The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would make the world a safer place. It would even enhance U.S. security. But it can't achieve anything until it is rescued from the cauldron of domestic politics in Washington.

The Test Ban Treaty has given us the unique opportunity to end nuclear testing definitively. Its commitments and compromises reflect the best attainable balance of different countries' interests. It would stop testing, end the arms race, prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and mark a milestone on the road to disarmament. Canada has been one of its strongest supporters.

Signed by 160 countries and ratified by 69 as of December, it was dealt a near-fatal blow when the U.S. Senate rejected its ratification in October of 1999.

That rejection was serious and so are its consequences. Foolishly, in our opinion, the drafters of the Test Ban Treaty made its entry into force conditional on being ratified by every one of the 44 countries with nuclear programs. That means everyone is held hostage to the whims of the last holdout. India vigorously opposed the treaty at the time of the signing, and the U.S. rejection makes it far more difficult now to coax India into joining the test-ban club. Without signing the treaty, pressures will mount in India to resume nuclear testing and build a more substantial nuclear capability. But an important development has taken place in Washington that might start turning the tide toward U.S. ratification and the treaty's full implementation.

Last March, Bill Clinton appointed the widely respected former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, to conduct a review of the Test Ban Treaty. His report, released last month, concludes that U.S. ratification of the treaty is essential in order to persuade others to adhere to it and to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. He urged the incoming Bush administration to revisit the treaty.

There is good reason for the new administration to do so.

The Test Ban Treaty's rejection by the Senate did not stem from an in-depth review of its merits. Rather, it was the result of a legislative ambush by Republicans, compounded by sloppy legislative management in the Clinton administration. The White House found itself unprepared, with insufficient time for the intensive lobbying generally preceding major treaty ratification votes.

In addition, the Senate may now prove more open-minded on the merits of the treaty when viewed in conjunction with other elements of the Bush administration's foreign and defence policy initiatives.

The Test Ban Treaty would lock in current U.S. superiority -- its provisions for detection and enforcement prevent the development by nuclear and non-nuclear rivals alike of any kind of weapon of military decisiveness. Without the treaty, however, potential challengers to U.S. pre-eminence could develop tactical nuclear weapons that might leverage the United States' massive superiority in conventional weapons. For example, China could develop, test and field new generations of mobile and multiple-warhead missiles.

Senior figures in the Bush administration have been divided on the issue. Secretary of State Colin Powell has supported the treaty in the past, while Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is against it on the grounds that it will impede U.S. capacity to develop new generations of nuclear weapons as the existing stockpile becomes obsolete. Gen. Shalikashvili addressed such concerns in his report, calling for increased verification measures, enhanced efforts to maintain the U.S. nuclear arsenal and a review of the treaty every 10 years.

There is no doubt that George W. Bush does not incline naturally toward multilateral diplomacy and a treaty-based international security system. Nevertheless, he will not wish to alienate close allies on more than one or two issues at once. And this may prove to be Canada's and the allies' ace in the hole.

The Bush administration has made it clear that its top priority is the further development and eventual deployment of a national missile defence system, an idea that has long unsettled not only Russia and China but also key European allies and Canada. Despite the opposition, the administration is planning to proceed. But it could well decide that ratification of the Test Ban Treaty at the same time would be a useful way to reassure allies and foes alike.

Regardless of their views on missile defence, U.S. allies and foes now need to consider their own strategies. Recent discussions in Europe make clear this is only beginning to happen there, but Ottawa is ahead of European capitals in its high-level contacts with Washington. For the allies indefinitely to stamp their feet in frustration on an issue that is non-negotiable for Washington in its essence but may be negotiable in specifics and at the margins would be self-defeating.

National Missile Defence is not something the allies, Moscow or Beijing can stop. But the context against which the system will be developed, its ultimate scope and its detailed aims could well be influenced by them. Their eventual consent might also be exchanged for concessions from Washington on related or different issues. It is time for some creativity in a number of key capitals around the world.

Last weekend, Senator John McCain, the maverick Republican, proposed a tradeoff between the U.S. ratification of the Test Ban Treaty and allied acquiescence in the development of missile defences. While Mr. McCain is in no position to deliver either the Senate or the administration on this proposal, it is increasingly clear that some aspects of the Republican defence agenda are becoming negotiable while others, such as missile defence, are not. This may be the opening Canada and its allies are looking for.

David Malone is president of the International Peace Academy in New York. Ramesh Thakur is vice-rector of the United Nations University in Tokyo.