Asahi Shimbun (Japanese) - Tokyo, Tuesday, October 10, 2000
and Asahi Evening News (English) - Tokyo, Wednesday, October 11, 2000
By Ramesh Thakur
The security order of Asia-Pacific is caught between an anachronistic Cold War framework and embryonic, untested regional approaches.
Trans-Pacific international relations have lacked institutional structures which are embedded in the Euro-Atlantic partnership. The multilateral structure across the Atlantic has also firmly anchored an American presence in Europe. The strategic rationale for U.S. presence in the Pacific has never been as stark and simple.
The framework for the world order resting on superpower rivalry was adopted at Yalta in 1945. Reflecting the two theaters of the World War II, that order had two geographical components: Europe and Asia-Pacific.
The Yalta-based order for Europe has crumbled, but not for Asia-Pacific. NATO enlargement and the air strikes on Serbia symbolically rubbed Russia's nose in the dirt of its historic Cold War defeat.
In Asia-Pacific, by contrast, walls have not come tumbling down. Korea is still divided. The empire of the former Soviet Union collapsed throughout Eastern Europe and Central Asia and the Soviet Red Army that had been stationed in many of these countries marched back home. Similar developments have not taken place in Asia. The kaleidoscope of cultures, cleavages and conflicts in Asia-Pacific does not permit a simple inter-continental transposition of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture.
The structure of power relations in Asia-Pacific is more fluid and complex, resting on five powers: United States, China, Japan, Russia and India. The United States is the pivot of the Asia-Pacific security order, and Okinawa is the geopolitical epicenter of the U.S. military presence in East Asia. If allies are prepared to accept responsibility for the defense of home territories to the best of their abilities against the backdrop of a strategic "over-the-horizon" U.S. military presence, then a continued commitment to the peace and security of Asia-Pacific will meet American interests and disposition.
Technological developments mean that the United States does not have to maintain a large physical military presence in the region. Instead, if it has signed agreements with regional governments that permit the prepositioning of U.S. military equipment and provide cooperation with Washington, it will have a credible surge capacity to continue underwriting regional security.
There is a greater variety of political systems in Asia-Pacific, ranging from robust and explosive democracy in India and fragile democracies in Bangladesh, Nepal and the Philippines and something less than full democracies in many other countries, to communism in three countries. The disparities in social and economic indicators are greater in Asia. In addition to enduring low-intensity insurgencies, many countries suffer from socio-economic fragility and regime brittleness.
Communism in Eastern Europe was installed and maintained by the barrel of Soviet Red Army guns. Its durability in Asian countries flows partly from its fusion with nationalism; hence the domino effect of the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union on the satellite regimes in Eastern Europe, in contrast to the capacity for independent survival of the Asian communists.
European achievements in arms control and disarmament have not been matched by comparable movement in Asia-Pacific. We may be witnessing an upward trajectory in military spending from South through Southeast to East Asia. Arms buildups reflect the existence of more multiple sources of threat to the peace and stability of Asia-Pacific than of Europe.
The political infrastructure to sustain peace and prosperity in Asia-Pacific includes the network of dialogue and consultations already in existence.
The most substantial forum is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), including the post-ministerial conference with dialogue partners and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as the region's main multilateral security dialogue forum. The ARF is very unusual: those in charge of its establishment, agenda and management are not the major powers, the driving seat being occupied by ASEAN; yet the primary focus of security concerns is Northeast Asia.
When we consider how painfully difficult it has been for Europe, a well-established economic and political entity, to manage the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, our expectations of the ARF in managing conflicts must remain modest. Asia is more diverse than Europe and lacks the ballast and texture of the theory, history and practice of European cooperation and integration.
Born in India, Ramesh Thakur is vice rector of the United Nations University. These are his personal views.
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