By Ramesh Thakur

Few observers have any illusions left about Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. Most agree that the attacks on Serbia violate international law. Even the Rambouillet peace deal acknowledged Kosovo as part of Serbia. Because Yugoslavia has not attacked any NATO member, the out-of-area strikes violate NATO treaty. Because they have not been authorized by the United Nations, they violate its Charter.

Such questions pose challenges, but not necessarily insurmountable ones. The doctrine of national sovereignty, which gave the most brutal tyrant protection against attack from without while engaged in oppression within, has gone with the wind. The tragedy of Rwanda diminished us all as members of the human family.

Equally important, however, we cannot accept the doctrine that any one state or coalition can decide when to intervene with force in the internal affairs of other countries, for down that path lies total chaos. War is itself a major human tragedy. The use of force to attack a sovereign state is an extreme measure. It can be justified only under the most compelling circumstances regarding the provocation, the likelihood of success and the consequences that may reasonably be predicted. The burden of proof does not rest on the opponents of force. Has the case for NATO strikes been made with persuasive enough force to overcome the presumption of doubt?

The inconsistencies with regard to striking Belgrade for its Kosovo policy are substantial and numerous. There are graver and more unprovoked attacks against other minorities in many parts of the world, some of long standing, and some indeed involving regimes with continuing military links to Western nations. No regional organization, and in fact not even the U.N., has the right to impose the terms of political settlement between the central and provincial governments of sovereign countries.

Bombing was the second option of choice (not first, nor the last) for those innocent of the history, demographics and passions of the region. (They are innocent also of the historical role of force and conquest in making America the paragon of pluralistic multiethnicity it is today.) The use of force requires moral clarity between the good and bad, not shades of ambiguity. The color of truth in Kosovo is gray. Efforts to demonize Milosevic deflect attention from those who until recently were branded terrorists by Western governments, but are today the principal beneficiaries of the bombing. The argument about NATO's credibility, with echoes of Vietnam, confuses ends and means. NATO exists to deter and win wars; war is not the instrument for preserving an alliance.

Success is hard to measure because of the vague, confused and contradictory goals that have been given by different spokesmen. Goals are also metamorphosed in the crucible of war once started. To be sure, Milosevic is no longer in doubt that NATO takes the issue seriously. But the human plight of Kosovars has worsened, and predictably so. Even if the Serbs were to be defeated and Kosovo taken by force, the problem would fester, perhaps for centuries. Will NATO be the perpetual guarantor of an independent Kosovo protectorate and the indefinite guardian of a sullen and defeated Serbian ward?

The local, regional and international consequences are likely to prove to be the most enduring and damaging. The Serb nation has rallied around Milosevic, and his political position is stronger. The tribal hatreds of the different communities will be hardened for decades. The peace plan required coexistence; the bombings were meant to coerce one party into accepting that peace plan; instead they have sabotaged any hopes of interethnic peaceful coexistence.

The depth of anger and resentment in Russia is equally pronounced. Kosovo might mark the watershed in its transition from strategic partner to dormant, bankrupt but still nuclear-armed rival. It will surely harden the determination of security planners in Moscow, Beijing and New Delhi to put their faith in survivable nuclear forces rather than the enlightened goodwill of the most powerful. Other countries too will conclude that they had better look to their own military force, perhaps with nuclear and missile cores, if they are not to become the victims of the use of force by some future self-appointed guardians of international morality.

The prospects of a world order based on the rule of law are no brighter. The overriding message is not that force has been put to the service of law, but that might is right. The symbolism of the U.N. as the institution for moderating the use of force to settle international quarrels has been dealt a body blow, though hopefully not a mortal blow.

All this is a high price to pay. We can only hope that those who have elected to pay the price in our name -- in the name of the international community -- know what they are doing.

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