Special to International Herald Tribune, Neuilly-Sur-Seine Monday, July 5, 1999
By Ramesh Thakur
For the first time, there is universal understanding of India's position. There is also praise for New Delhi's restraint in the face of grave provocation, starting with the movement of the well-armed infiltrators from the Pakistan side of Kashmir to the Indian side.
The motives of the armed forces in Pakistan are also open to speculation. Perhaps they feared that normalized relations would strip away their privileged status and dominance in affairs of state. Perhaps they expected that the caretaker government of India, which faces fresh elections in September, would be unable to coordinate a forceful response. Perhaps they hoped that they would end up in a win-win situation: Either they would succeed in altering the Line of Control permanently to their advantage by cutting off a major portion of Indian Kashmir in the northeast; or else the conflict would become internationalized and India would be forced to accept outside mediation something Pakistan has long sought.
As the fighting over Kashmir drags on, India has an unprecedented opportunity to seize the moral high ground and take the issue off the international agenda.
For the first time, there is universal understanding of India's position. There is also praise for New Delhi's restraint in the face of grave provocation, starting with the movement of the well-armed infiltrators from the Pakistan side of Kashmir to the Indian side.
The core facts are now broadly accepted. Within the last couple of years, the Pakistani military began preparations to launch armed incursions across the Line of Control that forms the de facto border of the disputed territory of Kashmir. What remains unclear is whether it did so as a rogue force, or with the government's approval.
The motives of the armed forces in Pakistan are also open to speculation. Perhaps they feared that normalized relations would strip away their privileged status and dominance in affairs of state. Perhaps they expected that the caretaker government of India, which faces fresh elections in September, would be unable to coordinate a forceful response. Perhaps they hoped that they would end up in a win-win situation: Either they would succeed in altering the Line of Control permanently to their advantage by cutting off a major portion of Indian Kashmir in the northeast; or else the conflict would become internationalized and India would be forced to accept outside mediation something Pakistan has long sought.
Instead Pakistan finds itself trapped in a lose-lose situation. The conflict has indeed drawn international attention, but on India's terms. The United States, Britain, Russia and most of the international community have made it clear that Pakistan is to blame for the flare-up and should withdraw the infiltrators.
China has moved from a position of neutrality already a setback for its traditional ally, Pakistan to one of alignment with the international mainstream. Beijing is unhappy at the prospect of yet another front being opened up for U.S. diplomacy, this time much closer to its borders. Nor is China happy at the prospect of Islamic fundamentalist influence radiating from Afghanistan. Some of the infiltrators from Pakistan are known to be militant supporters of the Taleban regime in Afghanistan. Rarely has Pakistan been so isolated.
Pakistani miscalculations are only one part of the explanation for the international response. Just as important is the perception that India had taken a calculated risk in initiating the diplomacy that appeared to produce a breakthrough in March toward better relations with Pakistan. The show of restraint by India over the Kashmir crisis, despite heavy casualties among its soldiers, has drawn universal praise. It also heightens the perception that India is a mature and responsible country that is using much less force than it possesses.
Far from weakening India, therefore, the diplomacy has paid handsome international dividends. The world has stressed its conviction in the sanctity of Kashmir's Line of Control. New Delhi should therefore issue a unilateral declaration converting the line into the international border. It should call upon Pakistan to enter into talks for mutual pullback of troops, followed by a general demilitarization in a 10 to 20-kilometer corridor.
In a recent article (IHT, June 9), the former Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto made an important confession. Holding Indian- Pakistani relations hostage to the single issue of Kashmir had been a mistake, she wrote. The cause of mutual peace and prosperity would have been advanced by consolidating relations on other fronts, while shelving the Kashmir dispute without prejudice to either side's case.
That remains the best course. Ironically, Pakistan would have gained more if it had followed such a policy over the last 52 years.
By history and geography, the fates of India and Pakistan are tied together. They can work to improve the living standards and quality of life of their two peoples; or they can fight to keep each other at the bottom of the international league.
The writer, vice rector of the United Nations University in Tokyo, contributed this personal comment to the International Herald Tribune.
Credit: International Herald Tribune
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