Executive Summary :

 

The Setting

 

Ethiopia is a developing country that has been vulnerable to climate-related disasters during the last three decades.  More than 88 percent of Ethiopia’s 60 million people are engaged in agricultural and pastoral activities for their livelihood. With little access to irrigation, these predominantly smallholding farmers depend on rainfall to cultivate their crops.  Poverty, lack of access to technology, subsistence agriculture, deforestation, soil erosion and over-population are some of the problems that increase the vulnerability of the people to climate-related disasters. Constant wars and political instability also contributed to the severity of the impact of disasters.

 

Ethiopia is located in the tropics. Its climate, however, is modified by altitude, which has  led to the existence of diverse microclimates. Ethiopia has four climatic zones, which are classified according to the patterns of rainfall.  These climate zones are those (1) with a distinct wet and a distinct dry season, (2) with two wet and two dry seasons, (3) with two wet seasons and one dry season in between, and (4) with an undefined rainy season. Altitude leads to the creation of microclimates such as the quola, weinadega and dega, which are hot, temperate and cool, respectively. One of the major causes of rainfall variation in Ethiopia is the north-south movement of the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ, following the seasons. The three-season pattern known as Kiremt (big rains from June-September), Bega (dry from October-January) and the belg (small rains from February-May) characterize the crop-producing areas of the country.

 

Drought is the dominant climate-related disaster in Ethiopia. Droughts in Ethiopia have killed many people and animals in 1957-58, 1964-65, 1972-73 and 1983-84. Though not as pronounced as drought in their impact and publicity, floods and fires have increasingly caused disasters in Ethiopia.  In response to these disasters, Ethiopian governments decided to create the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) in 1976 (which was renamed in 1995 the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC)).

 

In the 1990s, the government of Ethiopia had created four important documents to guide its early warning system and food security. These are  (1) National Food Security Policy; (2) The National Policy for Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Management (NDPPM); (3) General Guidelines for the Implementation of the National Policies on Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Management; and (4) The Five-Year Disaster Prevention Plan 1998-2002 (DPPC).

 

The National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee (NDPPC) is chaired by the Prime Minister. The Regional Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committees are presided over by the regional presidents.  Its important members are the National Meteorological Services Agency (NMSA) and the Ministry of Agriculture and the DPPC, which is the secretary. It also has other important ministries as its members. The objective of the NDPPC is to implement the National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Policy. There are early warning committees at all levels of the government down to the lowest level, the wereda. The committees gather the information, evaluate their work and report to the higher-level committees. They are composed of various government agencies.

 

There were major developments in the area of preparedness for climate-related hazards in Ethiopia in the 1990s. To this end, rural communities were involved in water and soil conservation activities such as terracing the hills and the construction of micro-dams. Ethiopia established the National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Fund (NDPPF), seed reserves, and strengthened the Emergency Food Security Reserve Administration (EFSRA) by raising its stock from 33, 000 metric tons (MT) to 307, 000 MT. These activities were conducted to strengthen Ethiopia’s disaster prevention and preparedness capacity.

 

Ethiopia began to use El Niño information to forecast drought after the 1983-84 drought, which was believed to have been influenced by El Niño. According to the manager of the NMSA, interest and preliminary research on El Niño was motivated by the desire to make long-range forecasts for the country (Kassahun, 2000). Because of the severity of the drought in 1983-84, the NMSA was compelled to prepare and issue a seasonal forecast of the Belg and Kiremt rains for 1987, well in advance.

 

The NMSA uses statistical and analogy methods in constructing its El Niño impact forecast. For example, the 1997-98 El Niño’s analogue event was the 1972 El Niño. The NMSA scientists identify the current El Niño and compare it with known El Niños of the past with similar characteristics. Then, the forecast would follow the pattern of the past El Niño. The NMSA scientists also realized that the sea surface temperatures (SSTs) in the Indian and Atlantic oceans also affect Ethiopian weather. El Niño is a relatively new concept in Ethiopia with no known scientific research on it outside the NMSA.

 

The 1997-98 Event

 

The NMSA was the first Ethiopian agency to hear about the 1997-98 El Niño in March 1997. Other agencies learned about it during the presentation of the weather assessment outlook by the NMSA when presenting its seasonal forecast. The El Niño information had been received from the Climate Prediction Center of NOAA through its Climate Diagnostics Bulletin. The NMSA did not have an e-mail connection at that time. When NMSA heard in May 1997that the 1997 El Niño would be strong, it issued the el Niño-related seasonal forecast on May 29.

 

The first media report on El Niño appeared on August 5, 1997, when experts from the NMSA gave an interview on Ethiopian TV to explain the role of the El Niño phenomenon in Ethiopian droughts. There was no report in the Ethiopian media about the evolution of the 1997 El Niño[1]. The media reported the NMSA forecast issued by NMSA at the end of May, but there was no follow-up report on the issue.

 

Media interest in El Niño began to pick up when the impact was felt at the end of August, and when the Prime Minister’s Office instructed federal and regional authorities to monitor the situation of El Niño and its impact on Ethiopia. The Ethiopian News Agency, The Ethiopian Herald and Addis Zemen wrote that El Niño causes drought in Ethiopia. The media also wrote about the impacts of the drought and floods of 1997 for which they blamed El Niño. One of the shortcomings of the Ethiopian media was their inability to clearly inform the public without confusion. There was no expert analysis or editorial specifically focused on El Niño and its climate-related impact in Ethiopia, which might have contributed to an understanding of the phenomenon by Ethiopians.

 

Teleconnections

 

According to Kassahun,[2] research at NMSA concluded that El Niño affects the weather in Ethiopia. In 1987, El Niño effects on the Ethiopian seasonal forecast were first considered by the NMSA.[3] El Niño years are characterized by below normal rainfall in Ethiopia. Neville Nicholls believes that the 1888 Great Ethiopian Drought was caused by El Niño. Empirical observations also show a connection between El Niño and droughts in Ethiopia. For example, the major droughts in Ethiopia in 1957, 1965, 1973, 1983-84, 1987, 1993-94 occurred following El Niño events. The teleconnection between El Niño and Ethiopian seasons has been established by NMSA. El Niño decreases and disrupts the kiremt rainfall (main season) in Ethiopia and boosts the belg rainfall (small rainfall season). However, it should be noted that weather in some areas might not be correlated with El Niño events because of the country’s diverse microclimates.

 

Total rainfall in Ethiopia between June and September 1997 at 20 weather stations was 20% less than 1996. According to the NMSA, almost all parts of Ethiopia had dry spells in the Kiremt months of July and August 1997. Out of the 33 zones in Ethiopia, 18 zones received late rainfall, affecting land preparation and sowing. The 15 zones that had a good start in rainfall were affected by dry spells in August and September 1997, which adversely affected the maturation stage of the crops.

 

The unseasonable rainfall in October and November 1997 led to fungal attack, slowed the rate of desiccation of the seeds, and led to the germination of the seeds before the harvest.[4] Erratic rainfall affected the size of cultivable land by 9% from that of 1996, because of oxen with low energy levels due to less access to fodder. Poor farmers could not rent or borrow oxen at the right time because the owner gave priority to his own plot. The re-planting of the land several times following the coming and retreating of rainfall depleted the seed reserves of farmers. Yields were low because of reduced land preparation, and poor and early cessation of rainfall. Heavy rainfall that flooded farms along with pest infestation also reduced output. Lack of fodder reduced the price of cattle and some animals died, especially in the Raya region of northern Ethiopia. Coffee, the main cash crop of the country, was reduced in production because “coffee berries ready to be picked from the trees have been falling on the ground due to heavy rains.”[5] Food production declined after two years of good harvest in 1995-96 and 1996-97. Total output in the meher[6] season in 1997-98 was reduced by 24 % from the 1996-97 output. Prices of agricultural commodities also increased by 13%-53% from those of 1996.

 

It was reported that there was an abnormal number of rainfall-related deaths: more than 237 persons and 16,887 animals. Many houses were washed away because of floods and thousands of people were displaced. Some commercial plantations in the Awash Valley were flooded, which was a loss of millions of birr.[7] Water shortfalls in hydroelectric dams led to the rationing of electric power.

 

The abnormal weather was the cause of these disasters. The only other factor that might have decreased 1997-98 food output was the reduction in the subsidy of fertilizer prices. However, farmers interviewed did not cite that as a cause of decline in food production. There was access to credit from the government and NGOs to buy fertilizers, but farmers were not sure of the reliability of rainfall. Besides, the use of fertilizer is effective with the use of selected seeds and adequate rainfall. In 1997-98, the use of fertilizer would not have increased output because farmers were re-planting their land with fast-maturing and drought-resistant crops.

 

Responses

 

The first response of the Ethiopian government to the El Niño was to issue a forecast on May 29, 1997. It warned that the Kiremt rainfall would be erratic and begin late. The DPPC wrote its early warning report about the possible impacts of the abnormal weather. Immediately, the NDPPC came up with a response plan to avert the disaster. The two-pronged response was designed in the area of agricultural policies and mobilization of resources.  Meetings were organized in the regions, zones and weredas to brief every Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee member on responses specific to the area. They decided to study the strengths and weaknesses of the most vulnerable weredas.

 

At the national level, the NDPPC asked the Ministry of Agriculture, which is a member of the committee, to come up with possible responses. The Ministry estimated that food production would be down by 40%, based on the weather forecast issued by the NMSA for the Kiremt season. It recommended the planting of drought-resistant crops, such as chickpea, and the replanting of failed crops with fast-maturing ones, such as teff and lentils. It also recommended the provision of seeds to farmers until the end of August and the protection of crops through the free distribution of pesticides. In addition, it advised the use of all newly constructed micro-dams and ponds by farmers, as well as the building of irrigation canals. Farmers were also advised to plant potatoes and convert lost crops to feed the animals. The mass media was to be used to educate the people on the response actions.

 

A major response came from the office of the Prime Minister when the issue of El Niño was raised during a meeting of the Prime Minister with high-level national officials and the Regional Presidents on August 25, 1997.  They addressed their concern about the impact of El Niño and all responsible officials and departments were given instructions to respond to the crisis.

 

The regions also issued evaluation reports on the impact of the erratic rainy season on agriculture. The DPPC issued a special report in October about the impact of El Niño on Ethiopian weather.

 

As the season progressed, the Ministry of Agriculture advised farmers to replant their crops especially when the rains returned to some areas in August. The zone officers provided the seeds on credit in order to take advantage of the rains. The October-November 1997 floods disrupted the normal harvest of crops, and local governments organized popular campaigns to help farmers gather their crops. One of the most important roles of the NMSA during the 1997 abnormal weather was to update the unpredictable weather by providing information, such as about the continuation of the rains beyond the normal end of the season. For example, on Nov. 12, 1997, the NMSA urged farmers to “gather their harvest before an untimely rain expected over the various parts of the country.” The Ministry of Agriculture also advised farmers to harvest their matured crops before it was too late. Farmers were also advised to construct drainage in areas where crops had not yet matured.

The Ethiopian government was so concerned about the crisis that it asked the UN FAO/WFP crop production and food needs assessment team to arrive earlier than usual. The DPPC was also mobilizing resources internally and from the donors. The DPPC continued to appeal for aid to donors who were initially reluctant in their generosity. On November 29, 1997, Ethiopia appealed for 572, 835 MT of food aid to be distributed to over 4 million people. The major component of the 1997-98 appeal was emergency relief. Food supply was critical as early as December 1997 in the central highlands. Resource constraints and the lack of carry-over stock from 1997 contributed to the problem. Donors finally pledged for 352, 249 MT and eventually delivered 303, 987 MT.

 

The timely response to the crisis by the government avoided the death of people due to famine.[8]  The Ministry of Agriculture continued to advise farmers for the 1998 Belg season. In December 1997 and January 1998 one could see unseasonable crops, such as chickpeas, in the field in many parts of northern Ethiopia.

 

One of the characteristics of the 1997-98 crisis was the way information was flowing between the various DPP Committees in the center and in the regions. Despite various constraints, the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committees at all levels met every two weeks to exchange information, experience and evaluate the effectiveness of various responses. Local functionaries were also working despite the disadvantage of having unreliable local weather information about their weredas or villages. Ethiopia has designed a five-year development plan to deal with future disasters.

 

As a final note, at the end of the El Niño in the middle of 1998, a war started between Ethiopia and Eritrea.  The war began on May 12, at a time when Ethiopians were coping with the adverse impacts of El Niño. The conflict was an added constraint on the El Niño-related responses by the government and the people. About 450,000 Ethiopians who live in the border areas occupied by Eritrea were displaced and became dependent on food aid. They lost their animals, seeds, and harvests. Other farmers in the border areas could not plant, because of the lack of security and occasional shelling. Thousands of Ethiopian farmers were mobilized to defend against the Eritrean threat, and the farms of those who joined the army were cultivated with the help of those who remained in the villages. In July 1998, Eritrea confiscated 45,000 tons of U.S. grain that was in an Eritrean port en route to Ethiopia. It is believed that Eritrea confiscated more than US$300 million worth of goods when the conflict erupted. Ethiopia was forced to import food and other items through Djibouti in order to avoid the Eritrean ports because of the conflict.

 

There has been research interest on the climate-related impacts and responses in Ethiopia. Some of the major works have been done institutionally in the NMSA and the DPPC, on Ethiopian climate and disaster management, respectively: on the chronology of drought,  on El Niño, on seasonal forecasting, on the impact of Pacific SSTs on Ethiopian weather and Kassahun, and on climate change and Ethiopian weather.  These are some of the reports that have come out of the NMSA. There is very little research interest outside the NMSA on El Niño impacts in Ethiopia. Most of the research in Ethiopia has been in the area of drought and its impact on society. One of the notable researchers in the field includes Rahmato[9] on the coping mechanisms of peasants to drought and famine. International research on Ethiopian drought includes the social history of famine in Wollo, and on the Ethiopian early warning system.

 

Forecasting by Analogy

 

Lack of timely and credible weather forecasting is one of the constraints on the Ethiopian seasonal forecast. Theoretically, if there had been credible and perfect information as early as October 1996, there would have been adequate time to disseminate the information, and the response could have taken the form of a non-emergency. In the case of 1997, for example, the NMSA was informed about the El Niño as early as March 1997, but it had to wait until the end of May to declare a forecast for fear that a weak El Niño might not have a pronounced impact. The NMSA did not want to panic the users by giving out unreliable information. However, a May forecast (as was done on May 29, 1997) coincided with the beginning of planting in Ethiopia and was of little use for those who planned to plant long-maturing crops, such as maize and sorghum, at the end of April and May. There was very little early warning time to prepare any counter measures against the impact of the event.

 

Research shows that it took more than five weeks for the digested information and the various alternative recommended responses to reach the lowest wereda early warning committee. For example, in the case of the Tigray regional state, the NMSA gave its forecast on May 29, 1997 (Ginbot 19 in the Ethiopian calendar) and the Zone Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee members met with the regional DPPC at the beginning of July 1997 (Sene 28 in the Ethiopian calendar). It was after finishing this meeting in the capital, Mekelle, that they returned to their zones and gathered the wereda early warning committee members in the middle of July. It took this amount of time because, those involved at the different levels of government had to receive the information, study and discuss it and come up with the relevant responses to their specific problems.

 

With perfect and earlier information, the emergency nature of the activity could have been changed into a routine development work. Perfect information could have helped in Ethiopia’s preparedness for the disaster. Time is a very important factor in disaster response. There would have been enough time to mobilize domestic and international resources to reduce the impact of the El Niño. A perfect forecast with a longer lead-time could also have helped farmers and the government to have the time to budget their resources effectively both at a macro (national) and household level. For example, the Ethiopia government could have managed its import and export of cereals by taking the impacts of drought and flood into consideration. Rural households could have reduced their expenditures for festivities, such as weddings and teskars (memorials feasts for the dead), and saved their food for the impending food shortages.

 

Lack of trained staff, especially at the regional, zone and wereda levels, is one of the major constraints even in the face of perfect information. For example, one of the recommendations might be to construct dams and canals to harvest and distribute all the rainwater, but this would have been a very difficult task to accomplish in the short period of nine months. The amount to be done, even during normal weather conditions, is so huge that it might be difficult to solve all the problems. Weather is only one factor: there are also many existing social problems in the country. In other words, responding to abnormal weather alone is not enough since there is widespread poverty in the country. There is also the perennial problem of the lack of meteorological information at the local level. Many of the diverse microclimates in Ethiopia outside the cities do not have meteorological stations. Thus, El Niño information is relevant at the national level but very difficult to forecast for the local microclimates.

 

El Niño’s impact on Ethiopia is real. Therefore, El Niño considerations should be added explicitly to the country’s national disaster plans. These would help the national policy makers and the average person realize the impact of an El Niño and prepare for the event. Such inclusion into the Ethiopian disaster preparation plans would also help in the understanding of the phenomenon by a wider audience in Ethiopia. It should be noted that very few people outside the NMSA and the DPPC understand the impacts of El Niño.

 

There are strengths and weaknesses of the Ethiopian government’s response to El Niño-related climate impacts. The recurrence of drought in Ethiopia has led to the accumulation of experience in disaster response. The need to understand droughts in Ethiopia led the NMSA to discover the role of El Niño in 1986-87. Despite the lack of capacity, such as trained manpower, the NMSA has developed an effective methodology of forecasting by analogy, which is being used up to now. The response side has also led to the creation of a strong institution such as the DPPC with a department of early warning that works very closely with the Ministry of Agriculture and the NMSA. The DPPC has accumulated experiences to provide early warning and effective response to disasters.  The Ethiopian government has created an enabling political environment for disaster response. Finally, one of the strengths of the country’s response to El Niño is the existence of goodwill and support by the international donors for the activities of the government in disaster response.

 

Until recently, Ethiopia’s forecast and response to El Niño have been biased toward droughts, which left other disasters such as floods, fires and fast-onset disasters as secondary. In the last three years floods and fires have become more frequent in many parts of Ethiopia. Another weakness is the low level of research activity on El Niño. No models adequately relate Ethiopian weather to El Niño for use in forecasting. There is a lack of trained personnel and scarcity of resources, particularly in the regions for an effective response. Solutions to some of these problems could make Ethiopia’s use of El Niño as a tool in the forecasting of climate-related disasters more effective than has been the case until now.

 

Conclusion

 

Ethiopia is a developing country faced with many socio-economic problems, such as limited access to education, water supply and food.  High population growth, environmental degradation, and climate variability compound the intensity of the problem. Lack of access to irrigation and the dependence of Ethiopian agriculture on rainfall have made food security in Ethiopia vulnerable to the variability of weather and climate.

 

The recurrence of drought and famine has led to the creation of an excellent early warning and response mechanism in Ethiopia. The DPPC is the central institution of the Ethiopian National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee. The NMSA is a member of the NDPPC that provides weather forecasts to the users. The existence of such an institution has helped the country in the prevention of disaster in the 1990s.

 

The NMSA used the analogue method to identify characteristics of the 1997 El Niño. It reached the conclusion that the 1997-98 El Niño was analogous to that of 1972 in the amount and distribution of rainfall. The drought of 1973-74 had killed 200,000 people in the northern part of Ethiopia.  The 1997-98 rainfall was variable during the Kiremt season and anomalous excessive rainfall during the Bega or harvest season. It destroyed the crops during the growing, flowering and harvesting season. Total production was 25 percent lower than the previous year.

 

Donors were initially reluctant to meet the demand for food aid. One of the reasons for the reluctance of donors to meet the Ethiopian demand probably was the existence of a record harvest in the previous year and the success of the Emergency Food Security reserves. The widespread news in 1996-97 that Ethiopia had begun exporting food must have hurt the demand for food aid when crops failed in 1997-98.

 

One of the major problems that hinders long-term effective weather forecasting in Ethiopia is the absence of meteorological information in various parts of the country that have been accumulated over a long period of time. At present, there are only 600 meteorological stations in Ethiopia. Most of those stations are located in the urban areas. If the researchers were expected to forecast accurate El Niño-based forecasts for the diverse climate zones of Ethiopia, they would require meteorological information such as rainfall, temperature, pressure, etc. for those localities. One of the forecast and response constraints in Ethiopia was a lack of trained personnel to interpret the information, especially in the regional states. In addition, those who work in the regions do not have access to resources such as transportation, communication, and office equipment.

 

At the national level, Ethiopia has to increase the number of its researchers in meteorology in general and in climate forecasting in particular. At present there is no single Department of Meteorology in any of Ethiopia’s five universities. Mechanisms have also to be made so those social and physical scientists outside the DPPC and the NMSA could develop an interest in conducting research on the relationship between El Niño and climate-related impacts in Ethiopia.  In general, there is a need for the training of meteorologists, especially for the regions. There is a need for the supply of basic office materials, computers and access to the Internet.

 

The El Niño of 1997-98 exposed the fragility of food security in developing countries, even with a government that is focused on agricultural development. Ethiopia had excellent food production in 1995-96 and 1996-97, but the optimism was dashed with the onset of the first drought. In spite of the existence of a supportive political environment for those involved in disaster prevention in Ethiopia, the struggle was very difficult. At the end of 1997, the Emergency Food Security Reserve was depleted and there was nervousness in the country that famine might revisit the country. Only the mass intervention of the donors saved a “killer” famine. One of the lessons we learn from this experience is that even though food security reserves are an excellent way of responding to disasters, if they depend on donor generosity for refills, they can not be dependable. Donors can ignore pleas for food to fill the stocks, as happened in the case of Ethiopia in 1999 and 2000.

 

Long-lasting preparedness for climate-related impacts is necessary to improve the capacity of the country, especially in water preservation before the onset of the drought. Ethiopia is very rich in water resources, but a farmer’s access to irrigation is very limited. We should also learn that one of the reasons for the containment of the 1997-98 disaster was because of a positive economic condition in the country, open-mindedness on the part of the government and donor support. In the final analysis, however, we should note that complete national preparedness to disaster could come only through socio-economic development in all sectors of the country.

 

Lessons Learned

 

·         The existence of institutions in Ethiopia such as the disaster prevention and preparedness committees at all levels of government is important for the vertical flow of El Niño-related forecasts and impact information. However, the time it takes for the analyses of forecasts of El Niño to go from the highest levels of government to the lowest community levels must be shortened to allow for more lead time to prepare for the proposed impacts.

 

·         Involvement of the Prime Minister's office gave an important impetus to the level of credibility and importance of the El Niño forecasts.

 

·         Even countries such as Ethiopia, with little advance in scientific research, can select appropriate forecast methods, such as the use of historical analogues and can issue usable forecasts on El Niño impacts.

 

·         The Ethiopian media did not take a keen interest in disseminating information about the 1997-98 El Niño’s development until the impacts were being felt. It usually followed the responses of the government instead of becoming a leader and educator of the public on awareness of El Niño’s potential impacts. The media must be encouraged to sustain their interest in the phenomenon, so that the population can better understand what it means to its food security and livelihood.

 

·         There is a strong and compelling argument to enhance Ethiopia’s meteorological system and research activities at the national level. Such information has practical development application and is not just 'curiosity-driven' research. Research interest in El Niño and other climate-related impacts should also be encouraged outside the NMSA (National Meteorological Service Agency).

 

·         Successful responses to climate-related impacts require coordination between the national government and donors, as happened in Ethiopia in 1997-98.

 

·         There is a need for the issuance of forecast before the onset of the planting season. The late issuance of forecasts to improve the probability of success merges the risks associated with the timing of forecast and the response capability to proposed impacts.

 

·         Governments need timely and credible El Niño forecasts that also include a forecast about its intensity, timing, and spatial distribution of its potential impacts.

 

·         El Niño information, including forecasts, are useful for long-range development planning and not just for disaster early warning. Some of the recommended responses to reduce the adverse impacts of El Niño, such as the use of various types of dams, construction of canals, and the selling off of herds, are actions that should continue even after the El Niño event itself has ended.

 

·         There is a tendency to refer to whole countries when referencing El Niño's impacts. But it is seldom that an entire country would be adversely affected in the same way by an El Niño event given the variability in topographic features, e.g., Ethiopia is known for its local, small-scale (micro) climate regimes.  Ethiopia can suffer from droughts and floods during the same El Niño event.  It is important for governments to identify in advance the regions and sectors that are vulnerable to the regional impacts of ENSO’s extremes.

 

·         There should be an improved capacity of the regions in Ethiopia, in terms of skill improvement, access to information and resource capacity, to issue their own regional forecasts. This would make the forecasts more relevant to the local areas and would reduce the time spent in communications with the central government.

 

·         Education and training programs at the local and regional levels related to El Niño would improve Ethiopia's overall ability to mitigate El Niño's adverse impacts.

 

·         Countries such as Ethiopia that are frequented by climate-related hazards must not rush to export their cereals or deplete their food reserves before having assessed the status of the main harvest season, as happened in 1997-98 in Ethiopia.

 

·         The national-to-local communication systems must be developed and maintained between El Niño events so that they will be available and functioning during El Niño's impacts.