Proposal for a Study Of Issues Relating To Global Economic and Social Governance

The project is proposed in the context of the rapidly growing interest in, and demands on, the institutions of global governance. Despite, or perhaps because of, the vast implications of this subject matter, there exists some timidity about rigorously examining long-standing institutional arrangements or about searching for new ways to finance the attainment of globally agreed objectives, such as the Millennium Development Goals - goals which are considered urgent but which are unlikely to be met, in part due to inadequate resources. The work of the Commission on Global Governance in the 1990s offered the last detailed treatment of a number of these issues, and since the completion of its work, debates have advanced and still new questions have arisen.

The Zedillo Panel's Conclusion, in the lead-up to the first United Nations conference to principally focus on questions of financing, provides a cue for the main elements of this project:

Not only for official development assistance but also for humanitarian aid and for global public goods, the system needs more funds than are currently being provided by traditional sources. We see a genuine need to establish, by international consensus, stable and contractual sources of multilateral finance. To administer these resources effectively, we see a genuine need to fill gaps in global governance. Today's challenges cannot be adequately handled by an international system that was largely designed for the world of 50 years ago.

Concepts

The term governance has come to refer to the institutions and processes guiding and directing social entities of any kind. We evaluate governance according to its propensity for fulfilling what we consider to be the proper purposes of the entity concerned. In this way, corporate governance is commonly judged on criteria such as the extent to which it represents the interests of those considered to be the legitimate stakeholders of the corporation, resolves conflicts between them, and attains their common objectives. Similarly, an evaluative discussion of global governance supposes that the people of the world should be considered as a social entity with a certain community of interest; that the globe has legitimate stakeholders to be represented in its legislation and its directorship; and that it needs institutions for resolving the conflicts among the purposes of the stakeholders and expressing their community of interest so that their common objectives may be attained.

A convenient hypothetical standard for judging the current institutions of global governance is that of the roles we would expect a well-functioning democratic, law-governed federation or confederation of states to carry out. Such a federation or confederation, operating for the world community, would be entitled and enabled to provide those global public goods that states acting with their individual interests in mind would be unlikely to obtain. It would, if it followed the model of well-functioning democratic national governments, also be able and motivated to apply some consistent elements of social justice across the current populations of states, procuring some tolerable minimum standard of merit goods and to a point redistributing income for the purpose of minimizing extreme poverty and addressing other problems. And it would be empowered and expected to take fair and reasonable account of the interests of unborn generations.

Since there is no such federal or confederal government (indeed such a structure is considered neither desirable nor practical at present), we look for institutions that might simulate its hypothetical performance in a world of formally 'sovereign' states. In fact institutions for attaining certain particular global public goods or agreed common purposes exist, meeting their objectives more or less effectively. These are principally agencies such as the IMF, conventions such as the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, optional tribunals such as the International Criminal Court, and clubs such as the WTO and the ICAO. (To distinguish these devices from what we normally regard as government, they can be described as consensual regimes.) There are also forums, such as the UN General Assembly, the Annual Meetings of the Fund and Bank, and the annual G8 summits, and the UN Security Council, ostensibly taking counsel for the world. But what these meetings resolve does not necessarily happen. (For example, there is no reliable process leading from the resolution establishing the Millennium Development Goals to action, supported by adequate financing, for the attainment of those goals. And there is no great confidence that the goals will be attained. Indeed, because resolution does not imply implementation, such goals are likely to be framed without much consideration of how attainable they are.) In general, these forums can lead only by persuasion, and they tend to lack the structure, or the resources, or the legal and political credentials, for making this leadership very effective.

The present system of global governance has considerable gaps. These may be grouped under two main heads: finance and leadership. (The two, of course, are interlinked.) In this study we propose to consider the gaps principally insofar as they relate to meeting 'economic and social' objectives, though to a large extent similar considerations apply to other political subjects such as peace-making, jurisdictional disputes, and human rights.

The study would be structured as follows. A first volume would explore questions relating to the financing of global purposes, and specifically ways in which revenue might be expanded so that globally agreed objectives are attained. (This will be supplemented by a specialized monograph on the impact of a currency transactions tax on foreign exchange markets.) A second volume would be principally concerned with questions of global economic and social leadership, and with proposals for the reform of institutional arrangements to that end.

Method of work and output

The first two volumes will lie somewhere between edited and jointly authored work. Besides drafting sections ourselves, we intend to commission a number of outside experts to prepare particular chapters. A number of people highly distinguished in related scholarship or practice or both have agreed to act as an Advisory Panel for the project, and we intend to invite two or three additional persons to join the panel in the next few months. The advisory panel currently consists of Professor Gerry Helleiner, Professor Emeritus, Department of Economics, and Distinguished Research Fellow, Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto; Professor Devesh Kapur, Department of Government, Harvard University; Thandika Mkandawire, Director, UN Research Institute for Social Development; Gert Rosenthal, Ambassador of Guatemala to the United Nations and formerly Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean; John Williamson, Senior Fellow, Institute for International Economics, Washington and Project Director for the High-Level Panel on Financing for Development; Sir Brian Urquhart, past UN Under-Secretary General and eminent biographer and scholar of international relations; and the Hon Ralph Willis, Australian Treasurer, 1993-96. Our intention is to submit all the draft sections of the first two volumes to each of the members of the Advisory Panel. Where they have comments, these may either lead to modifications in the text or be appended as comments, according to what seems best to the original author, the commentator, and the team. After this process has been completed, we aim to run two expert consultations, each of no more than about thirty people, and each to discuss a section of the text before it reaches its final form. The procedure at these consultations has not been decided, but it might include inviting an opening discussant for each chapter. Discussion would be recorded and at least the gist of it reported, and we should frame concluding chapters in each volume in the light of the discussion.

Our hope is thus not only to present our own ideas and critiques and some original research but also to draw on extensive experience and thought from outside in order to augment, and to scrutinize, what we have to offer. We would in part be providing a framework on which the knowledge and experience of a range of people could be hung. We would be collecting and channeling ideas from a variety of sources for the elucidation of the two major puzzles.

1. Expanding revenue for global purposes

The first part of the study is concerned with questions relating to the financing of global purposes. We aim to explore a number of possible ways in which global good intentions might be backed more adequately by finance.

A functioning federal government with tax-raising powers is faced with a clear choice over any desirable objective that requires finance for its fulfillment. To decide on the end entails willing the means. Where there is a division of powers, one branch of government may admittedly resolve differently from another. But each branch knows that it is willing both the means and the ends, or neither. By contrast, the world's institutions can go through the motions of deciding on a precise goal - such as universal primary schooling by 2015 - without willing the financial means. The body that declares its commitment to the end has no power in itself to command the means. The decision in favour of the goal may be genuine - even in the sense that, on certain terms, the consenting governments, or their constituents, would be prepared together to bear the cost. But that does not guarantee the 189 or so separate decisions required to provide the resources. The paradox is readily explained by the theory of public goods. It may also be comprehensible from what we know of political dynamics. The disconnection between end and means is further aggravated by the complexity and uncertainty of the sequence through which dollars (in bilateral aid or in the hands of an international organization) can be converted across jurisdictions into, for example, school places.

We envisage that the argument of the first volume, under the theme expanding revenue for global purposes, would be structured as follows. The introductory section would make the case for why additional sources of financing are necessary - in the first chapter, setting out the global purposes and globally agreed objectives that need to be met, and the financial shortfall that currently exists in achieving them; in the second, setting out why relying solely on traditional external financing mechanisms such as bilateral ODA to meet that shortfall is neither politically plausible nor necessarily desirable. In light of this, the rest of the volume (chapters 3 through 9 in the preliminary outline below) would be devoted to examining, in turn, different proposals for expanding revenue that are identified as promising and/or have attracted interest among scholars and policy-makers. In each case, the aim will be to provide a detailed and up-to-date description of the proposal and its possible permutations, and then to evaluate each mechanism according to a set of common criteria (set out in a short introduction to these chapters) which would include efficiency, practicality, distributional impact and any externalities produced, modeling of the size of revenue generated, ease of implementation and political plausibility now and in the future. Chapter 3 would be concerned with innovative ways in which developing countries could generate additional revenue in order to finance spending on globally agreed priorities such as poverty reduction, chapters 4 through 9 would address financing mechanisms which are either global in scale or largely external to developing countries. The volume would conclude with some assessment of which proposals seem most promising given the criteria set out, and then propose a framework for advancing political and scholarly discussion of these proposals moving forwards.

The tentative chapter structure for the volume is set out below. Items with asterisks are those for which we intend to ask an outside expert to provide a draft.

1. This would identify goals proposed: what might reasonably be taken as objectives to be met with the help of additional sources of financing. These would include:
   • Global public goods, such as economic stabilization and the elimination of those infectious diseases of which people in all countries are at risk.
   • 'Merit goods': goods about which there is agreement that they should be available to everyone, even though their positive spillover effects may not be universal. Such would include primary education for all or the elimination of diseases such as schistosomiasis or river blindness that have limited geographical distribution.
   • Activities that contribute to a degree of general distributional equity, such as the objective of reducing the range of people living on less than so many dollars a day and income-protection for the poorest and most vulnerable.
   • Activities that contribute to maintenance of the environmental heritage for future generations, by, for example, containing global-warming.

   (The above list is not exhaustive and the dividing lines between these categories are debatable. We use expressions such as 'global purposes' to avoid these boundary disputes.) The chapter would work with certain time-limited political objectives (such as the Millennium Development Goals or some related set) and use estimates of how much additional finance, in one form or another, would be needed annually to meet them.

2. This would explore why - based on experience and economic and political models of behaviour - existing bilateral ODA is unlikely to be enough to achieve the globally agreed objectives and purposes set out in chapter 1. The chapter would consider the possibility of moving transfers to developing countries from the realm of charity to that of recognized claims. It would also set out why additional sources of financing may be desirable in any case - such as greater potential automaticity or stability of these sources compared with ODA, or the possibility of using financing mechanisms that raise revenue while also generating a positive externality. The rest of the volume would consider, one by one, various possible ways in which these extra funds might be forthcoming.

3. *Increasing domestic revenue generation in developing countries. This would include innovative strategies to improve domestic tax collection and mechanisms through which remittances from migrants from developing countries might be increased

4. *International tax cooperation as a means of increasing national public revenue. This subject attracted considerable interest during the International Conference on Financing for Development, with the benefits of improved international tax cooperation for developing countries' revenue collections estimated in the billions of dollars. Developed countries too would have much to gain from tighter control of international means of tax evasion.

5. *Ways of inducing increases in core and non-core national contributions to international agencies, including the possible role of earmarking of charges for particular purposes.

6. Ways of attracting private funds for global purposes. Private contributions from wealthy individuals, charitable foundations and corporations directly or via global funds or international agencies are viewed as an increasingly important and largely untapped source of additional revenue. This chapter would evaluate the size of this potential, consider the issues raised by private sector financing, and the strategies, financial incentives and technical support that might increase private sector contributions.

7. General purpose global funds such as the current proposal by the British and French governments for an International Finance Facility, multisectoral global funds for particular classes of objective (such as the new Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria - 'multisectoral' in that they involve the participation not only of governments and international agencies but also of NGOs and potentially private donors) and other fund-like instruments for general global purposes: whether and on what conditions they may be instrumental in increasing flows of funds from governments and the private sector and in directing the finance available more effectively for global purposes.

8. *Possible use of SDR-creation as a source of finance for global purposes; relationship of the use of additional SDRs as disposable revenue to the use of SDR creation and withdrawal for stabilization.

9. Internationally coordinated taxes and charges: an examination of the possibilities and requirements of a coordinated carbon tax, of a currency-transactions tax, and of other levies that have been discussed, as on international air transport and the rents from deep-ocean mining. (This section is designed in its final form to draw on the findings of the specialized monograph on the impact of a currency transactions tax on the currency markets.)

10. A final chapter would summarize the findings and be concerned with strategy: how political obstacles could be overcome and what framework there might be for action. This would include a consideration of the political and technical forums best positioned to advance the debate and negotiate any internationally agreed outcomes. It would lead on to the questions addressed in the second volume, especially as they relate the problem of how best to allocate funds for global purposes.

Specialized monograph: the impact of a currency transactions tax on foreign exchange markets

The discussion of possible globally available sources of finance inevitably raises the question of a currency-transaction tax (CTT). The CTT is capable, it would seem, of raising large amounts of revenue (several times perhaps the level of current ODA) at a very small tax rate, and ostensibly possesses other advantages, but has in the past been highly controversial - on reasonable, as well as unreasonable, grounds. Rodney Schmidt, one of the present applicants, has played a large part in addressing doubts about whether and how such a tax could be effectively implemented. But substantial policy misgivings about it remain so long as there is no clear idea about how various levels of CTT would affect the currency-exchange system, for better or for worse - and relatedly what, even very approximately, the response of the tax base would be to various rates of tax. It is proposed that Rodney Schmidt, with a colleague (who would be a financial economist), would undertake the necessary study of the composition of the foreign-exchange market and model the impact of various rates of CTT. Apart from the purpose of this research to contribute to the present study, it also has the potential for providing valuable descriptive information about a highly important market. But principally it is hoped that the results will clarify certain issues about the CTT, which is one of the most widely discussed of the proposals for new sources of financing under consideration in volume one. A small consultation with other experts would be held to review at some point during this study to discuss the research, its implications and possible additional work.

2. Filling the gaps in economic and social leadership

The second part of the study will address the institutional dimension of global governance, and specifically the question of global leadership in social and economic matters. Except in rather limited cases (such as what the IMF can do, because of the resources committed to it, in a financial crisis, or because signatory countries to treaties have agreed to cede part of their sovereignty to an international organisation such as the WTO or the ILO in the interests of achieving certain specific goals or standards), such leadership can be only persuasive, not directive. Such structured global leadership as exists is dispersed among several institutions, with different degrees and forms of unrepresentativeness in their constitutions. Moreover, there is no strong tendency for their approaches to be coordinated; their respective staffs may not talk much to each other. In several critical circumstances in recent times, it is widely believed that the coordinated or international action needed came far too late or not at all, or even that such action as was taken internationally worked in the wrong direction. The 1980s debt crisis, the global HIV/AIDS pandemic, the East Asian financial crises of 1997-8 and the recession of the early 1990s, are arguable examples. If it is held that, in the first and third of these, the IMF did the best it could with its resources and brief, the conclusion may have to be that its resources and brief were inadequate for its role as the world community's lead institution in such contingencies. If further international institutions of a consensual character are needed to secure global public goods such as stabilization, or the shoring up of national revenues against haemorrhage through transnational dealings, there is no body geared to sounding the alert; and national governments may be reluctant to do so because of the inertia that they could expect to face - and the fact that they have more pressing concerns. The intention of volume 2 is to explore how institutional arrangements might be altered in order to shape leadership mechanisms with real representative legitimacy, whose members together carry significant economic power, and who are in a position to receive both the best technical advice and the stimulus of new ideas.

We envisage that the argument of the second volume, under the theme filling the gaps in economic and social leadership, would be structured as follows. First, the economic and social leadership function would be defined and the corresponding deficiencies or gaps in existing leadership arrangements would be set out. A more detailed assessment would then made in chapters 2 and 3 of the strengths and weaknesses of the current institutional landscape. After this, chapter 4 would provide an overview of the major types of proposals to reform global economic and social governance to be considered in the volume. Chapters 5 to 8 then take each of the identified gaps in existing economic and social leadership and consider the merits of the different proposals to fill those gaps, through reform and restructuring of existing arrangements or through the creation of new ones. The rest of the volume is devoted to the practical and political implications of reforming the institutions of global economic and social governance, and how such a process might be carried out.

The chapter breakdown of volume 2 is tentatively planned as follows, (of which some would be written by invited external experts):

1. Gaps in global governance. The framework outlined in the section 'Concepts' above would be used to point to the existence of a number of interlinked deficiencies in the institutions designed for international leadership, specifically for:
   • Dealing in a timely and coordinated way with unforeseen crises.
   • Effectively pursuing longer-term economic and social objectives such as those embodied in the Millennium Development Goals. This includes recognizing and meeting any needs for new or modified consensual institutions in order to procure global public goods or other global common purposes.
   • Raising funds to finance the pursuit of agreed objectives (already addressed in volume one) and for systematically and effectively allocating to this end any funds under international direction.
   In each of these areas, existing governance arrangements are not currently providing adequate leadership.

2. How the world's political forums (e.g. those in the UN system and the G8) operate, the implications for their ability to provide effective governance and an assessment of recent reform efforts.

3. How the world's technical economic and social forums (e.g. the Bank, the Fund, the WTO and the ILO) operate, the implications for their ability to provide effective governance and an assessment of recent reform efforts.

4. Proposals for enhanced economic and social leadership. This chapter would provide an overview of the major types of proposals to reform global economic and social governance. They include:
   • Modification and strengthening of existing arrangements. Examples would be proposed changes to the role assigned to ECOSOC or the reform of the voting and decision-making rules of certain multilateral agencies.
   • Creation of new leadership institutions, forums or arrangements. Examples would include proposals for an Economic and Social Security Council or nexus structures, and consultative global people's assemblies.
   • Creation of new consensual institutions to meet specific needs, such as the provision of a global public good or other global common purpose. An example might be the proposed International Tax Organization.
   • Proposals centered around the use of public-private partnerships or global public policy networks, in which governments, international organizations, civil society and the private sector share information, and may undertake coordinated action, share in formal decision-making and undertake joint financing. Current examples include the World Commission on Dams and the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria.

5. Dealing with unforeseen crises. The requirements of effective crisis response and management would be set out. Proposals to reform the Bretton Woods Institutions and the UN system, and to improve inter-agency coordination, would be considered here, as well as the utility of any new structures.

6. Meeting longer-term social and economic objectives (a). The focus of this chapter would be on changes to the overall institutional architecture, in order to better meet these objectives. Proposals to strengthen ECOSOC or create an Economic and Social Security Council, and other reforms within the UN system such as to the UN conference system would be examined, as well as the utility of any new leadership structures.

7. Meeting longer-term social and economic objectives (b). This chapter will discuss the procurement of specific global public goods and the achievement of other global common purposes through specialized institutions and arrangements (e.g. an International Tax Organization).

8. Efficiently and justly allocating funds for global purposes. This will deal with institutional questions posed by the discussion of various new financing mechanisms volume 1. The chapter would address, among other questions, the merits of earmarked versus unearmarked funding structures (e.g. using issue 'silos' such as multisectoral global funds or more broad-based mechanisms such as those used by IDA) and the desirability of different institutional forms and instruments for making allocative decisions, including those based on partnerships or networks with civil society and the private sector. A specific question to be addressed would be the institutional arrangements needed to manage the allocation of that portion of the revenues of an internationally coordinated tax that might be available for global purposes.

9. A final chapter would summarize the findings and be concerned with strategy: how political obstacles could be overcome and what framework there might be for action. This would include a consideration of the political and technical forums best positioned to advance the debate and negotiate any internationally agreed outcomes.

This study intends to treat a range of questions that attract considerable political interest, such as proposals for the use of the Special Drawing Rights or for the creation of an Economic and Social Security Council, but which in many cases have not yet been subjected to detailed examination. In that sense, we hope to have significant new things to say in what is already an innovative area of research. We further anticipate that this study will contribute to a number of other related policy agendas and research programs - for example by advancing the debate on global public goods and their financing, by adding to the important debate about the merits of public-private partnerships and similar mechanisms and by injecting new ideas and insights into the push for the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals.

Though we intend to be open to whatever ideas may emerge from reading and consultations, there are certain ideas to which, because they seem promising or because they are already the subject of vigorous debate, are of particular interest at this early stage.

One possibility is the use of SDRs. This is a subject that received increased attention following serious discussion by the Zedillo Panel of the proposal as a means of increasing the financial resources of developing countries. George Soros' recent book 'On Globalization' gave additional prominence to this proposal. The amounts potentially involved are considerable. Both the stabilization and the asset-creation and resource-transfer uses of SDR creation - and how they might be combined - might benefit from fuller examination. Proper consideration requires careful thought about possibilities, some institutional research, and extensive discussion with informed and critical parties.

A second set of possibilities for particular consideration is how the total volume of funds for global common purposes might be increased and various public goods adequately provided by segregating and hypothecating funds for particular global public goods. Either funds contributed by governments might be separated for budgeting purposes from ODA; or particular negative externalities might be subjected to taxes or charges in a globally coordinated way to finance the corresponding public goods. These questions are raised in a shortly forthcoming book edited by Inge Kaul. We would consider them in the context of total funding of common purposes.

A third is the potential of a currency transactions tax as a source of international revenue. On the face of it, this seems a promising internationally coordinated tax. Though there has been intense opposition to it in the US Congress, its importance has been affirmed by a number of European governments, and it has even (after a fashion) been enacted by the Belgian Parliament, and supported by resolutions of the French and Canadian legislatures. Understanding of its application, either for stabilization or for revenue purposes, has progressed considerably since the publication of a symposium on the subject edited by Mahbub Ul-Haq and others under UNDP auspices in 1996. The base is virtually untapped; collection, it now appears, could be cheap and watertight and would require the cooperation of only a small number of national authorities; a political advantage is that the tax would probably have little visibility except to financial institutions. And yet it would appear that the amount collected could be very large with a very low rate of tax and therefore with very little distortion of economic activity, possibly even with favourable effects on financial stability. So the stakes seem to be high. But that last set of claims is one over which serious doubts persist. The specialized study that we propose might bring that question closer to settlement one way or the other.

A fourth possibility is the potential role of multisectoral collaboration as a tool of development financing and governance. 'Multisectoral global funds' have recently come into increased prominence with the Vaccine Fund and the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and multi-issue international social funds or global solidarity funds that have also recently been proposed. There are a variety of plausible reasons why this type of instrument might mobilize more funds for certain highly important global purposes, including substantial new funds from the private sector, and also enhance the effectiveness with which such funds are employed through leveraging the benefits of a multisectoral partnership. As far as we know the only study considering the advantages and drawbacks of this device is one for the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, completed this year by Jeremy Heimans, one of the present applicants. How far and in what directions this device can usefully be extended is a highly topical issue. The implications for global governance of the direct involvement of the private sector and civil society in managing international financial resources and in other kinds of global decision-making is a topic we intend to treat in both volumes.

A fifth, tentative, line of thinking concerns the moulding and designation of a central leadership institution for social and economic affairs. Our thought is that the first line of approach might be to find an existing body composed of the representatives of governments, probably within the UN system, whose brief and other characteristics might be modified. It would need perhaps to be convincingly representative of the world, to embody directly sufficient of the world's power in wealth and population, to be small enough for genuine discussion, to have access to the highest-quality advice, and to be given a large, though purely persuasive, leadership brief. (There might be some analogies with the Security Council, as in the proposal for an Economic and Social Security Council). Alongside it, and guaranteed its ear, might be an independent and representative advisory body of eminent persons without current governmental positions. This model might at least be a starting point for discussion of practical moves for sharpening leadership.

Specific research would be required on the currency markets (as explained above), on the rules and practice relating to SDRs, on the constitutions and practice of various UN and multilateral bodies, and on various potential tax bases.

Value-added: advantages of the applicants and the method

We are proposing to work on a range of related questions, to some of which we have special leads, but over which there are probably no comprehensive experts. Hence, the success and special contribution of the project will depend heavily on the process of high-level discussion, both with the members of the Advisory Panel and with the wider group that we hope to involve in the three consultations. John Langmore's position - at the heart, for the past five years, of the UN Secretariat's work on poverty and social development - puts him in a specially favoured position for knowing who from among those associated with international organizations - as staff, as delegates, as scholars - would be able to make useful contributions and to recruit their cooperation. His fund of experience and contacts will be of particular value on the leadership question, over which much must depend on insider views. While this advantage lasts, we can 'leverage' a much greater battery of knowledge and intelligence than we can directly command.

In addition, Rodney Schmidt has made, on the basis of careful institutional research, the principal contribution over the last three years - or arguably for much longer - to thinking about currency-transaction taxation, a subject on which John Langmore and Anthony Clunies Ross have also published. Langmore and Clunies Ross produced the Technical Note on innovative sources of finance for the International Conference on Financing for Development, a process in which Langmore was closely involved. He also had chief responsibility for developing the agenda for the UN General Assembly special session on social development in 2000. Jeremy Heimans has produced what seems to be the only study of multisectoral global funds, which are emerging as important new mechanisms for development financing. Clunies Ross has published on resource taxation and on global environmental policy, has produced a textbook on economic stabilization for developing countries and a research monograph on internal migration, and has co-edited/authored a book on Albania's economic transition. Short cvs of the applicants are appended.

Resources

Funds required are to make possible the meetings and consultations, to pay the outside contributors of draft sections, and to pay for varying amounts of the time of the four applicants. The project is estimated to cost a total of about $500,000.

Institutional base

The United Nations University, through its Vice-Rector, has agreed to own the project and to administer funds committed to it without any charge. The latter contribution is worth noting.

Timing

It is envisaged that the project be spread over three years. The exact plan of work would depend upon the time of year at which it was able to start and the existing commitments of the applicants then. After about 6 months from the starting-date, we should expect detailed draft outlines of all the originally planned sections for volumes 1 and 2. The applicants would meet, after say 7-9 months, with the members of the Advisory Panel individually to discuss these and the overall plan as it had developed. Fuller drafts of sections as they appeared would be circulated subsequently to relevant members of the Advisory Panel. At 18 months from the start we should expect full draft texts of the whole of volumes 1 and 2 to be ready. The specialized monograph on the CTT might or might not be completed to the same stage depending on when the 6 months' research for it had been timed. An expert consultation would be held after about 21 months, either on volumes 1 and 3 (which go together) or on volume 2. At this, each section of the volume or volumes considered should be presented and discussed. After about 24-27 months, there would be a similar consultation on the remainder of the work. After making revisions and addenda that emerged from the consultations, we should aim to have the text in publishable form at 30 months or soon after. We should have completed arrangements for publication and dissemination at 36 months.

Anthony Clunies-Ross has degrees from Melbourne and Cambridge Universities; taught at Melbourne and Monash Universities, the University of Papua New Guinea and the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow and on short courses in India and Tanzania; and was Professor of Economics at the University of Papua New Guinea and then at the University of Strathclyde, where he is now Professor Emeritus. He had periods as a member of the Papua New Guinea Tariff Advisory Committee and Rural Minimum Wages Board; was consultant to the Papua New Guinea Government on provincial government finance under the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation in 1975; has been engaged as an expert witness on cases related to Australian petroleum taxation; and has been commissioned by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs to prepare and contribute to papers on new and innovative sources of finance for social development over 1998-2001. He has written on public finance, stabilization and general economic policy issues, with particular reference to developing countries and to natural resources and the environment. Among other books, he is joint author of Taxation of Mineral Rent, published by Oxford University Press in 1983; author of a textbook, Economic Stabilization for Developing Countries, published by Edward Elgar in 1991; and joint editor of Albania's Economy in Transition and Turmoil, 1990-97, published by Ashgate in 1998.

Jeremy Heimans was educated at the University of Sydney and the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, where he was a Frank Knox Fellow. He will be based at University College, Oxford University for research leading to a doctorate from October 2003. His research interests are focused on international organizations and on current issues in development policy. He has acted as a consultant to the OECD Development Center and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, and worked for the consulting firm McKinsey and Company, where his responsibilities included the development of a diagnostic tool measuring performance gaps in the management of international institutions.

John Langmore was educated at Melbourne, Monash and Cambridge Universities. His employment has included four years as Lecturer in Economics at the University of Papua New Guinea; three years as Assistant Director of the National Planning Office in Papua New Guinea; eight years as staff economist to the Parliamentary Labor Party in Australia, including a period as Economic Advisor to the Australian Treasurer; twelve years as Member of the Australian House of Representatives including terms as Chair of various Parliamentary and party committees; and five years as Director of the Social Policy and Development Division in the UN Secretariat. He was responsible for the substantive preparation for the Twenty-fourth Special Session of the UN General Assembly on social development in Geneva in June 2000. This involved many of the kinds of activities that would be involved in this project such as organization of off the record seminars. He is the joint author of Work For All, published by Melbourne University Press in 1994; joint editor of two other books, Alternative Strategies for Papua New Guinea, published by OUP in 1973 and 1975, and Wealth, Poverty and Survival, published by Allen and Unwin in 1983; and author of many articles and chapters in books on national and international economic and social policy.

Rodney Schmidt was educated at Carleton and Toronto Universities, completing his doctorate on 'External debt, the exchange rate and asset demand' in 1994. After three years as senior economist in the Ministry of Economic Development in Belize, he was research assistant and then lecturer in the Department of Economics in the University of Toronto. Between 1993 and 1998, he was an international economist in the International Finance and Economic Analysis Division of the Canadian Department of Finance. During the latter part of that period, he was also a research associate of the North-South Institute in Ottawa. From 1998 to the end of 2001, he was a Program Advisor in Viet Nam for the Canadian International Development Research Council. He is currently Principal Researcher, Finance and Debt, at the North-South Institute in Canada. He has published many articles on financial and economic development issues