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GLOBALIZATION, SECURITY TECHNOLOGY AND CONFLICTS IN SOUTH ASIA

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Dr.Ms.Santishree.D.N.B.Pandit, University of Pune, India

INTRODUCTION

Globalization is one of the most powerful and persuasive images in today's world. The image of globalization- as a promise or as a threat- is invoked daily to justify actions and to rationalize policy. The real beauty of globalization is that it can be made to seem relevant at all levels of analysis. It a powerful tool of private interests, but it also equally useful in public sector. So what are the implications of globalization and in this paper to security technology and conflicts in South-Asia? Where does the logic of global markets lead? Does Security technology have a rationale of its own and has globalization with technology made borders more porous and states more vulnerable?

Both Globalization and security technology are transnational and have a momentum of their own. They greatly influence the ability by groups to sustain conflicts for a long period of time. The two examples, of Kashmir and the LTTE, who have sustained the conflict against the Indian and the Sri-Lankan states respectively for two decades have made use of globalization as well as technology to their causes. The weapons of mass destruction [WMD] is redundant and expensive, whereas the small arms and light weapons are preferred as they are cheap and affordable for these groups. And are used by terrorist groups to maintain a low intensity conflict and they have done it with a lethality that has risen to frightening potential.

Globalization is supposed to be about the extension of private market power, not public regulatory power.[i] The modern market has come into being on the assumption that individual players, both producers and consumers shall have freedom to

enter the market without any moral or legal coercion. There are three important elements in the neo-classical view of the market, namely contract, information and technology. Market is a price mechanism rather than an institution, which makes competitive activity possible. New firms freely enter the industry lured by excess profits with an entry pass called technology. The Bhopal tragedy is a case in point. " Changing technology, it is conceded, alters progressively and radically what is obtained from an given supply of factors." [ii] However Schumpeter explained economic change like globalization as the cyclical behaviour of economy by endogenising technology. The principle of individual freedom to maximize within an institution is retained, and the behaviour and efficiency of an institution is conditional on the equal access and availability of information. The inefficiency or imperfection in the working of institutions has to be set right by an external agency called the state.[iii]

States are supposed to have lost the ability to regulate global markets. It is hard to make sense of a globalization that produces global regulatory power. Globalization is the death of democracy[iv], as global firms and markets gain power, citizens lose it. The conflict is between the logics of democracy and market. They are seen as paradoxes. The democratic impulse is to bring decisions on issues affecting the society at large under popular, or public control. But in a free market systems, a whole range of decisions with important public consequences are private, held in the hands of rational, profit-seeking business leaders Citizens may prefer more government spending for universal health care, or tighter environmental and workplace safety regulations. They may organize to win higher wages and better working conditions. But these popular impulses may undermine profitability in ways that are unacceptable to business managers. Democratic claims often violate the logic of the market. In hyper-globalization[v] analysis, the rise of the private market unambiguously shrinks the domain of democratic public controls. Globalization is dollar dictatorship.[vi]

The focus of one school is just the opposite of achieving democracy through globalization.[vii]Here the threat of globalization can be used by

political entrepreneurs to gain power- globalization is an attractive foe that one can run against as well as run from. Globalization can apparently destroy democracy, create it, and be used by political entrepreneurs to manipulate democracy. Global markets dictate; national governments accommodate. Cultural diversity is also destroyed by the powerful global market. For the world will McDonaldized and Disneyfied, these being the principal forms of Anglo-Saxon media culture. The fascinating thing about globalization is its versatility, acting as a universal exilir. It can be used as an excuse or reason to do anything. It is an ongoing process and has potentially far reaching changes in the world order. Globalization has presented a fundamental challenge to the Westphalian states-system and its central principle of state sovereignty.[viii] Although it has through technology brought the demise of sovereignty, but it is by no means dissolving the state. The post-sovereign state will have contend with global governance agencies and these agencies suffer from severe democratic deficits. Global governance by the market implies deep inequalities and the hegemony of the rule of efficiency over democracy.

The issue that is uppermost is what has been raised by John Kenneth Galbraith in defense of the welfare state. The welfare state and the transfer of technology are extremely important for South Asia.

" Capitalism in its original form was an insufferable cruel thing. Only with trade unions, pensions for the old, compensation for the unemployed, public health care, lower-cost housing, a safety net for the unfortunate and the deprived and public action to mitigate capitalism's commitment to boom and slump did it become socially and politically acceptable. Let us not be reticent: we are the custodians of a political tradition that saved classical capitalism from itself."[ix]

Galbraith is right and this is more relevant to South Asia for Globalization is not the death of the welfare state, but a reason to extend it globally. This is at a time when the sovereignty of the state is being questioned by the spread of security technology and the transnational nature of conflicts in the region. With the experience of South East Asia, it is hard to picture markets on a foundation of turbulent global financial markets and this is exactly the problem of globalization.

GLOBALIZATION AND POROUS BORDERS

The competitive world is borderless. Markets have no national character. “On a political map, the boundaries between countries are as clear as ever. But on a competitive map, a map showing the real flows of financial and industrial activity, these boundaries have largely disappeared.”[x]Richard Rosecrance imagines actual states evaporating and being replaced by the virtual state. The economic culture of the world market has become the only international culture. “Less-developed countries, still producing goods that are derived from land, continue covet territory. In economies, where capital, labor and information are mobile and have risen to predominance, no land fetish remains…. The virtual state- a state that has downsized its territorially based production capability- is the logical consequence of this emancipation from the land.”[xi]

Globalization could mean several things. It is too vast an idea to express in a single sentence, but Petrella[xii] captures the notion in seven concepts.

1. Globalization of finances and capital ownership.
2. Globalization of markets and strategies, in particular competition.
3. Globalization of technology and linked R&D and knowledge.
4. Globalization of modes of life and consumption patterns: globalization of culture.
5. Globalization of regulatory capabilities and governance.
6. Globalization as the political unification of the world.
7. Globalization of perception and consciousness.

Access to global resource pools changes the economic, social and political dynamics of the system. Efficiency increases, but the nature of competition changes. Economically, access to the global resource pool provides efficiency advantages over those situations in which these resources are unavailable or unevenly available. The nature of competition changes because individual firms benefit to the degree that they draw from the global resource pool without bearing all its costs. Politically, the existence

of the global resource pool seems to weaken state power simply because, by definition, the state cannot control access to it and loses a set of policy levers it might have previously employed. The assumption is that the global resource pool strips the state of its power. Logically, the main limits to access must derive from power [the state] and cost [technology]. State actions and technological advances are both logically and actually the critical forces in globalization, and these two, state actions have been the more important. The main limits to common pool access in the twentieth century have been political, not technological.

Globalization has changed forms of money with the spread of trans-border currencies, distinctly supra-territorial denominations, global credit cards and digital cash.. It has reshaped banking with the growth of supra-territorial deposits, loans, branch networks and fund transfers. Securities markets have gained a global dimension through the development of trans-border bonds and stocks, trans-world portfolios, and electronic round the world trading. It has like wise affected the instruments and modes of trading on derivates market. Global trade and finance have spread unevenly between the different regions and different circles of people. It has developed most in the so called "triad" of East Asia, North America and Western Europe; in the urban areas relative to the rural districts worldwide; and in wealthy and professional circles.

The global dimension of contemporary world commerce has grown alongside and in complex relations with its territorial aspects. It is reconfiguring geography rather than obliterating territory. Territorial geography continues to be important in defining contemporary globalizing economy. There is little sign that global commerce and the state are inherently antithetical. On the contrary, the two have shown considerable mutual dependence. States have provided much of the regulatory framework for global trade and finance. They have indeed shared these competences with sub-state and supra-state agencies. While economic globalization has weakened cultural diversity and national attachments in some respects, it has reproduced them in others. Cultural diversity persists in trans-border marketing. Local peculiarities often affect the way that a global product is sold and used in different places. New technologies like computer aided

design have moreover allowed companies to tailor some global products to local proclivities. In this vein Michael Porter has argued that " national differences in character and culture, far from being threatened by global competition, prove integral to success in it".[xiii]

Among the many forces that limit the extent to which true globalization can happen is the fundamental instability of global financial markets. There is reason to believe that as global financial markets expand they become increasingly unstable. At some point, the instability is great enough to halt the forces of economic integration and perhaps to reverse them. Globalization is a self-limiting process. The process that we call globalization is really a complex set of changes.[xiv] Kenneth Waltz in his influential book, **"Man, the State and War**", he proposed a three level analytical framework.[xv] He writes about three images, which is the basis of the level-of-analysis approach to international relations. Human individuals exist within the nation-state, which exists within an international system. Each element-the individual, state, system-has its own nature and motivations and is conditioned by the next higher level of analysis. In writing about war, war and peace are complex matters that depend on all three levels and their interactions. To understand war and peace, one must understand human individuals and their motivations; the state and its motivation, and how it conditions the actions of individuals; and the international system, its structure, and how it conditions the actions of states.

Susan Strange[11] frames the issue in terms of the breakdown of traditional structures of authority and the creation of new combinations that embody authority in new ways. She perceives that the dynamic that we call globalization is conditioned by the diffusion of authority within society, not just between nation-states, which creates different patterns of influence and behaviour. There are more actors on the world's stage. She perceives the retreat of the state and the reasons for it are: the

accelerating rate of technological change and the accelerated mobility of capital. This causes three dilemmas on the state:-

1] Economic- A market economy needs a lender, an authority able to discipline but also to give confidence to banks and financial markets.

2] Environmental- The motivations of corporate players in the world market economy lead most of them to destroy and pollute the planet, while the necessary countervailing power of states is handicapped by principles of international law, sovereignity and the like.

3] Political- The long struggle for liberty and accountability gradually made at least some states accountable to the people, but globalization, by shifting power from states to firms, has allowed international bureaucracies to undermine that accountability. There will be a " democratic deficit".

James N. Rosenau has taken the idea of crumbling walls and complex behaviours and used it to develop models that resemble the formal mathematical models of hydrodynamic turbulence that were the original chaos theory.[12] He proposes that there are three dimensions of global politics. The first is at the level of individual. The second dimension operates at the level of 'collectivities', which include both state and non-state actors and where structural parameters are particularly relevant. The third dimension is relational and is a mixture of the first two. Rosenau argues that all the three dimensions of his analysis are undergoing change and are interacting in increasingly complex ways. That is, orientations and skills of individuals are changing rapidly within a system of collectives that is experiencing fundamental structural change, and during a period when the nature of relationships between and among individuals and collectives is also in flux. The result is conceptually similar to the fluid dynamical flows that produce turbulence and chaos in nature.

In many cases, especially in Asia the state has been the guiding factor in the process of privatization of industry, liberalization of the economy and aided the process of globalization. It is important to analyze these processes as the reality shows that in Asia atleast the authoritarian model of the state has been more successful in

tackling the forces of globalization like China and several of the South East Asian states. This does not automatically prove that in Asia , plural democracies may find it difficult to tackle the social and cultural forces unleashed by this process. It is hardly a unified phenomenon but rather a syndrome of processes and activities, a set of ideas and a policy framework. More specifically, globalization is propelled by a changing division of labour and power, manifested in a new regionalism and challenged by fledgling resistance movements. From this perspective the state will have to consider the voices of those affected by this trend including those who resist it and particularly those who are hurt by it. The evidence shows that while offering many benefits to some, globalization has become an uneasy correlation of deep tensions, giving rise to a range of alternative scenarios.

It is here that the third way suggested, is important but unlike Anthony Giddens[xvi] who has seen reality through the prism of a fundamentalist- cosmopolitan divide, it is a major period of historical transition and the this reordering of states and societies is unpredictable, but it also has several positive directions for the future like cosmopolitan tolerance and multiculturalism. There has been and will be growing politicization of the international economic order and an increase in policy competition. Government intervention in the areas of trade, money and production has grown immensely despite the revival of neoconservatism and rediscovery of market in many countries. Deregulation at home appears to be accompanied frequently by increased protection of domestic markets and policy initiatives designed to promote nationalist goals.

There is an increased regionalization of the world economy as global economic activities cluster around the several poles of the world economy. Regionalism will be a prominent feature of the globalizing system. It is unfortunate that the leaders of South Asia are still mired in the conflicts of the Cold war and partition mentality.[xvii] It is here that both India and Pakistan , the two large countries will have to look beyond Kashmir and the Taliban and cooperate to strengthen the SAARC instead of undermining each other.

TECHNOLOGY AND GLOBALIZATION

Most people perceive technology as the driving force for globalization. This is natural, since global market expansion has taken place in the last part of the twentieth century alongside great advances in telecommunications and microelectronics. Globalization set in with Vasco da Gama setting foot in Cochin in 1498 A.D. What is new is this is helped by technology and more so in security. Globalization exists as a process, but it is less complete than many people think and of a different nature than is commonly assumed. It is in practice turns out not to be the triumph of the irresistible market force over all that stands in its way. The rumours of the deaths of distance and the state and culture and the individual all are exaggerated. These forces, which have always limited global market integration, still limit today.

Technology generates change in population, security and economic affairs and this has moved by leaps and bounds. This necessitates not only an increased awareness of technology, but an adaptability to survival and action in rapidly changing environments. These effects make themselves felt in almost every facet of international relations from trade negotiations to military security. It is paradoxical that the demise of absolute military security is a product of the same technology that has produced advances in communication and industry, which contribute to social unrest in the developing countries, yielding perceptions of insecurity. Technology tends to be cumulative, accelerative, irreversible and to diffuse widely and quite rapidly from the country of origin. Not long ago there was a myth that western cultural backgrounds were necessary to apply to modern technology. This myth has been exploded with countries like Japan, China and India. What is needed are literacy, organization and capital. There has been a

deliberate attempt of certain states to restrict the spread of security technology, especially those of weapons of mass destruction.

In the real world of nation states and political boundaries, the transition from one center of innovation and growth to another is anything but smooth. It is highly conflictual as declining states and economic sectors resist the forces of technological change, and rising states and economic sectors try to break down trade and other barriers. Since capital and especially labour are unable to move freely throughout the system, structural rigidities prevent easy adjustment to emergent economic reality. Inefficiencies, bottlenecks and restrictions slow the rate of adjustment and economic growth.

Technology tends to alter the scope of the international goals of a state and it redefines the objectives factors of foreign policy. Technological advancement has become a requisite to any state, which would be a great power. In addition to materials requirements, leadership is partially dependent on prestige and technological leadership is a component of this prestige. Technology is primarily a means not an end. Now that technology has given military force the capability to effect enormous destruction in such a short time, the changing nature of society has made war an anachronistic instrument of policy. In essence, the logic argues that any instrument of policy is useful only so long as its direction and magnititude of effect can be controlled to make it serve policy objectives. Once the discontinuity of the strategic nuclear exchange is introduced, it may no longer be feasible to make war a servant of policy.

The pace of military technology has made weapon systems obsolete even before they could be deployed. While there is some value in distributing obsolescent weapons systems to lesser powers under the guise of military aid, two problems arise from such efforts. First, the producing state still does not recover the cost of the system, and increasing weapons costs limit the quantity of this largesse. Second, weapons systems once they are transferred come under of the recepient. The rapidity of change in military technology makes it almost impossible for the military establishment to

assimilate fully the effects of a weapons system before the time to decide whether or not to procure and deploy the system. This leads to the technological tail wagging the strategic dog , in that a state may feel forced to commit resources to the acquisition of weapons, and later find itself trying to devise a strategy to devise a strategy that will utilize the weapons.

Technology flows on without regard for human intentions and each technological breakthrough offers the possibility for decisive advantages to the side that first exploits it. The nature of this dynamism is such that it cannot be controlled unilaterally. Elements of technology are interdependent First it is useless to develop nuclear warheads without developing the delivery systems to deploy them. Second, advances in one field frequently suggest associated ideas or applications in others; therefore an agreement not to pursue certain areas of research is no guarantee that the technology of that field will remain static.

Technological developments have given rise to much soul searching about the digitized battlefield of the future, about smarter crime in the 21st century and about the magnitude of data theft and destruction. The main weapons in the new kind of warfare are computer viruses., programmed to damage software; logic bombs set to denote at a certain time and destroy or rewrite data; and HERF[high energy radio frequency] guns that disable electronic targets through high power radio signals. A suitcase size device can generate high -powered electromagnetic impulses affecting all electronic components in the vicinity. Computer viruses can shut down entire computer systems through self-replication on available disc space. There are logic bombs [hostile programs clandestinely introduced into target computers], so-called trapdoors, Trojan horses, worms, and spy chips. And as technology develops, so does the number possibilities to create havoc.

There is increased interdependence on collective security and other interdependent arrangements and use of military power by strengthening of third parities. The classic example of China's weapons transfer to North Korea and Pakistan, especially to curtail the US and Japan in Asia-Pacific and India in South Asia. So China is always a factor in South Asian security. Both create new forms of dependency. Therefore the dangers of direct conflict among the major powers and the importance of time become vital factors in the security calculus of the region. Military collaboration with friends becomes a continuing necessity rather a crisis phenomenon. States increasingly turn the mechanisms less formal than treaties to establish and govern these operations.

Interdependence brings more dilemmas to the great powers than it does to the small ones. Great powers become third parties to conflict among allies. A state may through technological innovation create a new capability that circumvents the purpose of an arms control agreement. The potential of curing this problem lies in that additional technological innovations are increasingly expensive and have increasing lead times to actual deployment and technology per se is global and therefore subject to independent discovery by the potential adversary before it becomes an actual threat. The rate of change of security technology may be gravely reducing the usefulness of technological criteria as arms control measures. Technology may in itself provide a de facto arms control through the mutual restraint imposed by nuclear powers by the weapons of mass destruction. But this does not work in the case of small arms and the forces of globalization could be misused for the spread of small arms and light weapons.

DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES

Disruptive technology changes the rules of the game. The danger lies in the failure to distinguish between technologies that help sustain leadership and those that undermine it by disrupting the status quo. By upsetting existing advantages, it nurtures new skills and fosters different strategies. The resulting uncertainty shakes up the established order and changes the standards by which leadership is measured. Leaders whose dominance is threatened often do not recognize major environmental changes until

it is too late. Using old standards, they assess their situation and conclude that they are safely ahead.

This has made a paradigm shift as they shift competition to areas where geographic and political factors work against the established governments as in the case of the Indian and Sri Lankan governments. The key geopolitical structure is the information network and access and availability of technology. A geography of finance and commerce has no place in it for war. Technology also creates a structural crisis , which the world has not witnessed so far. Asia is running out of room; the room for political and military maneuvering, room for buffer reactions between armed powers, no room to insulate domestic crises from spilling over into the international system, as in the case of India and Pakistan. Technology's relationship to geography is shrinkuing everyone's maneuvering room, political and military.

TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN SECURITY

Human security has meant free from all danger, anxiety and fear. Most threats are primarily, if not exclusively, military in nature and usually require a military response if the security target state is to be preserved. It is Walter Lippmannn's definition that is relevant , " a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war." This implies that security rises and falls with the ability of a nation to deter an attack, or to defeat it. The ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threats is extremely important. The Third world or Global South's weak links with the systemic security agenda further circumscribes the usefulness of the Western concept of security in explaining the problems of security Global South states face. This has happened with India. India did in 1964 make an appeal to extend the American security umbrella, when the US was giving the same to the

Scandinavian states, but India was denied. This made India to pursue an independent self-reliant path to security.

The human security policy here calls for one of the most widely shared values in the modern world, one that is ratified consistently in international agreements on Human rights is the principle that people of all ethnic and religious backgrounds within each society should enjoy economic and political opportunities. This principle motivated political movements that work for greater equality among disadvantaged peoples throughout the world. In the Indian theoretical framework, it is the concept of 'Vasudevai Kutumbakkam'[xviii],which meant that the human race and all living things were a single family and hence shared universal values, though different paths exist.

Throughout human history, societies have clashed over access to and control of ostensibly renewable resources such as water and farmland and over nonrenewable ones such as oil and minerals. But the competition over resources that was once a simple zero-sum-zero game- to the victor belonged the spoils- is being transformed by environmental scarcities. Although countering the degradation requires cooperation among countries that share watersheds and other ecosystems, the immediate effect is that competition between them intensifies, particularly as populations and development needs continue to grow.

The degradation of land, freshwater, and marine resources will become more pronounced with the onset of global climate change, and environmentally induced conflicts are likely to intensify. But in addition to disputes to these individual areas of concern, the global politics of climate change itself is already becoming a focus of diplomatic and political conflict. Ever since the Rio conference in 1992, countries have been maneuvering to limit or avoid responsibility for reducing their emissions for carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases.

To a large extent, this is shaping up as a dispute between the industrialized North, accounting for the bulk of emissions, which would primarily be a victim of global warming. Developing nations have been clamoring for technical and financial assistance to cope with the consequences. On the horizon is an issue that has barely been addressed yet: with developing countries, particularly China, South East Asian states, India, planning will need to slash their emissions even more dramatically, or they will need to develop and share alternative energy technologies much more generously. But the politics of global warming is characterized by a sharp discrepancy between the status quo of sovereign nation-states and the growing reality of borderless and massive environmental change.

Sustainability and sustainable development have become the guiding principles of environmental policy and international development. Caring for the Earth and the adoption of Agenda21 at the Earth Summit in 1992 and the awareness of the need to balance environmental and developmental concerns has increased dramatically. The human security policy would take into three types of Sustainability

1] Ecological

2] Social, and

3] Economic.

Systemic security had an inverse relationship with the security of Global South regions and has often contributed to insecurity in the developing world. It has done so by turning the Global South into a relatively low-cost, low stakes arena in which the rivalries of the major powers could be played out without affecting those powers' vital stakes or posing the threat of general war in the nuclear age. The Western concept of security has its external orientation, its links with systemic security and the correspondence of state security with alliance security. In the Global South, the security-insecurity calculus is defined in relation to vulnerabilities- both internal and external- that threaten or have the potential to bring down or weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional and governing regimes. Here, human security has been equated to

emancipation and empowerment. Emancipation is the freeing of people [as individuals and as groups] from the physical and human constraints, which stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do. Emancipation and empowerment, not power or order is true security.

Many of the problems we face today are not the result of incidental failures but of technological and scientific successes. Science can describe, with degrees of precision, what is and to a lesser degree, can help us to assess what can be. Science cannot tell us what should be, and that is the key issue. Science is a form of know-how: it is a means without consideration of ends. It underlines the differences between knowing how to do something, and to knowing what to do. Einstein observed that, " we cannot solve the problems that we have created with the same thinking that created them". It is not a problem of lack of knowledge, but primarily the problems of power and political will. Here in the present situation with forces of globalization and security technology having a momentum of their own, the global system is confronted with a situation where facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent. There are immutable laws of nature. There are no immutable laws of economics. Economics and economy are human constructs. So is security technology. The mantra of growth, the assumption that rising tides raises all ships; that increasing national wealth effects distribution and equity in a country; that comparative advantage and specialization apply where the capital is mobile; that the market and technology can deal with all issues and that competition is good and natural in all cases.

Both Globalization and the security technology bring in the issue of irreversible changes. We must understand the politics of knowledge and the political economy of science. There are no knowledge products independent of institutional setting, financial support, place, pace and person. So far both have been driven by Northern elites. The Global South speaks more of issues of poverty, inequality and justice. But the Northern paradigm of science still prevails. Measured against a Northern standard, what is taught, how it is taught and what is researched all too often are designed

to meet international standards than national needs. The Northern tradition of science has generally failed to value indigenous and experimental knowledge. Value disputation requires participation.

GLOBALIZATION AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGY

When this is applied to the Globalization and the Security technology issue, the three dimensions of political change are mixed, the result is a bifurcation, which is a common occurrence in naturally chaotic systems. That is, the world would settle into a simple and unique equilibrium but develops a pair of "strange attractors". The bifurcation is toward political issues that are too big for the nation-state [global issues such as ozone depletion and regional issues such as trading blocs] and those that are too small for the nation –state [many security issues and economic issues]. In the model of political turbulence, the nation-state is the missing middle in the bifurcation of politics. This political bifurcation model argues that the "death of the nation-state" that has been so loudly proclaimed is not caused by the rise of the all - powerful global markets. Rather, it is due to the rise of new combinations of opportunities and constraints within the world of politics itself. Many of the new orientations, skills, structures and relations involve technological and economic factors.

Both arms manufacturing and transfers grew in parallel with the general development of the capitalist international economic system[xix], as engineering breakthroughs are scored and as national governments replaced local rulers in demanding larger stocks of arms. With the increasingly sophisticated weaponary of the Industrial Revolution, however, came a more determined, though not always successful, effort to control and profit from arms supply and to gain technological advantages over opponents. Arms were still traded and transferred widely, but the ability to design and produce them and to innovate new ones spread much more slowly.[xx] Big powers, seeking both military and economic dominance, hoarded their production advantages and even while allowing

commercial partnerships with their foreign manufacturers under license, did not foster widespread technological know-how. The superiority of weapons does not always win wars but rather the determination of the opponents to come back.

Arms distribution among less developed countries has remained highly uneven, with most major imports going to regionally ambitious, conflict-prone, or better-funded states in West Asia and South Asia. One key factor affecting demand for arms imports is a country's ability to become self-reliant, to develop its own arms industries at least for some key weapons or parts. Past embargoes have stimulated such indigenous production efforts. Greater self-reliance, however, also usually entails significant continued import of parts and key weapon components and thus continued dependance, at least to some degree on outside powers. The arms race and the process of *détente* included conflict between arms manufacturers and peace movements, with scientists being crucial to both sides.

Globalization and Security technology work at three levels that Rosenau's political turbulence model has brought about. The levels at which it could be seen is at the level of weapons of mass destruction- nuclear technology, where a comparison between India and Pakistan as well as the spread of small arms which has brought about cross border terrorism, where Pakistan's role in Kashmir and the LTTE in Sri Lanka has been focused. The arms dealers as well as security technology are transnational and globalization has made the grey and black markets extremely profitable. This region has seen a lot of turmoil made on identity and these situations have prompted both sides to shop for weapons. Security Technology has a logic of its own and the access and availability of this technology both for weapons of mass destruction as well as of small arms and light weapons has made internal and civil wars in areas of the Global south and South Asia is no exception to this.

Now weapons-producing nations face a new development - the proliferation of transnational mergers and alliances. American contractors, emerging from a decade of deep and abrupt domestic military spending cuts, are actively seeking foreign, chiefly European, partners. European firms, long disadvantaged by the small size of their national markets, are trying to merge with each other, while their governments engage in a politically-embattled privatization process to pave the way. The industry is belatedly doing what its commercial counterparts have done for decades - gone global - not just by exporting arms but by establishing design, production and marketing operations in foreign locales.

But the defense industry is not just like any of its character and operations pose technological, economic, and security problems not present in a Chrysler/Daimle merger. Traditional issues of cost, quality, and innovation in market with considerable concentration will become formidable. Governments already find it difficult to oversee the industry, and coping with transnational suppliers be just that much more difficult. In addition to these micro-economic concerns, it will become more difficult to ensure that government investments in military R&D result in spin-off that is captured within the national economy. Transnational defense firms, in other words, pose large challenges to the security of a national system of innovation.

There are also security issues. Nations might have to compromise on weapons design, as other buyers loom larger in the strategic plans of transnational companies. Supply lines could be more easily disrupted in times of crisis. Sophisticated weapons technologies could move more easily from country to country, quickening the pace of proliferation. Within the confines of a single firm or strategic alliance, people, ideas and technologies, rather than weapons, would move more readily across national borders, making it difficult for governments to monitor cost, pricing, possession and re-export of arms. Lead nations could risk their competitive edge in weaponry altogether, as know-how diffuses to other centers of expertise.

The military industrial conundrum demonstrates just how deeply economic imperatives have become intertwined with security policy. There are good economic and political reasons to encourage transnational mergers and partnerships. They could speed the elimination of redundant capacity and lower the cost of designing and producing weaponry. They might also undermine the pork-barrelling which keeps military spending high and crowded into inappropriate activities. But these gains must be weighed against a fundamental fact - that a transnational defense industry would entail fewer sellers facing a greater number of buyers, shifting market power on balance from governments toward private industry.

The major powers still enjoy comparative advantage in weapons supply, that is they produce weapons with more efficiency and at lower cost than other states and, in some cases, than they themselves can produce other types of goods; since they tend to manufacture high volumes and a full range of land, sea and air equipment. They also offer technical assistance, financial credits, and the guarantee of weapons battle tested or at least fully evaluated by their own armed forces. On the whole, much of the increase in supplier interest in selling weapons has been economic, rather than strategic motives. Since the 1980s, China especially began to supply advanced designs, such as missile technologies, at relatively low, a form of proliferation that worries other major powers.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

The rise of Asian military power heralds the beginning of a second nuclear age as different from the first, that of the Cold War. The world that the West is being challenged- not just militarily, but in cultural as well as philosophical terms. Just as Asia began asserting itself economically in the 1960s and 1970s, it now does so militarily, backed by the use of force that would make Western interference in Asia less cost effective in periods free from apparent conflict than ever before. Ballistic missiles

carrying conventional warheads or weapons of mass destruction [WMD], along with their cutting edge technologies have now been indigenously developed in as a many as ten Asian nations from Israel to North Korea. This is a major shift affecting the world's balance of power due to the proliferation of science and technology in these hitherto trivialized developing nation states.

The dawning of a restructured second nuclear age seemingly overturns fundamental strategic assumptions about both the techno- military balance and the concept underlying the preservation of Western politico- techno dominance in other areas of the world. For example, the Western agenda today is defined almost exclusively in economic terms. But the presumption that the West can still set the agenda and determines which hoops Asia must jump through to join the world system is an issue of serious debate. It is in this alternative framework, which to our mind views 1998, as a watershed rather than 1989 when the Berlin wall fell. The Indian tests followed by Pakistan showed the fragility of the non-proliferation regime and the US evolving a counter proliferation stand. The year also marked the historical 500th anniversary of Vasco da Gama's landing in India, which is more significant from Asian point of view as it brought an end to Western dominance aided by "high-tech" armament.

Thus, what is now perceived in the West as a breakdown in nonproliferation policy is seen in the East as a push for redefined national security perspectives. Asia, so it seems, does not see any reason to accept a non-Asian monopoly on the military doctrines/policies needed to ensure order, which traditionally projects a growing sense of self -empowerment by reasonably wealthy and big countries to defend their own interests. The rise of Asian military power is also reactive to the way America has been acting and continues to do so in international affairs. This has been further constrained by doctrinaire attitudes of binary thinking, which appears to be a hangover of the Cold war. The world is more complex and this binary thinking was not the creation of an intellect but a force of circumstances into which America found herself entwined. It was certainly not a design preplanned but falling into a marshy bottom of cultural praxis precipitated by the circumstances of application of technology, due to the evolution of the

path-breaking discovery of nuclear power. On the other hand, the recent development in the decoding of the human genome, has been a collective effort, which took cognizance of biodiversity and the role of developing countries with their participation having specific end zones related to international security.

This alternative framework is an attempt at having a decision making system at a global level that resembles three dimensional chess, where decisions are so intricate that only a careful fine tuning of policies can adequately address them. Consider US China policy, which is usually cast in terms of engagement versus containment or global commerce, where free trade is set against protectionism. Even the most complicated issues are mapped into crude dichotomies. Such binary thinking leads to hasty judgements-even when they produce non-viable conclusions. Thus, India, the world's largest democracy, is punished for testing nuclear weapons, while China hardly a democracy, is courted as a strategic partner.

The "Achilles heel" is that the side with the best technology does not always win, e.g. Iraq and Balkans. It is because of a failure to make a fundamental distinction between technologies that sustain advantage and those that disrupt it. The failure to distinguish the two has caused countless upsets in business and wars. It is this that Asian states have and along with the role of nationalism, which is driven by national insecurities, is incomprehensible to outsiders whose security is no longer endangered. This may give rise to new scenarios in the future of a China-Pakistan-North Korea axis, India- Israel-Iran alliance or the Primakov idea of Russia-China-India alliance, or the India-US-Israel alliance.

The truly universal non-proliferation regime has to be constructed by incorporating the advocacies of the Third world, however incompatible it may have been in the perceptions of the Western mind. Earlier, the Western powers were the shapers, mapmakers and architects of the global system. Now, not only must the West integrate new powers into the old order, it must revise its self-conception as well in a more pluralistic and pragmatic manner.

Unlike WMD, small arms are so inexpensive many sub-state groups can afford them. Karp states in the early 1990s, ethnic conflict became the most prevalent type of warfare. "Over 75% of all warfare since 1945 has been internal, not between existing states, but over the emergence of new states." [xxi] Arms trafficking is expected to increase, partly because of this. He states that with so many new, poor states being created from the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, a cheap way of obtaining weapons will be needed to arm their militaries. He also attributes the coming increase in trafficking to a more competitive environment, a strong demand, growing international economy, and a large gap in military technology.

BHOPAL GAS SYNDROME

This has been an issue that is related to the issue of global governance structures and technology. The concept of the state has three different meanings: a legal person, political community and a government. The states and governments around the world maybe equal in law, but have few political similarities. Many governments control less resources than many transnational actors. It cannot be assumed that all state based political systems are more coherent than global systems, particularly as national loyalities do not match state boundaries. By abandoning the language of “states” and “non state” actors, we can admit the possibility of theorizing about many types of actors in global politics. By distinguishing government from society and nation from state, one can ask whether private voluntary groups, companies and national minorities in each state engage in transnational relations. Once states are no longer described as homogenous coherent entities, they must be analyzed as open systems, having many channels for governmental and transnational connections to international systems.

In this case the sovergeinty had its limitations due to extraterritoriality, regulatory arbitrage and trade triangulation. The technological

revolution has globalized communications, both for individuals and for the news media. This has created a political revolution. Most governments have virtually no ability to control the flow of information across the borders of their country. A few authoritarian governments can impose some restrictions, but not without incurring very high political and economic costs. The high politics , low politics, distinction is used to marginalize transnational actors. It is invalid because politics does not reduce to these two categories. All policy domains can be described by the type of issues, the status of governmental decision makers, the degree of involvement of transnational actors and the priority given to the policy.

A simple concept of power will not explain outcomes. Military and economic resources are not the only capabilities: communication facilities, information authority and status are also important political assets. In addition, the ability to use the interaction processes to mobilize support will contribute to influence over process. Different policy domains contain different actors, depending upon the salience of the issues being debated.

SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

Although most weapons used in ethnic conflicts are light weapons, there is some use of major weapons. This does not translate into a risk of war between major powers. This, in fact, has decreased in recent years with the buildup of nuclear arsenals. Karp says that major arms still have a greatly perceived impact on the world, but there is little actual potential threat. He says that chances are small that the arsenals will be used. One of the benefits of small weapons to sub-state groups, is their ease of assembly and care. It takes very little technical expertise, which is something that separatist groups tend to be short on. They are also easy to smuggle and conceal and are readily available on the black market. In fact, black-market sales are one of the four basic ways of trading weapons. They are traded by criminal or corrupt organizations in one country to illegal people someplace else. A form of the black market is also used

frequently by governments who wish to cover their sales as they want to be accountable for them.

Technology has brought in a new breed of a terrorist, the cyber terrorist. The emergence of the computer as a technological device associated with terrorism is a very a new phenomenon while chemical and biological munitions, though of recent origin, have been recognized as weapons of mass destruction for much longer. It is recent technological innovations, which have made them more viable as weapons. The sheer volume of such activities and their destructive potential makes terrorism more problematic, harder to monitor, and more difficult to deter.[xxii]

These important technological tools have augmented like the advancement of several technological innovations, such as the minaturization, portability and increased precision of weapons, and the spin off of technology into a variety of other domains. The tools of the terrorist became less expensive, more destructive and widely available through less secure non-governmental outlets. These have been further augmented by motivational factors. They are the resurgence of terrorism motivated by religion, amateurization of terrorism, and the enhanced professionalism of terrorists. Today's terrorists, Hoffman writes, are more " adept in their tradecraft of death and destruction; more formidable in terms of their abilities of tactical modification".[xxiii] Thus, access to new tools, a broadened supply of available terrorist goods, and the advent of computer technologies are not only critical developments to increase the nature of the terrorist threat. In fact, it may be that the 'soft' motivational factors make the technological factor more deadly.

The escalation of nuclear smuggling from the erstwhile Soviet Union and East Europe has made the problem more complex. It is illegal and therefore it is inherently covert or disguised in nature. It deliberately seeks to evade export controls and monitoring procedures carried out by various inspection bodies and established national and international agencies directly responsible for enforcing the non-proliferation

regime.[xxiv] This with computer facilities, many hackers can get in and have got into protected sites. Cellular phones have been used in hijacking planes by terrorist, for example the hijacking of IC 814. For the genuinely sophisticated terrorist, the computer is a tool for training and planning. By creating computer models of targets, it is possible to advance 'virtual walk- through' of facilities selected for terrorist operations.[xxv]The recent acts of hacking the web sites of the governments have been a favourite past time of certain groups.

Small arms and light weapons also have a longer life than major weapons. Major weapons become out-of-date very quickly, within a matter of five years or less. Small weapons also require significantly less maintenance. For instance, the AK-47 has only 16 moving parts, compared to the F-5 jet fighter's 60,000. These parts are therefore much easier to find and much easier to replace. In some places of the world, some World War II vintage small arms are still in use.

The terrorism in Kashmir can be classified under the category of communal contenders,[xxvi] who consider themselves among a number of culturally distinct groups that compete for a share in political power and politically active. The Tamils are ethnoclasses, who are distinct minorities, who occupy distinct social strata and have specialized economic roles in the societies. In the Global South, the ethnoclasses have their immigrant origins. These are visible and dominant minorities. Two underlying factors, however are present in all circumstances, one, people become more sharply aware of their common identity and people become increasingly resentful about their unjust and unequal status in comparison with other groups. The sense of resentment is usually based on inequalities and denial of people's rights and opportunities.

The weakening of the State due to the forces of globalization and technology has made these groups to use political violence by committing terrorist acts. Technology has altered our views of security, it has change the nature of relations among nations and within them. The proliferation of computer, biological, chemical and weapons terrorism is a consequence of technological innovations. Technology is an

intervening and an enhancing variable that has made the threat more significant. The Miniaturisation, portability and increased precision of weapons and the spin off of technology into a variety of domains, the tools of the terrorist became less expensive, more destructive and widely available through less secure non-governmental outlets. The innovation like the cyanide capsule and the human bomb are cases in point.

Small arms and light weapons are easy to find and purchase today. The most readily available weapon is probably then Kalashnikov assault rifle. This is best-known as the AK-47, although these automatic weapons have been manufactured in many years besides 1947. In fact, according to Ksenia Gonchar and Peter Lock's essay "Small Arms and Light Weapons: Russia and the Former Soviet Union", Russia is a leading manufacturer of light weapons. They traditionally try to export these weapons before the Russian army is offered the new weapons. According to Renner, more than 70 million Kalashnikovs in 100 versions have been manufactured since 1947. Most of these are still in use in 78 national armies and in many guerrilla groups around the world. These are available to South Asia through the Afghan Arms pipeline through Pakistan.[13]

The single important factor in the introduction of small arms and light weapons into South Asia has been the effort by the US and Pakistan to arm the Afghan mujahidin and now the Taliban[xxvii] especially during the Reagan regime, covertly, Pakistan became the conduit for a massive military assistance programme. The CIA then became its supplier, and the ISI the intermediary and distributor. Available evidence suggests that most weapons obtained by Sikh and Kashmiri militants have come from two sources within Pakistan: [14] They are the arms bazaar in Pakistan's North west frontier province [NWFP]- a vast black market for weapons and members of Pakistan's ISI [Inter Services Intelligence], operating either on their own or with tacit approval or explicit complexity of the central Pakistani government .

According to Yousaf, " The pipeline was divided into three distinct parts. The first belonged to the CIA, who bought the weapons and paid for their delivery to Pakistan; the second stretch was the ISI's responsibility, getting everything carried across Pakistan, allocated to and handed over to the parties at their headquarter offices near Peshawar and Quetta, the third and final leg of the journey belonged to them. The parties allocated the weapons to their commanders and distributed them inside Afghanistan".[15]

There are four main categories of Russian arms traffic. They are-

- The first of these is the Russian government. In 1993, the government's total defense exports totaled $1.8 billion. One company monopolizes all weapons exports. This company, Rosvooruzsheniye, has the power to invest the revenues they receive from arms sales to strengthen arms production and services for the international market.

- The second category is the Russian military. Surplus weapons from the military go to the Officers' "social needs", to sell and use the profits as they see fit. Other extra weapons are given to the former Soviet republics, for their own new military forces. Still other weapons left military hands as the Russian army pulled out of Germany at the end of the Cold War. As the soldiers demobilized, they sold their weapons on the black market.

- The third category is private arms dealers. These small arms manufacturers have become less state-controlled as the east has opened up, and as this has happened, their trade has increased significantly. The fourth category is the illegal arms trade. The network of dispersal includes the military, defense ministries and industrial plants, private companies, organized crime, and the black market. All of these groups find ways to profit from the illegal sale of light weapons.

Many other types of assault rifles are produced around the world. Several countries apparently produce counterfeit weapons. For instance, according to Chris Smith's essay "Light Weapons and Ethnic Conflict in South Asia", Kalashnikovs are much less expensive than Chinese assault rifles in Pakistan because people have no way of knowing whether they're purchasing an actual Kalashnikov or a shoddily-made exact replica (down to serial numbers). It is hard to know for sure, but it is thought that over 100 million assault rifles are in use.

The UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice is working on the problem of availability of weapons. They have tried to get data on manufacturing, trade, and private possession of firearms and crimes and accidents. Forty-six countries with 68% of the world's population responded, but not all of them with complete data. There is a figure of 34 million firearms in private possession in 35 countries, but this is probably extremely low. Part of this lack of data, according to Karp, stems from the fact that many people continue to treat light arms as inconsequential. This works the other way, as well, for he feels that this fact may contribute to greater ease of control of the trade in light weapons, because of their lack of symbolic importance to nations. Governments do not tend to regard money from their trade as economically vital. In fact, most of the impact in small arms trade is made by small countries, rather than by military giants such as the United States.

During the 1970s and 80s, according to Klare, the United States and the Soviet Union saw arms trafficking as a way to gain allies and influence in the world. At this time, many Third World nations could afford to buy weapons because of the money coming in from the higher oil prices. They wanted the weapons at the time because of regional conflicts. This trade was down in the late 80s, with the end of conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq war, with lower oil prices and a worse international economy. However, arms trafficking will probably increase again with a competitive

environment, strong demand, a growing international economy, and large gaps in military technology.

In recent years, the demand for light weapons has increased, according to Edward Laurance's essay, "Addressing the Negative Consequences of Light Weapons Trafficking". He says the end of the Cold War has left many nations with surplus weapons to get rid of. According to Klare, the arms trade was down in the late 80s with the end of some regional conflicts, such as the Iran-Iraq War. Oil prices had also dropped, contributing to a worse international economy, leaving less money available for weapons than had previously been accessible, thanks to the oil boom on the 70s and 80s. Some of the same conditions that were present in the 70s and early 80s are present again, including more regional violence, leading to an increase in desire for light weapons.

There are many ways of transferring weapons across international borders. They are-

- ✍ The first is government-to-government sales and government-approved private exports. This is the most important.
- ✍ The second is covert government deliveries and black market deals.
- ✍ The third is capture, theft, or passing them from one conflict spot to another.

Three hundred companies in 52 countries make small arms. Several non-national groups such as the IRA also make simple weapons. Total, perhaps tens of millions of light weapons are produced each year. Governments also do direct government-to-government sales. However, available statistics don't say anything about how much of these sales is major weapons and how much is light weapons. Black market sales are also important. They include secret, illegal government deals. They are more

significant in light weapons than major ones. Governments sometimes use the black market to deliver arms to separatist groups in other countries. This was a frequent practice during the Cold War. This is a fast, easy way to spread weapons. Private arms manufacturers and dealers also introduce weapons into the black market. They often barter weapons for other things such as drugs or animal products. Criminals and terrorists, on the other hand, tend to buy weapons legally, according to Naylor. This is happening in South where the drug mafia of the " golden Crescent" is deeply involved with the terrorist groups. So the drug mafia does use this group for illegal trafficking of drugs from Afghanistan, Pakistan into India, which is seen as the corridor to the West. This has complicated matters further and made security an internal as well as external issue.

According to Jo Husbands' essay, "Controlling Transfers in Light Arms", every country participates in light weapons trade to some extent. She says there is a long history of trying to control arms transfers. Klare says there is no reliable data on small arms imports or exports, which increases the difficulty of controlling the problem. Husbands says that conflict is the big reason for arms trade in the first place. She says in order to control arms trade, people must find some way to control conflict. She suggests monitoring the flow or arms to tense regions to gauge how close it is to conflict. She states that embargoes can end fighting early, if they are enforced. However, Karp feels that lack of weapons will not stop wars, that people will find some way to fight if that is their inclination.

Karp states that containing or stopping all arms traffic is not important. Rather, peole must stop just as much traffic as possible. In order to achieve the goal of fewer weapons in circulation, Renner says, governments must dismantle rather than sell their surplus weapons. While western countries can do this, Russian and the former Soviet republics don't have the money to do so. They need the money the

arms sales generate to put back into their economies. Many citizens steal and sell the weapons to make money.

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) has studied arms reduction and found major problems. For instance, no inventory of weapons is normally made at the end of conflicts. Therefore, there is no way of knowing the total number of weapons in circulation. Most weapons that are handed in after conflicts are cheap. Most likely, the best weapons are hidden. During conflicts, groups often pass weapons out to civilians, but no one can figure out how to collect them again. In many cases, those weapons that are collected are given to the army of the winning side. The CIA scrambled to buy captured Soviet weapons and equipment, including AK 74, in part because the AK 74 was more effective than the old AK47, and presumably also to cover up US involvement in weapons supplies to the Afghan mujahidin. The CIA's decision in 1986 to supply the Afghan Mujahidin with stinger surface-to –air missile marked an important turning point. This changed the character of the war and helped the Pakistan supported Taliban to capture power. More weapons are passed out than are needed. It is also harder to disarm the longer people wait to do so.

The array of weaponary for sale in the arms bazaars is unparalleled in South Asia. In these open bazaars virtually any type of non-major weapon can be procured with little effort and a relatively modest amount of cash. The streets of Dara are full of Pakistanis from Sind and Punjab provinces in pursuit of rifles, mainly the Kalashnikovs and Type-56. After payment, delivery can be made to anywhere in Pakistan and possibly beyond. It is also widely rumoured that the arms bazaars deal in much more sophisticated weapons, such as surface-to –air missiles. Although these are never placed on show in the bazaars [unlike the ubiquitous displays of assault rifles], the right kind of money and connections apparently give access to this discreet market.[18] The arms in the NWFP come from many sources. Currently weapons on sale in the arms bazaars fall into

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four categories: weapons from the Afghan pipeline; Soviet stocks captured during the Afghan war; locally produced arms; and arms arriving from miscellaneous routes such as West Asia and South East Asia.[19]

In many areas, gun buy-backs are attempted, where people will have in weapons in return for money or in-kind goods. However, a monetary payment can lead to stealing guns to sell back. Certainly, the geographic proximity of Kashmir to Islamabad, along with Karachi, the first destination in Pakistan of CIA shipments bound for the Afghan Mujahidin and the Taliban and Rawalpindi, the location of major ISI storage sites for pipeline weapons] would facilitate the transfer of pipeline weapons from Pakistan across the border of Kashmiri militants.[20] This was done with the so called LTTE surrender before the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord , where the LTTE was forced to surrender weapons and the Indian intelligence agency, RAW was training these very militants to fight the Sri-Lankan state.[xxviii]

CONCLUSION

Currently, there are no international norms or standards set for weapons. There has been a suggestion for a global register of small arms similar to the UN Register of Conventional Arms. Oscar Arias, the former president of Costa Rica, has a plan. According to his plan, official arms transfers would not be made to countries with human rights violations, a lack of respect for the rule of law, those not following arms embargoes or military sanctions, or those not participating in the UN arms register. He published this with plans of presenting it to the UN General Assembly. The support for this code is weak in the US Congress, but growing elsewhere in the world.

There has also been a suggestion to try to interfere with black market trade by siezing big transfers and interrupting normal trade routes. This suggestions also includes clamping down on ammunition. It is less easy to make or transfer than weapons,

and people without ammunition can't use guns. There have several issues, which at the conceptual level have dogged the whole 'security-insecurity' debate of dilemmas in the causation, access, availability, alternatives, equity and the political. With the momentum that technology and globalization have on their own, it is ultimately a decision of human beings to make, a political one. Aldous Huxley was right when he said , " wars are born in the minds of men[women as well] and it is in the minds of men [and women] that the barriers of peace have to be built".

It is important whether South Asia as a region will be able to face the challenge of the forces of globalization, technology from a perspective of cooperation and coexistence rather than of conflict. It is here that the role of an enlightened leadership which looks beyond the tip of the nose is necessary with a vision of a co=prosperity zone. It is unthinkable to visualize the hegemon in the region growing at the cost of others for an island of prosperity cannot exist in an ocean of despair, poverty and failing state structures. The integration of national economies in the region would mean shifting the focus from politically contentious issues to cooperative and mutually beneficial economic issues. A stable and growing economy needs a visionary political leadership, where leaders think of the next generation and not of the next election. In South Asia, the state as an structural apparatus will have to play the role of a regulating and interventionist state and not a withdrawing state. It will have to motivate, to accelerate development, arrest decline and protect domestic welfare.

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