NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY ISSUES IN NORTHEAST ASIA AND PROSPECTS FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Tsuneo Akaha
Professor of International Policy Studies and Director, Center for East Asian Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies
425 Van Buren Street, Monterey, California 93940, U.S.A.


Introduction
In this presentation I will offer my understanding of “non-traditional security,” describe briefly what non-traditional security issues are demanding the attention of political leaders in Northeast Asia, discuss what multilateral relations institutions are available to address those issues, and what challenges lie ahead in forging international cooperation in non-traditional security in the region.

Defining “Non-traditional Security”
The first task in defining “non-traditional security” is to identify issues that rise to the level of security concern, that is, to define “security”. The second task is to differentiate between “traditional” and “non-traditional” security issues.

In defining what constitutes “security”, five sets of questions need to be asked. First, what values are being threatened? Second, what is threatening those values? Third, what means are available to counter the threat? Fourth, who is expected to provide the protection or security against the threat? Fifth, and finally, who will pay the cost of the protection/security? Issues become “securitized” when a threat exists or is believed to exist against some fundamental values that are held by some actor, be it an individual, a group, a community, a nation, a group of nations, or an international community. Those fundamental values vary depending on whose values they are. From the perspective of national security policy makers, the national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of their state are the fundamental values they are charged to protect and they view threats to those values threats to their national security. Some of the threats may come from within their society, such as an open challenge to the legitimacy of the government in power, a civil strife, a civil war, and other developments that threaten the society the policymakers are expected to provide. Inability to meet such challenges itself may be seen as a national security threat; therefore, a weak state may be viewed as inadequate in meeting the challenges of national security. More often, however, challenges to national security are seen as emanating from outside the national society. Of particular concern are the challenges posed by the use of force or threat of the use of force by another state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of a state. This is the traditional view of national security, as most elaborately developed within the realist approach to international relations.
The realist concern is focused primarily on threats of a military nature against the state from external sources. Domestic developments may be sufficiently threatening to the viability or stability of the state, but the realist’s concern tends to be directed at external threats. The realist also tends to emphasize military response, or non-military coercive countermeasures, e.g., political and economic sanctions, against the sources such threats. In the following discussion I will use the term “traditional security” to refer to those threats that the realist typically considers as threats to national security. This is not the only way to define “traditional” security versus “non-traditional” security, but it is a simple and useful line to draw, as I will explain below.

In contrast, the liberal’s security concerns include not only the protection of the foundations of the state against external threats but also other types of values and other types of threats. Among the values of concern to the liberal are human rights, individual and communal identity, individuals’ spiritual growth, the material well-being of individuals and communities, social and cultural viability of ethnic and national groups, individual and public health, environmental protection, and sustainable development. For the purpose of the present discussion, I will refer to the protection of these values as non-traditional security.

The realist-liberal dichotomy is not the only differentiation one can draw between traditional and non-traditional security. One may employ some time frame to distinguish between “traditional” and “non-traditional” security concerns. A society may consider as “traditional” those issues that have existed for some time and around which it has formed certain views and expectations. “Non-traditional” security issues emerge when some members of the society view more recent concerns as threatening their fundamental values. Other members of the society may not share the same degree of concern over those issues, or may in fact oppose elevating those issues to the level of security.

Divergence on views on security may result from major historical experiences. Most societies use important events in their history in marking their sense of history. For all Northeast Asian countries, for example, the beginning and the end of Second World War and the beginning and the end of the Cold War informed and continue to inform their sense of history. For many Northeast Asian peoples, the legacies of both wars are still alive, with security concerns from those decades continuing to represent important security issues today. Among such issues are the division a society, e.g., in China and Korea, unsettled territorial disputes, e.g., in Russia, Japan, and China, compensation for human and material suffering at the hands of aggressors, e.g., in China and Korea, and the presence of foreign military forces in their own or neighboring countries, e.g., in China, Japan, and Korea. For increasing numbers of people in Northeast Asia, however, more recent developments are threatening their fundamental values. As I will discuss below, they are concerned that environmental problems, pressures on natural resources, growing income disparities, the influx of foreign migrants, illegal trade in arms, drugs, and humans, the spread of AIDS/HIV, and economic and social dislocations resulting from the ever-intrusive forces of globalization are disrupting their traditional ways of life and threatening their sense of security.

Some states within the region have been quicker than others to recognize some of these developments as issues of important consequence for their national security. For example, Japan has been quick, if not altogether effective, in combating AIDS/HIV while China has only recently acknowledged the severity of the problem. Similarly, Japanese
communities have long regarded environmental pollution as a serious problem to their health and pressed their national and local leaders to develop environmental measures, whereas China and Russia have been slow in recognizing the problem and unable to mobilize the necessary resources to meet their ecological challenges. Energy has also become a security concern in the region, again with Japan taking the lead, based on its experience during the oil crises of the 1970s, and China taking a more serious look at its future energy supply in connection with the environmental consequences of its heavy dependence on coal. This points to the problem of categorizing traditional vs. non-traditional security issues according to a common time frame for the entire region of Northeast Asia. That is, the same set of issues may be seen as “traditional” in some societies but as “non-traditional” in other societies.

The traditional vs. non-traditional differentiation in terms of the realist vs. liberal views of international relations helps us avoid the problem of inconsistent time frames used in different societies in defining security problems. It helps to highlight another important aspect of security discourse. The issue has to do with the respective roles of the state and society in providing for the security of its citizens. A closely related issue has to do with the values that need to be protected from variously viewed threats. Of particular relevance here is the distinction between national security and “human security.”

As I have already noted, whether a society regards a certain phenomenon as a security issue depends on whether its leaders adopt the state-centric view of international relations (and national security) or the liberal view that encompasses a broader range of security issues. Among the broadly defined concept of security are “human security” issues. The concept of human security is focused on questions of livelihoods and human development. As Secretary General stated in his Nobel lecture on December 10, 2001, “In this new century, we must start from the understanding that peace belongs not only to States or peoples, but to each and every member of those communities. The sovereignty of States must no longer be used as a shield for gross violations of human rights.” The broadest definition of human security is “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” (UNDP 1994). It encompasses economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security (UNDP 1994). It is not necessary to review here the theoretical and policy implications of shifting the emphasis in security discourse from national to human security, as there are several excellent discussions on the topic (see, e.g., Newman 2001; Paris 2001; Thakur 1997; Van Ginkel and Newman 2000). Suffice it here to note that the differentiation of traditional v. nontraditional security and that between stat and human security are made along two different dimensions and serve somewhat different purposes. Traditional security certainly includes most state-centric national security issues but may also include some human security issues, e.g., a revolution, civil war, or foreign invasion that directly threatens the survival of a large segment of people in a country. A contemporary example in Northeast Asia is the case of North Korea, where economic crisis and mass starvation can potentially threaten the survival of the regime in Pyongyang as well as the people of North Korea. On the other hand, non-traditional security issues, e.g., environmental deterioration, uncontrolled migration, and mismanaged national economy, can also threaten the stability of the state as well as the communal values and individual rights of citizens concerned.
Non-traditional Security Issues in Northeast Asia

Defining security from a non-state centric perspective, one finds the following issues as constituting major non-traditional security challenges in Northeast Asia:

- environmental deterioration and its deleterious effects on human health and trans-boundary pollution problems;
- growing pressures on natural resources due to expanding market demand, particularly with respect to forestry and fishery resources;
- legal and illegal migration and resulting ethnic tensions in and around China;
- increasing gaps in wealth and income within and between neighboring regions in part as a result of international and transnational economic exchanges;
- illegal drug trafficking; and,
- mismanagement of national economies and their vulnerability to the intensifying forces of globalization, resulting in major economic and social dislocations among the local populations.

Although there are other security issues in the Northeast Asian countries, including some human security issues, the above issues transcend national borders in terms of their effects and their solutions require international cooperation, including multilateral cooperation.

Environmental Security

In recent years we have seen a proliferation of international conferences on environmental problems in Asia-Pacific but very few of these are focused specifically on Northeast Asia. It is unclear, however, environmental problems have risen to the level of “national security” among the Northeast Asian governments. Examples of international meetings on environmental problems include the APEC environmental ministers’ meetings since 1994 and the series of meetings organized by the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) since 1978. There have also been a few international conferences focused on environmental problems in Northeast Asia. One example is the annual conference involving working-level officials from Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia. Begun in 1997, the conferences have discussed areas for regional cooperation, such as information sharing, collaborative research and training, and joint surveys. Another example is the series of meetings on environmental cooperation since 1993 involving senior officials from the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), ESCAP, and UNDP. China, North and South Korea, Mongolia, and Russia have adopted the “Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Principles Governing the Tumen River Economic Development Area and Northeast Asia.” These processes have produced myriad programs and action plans but their implementation is left to each member country and depends heavily on the availability of international financial and technological assistance.

At the technical level, as well, there is growing multilateral cooperation. An example is the cooperation among China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia in monitoring and exchanging information on acid precipitation in each country. Northeast Asian countries are yet to develop a multilateral environmental agreement with legal force. Instead, they continue to rely mostly on national and local means of pollution abatement and environmental protection and on voluntary
international programs. It should be noted, as well, that Japan has become an important donor of environmental assistance but most of this aid is disbursed bilaterally through Tokyo’s ODA programs, with China being the largest recipient of this aid. While not a region-specific regime, the Kyoto Protocol on Global Warming obviously has important implications for the environmental policies of the countries of Northeast Asia, including bilateral cooperation, e.g., between Japan and Russia, to meet the legal obligations of the parties to the treaty. Japan played a leading role in the adoption of the protocol in 2001 (Akaha 2001a).

Resource Security

In the natural resources sector, most problems have been addressed unilaterally. The only exception is a series of bilateral treaties on fisheries involving Japan, China, South Korea, and Russia since the 1950s. Most of these treaties include provisions for principles, rules, and procedures for resource conservation and dispute resolution regarding fishing in areas under each coastal state’s jurisdiction (Akaha 1996). These legal regimes have reduced the level of conflict between the coastal and fishing states over the years and today provide a degree of predictability to their fishery relations. However, the bilateral arrangements have been inadequate in dealing with resource depletion and illegal fishing problems. Where there are territorial and jurisdictional disputes, political expediency has dictated that treaties be established in such a way that they would not jeopardize each state’s sovereignty claims. Acrimonious negotiations over fishery agreements between Northeast Asian countries are well known (see, for example, Akaha 2000). Poaching in Russian waters by both Russian and foreign nationals has become a particularly serious problem in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the ensuing center-region tug-of-war over who should obtain the benefits of allowing foreign fishing in Russian coastal waters.

Energy Security

Energy security has also been recognized as an important issue for Northeast Asian countries, with their energy demand and dependence on Middle East oil expected to continue to grow. (National Institute for Research Advancement 2001). The current and near-term energy production and oil reserves in the Northeast Asian countries are likely to be inadequate to meet their future energy demand. Energy imports of these countries, particularly those of China, are expected to continue to grow, pushing up their dependence on Middle East oil. Of particular importance are the large reserves of oil and natural gas in Siberia and the Russian Far East and in Central Asia and their potential exports to China, South Korea, and Japan. This is an issue that is attracting increasingly focused attention in all Northeast Asian countries. In fact, the APEC energy ministers’ meeting in 1998 endorsed the “Natural Gas Initiative” prepared by its energy working group. The APEC Natural Gas Initiative calls for the promotion of investment in the development of natural gas supplies, infrastructure, and trade network in APEC member countries. It states that the development of a natural gas trade network composed of domestic and cross-border pipelines, LNG terminals, and a distribution system will expand the cooperation and trade among APEC members and promote regional economic development and growth (Ministry of International Trade and Industry 1998: 106). If
successfully developed, this initiative will enhance the region’s cooperation in this important sector as well as Russia’s influence in energy diplomacy.\(^5\)

**Human Flows Security**

There is no formal bilateral or multilateral mechanism in Northeast Asia to deal with trans-border human flows except that may have serious implications for relations between ethnic groups within and between countries. There are two potentially serious problems in this area—Chinese migration and settlement in the Russian Far East and North Korean refugees in case of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Against the background of deepening economic difficulties in the Russian Far East and the burgeoning Chinese economy and population, many residents in Far Eastern communities feel vulnerable to Chinese influence (see, for example, Alexseev 2001). Since the early 1990s, the influxes of large numbers of Chinese traders and laborers and poorly regulated border trade have raised the specter of “yellow peril” among Far Eastern territories. The tightening of visa control in the winter of 1993-94 alleviated much of the problem of Chinese migration, but it also caused a drastic drop in border trade, to the detriment of both sides. Although bilateral trade has since recovered, the Russian fear of Chinese influence remains unabated. Moreover, although Russia and China have managed to resolve most of their border demarcation issues since 1991, regional leaders in the border areas of the Russian Far East have and will continue to exploit for political purposes the nationalist sentiment among the local residents over these issues.

The potentially devastating effect of a massive flow of refugees from North Korea into South Korea, China, or Russia is on the minds of many government officials in the neighboring countries. However, to date, the issue has not been officially broached in any international forum, reflecting the very sensitive nature of the problem. Nor have experts in Korean affairs seriously discussed policy options available to the neighboring countries.\(^6\)

**Economic Gaps**

There is no regional forum for addressing the impact of growing transnational economic ties for the welfare of the local communities. On the one hand, the growing trade and other economic activities across national borders between China and Russia and between Mongolia and Russia, as well as international investments in these countries, is creating pockets of new wealth and opportunities in each country. On the other hand, most members of these communities have seen little or no benefits resulting from the growing interdependence (See, for example, Akaha and Vassilieva 2000).

**Illegal Trafficking in Drugs, Weapons, and Humans**

Illegal trafficking in drugs, weapons, and humans is another potentially serious security concern for which there is no regional forum. The problem is currently being addressed through bilateral channels, such as between Japan and Russia and between China and Russia.

**Globalization and Social-Economic Disruptions**

Finally, the management of national economies in Northeast Asia has been strictly a matter of national control. In the Asian currency-financial crisis of 1997-98 we saw
what devastating effects on human and community security of the mismanagement of national economies or their exposure to the inexorable forces of globalization. The crisis created serious difficulties in South Korea and equally troubling problems in Russia. Japan also felt the impact on its business presence in East Asia. Fortunately, unlike in many Southeast Asian countries, the state in each Northeast Asian country was strong enough to prevent the intense and even violent social tension and political conflict that were seen in Southeast Asia. As will be noted below, some efforts are underway within the framework of “ASEAN Plus Three” to prevent the recurrence of a similar crisis in the future but obviously much more needs to be done. Additionally, Japan and South Korea have been conducting discussion of a bilateral free-trade agreement. If successfully concluded, it would be a major step forward in regional cooperation in Northeast Asia. However, similar arrangements that included PRC, Taiwan, and Russia would be very difficult to forge.

Institutionalized Multilateral Cooperation in Northeast Asia

There are a number of multilateral cooperative arrangements in Northeast Asia. Are they effective methods of addressing the non-traditional security issues identified above? The short answer is no, but some of them have the potential to play a role in placing non-traditional security issues on the agenda for regional cooperation among the governments of the region. I will briefly discuss five frameworks: the Tumen River Area Development Program, the non-governmental Northeast Asia Economic Forum, the track-2 Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue, the track-2 Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, and the official framework of ASEAN Plus Three.

The Tumen River Area Development Program

The Tumen River program has the potential to evolve into a framework for multilateral cooperation involving all Northeast Asian countries. The current participants are Beijing, Moscow, Pyongyang, Seoul, and Ulaan Baatar. Unfortunately, competing national and local priorities and interests have proved formidable (see Akaha 2001b).

China has been the most enthusiastic participant in this project, making by far the most visible and substantial investments in the development of transportation and communication infrastructure. Progress has been very slow on the Russian side due to domestic economic chaos and disagreements between Moscow and the regional governments in the Russian Far East. There are serious local concerns about the economic and environmental impact of the multilateral project. North Korea has focused almost exclusively on the development of its own projects, particularly the special economic zone in Rajin-Sonbong. Pyongyang’s international isolation has also limited the international community’s involvement in the project. Furthermore, the absence of diplomatic ties between Pyongyang and Tokyo has prevented Japanese participation in the Tumen program.

The multilateral project has had difficulty attracting large international investments, which are essential to its success. The prospects of international capital have been hurt further by Japan’s protracted recession and the Asian financial crisis. Given the paucity of financial resources in the Tumen Region, the multilateral program must attract international capital. The earlier proposal to establish a Northeast Asia Development Bank has proven unrealistic so far. The most recent effort by the Tumen Secretariat in
Beijing is the proposal to establish a Northeast Asia/Tumen Investment Corporation (NEATIC).

The Tumen River program is increasing its attention to the protection of the environment. If effectively promoted, cooperation in this area will help the participating countries develop a habit of cooperation and sensitivity to the consequences of domestic developments for their neighboring countries. Particularly important is the international support for the environmental mitigation efforts in northeast China.

There is no question that without the involvement of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), it would have been impossible for the participants to develop the close consultations they currently conduct. UNDP not only provided financial assistance for some of the feasibility studies for the development program but also played a key role as coordinator and organizer of the project in its early phases. Given the politically sensitive issues yet to be resolved and the equally daunting task of attracting capital investment required for the project, the support of the UNDP remains critical.

Finally, the international environment surrounding the Tumen River program must continue to improve. This means, at a minimum, that the Korean conflict must be contained if not settled and this requires consensus among the four major powers about the need to engage North Korea, prevent its collapse, and expand North-South contacts. This in turn calls for an understanding among the great powers about a desirable multilateral framework for managing their competing political and security interests. Multilateral cooperation in economic and non-traditional security issues will improve the chances of favorable developments along these lines.

Northeast Asia Economic Forum (NEAEF)

The origins of the Forum were in a scientific meeting at the East-West Center in 1987 and a series of conferences in the region in subsequent years. Among the issues addressed in the early conferences were international cooperation for the management of ocean resources, development of marine transport, and environmental protection. One of these conferences, held in Changchun, China in 1990, generated interest in the concept of Tumen River development. It was also at this conference that the Northeast Asia Economic Forum was established. The Forum has since been held in Pyongyang, Vladivostok, Yeongbyong, Niigata, Honolulu, Ulaan Baatar, and Tianjin.

The Tianjin conference in 1999 discussed regional economic cooperation, transportation networks, the Tumen Region as a model for Northeast Asian economic cooperation, energy resources in the region, and environmental issues in the energy sector. Also on the agenda were financial issues and capital mobilization for infrastructure development, cooperation in the telecommunications sector and the electric power sector. In other words, economic and technical issues have become the central focus of the annual gatherings.

The Forum remains an informal, non-governmental process, similar to the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) that paved the way for the establishment of APEC. The Forum also tries to mobilize both national and international support for its mission by holding its conference in each participating country on a rotation basis. This has also facilitated a sense of fairness and equality among the participating countries. Participation has also been open to any and all actors, governmental or non-
governmental, regardless of national identity. That is, inclusiveness has been a hallmark of the Forum.

The limitations of the Forum have also become evident. The mobilization of sufficient financial, technical, and other resources for many of the needs identified by the Forum requires official support of Japan and other developed countries, but as long as the North Korean regime remains reclusive and suspicious of others, the necessary international support for the Tumen Project is unlikely. As long as the Forum remains focused on economic and technical issues, the Forum is unlikely to develop into a useful mechanism for addressing, much less managing non-traditional security issues. Its most notable weakness, from the perspective of implementation, is the absence of strong central government participation.

**Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)**

The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue was established by the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) as a supplement to broad regional bodies such as ASEAN. The NEACD’s goal is to promote cooperative dialogue among the six most influential states in Northeast Asia: Japan, China, South Korea, Russia, North Korea, and the United States. Such dialogue is encouraged through the group’s informal, Track Two status that allows representatives to air concerns independent of official state policy. Meetings involve government officials from the foreign and defense ministries, uniformed military officers, and participants from private research institutions.

Each meeting of the NEACD focuses on one area of possible cooperation, contains a session devoted to national and military perspectives on security, and addresses current topics in Northeast Asian security. The first meeting, held in California in October 1993, focused primarily on security issues. However, participants quickly agreed that promoting cooperation on less confrontational issues might build the trust necessary for productive discussions on security concerns. Attendees decided the NEACD should focus on several confidence-building measures, including maritime and nuclear policy, crisis prevention centers, and transparency.

The NEACD has endeavored to identify new areas in which to foster regional cooperation. The group has studied the security implications of energy issues in Northeast Asia, including regional demand and nuclear fuel cycle issues, and the role of agriculture production and trade. Later sessions examined potential cooperation in maritime shipping and trade and regional cooperation on the civilian use of nuclear energy. Working groups and study projects report their findings in these areas at every NEACD meeting. One of NEACD’s major projects is the Defense Information Sharing study project. The DIS stemmed from the Dialogue’s exploration of CBM’s and seeks to increase transparency in Northeast Asia. This study project is the first multilateral, military-to-military dialogue in the North Pacific. The group focuses on post-Cold War changes in the security environment, including the increased importance of economic security and the growing use of cooperative security in resolving disputes. The importance of considering inter-state relations and peacekeeping when formulating state security policy is also discussed.

One setback in the organization is North Korea’s failure to attend any of the sessions. North Korean officials did agree to the organization’s establishment, remain
involved in discussion for each meeting, and are provided with the proceedings of each
dialogue. The other representatives remain hopeful that North Korean officials will begin
actively participating in the discussions.

Among the multilateral cooperative efforts focused on Northeast Asia, the
NEACD offers the greatest promise for addressing security issues, but its primary
concern relates to traditional security problems and confidence-building measures. As
well, its limited size and resources will likely limit the scope of issues it can address.
Additionally, the U.S.-based forum may come under closer scrutiny, particularly from its
Asian participants, as it pushes forward with a more ambitious agenda.

The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific

CSCAP was formally established under the Kuala Lumpur Statement in June
1993. Its founding members were security and international studies institutes with
government ties in Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States.\textsuperscript{9} The organization was designed
to hold workshops to be attended by academics, business leaders, and former or current
officials from ministries of defense and foreign affairs. In accordance with this objective
the Council was made open to all countries and territories in the Asia-Pacific region
interested in promoting regional security cooperation.

The CSCAP Charter was adopted in December 1993 in Lombok, Indonesia and
later amended in August 1995. The Charter outlined seven functions the organization was
to undertake. In addition to promoting dialogue and cooperation on security issues, the
Charter called for establishing links with other institutions and organizations throughout
the world for exchanging information, and producing publications relevant to regional
security issues. CSCAP has been steadily expanding since its establishment. In addition
to the founding members, New Zealand, Russia, North Korea, Mongolia, India,
Cambodia, Papua New Guinea, the European Union, China, and Vietnam have become
full members. With this broad membership CSCAP is hoping to establish solid links to
the ASEAN Regional Forum.

CSCAP currently has five Working Groups. The first four were established in
1993-1994 and dealt with maritime cooperation, North Pacific/Northeast Asia security
cooperation, confidence and security building measures, including transparency, and
cooperative and comprehensive security. The fifth group, dealing with transnational
crime, was granted full working group status at the 1997 Steering Group Committee
Meeting in Tokyo. The working groups are the most productive portion of CSCAP and
have been conducting relevant and useful research. At the eighth meeting of the
Comprehensive and Cooperative Security Working Group, held in October 2000, topics
related to the theme, “Implications of Globalization for Security Cooperation in the Asia
Pacific” were discussed during five sessions. The first session was an overview of the
impact of globalization on security in the Asia Pacific. It highlighted the fact that
increased globalization has made traditional tools of security policy less appropriate and
emphasized the need for “trans-sovereign” security policies. The other sessions dealt with
globalization and sovereignty, the impact of the technological revolution on the balance
of power, and the role of multilateral institutions in managing globalization. Some issues
raised at this event were the need to develop an Asian perspective on ideas such as human
security rather than allowing the West to impose its own concepts on the region,
promoting more South-South cooperation, and developing stronger cooperation between multilateral institutions.

While the working groups have been successful in promoting dialogue, the extent to which such discussions have been transformed into policy is unclear. Working Group meetings generally end with suggestions for further discussions rather than suggesting how their ideas might be implemented. The extent to which attending government officials attempt to incorporate the suggestions in their policy recommendations is not discussed.

From the perspective of non-traditional security cooperation, CSCAP shows the greatest promise as a forum for research and dialogue. With its inclusiveness in terms of membership, agenda, and ties to institutions elsewhere, the group offers some definite advantages over the other forums discussed in this paper. However, how successful it will be in addressing some of the specific non-traditional security issues in Northeast Asia remains to be seen. In particular, its ability will be seriously tested if it decides to develop policy recommendations concerning some of the sensitive human security issues on the Korean Peninsula and China, the presence of ethnic minorities in China and the Russian Far East, and cross-border migration involving China.

ASEAN plus Three

ASEAN plus Three, comprising the ASEAN states and Japan, South Korea, and China, has been meeting informally since 1997. A drive to increase cooperation between Northeast and Southeast Asian states was brought about by what many Asian states viewed to be inadequate response by the West and the IMF to the financial crisis of 1997. This sentiment bolstered support for stronger regional bodies in order to reduce economic dependence on the West. In May 2000, ministers from ASEAN met with officials from Japan, China, and South Korea to discuss developing a joint approach to WTO and APEC discussions, regional economic recovery, and creating an expanded regional free trade area.

ASEAN plus Three held its first official summit meeting in Manila in November 1999. In attendance were the foreign ministers, trade and industry ministers, finance ministers, deputy central bank governors, and senior officials from various sectors of each participating state. The members stated that increased East Asian interaction was improving chances for cooperation and collaboration with each other and strengthening the potential for promoting peace and stability in the region. They also agreed to promote dialogue and deepen efforts to increase mutual understanding and trust in East Asia and beyond through existing cooperative processes and joint efforts. In accomplishing these goals, members agreed to follow guidelines set out in the UN Charter, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, and universally recognized principles of international law. Principles for promoting cooperation in economic, social and political areas were also proposed.

In the economic sphere, promoting trade, investments, technology transfer, and cooperation in industry, agriculture and monetary policy were agreed upon. The importance of developing social and human resources was highlighted, as well as the need for the association to cooperate in development programs. In the political and security areas they agreed to continue dialogue and cooperation to increase mutual understanding and trust. No firm plans for attaining these objectives were established.
At the second summit meeting in November 2000 the establishment of an East Asian free trade zone with an institutional link with Northeast Asia was proposed. At the time Prime Minister Goh of Singapore suggested the group would likely focus on economic and social issues, but that expansion into political issues was possible. Around this time the ten ASEAN states and Japan, China, and South Korea started referring to themselves as the East Asian states.

On the heels of the seventh ASEAN summit meeting in Bandar Seri Begawan in November 2001, the leaders of the ASEAN Plus Three countries held their fifth summit. The ASEAN summit addressed economic development, international cooperation against terrorism, and HIV/AIDS. Among other economic issues, the leaders agreed on the need to undertake measures to stimulate domestic economies, continue with post-financial crisis structural reforms, and initiate cooperation to counter the risk of development gap in ASEAN and accelerate regional integration, including the more recent ASEAN members—Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. On the terrorism issue, the leaders issued an ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism and called on the Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime, scheduled to meet in April 2002, to study various counter-terrorism proposals. The ASEAN Plus Three summit, the leaders also discussed terrorism, urged international cooperation, and called for the early signing and ratification of all twelve counter-terrorism conventions. Acknowledging lack of economic development and social problems as root causes of terrorism, the leaders also confirmed, “political stability, economic well being, and development in the region is a crucial foundation in [their] fight against international terrorism” (ASEAN 2002).

One non-traditional security issue that was specifically mentioned during the ASEAN Plus Three summit was energy security. On this issue, Northeast Asian countries have offered to support ASEAN member countries’ activities to promote people-to-people exchanges and human resource development. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is hosting a seminar on energy security in Tokyo in March, participants coning from the ASEAN Plus Three countries. The seminar will discuss how to strengthen energy security in Asia and energy cooperation in the framework of ASEAN Plus Three.

Despite being criticized as a “talk-shop’, ASEAN plus Three has made surprising advancements in promoting financial cooperation since the November 2000 summit. By January 2001 the thirteen East Asian states were establishing a network of bilateral swap and repurchase agreements to assist each other in the event of another financial difficulty. In the case of development, much of the group’s energy has thus far gone into promoting development in the Mekong River Basin. Mechanisms for cooperating in trade, investments, technology-transfer, and e-commerce were still being discussed. To assist in accelerating the integration process an East Asian Vision Group composed of respected intellectuals from the region was established, upon the initiative of South Korean President Kim Dae-jung.

**Obstacles to Multilateral Cooperation**

A careful assessment of the future prospects for international cooperation in non-traditional security in Northeast Asia must be based on an accurate understanding of the characteristics of the region as a political-economic space with important historical legacies and contemporary trends.
Multilateral regional cooperation, in both traditional and non-traditional security fields, has been difficult to develop in Northeast Asia. This is largely attributable to the nature of international relations in the region. First, memories of history weigh heavily on the contemporary mutual perceptions among the region’s powers, with animosity and suspicion more often the norm than a spirit of reconciliation and cooperation. Second, major power relations in the area are in flux, with their policies toward each other dominated by global and broader regional (Asia-Pacific) strategic considerations. This is particularly the case with respect to the strategic interaction among the United States, China, and Russia. Third, the regional power structure is complicated by the fact that the foundations of power of the region’s countries and the source of their international influence are quite different, uneven, and shifting at different rates. Fourth, the power of the state continues to prevail over the influence of civil society institutions, with authoritarian tendencies restricting democratic yearnings and state intervention inhibiting the liberalizing and integrative effects of transnational economic exchanges and social interactions. Nationalism remains a powerful force and continues to hamper internationalist initiatives by non-governmental agents. A related characteristic of the region is that international cooperation is severely constrained by the presence of traditional issues of nationalism, including territorial disputes and conflicts over maritime jurisdiction. Sixth, the region represents a full range of political systems and societal structures, as well as wide disparities in economic development.

Consequently, Northeast Asia remains a geographic referent, not a political unit, nor an integrated economic area. As such, the region lacks an institutional framework for multilateral cooperation, most efforts at policy coordination taking place through bilateral channels. Multilateral dialogue involving all the major powers of Northeast Asia has no historic precedent.

Moreover, traditional and non-traditional security issues exist side by side in Northeast Asia. The growing economic power of China has given rise to the specter of “China threat” in the United States and elsewhere. At the same time, there are growing signs of ethnic tension and social fissure resulting from the growing disparities in income and economic opportunities and the fast pace of social change accompanying economic reform. Moreover, internal and cross-border migration of hundreds of thousands, if not millions of Chinese has become a major challenge to both Beijing and the capitals in the neighboring countries, as well as to the affected local communities. The political and economic crises in post-Soviet Russia have caused a precipitous economic decline and serious social dislocation in the Russian Far East, exposing its woefully inadequate social and environmental safety net. Japan, heralded in the 1980s as an economic superpower and model of economic development, has experienced a long and deep economic recession since the bursting of its economic bubble in 1989-90, with no sign of sustainable recovery even under the reform-minded Prime Minister Koizumi. At the same time, Japan’s effort to upgrade its defense capabilities within the framework of its security alliance with the United States and more recently in response to the international call for “war on terrorism” after September 11, 2001, has invited Chinese charges of Japanese military resurgence. Even the United States--arguably the sole superpower in the post-Cold War world--has not yet developed a long-term strategic vision for the region, with the balance between political, security, and economic policy priorities shifting from time to time. The Northeast Asian countries are also uneasy about the
current Bush Administration’s inclination toward unilateralism, despite Washington’s call for international coalition against terrorism. The nuclear and missile development as well as massive starvation in the economically crippled North Korea feed speculations about Pyongyang’s collapse or military or terrorist adventurism against South Korea, demanding sustained attention on the part of the international community in general and among the Northeast Asian neighbors in particular. South Korea appears to have recovered from the devastating impact of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 by swallowing bitter pills for administrative and economic reforms, but the public is increasingly agitated by the economic and social consequences of reform policy. They are also unsettled by the lack of progress in North-South dialogue that the Kim Dae-jung government’s “Sunshine Policy” boldly promised (Akaha 2002). Mongolia continues to struggle with its domestic reforms after the demise of its Communist-controlled and Soviet-tied economy in the late-1980s, followed by the Communists’ comeback in parliamentary elections and resumption of power in 2000.

The balance of power in Northeast Asia is in a state of flux and there is no multilateral mechanism for managing great power relations in Northeast Asia. Because Northeast Asia remains a region dominated by state-centric international relations, with limited transnational integration, the changing power of the region’s major countries exerts important influences on the stability of the region. Russia’s economic decline after the breakup of the Soviet Union, China’s spectacular economic rise since the late 1970s, and Japan’s sluggish performance since the bursting of its economic bubble in 1989-90 present major challenges to the future stability of Northeast Asia. The presence of the United States in the region—through bilateral alliances with Japan and South Korea, strategic interaction with China and Russia, engagement with North Korea, and economic presence in the region—is a stabilizing factor (see Cossa and Khanna 1997, and Deng 1998). On the other hand, the strong U.S. presence also serves as a brake on multilateralism in Northeast Asia.

The economic relations among the Northeast Asian countries are quite varied. Some regional economies are increasingly interdependent and intra-regional trade is becoming a very important part of their global trade. Equally significant, however, is that some economies are extensively integrated with economies outside of the region, while other regional economies are fairly contained within the region, with one economy—that of North Korea—is virtually self-contained. The Asian currency-financial crisis of 1997-98 demonstrated the importance of trade ties among the Northeast Asian economies and also highlighted the importance of the United States as a trade partner of the region’s economies. In 1996, the eight Northeast Asian economies, counting Hong Kong and Taiwan separately from China and excluding the United States, conducted well over $733 billion in trade within this region, or 20 percent of their total trade. Their trade with the United States nearly matched that sum. (See Table 1.) In dollar terms, the total intra-regional trade fell from $733,710 million in 1996 to $655,843 million in 1998. (See Table 2.) In fact, during this period intra-regional trade shrunk for every regional economy except Taiwan. Excluding the United States, the proportion of the combined international trade of the eight regional economies that was conducted within the region declined from 20.8 percent to 18.5 percent. If we include trade with the United States, however, the Northeast Asian economies’ trade increased from $1,439,248 million (40.8% of their
global trade) to $1,457,027 million (41.1%). This clearly demonstrates the importance of U.S. markets for Northeast Asian traders.

It is evident that the importance of intra-regional trade to the Northeast Asian economies is quite uneven. For the major trading powers of the region, i.e., China, Japan, and South Korea, trade with other regional economies is very important. In 1998, excluding the United States, China conducted 47 percent of its trade in this region in 1998, Japan about 22 percent and South Korea almost 30 percent, respectively. Hong Kong’s trade within the region accounted for more than half of its global trade. For North Korea and Mongolia, the two smallest economies of the region, intra-regional trade accounted for 46.2 percent and 60.0 percent of their total trade, respectively. Russia was the least dependent on trade within the region, with less than 7 percent of its global trade being conducted in Northeast Asia. If we include trade with the United States, Northeast Asia represents a much more important region for each country.

Table 1. Trade in Northeast Asia, 1996
(in millions of US$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trade with:</th>
<th>Northeast Asia excluding US</th>
<th>Northeast Asia including US</th>
<th>World total</th>
<th>Northeast Asia excluding U.S. / World total (%)</th>
<th>Northeast Asia including U.S. / World total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>328,051</td>
<td>1,494,066</td>
<td>1,449,066</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>192,711</td>
<td>231,420</td>
<td>412,056</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>180,769</td>
<td>361,479</td>
<td>773,833</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>167,210</td>
<td>219,535</td>
<td>229,583</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>95.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>87,783</td>
<td>136,131</td>
<td>251,728</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>54.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>87,505</td>
<td>136,941</td>
<td>224,783</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>60.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>15,177</td>
<td>23,101</td>
<td>139,003</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1,960</td>
<td>1,961</td>
<td>3,215</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>61.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>69.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>733,710</td>
<td>1,439,248</td>
<td>3,529,176</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2. Trade in Northeast Asia, 1998
(In US$ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trade with:</th>
<th>Northeast Asia excluding US</th>
<th>Northeast Asia including US</th>
<th>World Total</th>
<th>Northeast Asia excluding U.S. / World Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>328,051</td>
<td>1,494,066</td>
<td>1,449,066</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>192,711</td>
<td>231,420</td>
<td>412,056</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>180,769</td>
<td>361,479</td>
<td>773,833</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>167,210</td>
<td>219,535</td>
<td>229,583</td>
<td>72.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>87,783</td>
<td>136,131</td>
<td>251,728</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>87,505</td>
<td>136,941</td>
<td>224,783</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>15,177</td>
<td>23,101</td>
<td>139,003</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1,960</td>
<td>1,961</td>
<td>3,215</td>
<td>61.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>65.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>733,710</td>
<td>1,439,248</td>
<td>3,529,176</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia is further complicated by the fact that
the region’s countries have different interests and perspectives on the issue.

Russia (and the Soviet Union before it) has been the most outspoken advocate of
multilateral security cooperation in the region. However, Japan and other regional powers
long viewed with suspicion Moscow’s repeated call for a regional security framework
during the Cold War. Russia has so far failed to persuade the United States, China, and
North and South Korea to enlarge the four-power talks over the Korean peninsula peace
into a six-party framework to include Russia and Japan. Russia was left out of the KEDO
process based on the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework. Russia is clearly aware of its
limited influence in regional affairs. While it is preoccupied with domestic economic and
political reforms, it relies more on diplomacy than on military or economic foundations
of power in pursuing its regional interests. Russia has expressed interest in multilateral
initiatives in Northeast Asia, including the Tumen River Area Development Program, but
lack of resources and discord between Moscow and the nation’s Far Eastern regions over
the merits of closer ties with China have seriously constrained Russia’s participation in
the multilateral project. The downward spiral of its economy since the early 1990s up
through the financial crisis in 1998 has had painful consequences for Far Eastern Russia.
Dwindling federal subsidies, scarce capital investments, and shrinking defense contracts
have crippled industrial and agricultural production in the region. Moscow’s new foreign
policy doctrine highlights its desire to strengthen Russia’s ties to the dynamic economies
of Asia Pacific. In the absence of any multilateral political or security framework in
Northeast Asia, Russia is eager to improve bilateral ties in the region. Moscow and
Beijing share the common objective of constraining the dominance of the United States
in the region’s strategic environment. Although there are limits to the “strategic
partnership” between Russia and China, Moscow is determined to expand cooperation
with Beijing for political, strategic, and economic purposes (see Garnett 1998, Li 2000,
and Rozman 2000a). Moscow is making similar efforts to improve its ties with Tokyo, but so far this bilateral relationship has received only secondary priority. Moreover, the irreconcilable territorial dispute with Japan constrains Russia’s economic opportunities with Japan.

China’s current foreign policy has four priorities (Scalapino 1999: 15-16). First, it seeks relationships that advance its domestic goal of rapid economic development. Second, China opposes what it views as U.S.-centered unipolarism, although it wants to maintain economic ties with the United States to meet its developmental needs. Third, China stands firm on its territorial claims, most importantly with respect to Taiwan but also over offshore territories claimed by its neighboring countries. Fourth, China is seeking to develop a more even balance between bilateralism, which it has traditionally favored, and multilateralism, which it finds increasingly beneficial to its strategic and economic interests. The PRC leaders believe that the success of regional multilateral organizations will depend on healthy bilateral relations. Nationalism remains a powerful force behind Chinese foreign policy in this region and elsewhere. Since the reform policy began in the late 1970s and in the aftermath of the Cold War, the Chinese leadership has increasingly turned to nationalism as the glue to hold the nation together while, at the same time, pursuing a pragmatic approach to the expansion of international economic ties. Territorial disputes, human rights issues, military development, and nonproliferation issues all touch the nationalist nerves of the power center in Beijing. Chinese leaders are not averse to multilateralism if benefits far outweigh potential costs and, especially, if multilateral engagement will directly benefit their top priorities. This is evident in China’s push to join the World Trade Organization. China has also been a strong supporter of the Tumen River Area Development Program (see Hu 1999).
Japan’s superior power, except in the military field, gives it a broader base of international influence than Russia or China, particularly in the economic and technological fields. Japan’s long-standing membership in such forums as the World Bank, IMF, G-8, and APEC gives it a more prominent global and regional profile. However, Japan views Northeast Asia from a long-term perspective and can “bide its time at little domestic cost” (Rozman 1997). Japan pursued a predominantly bilateral mode of diplomacy in Northeast Asia during the Cold War and continues to use existing bilateral ties to pursue its political and security interests in the region (Anderson 1999). The only exception is the Washington-Tokyo-Seoul coordination of policy regarding North Korea, including its supportive role in KEDO (Inoguchi 1999). This contrasts sharply with Tokyo’s active diplomacy to promote multilateral dialogue and cooperation in Southeast Asia, including in the hosting of international conferences in support of Cambodian settlement and post-conflict assistance, as well as high profile participation in the ASEAN postministerials and active promotion of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Prospects for multilateral engagement involving Japan appear much brighter on the economic front than in the traditional security realm. Tokyo and Seoul have initiated discussion of a free trade agreement. If the two countries are successful in establishing a free trade area between them, it will brighten the prospects of a natural economic territory (NET) encompassing Japan, South Korea, and areas of Northeast China, where Japanese and South Korean firms are already heavily invested. Tokyo has also embraced “human security” and “global environment” as important diplomatic issues.

South Korea is eager to play a key role in Northeast Asian affairs but its resource base and international influences are substantially smaller than those of the larger regional powers. On the one hand, the potentially explosive situation on the Korean Peninsula forces both North and South Korea to maintain a high level of political attention and resource commitment. On the other hand, the same conflict draws to the North and the South a higher level of political attention and material support from the international community than it might otherwise attract. In South Korea there are both liberal voices in support of greater international engagement and economic interdependence and nationalist concerns about foreign powers’ influence on peninsular affairs and dominance in their economy (Moon and Ko 1999). The liberals maintain that South Korea should fill in the gap created by the absence of Japanese or Chinese leadership in regional cooperation (Choo et al 1999: 39). The nationalist sentiment is a product of the long history of foreign dominance and interference on the peninsula, as well as an expression of South Koreans’ national security concern in the fragile security environment they face. This sentiment is clearly more pronounced among the North Koreans, who have had no choice but to follow the dogmatic and isolationist worldview dictated by their Leninist leaders. For all intents and purposes liberal views are non-existent in North Korea.

Mongolia is one of the most active supporters of regional cooperation in Northeast Asia (Sukhbaatar 2000). From the Mongolian perspective, it is advantageous to align itself with the Northeast Asian countries and place itself under the “economic umbrella” of technologically advanced countries like Japan, South Korea, and the United States (Batbayar 1999). Landlocked and in need of unimpeded access to international commerce, Mongolia needs to develop bilateral relations with its immediate neighbors, the Russian Far East, Northeast China, and North Korea. Access to Mongolia is possible
only through Russia and China. The Tumen River Area Development Program, discussed below, offers Mongolia that access and, therefore, Ulaan Baatar is actively participating in the multilateral project. At the same time, however, Mongolia must avoid economic or political subordination to its Cold War protector, the former Soviet Union, or its dynamic but dominant neighbor, China. Therefore, Mongolia actively supports multilateral cooperation that will involve Japan, South Korea, the United States, and other members of the international community. These countries can also provide Mongolia with the necessary capital and technological assistance to sustain its economic reform and development. In order to avoid high inflation, bad commercial loans, and high interest rates, Mongolia needs international financial aid and investment.

**Prospects for Future Cooperation**

Given the above complexities of the Northeast Asian region, some of the non-traditional security issues noted earlier may offer promising opportunities for developing multilateral cooperation, including dialogue and common problem solving.

What rules should guide the institutionalization of multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia? The most realistic approach to multilateral decision making in Northeast Asia would resemble the procedural rules practiced by the ASEAN, i.e., consensual decision making based on the least common denominator. The Northeast Asian countries that participate in the ARF may be able to transfer their experience as dialogue partners in that process to a future Northeast Asian security forum. The recent establishment of ASEAN plus Three gives testimony to this logic.

Initial emphasis in multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia will likely be placed on the process of dialogue and consultation rather than on formal decisions involving firm commitments. Consensus will be required for all issues that entail substantial domestic adjustments. However, some non-controversial issues may be put to a majority vote as a package to develop a habit of cooperation, collective decision-making, and bargaining through issue linkage.

The experience of the Tumen River Area Development Program suggests that as long as the states remain the key participants in a multilateral cooperation scheme in the region, their political and security interests will dictate the manner of cooperation and the pace of progress. The record of the Northeast Asia Economic Forum indicates that non-state participants are unwilling or unable to take on traditional security issues. However, as transnational linkages among civic society groups grow and their security implications are more widely realized, those linkages cannot but contribute to the recognition of the importance of multilateral approaches to confidence building, problem solving, and crisis management or prevention. In this process, non-governmental organizations can play an important role in promoting the development of trust, elimination of prejudices, and cultivation of a sense of shared future among the peoples of Northeast Asia. Ultimately, however, official support and participation will be required to meet the specific requirements of regional cooperation, be they infrastructure development, capital investment, removal of customs barriers, or implementation of environmental programs or measures in other non-traditional security fields.

The experience of NEASD testifies to the importance of intellectual communities’ role in facilitating multilateral security dialogue when political leaders cannot overcome obstacles to governmental-level cooperation. CSCAP, with its greater readiness to add
non-traditional security issues to its agenda and its more inclusive approach to membership, has a more promising potential to become an important facilitator of multilateral cooperation in non-traditional security issues. ASEAN Plus Three has begun to articulate an Asian voice in the management of regional economic issues, but it faces the daunting task of going beyond dialogue. Moreover, the group’s relevance to non-traditional security issues specific to Northeast Asia remains to be established.

Whatever institutional mechanism or mechanisms Northeast Asian countries employ in addressing the challenges of non-traditional security issues, they must keep in mind the six main characteristics of the region that were noted at the outset of this paper. They are the memories of history, the shifting balance of power, disparate foundations of national power, dominance of the state in domestic and international affairs, strong nationalism, and diversity in terms of political systems, societal structures, and economic development. Civil society institutions and private businesses must be encouraged to promote the integrative effects of transnational economic, social, and cultural exchanges, which will also facilitate the development of tolerance toward diversity. However, successful regional cooperation will depend on the authority and resources of central governments.

Given the strong national sensitivities and sensibilities in the region, security cooperation can only begin in areas that do not threaten national sovereignty but which offer promises of mutual benefits. Promising candidate issues include environmental protection, resource conservation and development, coordination of migration policy, and effective management of cross-border flows of goods and people. Finally, cooperative schemes must employ non-threatening rules and procedures, allowing for gradual building of consensus, eschewing, at least initially, demanding political compromises or major resource commitments.

References
Growth and Environment. Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University.


ASEAN (2002) “Press Statement by the Chairman of the 7th ASEAN Summit and the 5th ASEAN + 3 Summit,” 5 November, Bandar Seri Begawan.


Inoguchi, Takashi (1999) “Globalization and Japan’s Foreign Policy.” Japan Review of International Affairs, 13(3).


Notes


2 For a review of the emerging environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia, see Schreurs 1998.

3 For a useful caution against ambiguous “securitization” of environmental issues, see Levy 1995.

4 Another example of a regional environmental agreement is the UNEP’s Northwest Pacific Action Plan.

5 For an examination of Russia’s energy diplomacy in Northeast Asia, see Ivanov 1999.

6 Reflecting the traditional realist conceptualization of security, a 1998 collection of analyses by some of the best-known experts in North Korean affairs includes but one minor reference to the issue of North Korean refugees. See Suh and Lee (ed) 1998.

7 For a description of the evolution of the Forum, see Valencia 1999.

8 The Forum will be holding two conferences in October 2001, one in Hong Kong and one in Anchorage, Alaska.

9 They are: Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, Australian National University, Australia; University of Toronto-York University Joint Center for Asia Pacific Studies, Canada; Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia; Japan Institute of International Affairs, Japan; The Seoul Forum for International Affairs, Republic of Korea; Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Malaysia; Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Philippines; Singapore Institute of International Affairs, Singapore; Institute for Security and International Studies, Thailand; and the Pacific Forum/CSIS, U.S.A.

10 For a comprehensive examination of Northeast Asia as a region, see Akaha (ed) 1999.

11 For a similar characterization of Northeast Asia as a region, see Rozman 2000b: 3-4.


13 For an explication of South Korean views on regional cooperation, see Choo et al 1999.