But, markets do not work in an institutional vacuum. Broad based growth requires a developmental state that not only promotes macroeconomic stability, but also establishes an institutional framework that provides law and order, effective administration of justice and peaceful resolution of conflicts. The state should also ensure protection of property rights, invest in infrastructure and human development. This requires a proper understanding of the local conditions and promotion of complementarity of the state and the private sector.

The spectacular success of the East Asian "Four Tigers" has also led not only to a re-reading of the role of the state in the development process. One issue of concern is whether such states are replicable in Africa. The general view, pushed by the Bretton Woods institutions, has been that while such states may have played an important role they are unlikely to play such a role in Africa. The reasons include the (a) lack of ideology (b) "softness" of the African state and its proneness to "capture" by special interest groups (c) lack of technical and analytical capacity and (d) past poor record of performance.

Most of these arguments are weak. Take the case of lack of ideology. For most of the first generation of African leaders "development" was a central preoccupation. By political commitment and social origins most of the leaders were deeply committed to the "eradication of poverty, ignorance and disease".

The argument regarding "rent-seeking" is similarly weak. Rents can be both "productive" or "unproductive" in their incentive impact. Much of the writing on Asia, at least up until the current financial crisis, took it for granted that the creation and allocation of rents by the state had played a role. The relevant issues are: "rents" for whom and with what reciprocal obligations for receivers of such rents? And the answer will lie on the desired income distribution and strategy of development.

Contrary to the widespread mis-reading of the economic history of Africa as charactised by a downward spiral since political independence, we should also note that the "develeopmental state" is not alien to Africa. Up until the second "oil crisis" many African economies had performed relatively well. Indeed the performance of some of the countries were of "miraculous" proportions (For instance Côte d'Ivoire, Malawi, Kenya, Tanzania had rates of growth of more the 6 percent for over a decade based largely on agricultural and industrial expansion). The definition of a developmental state must allow room for poor performance due to exogenous factors, miscalculation or plain bad luck.

The significance of the view that African states can never played a developmental role lies in the fact that it has led to set of measures by the Bretton Woods Institutions that have maladjusted African states. To avoid clientalism and rent-seeking, the state is squeezed fiscally and even politically. This weakened state then exhibits incapacity to carry out its basic functions. This is then used to argue that the state in Africa is not capable of being developmental.

No wonder "capacity building" is now a major buzzword in the donor community. But are "capacity building" projects really going to have any effect or are they the new justification of technical assistance even as international organizations complain about the lack of ownership. Rather than on "capacity building", focus in Africa should first and foremost be on valorization of existing capacities through better "capacity utilization" and "retooling" of the civil service, reversing the brain drain and in the rebuilding the educational and training institutions in light of long-term developmental needs rather than the ad hoc manner encouraged by new "capacity-building" fads.

We have maintained that most arguments raised on the impossibility of developmental states in Africa are not firmly founded either in African historical experience or in the trajectories of the more successful "developmental states". This misreading denies us the opportunity to think creatively of modes of social organization that can extricate African countries from the crises they confront. It also leaves the door wide open for unlimited intervention in African affairs and ultimately dissipates whatever enthusiasm the locals may have had for development. The experience elsewhere is that developmental states are social constructs consciously brought about by states and societies. As difficult as the political and economic task of establishing such states may be, it is within the reach of many countries struggling against the ravages of poverty and underdevelopment.

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