Context - Increasing evidence that bureaucratic performance explains differences in economic performance around the world. But how can incentives and organizational structures of bureaucracies be improved?

Rationale - The weak capacity of African bureaucracies has been partly responsible for the poor development performance in the region. However, systematic analysis has been hampered by the lack of relevant data. Evidence on bureaucratic performance in Africa has only been based on case studies. Also, the only existing global dataset includes only a limited number of countries and very few from Africa.

Objectives - (i) To undertake the first systematic data collection on bureaucratic structure and performance in Africa. (ii) To expand the existing global dataset. (iii) To empirically assess which incentives and organizational structures of bureaucracies affect bureaucratic performance.

Innovative Methodology - A survey of high-level bureaucrats using country coordinators. The survey focused on policy formulation; recruitment and careers; salaries; and relationship with the private sector.

Empirical Results - Better bureaucratic performance is associated with:
Agency power - greater influence of core economic agencies in formulating new policies.
Autonomy - top civil servants have job security when political leadership changes.
Career opportunities - internal promotion, duration and civil service opportunities.
Good relative wage - public sector salaries compare reasonably to private sector ones.
Merit-based entry mechanisms - entrance via a formal exam and university degrees. (African bureaucracies are guided by the same incentives as others.)

Africa Findings
Bureaucratic structure and performance varies considerably across the region, with a number of countries scoring well.
The good news is that the relationship between the public and private sector seems to be improving across the region.
More worryingly however, perceived levels of corruption are increasing.
Also, many senior bureaucrats feel they lack "ownership"; they felt that economic policy is formulated outside the country, particularly by the Bretton Woods Institutions.

For further information please contact:

Julius Court
Research Fellow
Overseas Development Institute (ODI)
111 Westminster Bridge Road
London SE1 7JD, UK
Tel: +44 20 7922 0368
Email: jcourt@odi.org.uk
Website: www.odi.org.uk/rapid/

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