NGOs have sought to maintain a strict and complete neutrality, while others have responded with overtly political commitments. Complex emergencies, in Terry's view, are scarcely more complex than in the past; rather, it is the reaction of humanitarian actors that is complicated, because of the diversity of their agendas and objectives. Humanitarian crises have political causes, and governments can too easily wash their hands of responsibility by painting such situations as purely humanitarian, requiring a purely humanitarian response. Civil-military cooperation in disrupted states tends to be complicated by weaknesses in mandates, or by mandates that are poorly focused. This problem is compounded by political expediency and by the push to define "end-states" at which point a mission can be terminated, even at the expense of long-term reconciliation. She concludes that genuine ethical dilemmas surround humanitarian action and that these should be properly debated, rather than smothered by a blanket of conformity.

Sadako Ogata, who had the front-line responsibility for coping with the dramatic upsurge in refugees, reminds us that the right balance has to be struck also between the pressing interests of the most vulnerable and deprived people in the world and the legitimate concerns of states. She notes the paradox that peace operations continue to be country based, reflecting neither the internal nor the regional nature of many contemporary wars. Given compressed time frames and an increasingly congested humanitarian space, she argues for the need for an upgraded "surge capacity" for responding to refugee emergencies, for narrowing

the gap between the deployment of humanitarian personnel and security support measures, and for constructing a “ladder of options” that include intermediate security measures pending the deployment of peace operations. Only thus can the security – of refugees, of the communities hosting them, and of the international humanitarian staff assisting them – be enhanced.

Samuel M. Makinda takes up the issue of the disarmament and re-integration of combatants, a problem of fundamental importance in states where the ploughshare is an oddity to soldiers – both adult and child – who know only the sword. He notes that realist, liberal, constructivist and feminist points of departure lead one to investigate the question in quite different ways. Conventional approaches to disarmament have too often been undermined by insufficient attention to vital questions about the states or societies in point, something which Makinda demonstrates with detailed discussion of the situations in Somalia and Cambodia. In Somalia, haphazard disarmament left disarmed groups at the mercy of those that had not disarmed. In Cambodia, the failure to disarm the armed factions left the existing power equation in place in Phnom Penh despite the 1993 vote of the Cambodian people. He concludes by suggesting that a critical perspective which does not take institutions and power relations for granted should augment a problem-solving approach to the disarmament of antagonists. The broader context of political and social reconstruction must be taken properly into account.

Adrien Whiddett discusses the use of police in the transition to civil order. Policing a democracy, he notes, is vastly more arduous than policing a totalitarian state, since the rights of citizens must be properly recognised. Criminal behaviour, in the context of wider world disorder, creates significant challenges for peace operations. Police from middle powers such as Australia have valuable roles to play when such operations are undertaken. In areas as diverse as Cyprus and Cambodia, certain distinctive skills of policing have proved to be effective contributors to order. However, strategies for operations must be properly integrated and graduated; police must be properly trained; and underperformers can seriously impair the efficient discharge of a civilian police contingent’s responsibilities.

In conclusion, Martin P. Ganzglass reflects on the problems of rebuilding the rule of law in the Horn of Africa. He surveys the very different experiences of Australians in Somalia and code-drafters in Eritrea, and argues that a new NGO, “Justice Without Borders”, might have a useful role to play in filling gaps that the breakdown of the rule of law in disrupted states characteristically causes. Looking at the contemporary cases of Kosovo and East Timor, he offers some suggestions as to how each of these different approaches might have something to offer.

Notes

1. Quoted in Norman Davies, *Europe: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 568.
2. See Stephen D. Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia", *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 3, Winter 1995–96, pp. 115–151; Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
3. See Daniel Philpott, "The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations", *World Politics*, vol. 52, no. 2, January 2000, pp. 206–245 at p. 211; also Derek Croxton, "The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty", *International History Review*, vol. 21, no. 3, September 1999, pp. 569–591.
4. Donald Cameron Watt, *How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938–1939* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), p. 85.
5. For more detailed discussion, see Daniel Philpott, "Sovereignty: An Introduction and Brief History", *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 48, no. 2, Winter 1995, pp. 353–368; Michael Barnett, "The New United Nations Politics of Peace: From Juridical Sovereignty to Empirical Sovereignty", *Global Governance*, vol. 1, no. 1, Winter 1995, pp. 79–97; Michael Ross Fowler and Julie Marie Bunck, "What Constitutes the Sovereign State?", *Review of International Studies*, vol. 22, no. 4, October 1996, pp. 381–404; Øyvind Østerud, "The Narrow Gate: Entry to the Club of Sovereign States", *Review of International Studies*, vol. 23, no. 2, April 1997, pp. 167–184; Martin van Creveld, *The Rise and Decline of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
6. Jackson has described these as "quasi-states": see Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
7. See Linda B. Miller, *World Order and Local Disorder: The United Nations and Internal Conflicts* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967); Evan Luard (ed.), *The International Regulation of Civil Wars* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1972).
8. See Ted Robert Gurr, "Ethnic Warfare on the Wane", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 79, no. 3, May–June 2000, pp. 52–64.
9. See Linda Melvern, "Genocide behind the Thin Blue Line", *Security Dialogue*, vol. 28, no. 3, September 1997, pp. 333–346; Human Rights Watch, *Leave None to Tell the Tale: Genocide in Rwanda* (New York: Human Rights Watch, March 1999); *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda* (New York: United Nations, 15 December 1999); Human Rights Watch, *The Fall of Srebrenica and the Failure of UN Peacekeeping* (New York: Human Rights Watch, October 1995); *Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica* (New York: United Nations, A/54/549, 15 November 1999); William Maley, "The UN and East Timor", *Pacifica Review*, vol. 12, no. 1, February 2000, pp. 63–76.
10. See Arthur Lee Burns and Nina Heathcote, *Peacekeeping by UN Forces: From Suez to the Congo* (New York: Praeger, 1963); Rosalyn Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary*, vols. I–IV (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969–1981); Alan James, *The Politics of Peacekeeping* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1969); Indarjit Rikhye, *The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1984); *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1990); Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1990); A. B. Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping* (London: Macmillan, 1994); Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

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11. See Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes (eds), *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995); Steven R. Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold War* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995); Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer (eds), *A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995); Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone and Robert C. Orr (eds), *Keeping the Peace: Multilateral UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Jarat Chopra (ed.), *The Politics of Peace-Maintenance* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Jarat Chopra, *Peace-Maintenance: The Evolution of International Political Authority* (London: Routledge, 1999); Thomas G. Weiss, *Military–Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999); Geoff Harris (ed.), *Recovery from Armed Conflict in Developing Countries: An Economic and Political Analysis* (London: Routledge, 1999).
 12. For an exploration of the range of issues involved in the Kosovo case, see Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur (eds), *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000).
 13. See James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds), *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
 14. See, for example, *Preventing Deadly Conflict* (New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997); Barnett R. Rubin (ed.), *Cases and Strategies for Preventive Action* (New York: Century Foundation Press, 1998).
 15. Robert Rhodes James (ed.), *Winston S. Churchill: Speeches 1897–1963*, vol. VII (New York: Chelsea House, 1983), pp. 126–127.
 16. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).