Serbia and Mr. Milosevic, the country's authoritarian head of state, are set on preserving the territorial integrity of what is left of Yugoslavia. He is determined not to go down in history as the man who "lost Kosovo," often referred to as the cradle of the Serb nation. Kosovo's Albanian community, strengthened in its resolve by the fighting power of the Kosovo Liberation Army, refuses to live a life of political, cultural and economic oppression within a unified Yugoslav state. They want the greatest degree of autonomy possible, and eventually independence. The peace plan brokered in Paris would give them what they want. The peace plan also asks for 28,000 NATO troops to be stationed in Kosovo during a three-year interim period, after which full independence would be more than likely. Serbia does not accept the fact that foreign troops would occupy part of its country, only to allow that territory to separate a few years down the road.

Then there is the international community. The UN, the only body that can claim to be the legitimate voice of the international community, has, for all intents and purposes, been sidelined in its efforts to manage peace (and war) in the Balkans. It plays only a minor role in Bosnia, its prevention force in Macedonia has recently been cancelled in response to China's anger about Macedonian-Taiwanese relations, and Russia and - again - China are blocking any action in the Security Council that would force Milosevic into compliance over what they consider an exclusively internal affair of a sovereign state. As more killings, purges and ethnic cleansing triggers mass refugee movements, the Kosovo crisis might possibly be seen to qualify as a threat to international peace and security (under Chapter VII of the UN Charter). While that would justify the use of force by the international community, it is doubtful that Russia would act in response to a Yugoslav "Chechnya" or China to a Yugoslav "Tibet."

As diplomatic efforts to bring peace to Kosovo have gone astray, NATO, and thus America and its European partners, do feel that a humanitarian disaster similar to the one that was eventually stopped through airstrikes in Bosnia in 1995 can be - and indeed has to be - averted through an early use of force. They hope that striking Serb defense and military facilities will convince Milosevic that he must sign a peace plan, allow the stationing of peace troops in Kosovo, and face the likelihood that Kosovo will eventually be lost. Moreover, America and its allies realize that after months of empty military threats the credibility of NATO's deterrence capability has all but eroded. At the moment, concerns over the legitimacy of NATO action from the UN, Russia and China can be brushed aside, as none of those actors have enough political clout to prevent unilateral US/NATO action.

If airstrikes do cause Milosevic to retreat, the current Serb offensive against Kosovo-Albanian military and civilian targets can be stopped, and an evolving humanitarian disaster and massive refugee movements into already unstable Albania and Macedonia (and the insecurity this would trigger) can be averted, airstrikes would in retrospect seem reasonable. What, however, if Milosevic does not budge? What if he engages in extensive warfare with NATO forces, in the process inflicting as much pain as possible on the Albanian community and military forces throughout Kosovo? Will NATO intervene with ground troops and engage in a potentially bloody ground war? Even if that will indeed happen, how long would this be supported by the citizens of NATO memberstates? NATO has no strategy for fighting a war with Yugoslavia, nor does it have a viable exit strategy. And how can it come up with such strategies if its involvement will be driven entirely by ad hoc policy decisions in response to the moves by Milosevic, the Kosovo-Albanians, Russia, China, and NATO members and their citizens?

Operation Allied Force could result in a difficult mess in which the Alliance and its members would suffer greatly - not only in human and economic terms, but also particularly in political terms. After launching a military intervention into another country without a UN mandate, one better make sure it will be quick and successful, that a grave humanitarian catastrophe was averted and that long-term commitment to peacebuilding is guaranteed. If NATO's involvement triggers prolonged war with Yugoslav forces, humanitarian disasters for the Albanian population, refugee movements across borders to neighboring Balkan states and Western Europe, and possibly even an eventual Somalia-style withdrawal, things will have gone from bad to much worse.

At the moment, one can only hope that Milosevic will give in after this first round of strikes against Yugoslav military targets. Alternatively, one could hope for some opportunism on the part of Russia and/or China. Both can gain international profile by putting pressure on Milosevic to give up in order to avoid further military attacks. They could then bring the UN back into the game and push for a resolution in the Security Council that would allow for a revised peace treaty more or less acceptable to all parties and sensitive to the principle of state sovereignty. Although not an easy task, such a move would save the faces of Milosevic, NATO and "the West," who would all then be indebted to Russia and China (a debt which can be repaid in many ways, as Primakov will undoubtedly remember during his postponed visit to Washington). This is an opportunity for Russia and China to gain profile as major political actors in international affairs - and on the Security Council. It would seem foolish of them not to seize this opportunity. The results would be immeasurably useful in averting a further destabilization of the Balkans, a severely weakened Alliance, political damage to the US and its European allies, and a major blow to post-Cold War international and European security. Unfortunately, these very reasons can also be interpreted as major incentives for China's and Russia's inaction.

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