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4. Environmental and institutional aspects of land policy

Social and environmental impacts of agrarian reform in rural Botswana
Environmental implications of land-use patterns in the new villages in Tanzania
Environmental pressure and land-use change in communal eastern Botswana: The case of Kgatleng

Social and environmental impacts of agrarian reform in rural Botswana

R.K. Hitchcock and T. Nkwe
Rural Sociology Unit, Ministry of Agriculture, Gaborone, Botswana

The Government now intends to bring in the new policy for grazing land. There are people who fear what can happen if the old ways of /and holding and land use are changed. For example, some fear that the small owners will be forced to move and the rich will come to control all the land. The Government recognizes that these fears exist but is convinced that through careful planning and consultation with the people the dangers can be avoided. Planning will aim to ensure that land development helps the poor and does not make them worse off.

-National Policy on Tribal Grazing Land


Botswana's National Policy on Tribal Grazing Land is a rural development and agrarian reform programme aimed at (1) stopping overgrazing and range degradation, (2) facilitating growth and commercialization of the country's livestock industry on a sustained basis, and (3) promoting greater equality of incomes in rural areas. Launched in 1975 by Sir Seretse Khama (Khama 19751, the policy was described in a Government White Paper (Botswana 1975). This land reform policy has been described as "probably the most open and comprehensive land reform programme being undertaken anywhere in the world at this time'' (don Kaufmann 1979, 255). The policy was prompted by increasing concern over problems of overgrazing in the area of villages and water points. An additional motivation was recognition of a trend towards wealthy livestock owners gaining increasing control over substantial portions of the nation's grazing land. Equitable distribution and proper management of the available rangeland were viewed as important concerns by the Botswana Government. It was felt that improved systems of livestock and range management, combined with better systems of land allocation, could bring about a reduction in the problems of range degradation and the increasing gap in income between rich and poor in Botswana.

Implementation of the National Policy on Tribal Grazing Land over the past six and a half years has seen a number of changes in the original tenets of the programme. It has been found that a number of the assumptions made by planners at the outset were incorrect, perhaps the most important being the notion that there were large tracts of empty land into which commercial ranching operations could expand. The policy has already had a number of effects, both social and environmental, in the rural areas of Botswana. Whereas the original intention of the policy was to reduce overgrazing in the rural areas through movement of large herd owners out of the communal grazing lands, more and more emphasis has been placed on turning existing cattle posts into leasehold properties in which individuals and small groups have exclusive rights. Despite the fact that the policy paper stated that land boards were to ''decide how much land is left for commercial development after taking into account communal, reserved and national needs" (Botswana 1975, 11, par. 38e, emphasis added), establishment of commercial ranches has become the major focus of the policy. At the same time, implementation of the policy has brought to light issues which were not foreseen at the outset, one example being the large numbers of people without livestock who reside in rural Botswana. While the policy White Paper states that commercial leases will not be given over any existing water source until satisfactory watering arrangements have been made for all livestock owners currently using that borehole (Botswana 1975, 13, par. 42i), there is no mention whatsoever of non-stockholders. There is a danger, therefore, that large numbers of people could ultimately be dispossessed unless some efforts are made to ensure that land is set aside and that compensation is worked out to their satisfaction.

The purpose of this paper is to examine Botswana's agrarian reform programme with an eye towards determining its social and environmental consequences. While admittedly the tribal grazing land policy is at an early stage, it is possible to assess some of the socio-economic impacts of the policy. Commercial ranches have now been established in six of Botswana's 10 districts, and over 50 leases have been signed. Complaints have begun to be heard about encroachment of commercial ranches against local people's will. Compensation payments in the form of land have yet to be worked out, and the cash payments for capital improvements on land now under leasehold tenure have been minimal. It is clear that unless efforts are made to set aside land for people who are dispossessed and unless steps are taken to ensure that livestock owners manage their herds and the range properly, the policy will exacerbate the social and environmental problems in the rural areas of Botswana.

Botswana's Agrarian Reform Programme

The traditional land tenure system of Botswana is such that individuals do not have exclusive control over specific parts of the range. Land was divided among wards (dikgotla) or groups of wards. All land was in the hands of the chiefs, and they allocated areas for residential, arable, and grazing purposes. The colonial period in Botswana saw a number of changes in the land tenure system, with some areas being handed over to the Crown in the latter part of the 19th century (these areas are now called State land), and other areas being set aside as freehold, where settlers were given exclusive rights (e.g. the Tuli, Tati, and Ghanzi farming blocks). In 1969, the Tribal Land Act was passed by Parliament, and in 1970 land boards went into operation. The allocation powers of the chiefs were ceded over to these land boards, ostensibly to ensure a more equitable distribution of land. While the establishment of land boards clearly had an impact on the land allocation system, it is important to stress that traditional tribal authorities still have an important say over land matters (Hitchcock 1980).

The communal grazing system is viewed as having a number of disadvantages, the most important being said to be the inability to control grazing. Cattle could move where they wished, since the land was unenclosed and available for use theoretically by all members of the tribe. An argument heard early on in the colonial period was that individuals did not have the incentive to make improvements on the land unless they had exclusive access to it. This argument was extended in the post-independence period to say that range conservation was impossible without exclusive rights being granted over blocks of land.

The 20th century in Botswana has seen a remarkable growth in the economy, particularly in the livestock and mining sectors. The production base has diversified, with export earnings rising concomitantly. Rural development has become a major focus of Government attention and the various national development plans provide some indication of this trend. The national cattle herd has expanded to the point where there are four head of cattle to every person in the country. With rising cattle numbers, there has been increasing emphasis on borehole drilling, particularly in the Kalahari sandveld areas of the country. In 1971, a conference on "Sustained Production from Semiarid Areas" stressed that renewed efforts had to be made to preserve the fragile Kalahari ecosystem (Botswana Society 1971). This conference was followed by an assessment of rural development strategies (Chambers and Feldman 1973), resulting in a Government White Paper in which it was argued that land-use planning should be initiated and grazing control should be implemented (Botswana 1973). The Animal Production Research Unit had been conducting research in Botswana which indicated that fencing could assist in raising production levels in the livestock sector. This so-called "improved" system of management was viewed early on as being capable of more than doubling productivity. By 1974 it was clear that the Government was about to embark on an agrarian reform programme aimed at giving exclusive leasehold rights over blocks of land. This land could then be fenced, thus ensuring supposedly better methods of range management. The basic assumption was that exclusive or private control would provide an incentive to preserve the range.

The National Policy on Tribal Grazing Land was the product of a desire to control grazing and thus prevent further range degradation on the one hand and a wish to increase livestock production on the other. Land policy, therefore, was seen in Botswana as having a direct impact on agricultural production. In order to achieve the aims of better grazing control and increased productivity, the White Paper on tribal grazing lands policy suggested that land boards divide the tribal grazing areas into three zones:

  1. commercial, over which individuals and groups would be able to have exclusive leasehold rights in exchange for a rental payment;
  2. communal, in which the basis of land tenure would remain the same but where stock limitations would be imposed; and
  3. reserves, in which blocks of land would be set aside for future use by those with few cattle at present, or for purposes of wildlife, mining, or cultivation.

The White Paper argued that stocking rates would be brought into line with the existing carrying capacity in two ways. First, large cattle owners would be encouraged to move their herds to the commercial ranching areas. Second, the land board would impose stock limitations, thus controlling the numbers of animals kept by individuals and groups in the communal areas. In the commercial ranching areas, common law leases were to be granted under Section 21 of the Tribal Land Act (Botswana 1970). These leases would last for a period of 50 years, during which they would be inheritable and renewable. The White Paper stated that there would be restrictions on the transfer of leases, and subletting would be permitted only with the approval of the land board. The rent collected in exchange for the granting of exclusive leasehold rights was to be used by local authorities for developing the communal areas.

The grazing land development programme was to be approached in a phased manner. Phase 1 would be the zoning of the land, based on land use, water points, soil, and range surveys. Phase 2, which would be initiated during the time the zoning was ongoing, was a large-scale consultation campaign. The public was to be informed about the policy through a massive radio campaign, and Government officials and politicians would hold a series of kgotla (council) meetings. Feedback concerning the policy was to be encouraged, and the White Paper promised that the Government would take appropriate action in order to put the people's views into effect (Botswana 1975, 18). Finally, there would be a phase in which grazing land would be demarcated, allocated, and leased. It was expected at the time of the declaration of the policy that the entire process would take a fair amount of time, believed then to be approximately two years.

Progress and Problems in Implementation of the Policy on Tribal Grazing Land

The implementation of the tribal grazing land policy has seen a number of problems come to the fore, many of which were not realized at the time the policy was framed. Perhaps the most significant of the problems was the fact that there was far less land available for commercial ranching purposes than was originally thought. Zoning surveys in 1975-1976 showed that many of the sandveld areas of the country, which were to be turned into blocks of leasehold ranches (Botswana 1975, 11, par. 37b), already contained numerous water sources and substantial livestock and human populations. In the western part of Central district, for example, there were dozens of boreholes and thousands of people, a large proportion of whom were non-stockholders. The tribal grazing land policy White Paper, although it mentioned that watering arrangements would be made for livestock owners required to move, was silent on the question of people who did not have water sources or livestock.

One of the problems with the discovery that large numbers of water sources already existed in areas zoned commercial was that there would be little, if any, room left for large herd owners to move out of communal areas. Under customary law, the owners of the water sources had de facto rights to the surrounding grazing. By giving exclusive rights to people with pre-existing water rights, one was simply making those rights de jure; thus, cattle posts would be turned into ranches simply at the stroke of a pen. While at first it was envisioned that leases under the tribal grazing land policy would contain some requirements that the lessees would have to abide by, changes in the stipulations over the past six and a half years have left the document with few provisions. There are no requirements to fence the land, and it is interesting to note that a number of livestock owners have stated that they have no intention whatsoever of fencing their ranches. Those who do plan to fence are erecting perimeter fences in order to bound their own space; such fencing does not assist the farmers in establishing a rotational grazing system on the ranches. There are no requirements that lessees keep their stock numbers below certain limits. When the land boards (e.g. Central, Ngwaketse) expressed the desire to set maximum stocking limits on tribal grazing land policy ranches in the form of appendices to the lease, the attorney general's Chambers ruled such appendices "illegal'' in an unpublished decision in November 1979. The tribal grazing land policy consultation campaign indicated a general dislike for the idea of stock limitations, and the idea was subsequently dropped. Interestingly, the public had not been informed of this change in the provisions of the policy.

Range preservation was a major focus of discussion during the formulation stages of the policy. The idea of the policy was to encourage better methods of range management, in part through fencing but also through reticulation of water and improved methods of livestock management. It was hoped that the granting of exclusive leasehold rights would result in people making more conscious efforts at reducing range degradation. Experience gained during the course of the First Livestock Development Project in Ncojane area of western Botswana, however, indicated that granting of exclusive rights has not, in fact, resulted in better methods of range management (Odell 1980; Bekure and Kgosidintsi 1979). There, 16 ranches, or 69 per cent of the total, are overstocked, one of them by 52 per cent (Bekure and Kgosidintsi 1979). This overstocking is not the result of local herd growth but rather is the product of transfer of steers from other cattle posts. Only three years after livestock were brought on to the Ncojane ranches, farmers have begun to complain about severe overgrazing, and one farmer has abandoned his ranch and has returned to the communal areas. Bekure and Kgosidintsi (1979) suggest that eventually evacuation of the leasehold ranches will result, unless strong measures are taken to enforce the stocking limits on each ranch.

The tribal grazing land policy areas, too, have seen range degradation, and in some cases farmers have already abandoned their ranches. In the case of one ranch in the mid-Ngwaketse First Development Area, for example, the area was badly overgrazed only two years after the ranch was allocated. The farmer removed his herd and is now grazing them in the communal area of the district. In the Nata ranches, developed on State land in the northern part of Central District, a severe bush fire destroyed much of the grazing in the latter part of the dry season of 1981. Such an event would not have been a problem had the ranchers made firebreaks around the boundaries of their ranches. Complaints about the quality of grazing and range degradation have also been heard in Kweneng district's First Development Area. It is clear, therefore, that exclusive rights by themselves have not resulted in a reduction of overgrazing. At the same time, there has been a marked reluctance on the part of the Government to enforce the provisions of the Agricultural Resources Conservation Act of 1972, which allows the prosecution of individuals who grossly mismanage the land. The result has been that the tribal grazing land policy has not led to better range management. Efforts are under way by the Ranch Extension Unit in the Division of Animal Production, Ministry of Agriculture, however, to assist farmers in improving their methods of livestock and range management. It is too early to tell how successful these efforts will be.

Much of the attention of planners in the districts and at central Government level has been on the establishment of commercial ranches. Over 300 ranches have so far been marked with corner points, and well over 100 of these ranches have been allocated to individuals and groups. Some of the districts have already established Second Development Areas and one district, Ngwaketse, is planning a Third Development Area. Over 11 per cent of the total surface area of Botswana has been zoned commercial. Approximately 32 per cent of the country has been zoned communal, and some areas have been set aside as Wildlife Management Areas. It is important to note that no land whatsoever has been reserved in Botswana in spite of the fact that these areas were supposed to be the "safeguards" for the poorer members of the population" (Botswana 1975, 7, par. 27).

A process of land adjudication has been established whereby hearings are held for ranch allocation. At these hearings, decisions are made as to whether the land should become private, leasehold or not. Prior to the time the adjudication and allocation hearings are held, there is supposed to be a detailed population survey of the commercial area in question, conducted by the district officer (Lands!, the remote area development officer, and a member of the district's land board. If too many conflicts are discovered in a particular ranch area, the ranch is supposed to be dezoned. Virtually all commercial ranch areas, with the exception of Ghanzi and the Halnaveld in Ngamiland, have had at least some ranches dezoned as a result of this process. It is important to note, however, that in some cases the warnings sounded by those who conducted the population surveys have not been heeded. This was the case, for example, in Ngwaketse District, where hundreds of people were found to be occupying the area in and adjacent to the First Development Area. Three of the ranches were dezoned, but others contained large numbers of people. A Commission of Inquiry into the allocation of these ranches, carried out in mid-1980, revealed that complaints of local people were ignored in the rush to get some ranches off the ground (Botswana 1981).

Some of the rules which were to apply to the commercial regions have changed during the course of implementation of the tribal grazing land policy. First, it has been decided that those farmers in commercial areas who do not wish to take out leases will not be forced to do so. Second, a precedent has been set in which an individual who drilled illegally in the Second Allocation Area of the First Development Area of Ngwaketse District was allowed to keep the ranch in which he had sunk his borehole, in spite of the fact that there was a Government borehole on the property that had been reserved for use by an Agricultural Management Association (AMA -a registered group). In this case, the interests of an individual have taken precedence over those of a group of people, in contradiction to stated policy in the White Paper on tribal grazing land policy (Botswana 1975, 13, par. 42d). Third, minimum and maximum numbers have not been set for people being allocated a ranch under the tribal grazing land policy. in the case of the First Development Area of Ngwaketse, an individual who had only six head of cattle was given a ranch in spite of the fact that he had falsified his lease application form (Botswana 1981). Fourth, there are to be no limitations on the number of ranches an individual may have (in contradiction of rule 429, Botswana 1975, 13). Finally, an important change in the tribal grazing land policy stipulations is that the rent has been set at a sub-economic level, that is, 4 thebe per hectare or P256.00 per year for a 6,400-hectare ranch. It has also been decided that a three-year grace period would be instituted during which an individual or group would not have to pay rent. This grace period can be extended to five years upon application to the land board. Thus, there will be little money coming in to the land boards for use in developing the communal areas. We would also predict that it will be difficult to get the rents from the lessees five years hence, since no system has been established to collect these payments, and leases were signed at different times, meaning that each rancher could potentially have a different payment schedule.

Many of these changes in the tribal grazing land policy have not been announced to the public. The last time there was an effort to consult the people was in 1977 when the Hon. L. Makgekgenene, Minister of Local Government and Lands, gave a speech in June of that year which dealt with progress in the policy's implementation. The effectiveness of the consultation campaign for the policy is another issue which deserves mention. The report on the public consultation (Ministry of Local Government and Lands 1977) noted that sandveld areas by and large were not covered during the course of the campaign. What this means, in essence, is that the people in those areas which are to be most affected by the policy's implementation were the ones who heard least about the policy. There was not a single radio listening group in the vast Western Sandveld region of Central District, for example, in spite of the fact that decisions had already been made to turn this area into a commercial ranching block (Hitchcock 1978). The zoning surveys in 1975-1976 and policy attitude surveys conducted in 1977 by the Rural Sociology Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture revealed widespread confusion about the policy. One thing was clear, however; people were concerned about the effects the policy would have on the poor, and by and large the radio listening groups did not want commercial ranches in their areas (Ministry of Local Government and Lands 1977).

The Social Impacts of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy

It had been pointed out that most of the planning effort had been on the commercial ranches during the course of implementation of the tribal grazing land policy. Relatively little attention has been paid, until recently, to the communal areas, and no land has been set aside for the future. The notion that large numbers of livestock would be withdrawn from the communal areas and placed in commercial ranches has not been borne out in practice. In most of the commercial areas there were pre-existing water sources, and these places have simply been turned into ranches under leasehold tenure. There has not been a large-scale move out of the communal areas into commercial areas. In fact, if anything, the move has been the other way, with small-scale livestock owners who lacked water rights and non-stockholders moving out of commercial areas into the communal areas. The policy, in effect, is accomplishing just the opposite of what it set out to do: it is witnessing a drop in the stocking rate in the commercial areas and a rise in the communal areas.

Perhaps the most significant area of social impact of the policy has been on the non-stockholding population, many of whom are hunter-gatherers or cattlepost employees, and their families. The land rights of remote area dwellers have been questioned, and an informal ruling of the attorney general's Chambers suggests that these people may have no land rights whatsoever. This is a serious matter in the Central and Kweneng districts, for example, where well over 70 per cent of the commercial area populations are comprised of these people. Thus far, compensation has been assessed only in the form of cash, not land. An attempt has been made, however, to establish so-called Communal Service Centres or communal pockets in commercial zones, where people can have access to social services and be given land for production purposes. The problem has been that the areas set aside for these places have been far too small. In the Hainaveld of Ngamiland, for example, only a single ranch has been available, and the same is true for the arable and grazing interests in the ranch areas. The lease, however, places a limit on the amount of arable land to be cultivated on each ranch of 5 hectares, thus placing limits on the production potential of employees residing on the ranches. The level of violence is rising in some of the commercial areas as people are excluded from the ranches. There is rising dissatisfaction among people in the commercial ranches. In the Kweneng District, there has been general unhappiness with the location of these ranches. These resentments have been expressed in public and have resulted in the temporary withdrawal of ranches that were advertised for allocation in March 1981. It is becoming increasingly clear that there is a mounting feeling in the rural areas that the tribal grazing land policy will affect resident populations negatively.

There are a number of other social impacts of the policy which deserve attention. The expansion of pastoralism into areas heretofore occupied solely by hunter-gatherers threatens the subsistence base of indigenous populations. Cattle tend to eat some of the plants used by human groups and they outcompete game in the vicinity of water points. The result is that the subsistence security of hunter-gatherers is reduced. More and more, hunter-gatherers are turning to alternative subsistence systems (Hitchcock 1978; Sandford 1980). The problem is that pastoralists who are moving into commercial modes of production are less and less inclined to allow people to use their livestock for subsistence and draught-power purposes. The traditional system of livestock exchange, known as mafisa, is being reduced. Less use is now being made of oxen for draught purposes, since it reduces their sale value to the Botswana Meat Commission. Livestock owners prefer that the milk of their cows goes to their calves rather than to the families of employees.

Another area of social impact has to do with income distribution. The rate of unemployment in the rural areas is rising. As commercialization of the livestock industry proceeds, fewer badisa (herders) are needed, and those that are used tend to be ones with more skills. Local people are being replaced more and more by outsiders. Fences, too, are taking their toll: fenced ranches tend to have about half as many employees watching over the herds. While a systematic study of income distribution changes has yet to be conducted, preliminary data collected during the course of monitoring of the tribal grazing land policy suggest that incomes are being reduced in the commercial areas. This is particularly true when both subsistence (in kind) and cash incomes are considered.

To the extent that implementation of the policy does involve the departure of large stock owners from the communal areas and their resettlement on commercial ranches, other forms of social disruption arise. Rich and poor have traditionally been linked in Botswana society through a number of sharing relationships, most notably the mafisa system, where rights of usufruct in cattle are transferred by rich men to relatives and other clients. Such relationships are likely to be weakened or demolished by the further separation between rich and poor which the policy is effecting. This, in turn, helps replace the traditional sharing relationship between traditional Tswana social classes with a more open and rigid class system.

The creation of landless squatters is a process that was seen during colonial times when the Ghanzi and Tuli blocks (i.e. freehold areas, mainly used for livestock production) were established. It is apparent that a similar situation is now being created in the commercial ranching areas of Botswana. Compensation thus far has been not in the form of land but cash. By and large, the recompense received has been minimal, and there is still some question as to who is to pay it. In the Lepasha area, for example, one farmer refused to pay compensation to people who were moved off his ranch, saying that the land board should do it. The issue has yet to be settled, although the inter-ministerial Land Development Committee has been working on a policy of compensation for several months. It can be seen that, in some ways, the objectives of the tribal grazing land policy, that is, to reduce income disparities and to increase production levels, have thus far not been achieved, at least insofar as the poorer members of the rural population are concerned.


The social costs of land reform in a third world country are well illustrated by the Botswana case. Whereas land reform in some other African countries has been concerned with more equitable distribution of land holdings, it is apparent that Botswana has pursued a course in which a few people are getting access to grazing land at the expense of the majority. While the implementation of a land reform programme is a long-term process, it can be seen that already some negative effects of Botswana's agrarian reform policy implementation have begun to be felt.

The tribal grazing land policy has changed substantially over time, primarily in the direction of making requirements less strict for those who will be gaining exclusive leasehold rights. Overgrazing has not been stopped; in fact, the evidence indicates that range degradation is being exacerbated in the ranching areas. More attention needs to be paid to traditional methods of range management and land allocation. Fences are already preventing the movement of livestock, which was the key to survival in a semi-arid ecosystem in which localized droughts and bush fires can destroy grazing. Efforts need to be made to enforce the existing legislation concerning range conservation in Botswana. Range and livestock management can undoubtedly be improved, but it must be done through close consultation with local people.

Given time, with careful planning and efforts made to ensure that everyone benefits from the agrarian reform programme and not just the better-off livestock owners, it may be possible to realize the objectives of the tribal grazing land policy. Incorrect assumptions at the outset, combined with pressure to get ranches implemented on the ground, have resulted in dislocation for a number of local people in rural Botswana. Land must be set aside, and compensation payments must be organized in such a way that the amounts and types are suitable for the needs of the people who are being affected. At the same time, programmes must be started which are aimed towards increasing the production of the lower levels of Botswana's rural population. Without land and alternative arrangements for new kinds of lifestyles, dependency and social and economic problems will increase. Finally, steps need to be taken to ensure that livestock owners manage the range and their herds properly. Otherwise, Botswana's agrarian reform programme will simply worsen the social and environmental situation in the rural areas.


Bekure, S., and A. Kgosidintsi. 1979. "Overstocking and the Future of the Ncojane Ranches," ILCA Botswana Working Document No. 2. International Livestock Centre for Africa and Animal Production Unit, Gaborone.

Botswana. 1970, The Tribal Land Act 1968, No. 54 of 1968. Government Printer, Gaborone.

___________. 1972. Rural Development in Botswana. Government Paper No. 1 of 1972. Government Printer, Gaborone.

___________. 1975. National Policy on Tribal Grazing Land. Government Paper No. 2 of 1975. Government Printer, Gaborone.

___________. 1981. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Ngwaketse First Development Area Ranches and Government's Decision on the Recommendation of the Commission. Government Printer, Gaborone.

Botswana Society. 1971. Proceedings of the Conference on Sustained Production from Semi-arid Areas, with Particular Reference to Botswana. Botswana Notes and Records, Special Edition, No. 1. Botswana Society, Gaborone.

Chambers, R., and D. Feldman. 1973. Report on Rural Development. Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, Gaborone.

___________. National Policy on Rural Development: The Government's Decisions on the Report on Rural Development. Government Paper No. 2 of 1973. Government Printer, Gaborone.

Hitchcock, Robert K. 1978. Kalahari Cattle Posts: A Regional Study of Hunter-Gatherers, Pastoralists and Agriculturalists in the Western Sandveld Region, Central District, Botswana. Government Printer, Gaborone.

___________. 1980. "Tradition, Social Justice, and Land Reform in Central Botswana.'' Journal of African Law, 24(1): 1 -34.

Khama, Sir Seretse. 1975. Speech Launching the Tribal Grazing Land Policy 14th July, 1975. Government Printer, Gaborone.

Ministry of Local Government and Lands. 1977. Lefatshe la Rona-Our Land: The Report on the Botswana Government's Public Consultation and Its Policy Proposals on Tribal Grazing Land. Government Printer, Gaborone.

Odell, Marcia L. 1980. Botswana's First Livestock Development Project: An Experiment in Agricultural Transformation. Swedish International Development Authority, Gaborone.

Sandford, Stephen. 1980. Keeping an Eye on TGLP. Working Paper No. 21. A Report prepared for the National Institute of Research. National Institute of Development and Cultural Research, Gaborone.

Von Kaufmann, R.R. 1979. "The Tribal Grazing Land Policy's Relevance in a Drought-Prone Environment." In M.T. Hinchey, ea., Proceedings of the Symposium on Drought in Botswana. Botswana Society. Gaborone.

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