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Part 4 - Some specific Issues

7. Human rights and the structure of the scientific enterprise
8. Human rights, technology, and development
9. Human rights and environmental issues

7. Human rights and the structure of the scientific enterprise




Scientists open up many problems of human rights and lawyers attempt to solve them. So far, however, the two communities have remained isolated from each other at two extremities of a spectrum.

In a search for bibliographical information on the matter of "human rights and science," I made some inquiries of my "science study" community, which includes the disciplines of history, philosophy, sociology of science, and science policy studies. The typical responses of my colleagues have been that our study has reached the sociological, economic, political and even ethical aspects of science, but not the legal one as yet.

Though there have been numerous writings on human rights issues, it seems that the issue of human rights in relation to the development of science and technology has been raised only recently, and that people have developed a "critical awareness of science" only since the late 1960s. The turning-point may be found in the "Human Rights and Scientific and Technological Developments" resolution at the Intergovernmental Conference on Human Rights held at Tehran in May 1968.

Since then, a number of possible sources of violation of human dignity have emerged, along with the rapid development of the frontiers of micro-electronics and life science, as enumerated by Professor C.G. Weeramantry in his recent book The Slumbering Sentinels, which is, to my knowledge, the first serious attempt to tackle the issues from a legal point of view.2 The tempo has been so rapid that the legal profession seems not to have caught up effectively. This state of affairs has been lamented by my lawyer friends who have no scientific background. Weeramantry too has pointed out that the law has been tardy in evolving concepts to deal with technology.

Scientists in their laboratories, preoccupied with their immediate goals, are not aware of the possible consequences of their research. Legalists deal with the issue of science and technology in an ex post facto fashion on such aspects as society and environment, aiming to fill the gap between the scientific and legal communities. I shall explore the production mechanisms of scientific knowledge and technological information in the human rights context, and then present the general pattern of attempts to discover where principles and mechanisms for technology assessment can best be applied. This sort of analysis is, in my view, more essential than the piecemeal information gathered on the research front.

Table 1






Assessors Peer Sponsor Military Public
Competition Individual Corporate National None
Expression Open Classified Classified Open


As suggested by Dr Mushakoji in his problématique for this project, science and technology should be treated as information. There are two ends of information How: the production of information at one end and its assessment and utilization at the other. In the post-war period, the latter has come to be overwhelmingly powerful while the former tends to occupy a subordinate position. The central concern here is who will review and assess the information that scientists and technologists produce. From the viewpoint of the sociology of science, I hold the view that the question of the audience to whom scientific research is addressed is the most important factor in shaping and defining its character. Viewed in terms of operative mechanisms, four types of scientific activities may be distinguished, as shown in table 1.

From this point on, I do not in principle distinguish between science and technology, as this is only a historically meaningful distinction, which may no longer be valid, particularly in the case of industrial and defence sciences (though the classical distinction may still hold good at times in the case of academic science).


Academic science is the science practiced in the open scientific community, in which members present their research for debate and discussion by their colleagues, and seek recognition of their work through publication in scientific journals. Research is initiated out of personal interest and pursued for reasons of personal honour and distinction meted out through a referee system.

In academic science, researchers typically proceed by the following steps:

1. Design of research.
2. Application for research funds.
3. Research.
4. Peer review of research findings
5. Publication.

In the above process, steps I and 3 are matters of highly individual concern, since it is generally believed that classical freedom of research has to be maintained. This is the point at which academic science becomes very different from trial and defence sciences.

In reality, however, it has been proven that nineteenth-century science can no longer compete with post-war organized mass science and hence, as the size of scientific enterprises inevitably grows bigger, it becomes difficult to maintain individual identity in formulating research problématiques, and the tendency is to conform to the norms of mass science. Sometimes the human rights of nonconforming scientists and engineers are infringed so that the immediate goal of a bureaucratic organization may be achieved, as in the case of the promotion of the SDI project. Though not always overly careful, researchers usually keep their ideas and findings secret before publication, since they are concerned about the possibility of their being stolen by competitors.

In the post-war period, practically all scientists have applied for research funds of some kind. All academic scientists are involved in the competition for securing research funds, success in which process often predetermines the winner of the game at an early stage, even before any research is commenced. At this stage the distinction between members of the scientific community and amateurs is sharply applied, placing the latter out of reach of any research funds. This situation contributes to the formation of scientific groups resembling closed-shop unions, resulting in a clear-cut demarcation between the scientific community and those outside it. In the scientific community application forms are commonly sent to an assessment committee and are subject to close scrutiny by peers. It is also not uncommon for applicants preparing their forms to conceal carefully the essential points of their ideas, so that a peer assessor cannot appropriate them.

In the 1970s, when the unforeseeable dangers of DNA were recognized, it was felt that the social evaluation of science should not be ex post facto, on the outcome of research, but preliminary, before the research starts. The National Institute of Health tried to use their funding mechanism for the pre-assessment of hazardous research by applying their guidelines. Since corporations could afford such research with their own funds, this standard could not be extended to industrial science.

At step 3, a general statement is hardly possible because of the diversity of topics involved in scientific endeavour. One recent trend is observable, however.

Unlike a social scientist, who clings to ideology and conscience in carrying out research, an experimental scientist is happy to change his methodology until he finally arrives at a satisfactory position. In a major scientific project, however, he cannot easily do so owing to the fear that he will be called upon to account for funds already spent, even though he might know that the project will eventually turn out to be a failure, in such cases as nuclear fusion and the SDI project.

At step 4 another opportunity for "post-research and pre-publication" assessment is theoretically open. Again, on manuscripts submitted to the referee mechanism, precautions are taken to defend the researchers' prior claims to the knowledge they contain. Otherwise, a referee might hold up its publication and meanwhile appropriate the ideas and publish them elsewhere.

Along with overspecialization in science and the overproduction of research output, it is generally suspected that the old referee system is approaching bankruptcy, though people still believe that distinguished work can survive the process of selection.

In view of the recent advent of micro-electronic technology, step 5 deserves to be treated in the following independent subsection.


In the old days, knowledge and information were the private monopoly of a select group of people, transmitted orally or secretly through manuscripts. The modern printing media have made knowledge publicly available and promoted the objectivity of modern science and freedom of expression for the last three centuries. With the referee system intervening between the manuscript and printing stages, science was raised to the status of public knowledge.3

In reality, however, academic science is defenceless in safeguarding human rights against authority, ecclesiastical or civil.

Freedom of expression is still "academically" maintained, though the knowledge and information produced are circulated within a closed circuit, practically out of the reach of most people. Furthermore, the new micro-electronic media will bypass the referee system that modern scientific tradition has so far cultivated and turn scientific knowledge back into privately circulated and monopolized information.4 In the generality of cases, micro-electronic media have been commercially developed to promote private information rather than public knowledge. There is a fear that by making knowledge private once again we will revive the exclusiveness of knowledge and information which was a feature of the manuscript age.

Moreover, as the new electronic media make it possible to disseminate small quantities of a wide range of scientific information, the trend towards specialization will be spurred on still further, beyond the reach and comprehension of the general public.


Industrial science as practiced in private laboratories has had much in common with defence science and little in common with academic science. Jerry Ravetz generalized its many manifestations into a single term, "industrialized science,"5 emphasizing the characteristics of production of scientific information as similar to those of an industrial commodity. David Dixson would like to call them "strategic science," with emphasis on its goal-oriented nature.6 I prefer the Japanese term taiserka kagaku (Establishment Science) which stresses its characteristic of tight and rigid incorporation into the present establishment and its isolation from the general public; thus, it may be called, with Steven Rose, "incorporated science."7

Although most people still talk of science in terms of the classical academic science paradigm, this is not the dominant form of contemporary research. Major resources for research and development are now allocated to industrial and defence sciences. These incorporated sciences are vigorously promoted by the driving force of competition among corporations or nations, while profits and military strategic necessity determine how their results will be evaluated.

Industrial science is targeted to the areas that promise the greatest profits. Defence science proceeds along policy lines laid down by a handful of military strategists, despite the fact that it involves a large amount of taxpayers' money. The most problematic aspect of these sciences is that they continue to remain beyond the purview of public scrutiny or any form of public accountability. The researcher's work is assessed wholly within the organizations, and is not reviewed or evaluated by anyone from outside. This is why industrial and defence sciences are referred to more generally as "incorporated sciences."

Scientific works openly assessed and publicly recognized are called "knowledge, " while the findings of incorporated sciences, classified and available only to a limited circle for private monopoly, are referred to as "information."


The sociology of science as an established discipline has developed considerably during the last two decades, but so far its major interest has continued to be the analysis of traditional academic science. We badly need the structural analysis of incorporated science but, mainly because of its very corporate nature, we have to confess that the investigation is neither thorough nor penetrating as yet. Furthermore, there is no general rule applicable to all establishments that are competing with each other. However, it is still worthwhile to conceptualize the idealized case.

The steps of commercialized industrial science may be summed up as follows:

1. Market demand.
2. Targeting and formulation of plans.
3. Research and development.
4. Model, test, and production.
5. Advertisement.
6. Dissemination into market.

In step 1, consumer assessment is incorporated when business enterprises carry out market research. A leader in each research group is responsible for formulating his or her target at step 2, taking into account the overriding need for commercial success, and submits his or her research proposal to the upper strata of the corporation. Unlike academic science, researchers in industrial science cannot determine their targets autonomously and hence their creativity is said to be considerably reduced.

At step 3, the assessment by top managers of corporations comes in. Many research plans are abandoned at this stage. In industrial science, assessment by top managers and sponsors, rather than the wishes of consumers, tends to prevail in determining the final product at step 6.

Steps 2 to 4 are absolute corporate secrets. Confidentiality is maintained against competing companies, not against consuming customers, but its ultimate effect appears to be similar.

Old Marxists claimed that the large corporation, with its desire to maintain market stability, purchased the patents of scientists and inventors and kept them secret, resulting in the distortion and negation of healthy progress in science and technology; in other words, monopoly capitalism killed off competition in science and technology. There have been many cases in history to prove the above statement, but the present-day reality is that industrial science is ruthlessly promoted by competition between rival enterprises in the oligopolistic system.

With regard to research and development, it is cynically remarked in the scientific community that, in rapidly changing and innovative industrial science, the findings of primary importance are classified as the "know-how" of the company and those of secondary importance are patented and sold on the market, while only insignificant results from the corporation's viewpoint are reported in scientific journals and academic meetings following the convention of academic science. In the most innovative fields, however, intellectual property rights cannot be maintained too long as such property becomes outdated quite quickly.

At the step of basic research, classification is not yet too strict, but as the production step is approached, precaution is exercised to an excessive degree. Social assessment can be applied only to steps 5 and 6. Step I is then returned to, thus repeating the cycle. It is, however, often pointed out that post-advertisement assessment is too late, especially on the frontier of biotechnology and life science, where past experience and simulation do not help much.


The structure of defence or armaments science is the most difficult for us to analyse, as it is deeply embedded in the self-perpetuating military-industrial complex. The following model is taken from the well-publicized, recently formulated SDI Project of the USA.

1. Idea and design.
2. Proposal to the military.
3. Governmental approval and parliamentary hearing.
4. Research and development.
5. Model, test, procurement, and production.
6. Assessment by the military.

Whereas all the steps in industrial science are normally conducted within the corporate system, the common procedure in respect of defence science projects is twofold: scientists in universities and corporations initiate ideas and military procurers assess and accept them. In reality, the research sectors of all the above organizations form an exclusive group called a military-industrial-academic complex. Hence, whether research is conducted in universities, corporations, or inhouse military laboratories, such an activity can be called defence science.

The market demand for industrial science noted in step 1 is absent in the case of defence science in peacetime. Ideas for new weapons development have never originated from professional career servicemen but have been initiated by scientists who have made proposals to the military; the SDI project is such a case. The military always seek quantitative expansion while qualitative leaps are made only by scientists.8

The professional assignment of scientists and technologists is to create something new. Thus, researchers in a military-industrial-academic complex constantly feel compelled to propose ideas for new weaponry. On the other hand, the military establishment can no longer assess the cost of innovation of weapons systems at step 2. Matters are entirely left in the hands of a handful of leading scientists and technologists.

At this point, a word is in order to clarify the nature of the "military-industrial-academic complex." This does not mean the weapons production departments of corporations but the complex of research and development sectors of universities, national laboratories, corporations, and military establishments. In the case of the SDI project, the Lawrence-Levermore Laboratory, MIT, and the Lockheed Corporation are major sharers of the governmental R&D budget, where step I to step 4 are proceeded with and the results fed back to step I in a repetitive cycle. It would not necessarily be continued to step 5 of procurement and production. The complex is only happy as long as the cycle continues to be repeated and escalated. This is a point where defence or incorporated science differs from industrial science. Like a nuclear fusion project, incorporated science can exist by implementing a cyclic mechanism without reference to immediate production.

From the point of view of the social assessment of science, the problem here is obviously the exclusiveness of the project, its confinement within a very limited circle. Step 3, the only step available for social assessment, is usually avoided in the name of strategic secrecy. In step 3, the process of governmental approval and parliamentary hearing on the R&D budget proposals, public assessment is formally carried out, but in practice certain limitations on public inquiry are imposed even at the congressional hearing, under the pretext of national security. In place of market demand, the most compelling arguments are built up on the assumed effectiveness of the weapons system of a hypothetical enemy.

Research and development in step 4, in the case of defence and incorporated science, is conducted on a large scale, on the solid base of a huge national budget with which industrial science is unable to compete. The high social status of defence scientists and technologists in the American scientific and engineering community is due to the huge budget with which they can develop their ideas freely, without being disturbed by commercial market assessments.

Sometimes a rationale is provided for a high defence science budget on the basis that its findings will have a spin-off to the civil sector, thus enabling industrial science to enjoy economies in the initial cost of R&D, which private corporations cannot afford. A little thought would show these arguments to be incorrect, as defence science has to observe, except in step 2, a strictly enforced classification which prevents its findings from leaking to other social sectors. Only in those areas such as nuclear energy and space science, where the basic paradigms of research have originated in defence science but have public applicability, have spin-offs been possible. But these areas could not be called industrial science; they are, rather, incorporated science, or pseudo-civil science, as Aant Elzinga calls it.

At step 5 the position of defence science is similar to that of industrial science, but the lack of commercial assessment often leads to extravagance; the organization may have proven its efficiency for the immediate purpose of wartime crash programmes, but those scientists involved, if they work on a long enough project, can lose a sense of economy and can often be misled to corruption, which is still more prevalent in step 6.

In the final stages of step 6, peacetime assessment of new weaponry is made at practice manoeuvres, but the difference from real war is obvious. Weapons systems can best be assessed only in terms of the difference between them and those of opponents. Assessment becomes a game within the military-industrial-academic complex against a hypothetical enemy. In the last step, a new military demand and requests for further improvement will appear, as necessary for defence against a hypothetical enemy, resulting in the renewal of the cycle.


Scientists' rights to publish research results are often infringed or denied because of the policy of giving priority to the interests of the business and military establishments. Especially for those scientists and engineers in industrial and defence sciences, these rights are categorically denied. As the Unesco Recommendation on the Position of Scientific Researchers (1974) has already demanded, the right to disclose military or corporate secrets, in cases where scientific information is of a crucial nature for human existence, should be protected.

I cannot, however, be too optimistic about the ombudsman function of the scientific community. My long experience shows that only a small portion of the community (say 10 per cent) is truly qualified as guardians of human rights, the rest being prone to undertake whatever research is best funded. Most contemporary scientists are involved with the industrial and defence establishments, and thus the collective inclination of the scientific community is not necessarily sound.

Important Role of Technicians

I would like to suggest in this connection the important role to be played by technicians, or rank and file scientists and engineers, rather than leaders of projects, in affording protection against science-related hazards.

In general terms, there are three stages in the development of pollution originating from scientific research.

1. Small-scale pioneering experiment by a leading scientist.
2. Large scale R&D in major industrial laboratories.
3. Industrialization and introduction of industrial products into the environment.

In stage 1 the scale of experiment is so small that its hazards are faced only by the individual scientist who designs the project. It is well known that Madame Marie Curie shortened her natural life by exposing herself to radiation at her laboratory. Early workers on the DNA recombinant experiment must also have undergone such risks. In such cases, as well as those of pioneer-adventurers, intellectual or otherwise, an individual risk may be compensated by individual success and reputation. As long as the adventurer maintains complete freedom of decision-making in exposing his life to the hazards of his experiment, no infringement of his human rights will occur. Furthermore, in the early stage the rule of the openness of academic science is usually observed.

In stage 2 large-scale R&D involves a number of technicians and rank and file scientists who are engaged in the project for their livelihood. Their risk may be compensated partially by their salary, but this is not worth the risk they are exposed to. Hence, they can assume a more cautious and detached attitude than the adventurous leader in identifying hazards. If they have no freedom to reveal and express themselves about possible hazards, there will have been an infringement of their human rights.

In the case of X-ray experiments, the International Physics Society admitted and set a threshold value of X-ray exposure only as late as 1928, when many technicians were exposed to the radiation hazard. In the case of the recent recombinant DNA experiment, labour unions such as the British Association of Scientific Workers have played a watch-dog role in formulating guidelines for the experiment through assessment committees like the G-MAG (Genetic Manipulation Advice Group). The Association of Scientific Workers has long been concerned to protect the human rights of technicians and laboratory workers.

These hazards are a sort of occupational disease that may turn into environmental pollution when scaled up.

In stage 3 the citizenry has nothing by way of compensation. They may retain the right to complain about pollution, but they have no special knowledge of it and hence they can easily be cheated in the ensuing debates. In the case of the recombinant DNA experiment, a representative of the citizenry was invited to the G-MAG. Jerry Ravetz, a critical historian of science, was chosen for that work but he complained that his role was merely ornamental. It was then said that G-MAG was a cosmetic exercise and Jerry Ravetz was the lipstick. None of the scientists on G-MAG believed there was a read hazard.

It is rather difficult to find an expert who stands on the side of the citizenry on hazards and pollution issues. At this point, it is indispensably important for the technicians at stage 2, with their expert knowledge, to disclose and expose to the public the possible hazard before it can be diffused into the environment.


The slogan "science for mankind" still lingers in the popular imagination. Scientists who devote themselves to "truth-seeking" are considered to be qualified to decide what is truth and what is not, to be providers of intellectual services to mankind and, like other professionals, to be quite independent of earthly desire for wealth and power. A classic example would be those engaged in the search for bacteria at the turn of the century.

I have defined "service science" as science assessed by the citizenry - citizenry defined as "those who have no direct vested interest in science and technology activities as such" and who are thus qualified to be objective, disinterested assessors. It seems that there is no such assessing mechanism by the citizenry at work at the present time, but again a classic exception may be found in medical science, in the relationship between a doctor and his client.

As we cannot expect much from academic science as a counterbalance to the menace of incorporated industrial and defence science, we must inevitably turn to another kind of enlightenment, that of service science.

For the role of protecting human rights against the aggression of industrial and defence sciences, service science needs to be promoted in place of classical academic science. Indeed, we need to elaborate the concept of service science a little further and to develop the strategy and tactics for promoting it.

Its structure is rather simple, since nothing, no bureaucracy, no interest group, intervenes between practicing scientists and citizen assessors; it is as follows:

1. Exposure of problems.
2. Solution of problems.
3. Assessment by the people.

All of the above processes are, in principle, kept open to the general public.

In step 1 we find outspoken messages of service science expressed by science journalism, which exposes all positive and negative aspects of scientific endeavour to the people for their own critical judgment and choice. The incident of the Asilomar Conference in 1974 marked the beginning of science journalism's assumption of this critical role in a positive sense.

Journalists present serious problems but never solve them. Journalistic provocations are relatively short-lived. Before society tires of repeated alarms, someone must take a step toward solving the problem.

It is the official duty of the non-military sector of public laboratories to undertake such service science. The daily life of taxpayers is conducted not on the basis of competition but rather compassion and co-operation, and so also should service science be conducted for the betterment of ordinary life. However, in the absence of such competition as has existed in the academic and incorporated sciences, service science for the people's sake lacks adequate financial support and motivation and remains insignificant and powerless.

In point of fact, if there is any one eIement that distinguishes service science from any other type of science, it is the system by which research is reviewed and evaluated. Service science addresses its findings neither to fellow scholars, as in academic science, nor to research administrators, as in incorporated science, but directly to local residents. Yet, service science still does not have any clearly defined apparatus for this purpose. In reality, works of scientists at a service science institute, like a research institute for environmental protection, are still evaluated according to the standards of academic science.

Hence, service science requires forms of communication that differ from the scientific papers of academic science or the know-how and reports of incorporated science. Since neither originality nor the accumulation of classified know-how is involved in service science, it can make its point in handbills and appeals, in a style designed to secure as wide an audience as possible. It also makes maximum use of journalism and the broadcast media.9


So far, we have discussed service science in a positive way as a defence against the hazards of incorporated sciences. Medical and life sciences used to be primarily service sciences of the first grade and there was little intervention from industry or the military between scientists and the general public.

The service science of life is, however, increasingly industrialized now. Medical technology assessment is needed in connection with the introduction of elaborate and expensive machinery into the health-care system. Mass production of artificial organs will be the big industry of tomorrow, far surpassing the car industry of today.

The advent of the new life sciences portends future markets for the sale and hire of human organs and sale of human tissues. We do not know as yet how much these businesses will be industrialized. As they are still conducted between an individual doctor and an individual patient, people may not be aware of the possible danger of human rights infringement. In spite of the direct influence of life science on everyday life, laymen are quite at a loss in evaluating and assessing the outcomes of research.


It is obvious that the human right of access to scientific information should be fully guaranteed, in principle. Towards this end we shall introduce a new issue hitherto not much considered nor discussed. We would like to bring to your attention an issue that perhaps makes up two sides of the same coin, namely "the human right not to know about specific scientific information but still not to remain at a disadvantage because of ignorance" or, in brief, "rights of the ignorant. "

It may be too early to propose such a right without fear of being misunderstood, especially when enlightened education still needs to be promoted among the people in the third world. But we can foresee that it is a logical consequence of contemporary trends that the infringement of human rights, due to the compartmentalization of scientific and technological knowledge, is destined to become serious sooner or later. This is by no means an official proposal being formally presented, but we would like to provoke our readers to consider this issue.

Suppose that maldistribution of information is modified to the extent that nobody suffers any disadvantages from inaccessibility to information resources. Still a fundamental problem remains unsolved. It is a deep-rooted issue in the contemporary intellectual environment. It is an ever-present issue in relations between technocratic specialists and the amateur citizenry.

Suppose that the technocratic establishment starts to construct an atomic power station in a region. Local residents naturally feel apprehensive of possible radioactive pollution. The technocrats then hold meetings to discuss devices to dispel residents' misgivings. They start with the premise that knowledge of all sorts concerning atomic power is held by the establishment and that residents are entirely ignorant of that knowledge. Their next move is to send out pamphlets to residents illustrating the safe nature of atomic power or to send specialists to a public forum to explain it to the residents.

The method of persuasion on the part of the scientific establishment may be as follows: the distrust of or misgivings about an atomic reactor on the part of the citizenry is due to their ignorance on scientific matters and hence they must be required to be knowledgeable in such matters to the same standard as experts. If they learn enough, they will be convinced of the safety of atomic power. It is entirely because of their lack of effort in gaining information about science and technology that they oppose governmental planning.

Resident groups may not be convinced by the persuasive arguments of the establishment, and may sometimes invite critics who are public activists in order to have a counter view.

These residents are in the main people who live average lives and have only a basic knowledge of reading, writing, and arithmetic. Then a new body of knowledge about atomic power is forced upon them. Unless they work hard to gain knowledge about atomic power and build up their ability to assess the incoming new technology, they may not be able to survive in the atomic age. Hence, whether they like it or not, they will have to devote much effort to understanding recent advances in atomic power technology, and even basic atomic physics, in order to prevent themselves being deceived. From the viewpoint of the citizenry, this is nothing but a pollution of the intellectual environment, or information pollution; namely, laymen are requested to be knowledgeable in the technicalities of atomic reactors, which is a nuisance to those who do not have any particular training in atomic science. They would like to spend their time more enjoyably. Further, the kind of technology with which citizens are incessantly called upon to familiarize themselves is not a technology of quality.

In these circumstances, how much claim can the citizenry make to the human right to remain ignorant about any particular knowledge?

In the debate on environmental issues, techno-bureaucrats often insist that they are not concealing information (say, of possible hazards of atomic reactors) from the citizenry, but the citizenry complains that, as they do not have time to specialize in atomic physics, they cannot effectively assess what the technocrat-specialists are trying to bring into their local environment. This gap of information, or more precisely this gap in the time allocated to specialized knowledge by specialists and ordinary citizens, will continue to widen so long as scientific specialization keeps advancing.

In order to prevent this situation of "no information, but retained advantage," we shall have to introduce a human right "not to be at a disadvantage even though one does not have training and time for mastering specialized information." A similar problem may be detected in arguments over bilingual education in large American cities. Do Hispanic high-school students have a right to be illiterate in English? such a human right is introduced, future society will be full of information pollution, from which nobody will be able to escape.


1. Jerry Ravetz's term.

2. C G. Weeramantry, The Slumbering Sentinels (Penguin, 1984), pp. 17-21.

3. John Ziman, Public Knowledge (Cambridge University Press, 1968).

4. Shigeru Nakayama, "The Three Stage Development of Knowledge and the Media," Historia scientiarum, no. 31 (1986): 101-113

5. Jerome R. Ravetz, Scientific Knowledge and its Social Problems (Oxford University Press, 1971).

6. Private communication, November 1987, Paris.

7. Shigeru Nakayama, Shimin notameno kagakuron. (Science Studies for the Citizenry) (Shakai Hyouronsha, Tokyo, 1984).

8. S. Zuckerman, Nuclear illusion and Reality (Viking Press, New York, 1982), pp. 103, 145.

9. Shigeru Nakayama, "The Future of Research - A Call for a Service Science," Fundamenta scientiae, vol. 2, no. 1 (1981): 85-97.


Morris-Suzuki, Tessa. Beyond Computopia : Information , Automation and Democracy In Japan. Kegan Paul International, 1988.

Nakayama, Shigeru. The Future of Research - A Call for a Service Science. Fundamenta scientiae, vol. 2, no. 1(1981): 85-97.

. The Three Stage Development of Knowledge and the Media. Historia scientiarum, no. 31 (1986): 101-113.

Ravetz, Jerome R. Scientific Knowledge and its Social Problems. Oxford University Press, 1971.

Weeramantry, C.G. Nuclear Weapons and Scientific Responslbility. Longwood. 1987.

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