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Peacebuilding has emerged as one of the most critically important, albeit vexing, aspects of international involvement in conflict and postconflict situations. Peacebuilding, as a concept and strategy, has been adopted by national governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and regional and international intergovernmental institutions (IGOs) as a means by which the outside world can contribute to the resolution of intrastate [or societal] conflict and to the reconstruction, or construction, of a culture of peace in postconflict situations. Persisting conflicts in places such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Haiti, Israel/Palestine, Kosovo, Rwanda and Sierra Leone demonstrate both the overwhelming need for and significant difficulties in building sustainable conditions for peace in postconflict societies.

Peacebuilding operations in these and other settings have confronted many barriers and have achieved varying degrees of success. Yet the very attempt on the part of outsiders to undertake such measures reflects an acknowledgment of international humanitarian and human rights law and a significant shift in international attitudes and practices towards civil conflicts.
The years since the end of the Cold War in 1989 have been marked by two distinct but interrelated trends in the arena of global politics. The first has been the persistence of violent conflict, much of it in the form of civil wars or internal repression where the overwhelming majority of the victims are civilians. Civil wars and repressive governments are not exceptional phenomena, and have been a part of the history of many nations; yet their prevalence in the post–Cold War period and the level of violence committed against civilian populations have become matters of increased international concern. They have also become a significant source of regional and international instability in the post–Cold War system. Civil wars are often more brutal than interstate wars in the extent to which they endanger civilians or result in attacks on civilian property. Thus, civil wars and other forms of intrastate conflict present a difficult set of problems for outside actors.

A second, more promising, feature of the post–Cold War years has been the concern that individuals, groups, governments, and international organizations have displayed for human rights, individual security and good governance, alongside an increased willingness among the international community and regional organizations to intervene in the internal affairs of countries in support of these concerns. There has been a significant increase in the number, variety, scope, and prominence of these interventions for overtly humanitarian purposes. These interventions have, with great frequency, adopted peacebuilding as one of their main objectives. The increased prominence and critical importance of peacebuilding are the primary reasons for undertaking this volume that brings together analysts and practitioners to assess the merits of peacebuilding.

Peacebuilding, as it has been practiced to date, involves a number of diverse instruments and players, and much like an orchestra, the instruments must be finely tuned and the players must work in concert in order to produce anything resembling a coherent approach to postconflict reconciliation and sustainable peace. As a multidimensional exercise, peacebuilding encompasses a variety of tasks.
such as disarming warring parties, decommissioning and destroying weapons, de-mining, repatriating refugees, restoring law and order, creating or rebuilding justice systems, training police forces and customs agents, providing technical assistance, advancing efforts to protect human rights, strengthening civil society institutions, and reforming and strengthening institutions of governance—including assistance in monitoring and supervising electoral processes and promoting formal and informal participation in the political process.

The players involved in peacebuilding are equally diverse—ranging from civil society and NGOs, governments, international and regional organizations, ad hoc criminal tribunals (and potentially the International Criminal Court (ICC)), to truth and reconciliation commissions and prominent individuals like the Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General. The complex character of peacebuilding reflects an acknowledgment of the multidimensional and integrated causes of civil war and of the need to address the economic, social and political aspects of reconstruction and reconciliation.

Much of the literature that has examined postconflict reconstruction mirrors the complex, multidimensional character of peacebuilding. This literature has examined, inter alia, the factors that have encouraged foreign governments and international and regional institutions to intervene in support of the process of resolving civil wars and reconciling divided societies; the different techniques and mechanisms that have been used in the peacebuilding process; the role of various nongovernmental actors; the relationship between the military and civil society groups in the process of peacebuilding; and the experiences of peacebuilding efforts in different parts of the world. One can discern a number of themes in the literature on peacebuilding, indicating the range of issues involved and the extent to which the discourse on and practice of peacebuilding has been evolving. For our purposes, these themes can be listed as follows: conceptualizing peacebuilding; relocating peacebuilding from post-conflict to preventive strategies; deconstructing the culture of war and constructing an indigenous culture of peace; broadening the
scope and scale of peacebuilding; assessing the international architecture in support of peacebuilding; examining civil-military relations and the tensions between order and justice; positioning peacebuilding within the broader concept of human security; and balancing demands for reconciliation and retributive justice.

The first theme in the literature addresses the conceptualization of peacebuilding. The genealogy of peacebuilding suggests rather radical origins found in the peace research writings of Johan Galtung and Kenneth and Elsie Boulding.² From this perspective, peacebuilding involves addressing underlying structural causes of conflict. It emphasizes bottom up approaches and the decentering of social and economic structures. In short, it calls for a radical transformation of society away from structures of coercion and violence to an embedded culture of peace. These ideas, although generally trumped by band-aid and sometimes shortsighted approaches to building peace, continue to resonate in the contemporary period.³

Many others have taken a less radical approach, while maintaining a holistic framework for peacebuilding. Lederach, for example, writes of marshalling all sectors of society in support of sustainable peace.⁴ Oliver Richmond elaborates on the model:

In Lederach’s model, the problem-solving approach to conflict resolution is combined with a public, process-oriented approach in order to address the multidimensional nature of protracted social conflicts in the context of a nonlinear peace-building process. This emphasizes the need for a multisectoral approach to conflict transformation that brings in grassroots, local, and NGO actors in order to create a sustainable process.⁵

The objective of such holistic approaches is to bring about a fundamental transformation of conflict-ridden societies. While the roots of peacebuilding can be traced to more radical peace studies literature (some appearing in the 1960s), the pervasive interest in peace-
building in the contemporary period can be found in the search for specific programs, policies and practices that can be employed to resolve civil conflicts in various regions of the world and restore conditions to the point where peace can be sustained.

Peacebuilding became part of the official discourse in the 1990s when former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali used the term in An Agenda for Peace.6 Initially, the concept was linked specifically with postconflict societies. Boutros-Ghali defined postconflict peacebuilding as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”7 He saw peacebuilding as an integral part of the UN’s work. For him, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping ought to be linked to peacebuilding so as to provide a seamless and comprehensive strategy for dealing with violent conflicts. The precise elements involved in peacebuilding, as envisioned by Boutros-Ghali, included disarming warring parties, restoring order, decommis-sioning and destroying weapons, repatriating refugees, providing advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, de-mining and other forms of demilitarization, providing technical assistance, advancing efforts to protect human rights, re-forming and strengthening institutions of governance—including assistance in monitoring and supervising electoral processes—and promoting formal and informal participation in the political process.

In the aftermath of war, postconflict peacebuilding might also take the form of concrete cooperative projects that link formerly warring parties together. These projects would be designed to be mutually beneficial and ideally would contribute to socio-economic development for all parties and to confidence building between former combatants. Other projects might include educational exchanges and curriculum reform designed to reduce hostile perceptions of the “other” and forestall the renewal of hostilities between the factions. In essence, peacebuilding has been conceived as the construction of a new environment in many areas—political, economic, social,
security—and can be viewed as a direct counterpart to preventive diplomacy “which seeks to avoid the breakdown of peaceful conditions.”

The challenge, according to Kenneth Bush, is “to encourage the creation of the political, economic, and social space, within which indigenous actors can identify, develop, and employ the resources necessary to build a peaceful, prosperous, and just society.” Boutros-Ghali’s view was premised on the notion that the UN (and other would-be peacebuilders), as a global governance institution, has an obligation to provide support for the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities and to work towards the strengthening of democratic institutions. Furthermore, social peace is as important as strategic or political peace. Most discussions of peacebuilding thus accept that it involves a multilayered approach, involving participants from many sectors who attempt to reconstruct deficient practices and institutions in support of sustainable peace. Kenneth Bush considers that,

In the broadest terms, peacebuilding refers to those initiatives which foster and support sustainable structures and processes, which strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence, or continuation, of violent conflict. The process entails both short- and long-term objectives, for example, short-term humanitarian operations, and longer-term developmental, political, economic, and social objectives.

A second theme in the peacebuilding discourse focuses on repositioning peacebuilding from simply being a response in the aftermath of conflict or crisis to being a preventive strategy that is initiated before the conflict erupts. One sees this theme in studies that call for a shift from the “culture of reaction” to a “culture of prevention.” Initially there was a tendency among scholars and practitioners of peacebuilding to focus on postconflict reconstruction and band-
aid solutions to crises. The authors in this volume by and large reject this and argue that a different approach is needed and that a broadened time perspective for peacebuilding has begun. There is an attempt in a number of quarters to move back and focus first on conflict prevention. At their summit in Cologne, the G-8 raised the significance of conflict prevention and dedicated a meeting to this issue in Berlin in 1999. The G-8 subsequently adopted the Miyazaki Initiatives for conflict prevention. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has conducted a study on the effectiveness of aid for the prevention of conflict. The Swedish government has commissioned several studies developing the concept of a culture of prevention. The current UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, has devoted much time and energy to the issue of conflict prevention.

Although Boutros-Ghali’s use of peacebuilding was conceived as a postconflict activity, peacebuilding can, conceptually, be practiced at a “preconflict” stage; the purpose being to forestall the outbreak of violent conflict. The Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Conflict viewed peacebuilding as either “structural prevention” (strategies designed to address the root causes of deadly conflict) or “operational prevention” (those strategies and tactics taken in the midst of a crisis or immediately thereafter to reconstruct the peace and thereby prevent a recurrence of violent conflict). So we can speak of structural peacebuilding and operational peacebuilding (to replace the notion of pre- and postconflict peacebuilding). Used in this way, peacebuilding is tied closely to preventive diplomacy and other chapter VI measures in the UN Charter that aim to address the underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian obstacles to sustainable peace. Peacebuilding is therefore concerned not just with postconflict situations, but also with the broad spectrum of conflict and its main aim is to generate and sustain conditions of peace while managing differences without recourse to violence.

Regarding the shift in attention to conflict prevention, there are observers who acknowledge that the most desirable solution to the
problems we have witnessed since the end of the Cold War is to prevent violent conflict through policies aimed at reconciling divided societies and constructing a stable peace—thus moving beyond a culture of war to a culture of peace.\textsuperscript{18} As Senator Roche notes in his foreword, just as the mind can be programmed for violence and prejudice, it can also be programmed for peace and tolerance. There is a need for people at all levels of society to work toward the establishment and entrenchment of a culture of peace and especially to advance it through supporting participatory and people-centered processes. Some authors, like James Scott, advocate tapping into society and indigenous knowledge that exists within societies, such as the wisdom of the elders. Scott makes a distinction between the use of abstract knowledge (\textit{techne}) on the part of outsiders and the potential benefits of practical knowledge (\textit{metis}) provided by locals.\textsuperscript{19} The pattern of intervention in the post–Cold War international system has tended not only to undermine the war-torn state, but also to ignore local actors and thus overlook the indigenous capacity of these local actors who in turn must assume greater responsibility for many aspects of sustainable peacebuilding, including security. This has sparked authors like Jarat Chopra to introduce the concept of participatory interventions, particularly in cases where international administrations are introduced in a country to govern temporarily:

The idea of “participatory intervention” stands in contrasts to the practice of state-(re)building processes of relying on only international appointees or elites self-appointed as representatives of the people. Instead the aim would be to include direct involvement of the local population from the very beginning of an international intervention, in order to ensure justice for the parts and that new governing structures resonate with local social reality.\textsuperscript{20}
He argues further that in these kinds of peacebuilding exercises, “participation has become a minimum standard and a moral imperative.”21

Other analysts have called attention to the significant progress that has been made when groups in civil society collaborate with governments to improve the tools of peacebuilding—citing, *inter alia*, the Ottawa Treaty banning antipersonnel land mines, the Treaty of Rome establishing the ICC, and the recent conclusion of a convention banning the use of child soldiers.22

Others, like Roland Paris, have warned against the “single-paradigm,” or liberal internationalist, approach to peacebuilding that has guided the work of many international agencies engaged in efforts to strengthen civil society in war-torn states. Part of the difficulty here is the assumption that the surest foundation for peace, both within and between states, is market democracy (a liberal democratic polity and a market economy). Such an assumption does not address other forces that have shaped the culture of these communities: “Peacebuilding in effect [becomes] an enormous experiment in social engineering—an experiment that involves transplanting Western models of social, political, and economic organization into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict: in other words, pacification through political and economic liberalization.”23 From this perspective, peacebuilding becomes a method for imposing particular solutions on other societies and ignoring more viable alternatives.

Ronnie Lipschutz maintains that such practices fail to address the underlying justice issues present in most contemporary conflicts. Lipschutz argues that too often the role of outside governments has been to support the formal institutions of democracy in an effort to restore political stability and, not coincidentally, viable economic activity. Agreements are signed, constitutions are drafted, elections are held, and a deeply divided society appears restored to a level of civility. Yet in almost all-important respects, the underlying fissures...
that have divided the society remain intact and are merely papered over through these cosmetic changes. Underlying issues are not addressed and unjust structures and practices continue and, in some cases, are exacerbated. One of the problems that confronts any attempt to reconcile societies divided by years of bitter conflict is that the institutional and procedural devices for addressing social problems—the foundational political culture that sustains societies—are often destroyed or so severely corrupted that they are effectively inoperable. Peacebuilding should necessarily raise “fundamental questions not only about what to reconstruct but also about how to do so in order not to recreate the unsustainable institutions and structures that originally contributed to the conflict.”

A fourth theme emerging from the literature on peacebuilding addresses the broadening scale and scope of peacebuilding. This includes an effort to encompass a wider array of development issues, as reflected, for example, in Bernard Wood’s work for the UN Development Programme that examines the contribution that economic and sustainable development efforts can make to the peacebuilding objectives. It also reflects a view that the approach of treating peacebuilding as a concentrated operation in an insular and isolated state is passé. Practitioners, policymakers, and analysts are now aware of the extent to which peacebuilding operations have expanded in scale and scope, involving in some cases nonfunctioning states, neighboring states and regional agencies. We have had to scale up to deal with these more complex issues. Due to the spillover effect, it has become necessary to examine civil conflict as a part of regional conflict and to develop appropriate peacebuilding strategies that involve roles for the neighbors of the target state. Regional actors and organizations in Africa, Latin America, and Asia have not only taken an interest, but also a more active level of intervention in support of peacebuilding operations in their respective regions.

Additionally, peacebuilding demands the support of an international environment and critically important international and/or regional actors. In this respect, the practice of peacebuilding must
include strategies at two levels: (1) the level of regional and international regimes and (2) in-country peacebuilding measures. Regional and international regimes refer to those principles, norms, rules and practices with respect to peacebuilding that are developed mostly in and around regional and international organizations and form a framework for action in societies that are moving away from violent conflict. In-country peacebuilding refers to national and local level efforts, involving both governmental and civil society actors, that are aimed at economic development, institution building and, more generally, the creation or restoration within countries of the conditions necessary to bring about stability and sustain peace.

A related aspect to this theme involves the North-South dimension of peacebuilding operations. What is the place of the South in peacebuilding? Interventions to date have tended to reflect asymmetrical distributions of power in which Northern states have determined where, when and how such interventions will occur. Many southern countries have taken on peacebuilding roles, especially in Africa. Yet the big Southern countries are often not even at the table when proposals for deploying peacebuilding operations are discussed at the UN. Some analysts have advocated that measures be undertaken to ensure the involvement of key Southern countries such as Brazil, Mexico, China, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia in developing peacebuilding strategies. If they were more integrally involved, the colonial overtones surrounding intervention would be reduced and the legitimacy of these operations would be strengthened. It may also be possible that these countries will have some familiarity with the sorts of problems being confronted by postconflict societies in the South and thus make an effective contribution to the content of peacebuilding operations.

A final issue regarding the broadening of the scope of the concept is that of national interests and the extent to which these guide interventions. At one level, interventions in support of peacebuilding challenge the whole concept of national interest as the norms of human or individual rights and security are strengthened. Yet
national interests are also crucial to the whole process of intervention and peacebuilding. Such interests are necessary for the mobilization of resources in support of peacebuilding operations. They are particularly important in securing the attention of the principal governments that initiate these operations. At the same time, interests color and distort peacebuilding activities and undermine efforts to retain impartiality and to give primary attention to the needs of the people in postconflict settings. One cannot swim against the current of national interests and therefore one must harness national interests to serve peacebuilding objectives.

Another critically important theme in the discourse on peacebuilding has been a focus on the design and capacity of the international architecture in support of peacebuilding. As indicated above, successful peacebuilding does not take place in a vacuum. Indeed, international and regional organizations have been the principal sponsors of peacebuilding operations. In Cambodia, Eastern Slovenia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, East Timor and Kosovo, the UN was given full responsibility for implementing the peacebuilding operation. These transitional administrative operations were decided on, designed within, and resourced through the UN. Organizations have also developed specialized instruments in support of peacebuilding, such as the Secretary-General’s Special representative in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Iraq or the more permanent UN Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

It is surprising that despite the growing pool of knowledge about the experience of international transitional administrations, particularly since the end of the Cold War, there are still major problems with these postwar reconstruction projects and not all of them are viewed as legitimate. Especially problematic are those operations controlled by a single state or small coalition of states as the US/UK-led coalition efforts in Iraq. Even those that are approved and sanctioned by the UN are sometimes seen as attempts at bringing back trusteeships and protectorates. There is a general sense, especially within the developing countries, to view these operations
with suspicion. Mohammed Ayoob points out that developing states, being new states that have only recently “acquired the formal trappings of juridical sovereignty,” are rather “apprehensive of the new international activism” associated with the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention.\textsuperscript{26} They tend to place international administration in the same category, viewing it as a major constraint on sovereignty. It is therefore essential to assess these interventionary measures critically rather than to allow them to be inserted into countries on a purely ad hoc and uncritical basis. As Edward Mortimer succinctly put it: “the only possible justification for international intervention and administration is the need to rescue people from the effects of arbitrary or ineffective government, and to help them acquire the skills needed for stable and enlightened self-rule.”\textsuperscript{27}

International and regional financial institutions are also becoming integrally involved in peacebuilding efforts. The World Bank, for instance, has been heavily involved in the peacebuilding efforts in East Timor. The International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank was designated the trustee of the reconstruction Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET) and played a major role in community empowerment and local governance there. But here again, we need to assess whether these external financial administrative interventions are actually contributing to sustainable peace or not. At times these institutions attempt to conduct practices as usual in the midst of major peacebuilding operations. The most often cited criticisms in this regard are the strict conditions imposed by international financial institutions that may impede reconstruction efforts in post-conflict countries.

Disarmament at all levels is another part of this international architecture: nuclear, small arms, landmines, etc. Yet there are many concerns about the capacity of disarmament treaties and conventions to support peacebuilding.\textsuperscript{28} There have also been very significant concerns expressed about the coordination of the activities of the many organizations that are involved in peacebuilding operations. Authors have noted that one set of international institutions may
be supporting a peacebuilding process at the same time as another has sought to enforce policies that directly or indirectly undermine such efforts. Most often cited in this regard are the strict condition-\alities imposed by international financial institutions that may impede reconstruction efforts in postconflict situations. Many other issues, including concerns about the coherence and coordination of institutional responses, have also been discussed widely—yet solutions are often difficult to implement.\textsuperscript{29}

A fifth theme has been the recognition of the tensions involved in civil-military relations during peacebuilding operations. Since the initial stage of peacebuilding will generally involve attempts at stabilizing a country that has been undergoing violent conflict, it is expected that military forces will be involved in some capacity during a peacebuilding operation. There has been a significant change in the military’s role in what is now commonly described in Canada’s Department of National Defence as peace support operations. This change makes it necessary to determine the proper role for the military in peacebuilding. Moreover, given the multidimensional nature of peacebuilding, the military must necessarily interact more extensively with the civilian population and with a variety of civil society entities. Part of the problem in discerning a clear division of labor between the military and civilian operations lies in the inherent difficulty in generating a clear definition of conflict and, more specifically, determining when a conflict begins and ends—a difficulty confounded by the nature of many contemporary conflicts and the nature of peacebuilding itself.

Since peacebuilding looks at ensuring a lasting peace, it is expected to involve much more than a cessation of hostilities. It must include such essentials as economic development, human rights, the rule of law, democracy, social equity, and environmental sustainability. Many of these tasks require the capacity of nonmilitary (civilian) actors and it therefore becomes essential for the military to work with civilians in support of peacebuilding. Yet the military also possesses some important tools that are not available to others. It
provides an essential element of force and the application of this force to create a secure environment in which others can work to build the peace. The military can also be commanded into the field and be required to participate in these operations, unlike NGOs or even other public servants.

One of the critically important issues emerging in postconflict societies is finding the proper balance between military forces and civilian policing activities. While the military is particularly important during the crisis phase, helping to ensure that the other actors have a stable environment in which to work, there is a need to hand over responsibilities to others as the situation moves from crisis to longer-term development. In the interim, there is a need to reconcile the two approaches. Some of the postconflict literature reveals the tensions that result from the intersection of these two entities (civil/military) that have different value systems and *modi operandi*. Yet there is also some indication in the literature of attempts at developing a cooperative civil-military approach to peacebuilding.30

A related issue is the pressing need in most postconflict situations to develop and support in a sustainable fashion a civilian policing component to maintain internal order in a peaceful and just manner. Civilian policing, or civ-pol as it is commonly known, has become one of the more important, yet problematic, aspects of postconflict reconstruction.31 This is particularly difficult in societies that have experienced the coercive hand of an oppressive state. In these circumstances there has been little to distinguish between the forces of oppression and domestic policing activities. Maintaining civil order is also complicated by the proliferation of small arms and the economic dislocations that usually occur in postconflict settings. Such conditions are conducive for a dramatic growth in criminal activity that might leave the local civilian population even more insecure than it was during the conflict. The lack of effective regional and international resources to support reconstruction and the activities of civ-pol operations adds a further complication to this difficult situation.
A sixth theme examines the relationship between peacebuilding and human security. Peacebuilding has emerged as a significant international practice alongside a growing concern about human security. Originating in the UNDP reports of the early 1990s, human security has been identified by a number of governments, including Canada, Chile, Norway and South Africa as a foreign policy priority. These governments have advocated for a more profound understanding of what is needed for personal security and have warned that not only conflict but also postconflict conditions disrupt personal security for people who lack protection under international law.

For governments like Canada, the commitment to peacebuilding emerged from this shift in focus on the part of certain policy officials. As a result of this commitment, security guarantees that touch the lives of individuals have been built into the Canadian conception of international peacebuilding missions. There is also a growing recognition of the differing security needs of men, women and children. Ending the fighting and restoring calm does not necessarily increase security in all cases. For example, many postconflict societies experience a significant increase in violent crime and personal insecurity after the war. Crime, for many individuals, can be as pervasive a source of insecurity as civil conflict. Alternatively, securing a safe environment for men or for one ethnic group does not necessarily reduce the security threats to other segments of the population. This is one of the primary reasons for the recent emphasis on security sector reform. It is also an important reason to consider the effects of peacebuilding practices on gender and ethnicity. This also indicates a need to shift from looking at peacebuilding as a discrete activity to viewing it within the broader conception of human security governance; a need to put individuals, and not just sovereign states, at the heart of international relations.32

A final theme identified in the postconflict literature tackles the tensions between reconciliation and retributive justice and the mechanisms by which these are to be achieved. Internal wars tend to be devastating for individuals within war-torn societies and such wars
are often marked by an extensive array of crimes against innocent and vulnerable populations. Trying to establish a sustainable peace for these societies after the shooting or oppression has ended has, in some cases, been stymied by the perception or reality of impunity. Yet many efforts have been undertaken to address underlying injustices that marked the period of conflict. Such situations often demand an element of retributive justice as part of the process of reconciliation.

Dealing with the past is one of the unavoidable issues that peacebuilding has to confront. The society coming out of conflict must find a way to address the fact that gross violations of human rights (genocide, ethnic cleansing, forced displacement, torture, rape and assassinations) may have occurred during the conflict. Impunity is a grave practical problem for peacebuilding. Amnesties for gross violators of human rights or refusal to prosecute perpetrators of past abuses may indicate lack of justice, which is why the horrors of the past must be confronted, recognized, and addressed. One mechanism for this is a truth commission. Sometimes accompanied by amnesty for some perpetrators of abuse, the intent of these commissions is to bring about reconciliation through a public accounting of abuses. However, they may also inadvertently keep alive the memory of the atrocities, which may be a good or bad thing, depending on the particular circumstances. In some cases, truth commissions simply accentuate cleavages in the society. However, on the positive side, they could act as a deterrent and remind people that such atrocities should never again be allowed to occur.

Truth commissions have been varied in mandate, composition, objectives, legitimacy and results, as the examples of the differences in Argentina (1983–84), Chile (1991), El Salvador (1993), Haiti (1995), South Africa (1995), and Guatemala (1996) indicate. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa, composed entirely of South Africans and given a mandate to carry out an exhaustive analysis of the weaknesses of truth commissions elsewhere, has been considered an important contribution to the peacebuilding process in that country. The objectives of the TRC were to examine each
case of human rights and power abuse, identify the perpetrators, and bring to justice the intellectual authors of the abuses, and to promote truth and forgiveness through direct confrontation between victims and perpetrators.

Despite local demands for justice by victims and families of victims, at the international level there remains some resistance to the idea that retributive justice can contribute to the peacebuilding process. This resistance has been combined with a great deal of controversy with respect to the implementation of formal justice or Western-imposed forms of justice, still in its infancy at the international level. The *ad hoc* International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) have served as important laboratories for the application of international criminal justice in postconflict (or ongoing conflict) situations. They have, however, operated in very different circumstances and under different mandates.

The ICTY operated in the middle of ongoing conflict, amidst an array of IGOs and NGOs, including the NATO peace support operations—the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). In contrast, the ICTR operated after the conflict had ended and in a virtual political vacuum, as only a handful of IGOs and NGOs continued to operate in the region. The ICTR itself worked from a small office for the prosecutor in Kigali and the Tribunal conducted its hearings in Arusha, Tanzania. The ICTR worked under a very restricted mandate that was bound in terms of time and territory. The ICTY’s mandate, in contrast, was more open ended. This allowed the ICTY to continue its work in Kosovo, whereas the ICTR could not investigate any activities that took place before or after 1994 or outside of Rwanda.

One of the difficulties that the Tribunals have encountered in their work has been a strong resistance on the part of the military to support the enforcement of proper conduct by combatants. The ICTY was given a chapter VII mandate from the UN Security Council, but, as former Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour pointed out, there
was an initial reluctance on the part of military units to work with the ICTY in the field. The ICTY, for its part, relied on the military rather extensively for logistical support in conducting its on site investigations of war crimes. This was necessitated by the need to operate in high-risk areas where the conflict was often ongoing, as well as the need to keep the “scene of the crime” secure while the prosecutors completed their investigation. The military eventually became more cooperative and IFOR was subsequently tasked to aid in the apprehension of indicted war criminals.

A second difficulty encountered by the Tribunals and the more general effort to pursue justice at the international level has been the strong commitment on the part of the UN, other IGOs, and most NGOs to a culture of neutrality. A culture of neutrality does not favor the production of evidence to support the prosecution of war criminals. While adopted in good faith, a culture of neutrality limits the willingness of these actors to support the work of the Tribunals for fear that the actors will be tainted with being on one side or the other during the conflict, or in its aftermath. The prosecutor’s office of the International Tribunals took great pains to explain that they were pursuing criminals not Serbs or Croats or Hutus and that the only side they took was the side of justice and truth. They refused to participate in the discourse of ethnic communities and instead stood firm on the discourse of justice and criminals. The culture of neutrality is, however, pervasive throughout most international institutions and remains one of the more significant challenges confronting future efforts in this area such as the work of the ICC.

The international community’s intervention in the postconflict search for justice has been the cause of resentment for different reasons. For some it interferes with local efforts and undermines the development of domestic judicial capacities to pursue justice. This has, for example, been a concern in Rwanda where a government that holds considerable resentment towards the international...
community and its tribunals has adopted its own methods for distributing justice in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide. In addition to the more formal but excruciatingly slow legal methods, there are attempts to turn to a more traditional method, known as gacaca, in the hope that this will not only expedite the process of reconciliation, but also secure a greater degree of legitimacy and thereby contribute more directly to the peacebuilding process in that country.³⁴

IN SOME FORM or another, the issues noted here are represented in this collection of essays. Jean Daudelin tackles one of the first hurdles that any international peacebuilding effort will have to overcome—the fundamental dilemmas surrounding “humanitarian intervention.” Daudelin notes that there are certain circumstances that ought to trigger humanitarian and moral calls for intervention by the international community. Using Rwanda as an example, he argues that apathy is not an option in the face of massive human rights abuse and humanitarian tragedies. As long as such instances continue to persist, it is best to have, up front, a full and frank discussion of the pros and cons of such interventions and to assess honestly the concrete requirements of such actions in terms of scope, timeframe, resources and political sustainability. According to Daudelin, such criteria and mechanisms for international interventions are sorely missing, and this presents a real obstacle to the proper initiation of peacebuilding missions.

Daudelin identifies four key issue areas or problems that need to be addressed urgently. First, there is the scope and duration of peacebuilding operations. Peacebuilding should not be viewed as a short-term exercise. Indeed, with attendant intervention, peacebuilding missions will inevitably be long and protracted because they have to deal with significant problems such as massive human abuse and, in some cases, the complete breakdown of government and societal order. Interveners must therefore be committed to long-term involvement. One approach suggested by Daudelin is for

I. Introduction
peacebuilders to think in terms of tasks, not time. The second important issue raised by the author is funding. Peacebuilding can be very costly. While there is currently a commendable willingness on the part of the international community to invest in the process, the resources are not always forthcoming or sufficient for the task. As the author points out, inadequate funding can threaten the credibility, consistency, and effectiveness of interventions. The third issue raised is the North-South dimension of these operations. The author is particularly concerned here with the place of the South in peacebuilding and with the reality that it is difficult to avoid colonialist/imperialist overtones of externally imposed peacebuilding operations. Finally, Daudelin discusses the place of national interests and the extent to which these guide interventions. He notes that national interests will inevitably be a crucial part of the peacebuilding process, and argues that if we cannot link peacebuilding to the national interest (with all the support, commitment, and resources that this would imply), it is better to “stay home and shut up.”

Kenneth Bush expands the conceptual discussion of the interventionary aspects of peacebuilding. He first provides an overview of the different instruments used by the international community in pursuit of peacebuilding, but cautions against overemphasizing certain peacebuilding instruments to the exclusion of others. Bush maintains that too little attention is devoted to certain instruments not commonly associated with peacebuilding and that may in fact actually contribute more than the frequently discussed ones to establishing a sustainable peace. He raises the following important questions: do the so-called instruments of peacebuilding serve to undermine or enhance prospects for a truly sustainable peace? How do we determine if peacebuilding instruments work? Bush stresses the importance of not ghettoizing, or compartmentalizing, peacebuilding. Rather, he calls for a closer integration of peacebuilding and development activities and recommends that scholars and practitioners examine carefully how development work can contribute to peacebuilding, and vice versa.
This kind of intersecting analysis should cause one to consider the tensions that exist between the instruments of peacebuilding, particularly those that involve military or security forces, and the desired outcomes. In cautioning against the “commodification” and militarization of peacebuilding, Bush is critical of the conflict-nurturing aspects of some Western-designed peacebuilding activities and of attempts to suppress and undermine indigenous capacity for recovery. He advocates the delegitimization of gun-based structures of power and a search for other means of establishing and exercising authority in the administration of international peacebuilding efforts.

In contrast to Bush’s analysis, Melissa Labonte begins with the assumption that in the foreseeable future, the development of robust norms of peace and prevention in the global community will necessarily have to include the use of force. Ankersen and others echo this theme. Noting that a necessary precondition for the establishment of a peacebuilding mission in a war-torn state is the restoration of political stability, Labonte maintains that armed force will most likely be needed to end military hostilities and enforce weapons disarmament of local conflicting parties. Labonte’s concern is with the preventive value of external military forces to diffuse situations of unfolding and incipient violent conflict that could negatively affect peacebuilding and humanitarian activity if left unchecked.

Labonte is particularly interested in the outcomes resulting from interactions between various actors involved in peacebuilding: international nongovernmental humanitarian actors (INGHAs), governments, and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). These actors help define and influence policymakers with respect to the operational preventive strategies of peacebuilding. The author is interested in understanding why such strategies are rare and why the decision to undertake preventive humanitarian responses that include a military component varies so much among complex emergencies and conflicts that share similar characteristics.
Chris Ankersen agrees with Labonte and argues that force continues to play a significant role in peacebuilding in his discussion of the military's role in the peacebuilding operation in Kosovo. However, his case study demonstrates a significant change in the military's role in what are now commonly described as peace support operations. Such operations make it necessary to determine the proper role for the military, and perhaps even more importantly, to determine the relationship between the military and other actors involved in peacebuilding. Part of the difficulty confronting the military in peacebuilding is generating a clear definition of conflict and, more specifically, determining when a conflict begins and ends. If peacebuilding is about ensuring a lasting peace, then it must involve much more than a cessation of hostilities. It needs to include such essential building blocks as economic development, human rights, the rule of law, democracy, social equity, and environmental sustainability. Many of these are dependent on the capacity of non-military actors and it therefore becomes essential for the military to work with civilian players such as NGOs in support of peacebuilding. As the author suggests, an enduring peace requires more than the military alone can provide and it also obliges all actors (military and civilian) to cooperate and to overcome their institutional prejudices.

Francis Abiew and Tom Keating examine the role of NGOs in peacebuilding missions and consider both the reasons for and the effects of NGO involvement in these operations. They demonstrate the extent to which the direction and outcome of peacebuilding processes have been strongly influenced by the participation of local and transnational NGOs. Abiew and Keating point out that the military's partnership with civil society is, in most instances, not an option these days, but a necessity. The importance of an active NGO presence in peacebuilding situations is supported by examples from the point of view of operations on the ground. For example, the authors argue that NGOs have a wealth of experience in relief and recovery.
operations. These groups know who can be rapidly and economically deployed and are generally aware of the importance of linking relief efforts to longer-term sustainability and capacity building. We learn from Abiew and Keating that sustainable peacebuilding concepts seem to be more readily understood by NGOs than by the military establishment or even some governments.

Issues such as people-centered development, the significance of women and gender issues (such as the education of girls), and more generally, the importance of ensuring that educational structures do not replicate past injustices, are generally familiar terrain to NGOs. As Abiew and Keating suggest, these nonstate actors are at the forefront of efforts to reintegrate combatants, refugees, and displaced persons into postconflict society. Yet NGOs are not free from problems and may need codes of conduct that are publicly enunciated and enforced. In building local capacity, outsiders, including international NGOs, must recognize that they are not neutral actors and that their involvement will have political consequences—some negative, some positive.

David Beer demonstrates some of the political consequences that can befall some of the most laudable international peacebuilding efforts. His study focuses on the efforts to return the legitimately elected leader of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, to power and to strengthen the institutions of justice and policing that were systematically corrupted during the decades under the country’s former Duvalier and Cédras dictatorships. Beer shows that while these were worthy peacebuilding goals, the process was tainted by the blatant self-interest of the US, the lack of coordination between the many external players, and the reluctance of the Haitian government to embrace the need for radical change in the justice and police sectors. This case points to the need for peacebuilding efforts to have clear and attainable goals, to be better coordinated in order to avoid the overlapping of projects by the multiple players involved, thus wasting time and resources. Beer also clearly indicates that
the local (recipient) government must be a responsible and reliable partner in the peacebuilding process if that process is to reap success.

Sumie Nakaya examines the role of women in peacebuilding, drawing on evidence from some peacebuilding strategies applied in Mozambique and Somalia. Nakaya highlights the importance of enhancing gender equality in postconflict governance and in the process of structural and social transformation, noting that women's commitment to peace is crucial if any postconflict society is to be able to sustain peace agreements. In her opinion, the often-ignored discriminatory effects of peacebuilding operations on women, such as continued violence, discrimination, and poverty, encompass political, security, social and economic aspects. It is important therefore to examine these areas in the search for building a sustainable peace based on the platform of gender equity. If Nakaya is right, then conflict resolution and peacebuilding will provide a window of opportunity for social transformation and the integration of gender equality into emerging state and social structures. But this will mean gender mainstreaming both within institutions and at the center of the structural base of power in postconflict societies.

Adekeye Adebajo concentrates on the role that regional and international actors played in attempts at building peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone during the last decade of the twentieth century. He labels these two countries “West Africa’s tragic twins” and describes the interlocking relationships that existed between them. Both countries were plunged into a decade-long civil war by warlords Charles Taylor (Liberia) and Foday Sankoh (Sierra Leone), who used revenue from blood diamonds and other raw materials to fuel the conflicts. In discussing the peacebuilding tools that were used, Adebajo notes that interventions must be provided with timely resources if they are to achieve their goals. He also notes that the role of regional hegemons, like Nigeria, is important, and that international efforts to contribute to peacebuilding could be built around pillars of regional hegemons, with the UN helping to share the burdens and
costs of the operations. In such cases, the author emphasizes the importance of funding for the reintegration of ex-combatants into society, for the stabilization of the security sector, and for the rebuilding of state and societal structures and institutions. In addition, donor conferences, such as have been held for the Balkans, should be replicated for other regions (like Africa) if peacebuilding operations are to be successful. Adebajo also notes the importance of putting a stop to illicit activities. In addressing all of these concerns, it will be essential for the international community to dig deeper to provide resources.

Kassu Gebremariam reviews the peacebuilding process in the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, and Egypt) and the role of outside agents, especially that of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Intergovernmental Authority for Drought and Development (IGADD). He argues that the existing approach to peacebuilding will not alleviate the crisis in the region. The current approach is, in his view, overly deterministic and inadequate, for it fails to address critical values such as the influence of the international factor, especially in an historical context. He questions the commitment to human rights in the region. He also argues that with the emergence of the neoliberal world order there has been a disintegration of the state and a decline in individual security. Thus an international order that sought to protect national borders might provide a more effective structure of security than one that adopted a more permissive view of intervention in the name of human security.

Gebremariam strongly suggests that it is necessary for peacebuilders to tap into the local society and to benefit from its indigenous knowledge, particularly that of the elders. The pattern of intervention that has marked the post–Cold War international system has tended to undermine African states and overlooked the indigenous capacity of local actors who are expected to assume the responsibility of state and societal rebuilding once the international actors withdraw from their territory.
Shaun Narine is even less sanguine about peacebuilding in Southeast Asia in his insightful examination into nontraditional forms of intervention and peace support currently being considered by members of ASEAN. He argues that insofar as “peacebuilding” requires physical intervention within postconflict societies, ASEAN can be considered more of an impediment to regional peacebuilding than a help because peacebuilding norms are generally at odds with most ASEAN members’ view that external intervention in the affairs of the regional states should be avoided as much as possible. Yet, insofar as peacebuilding is concentrated on preventing the outbreak and escalation of conflict, Narine suggests that ASEAN may have a meaningful, albeit limited, role to play in laying the foundations for a “culture of conflict prevention” in Southeast Asia. A move into this area provides a critically important point of departure for this regional institution. However, developing a culture of conflict prevention is very much contingent upon how well the values embodied in that peacebuilding concept corresponds with the narrower political and economic self-interest of the states in this region.

Jarat Chopra and Tanja Hohe suggest that peacebuilding can overcome the powerful norms of nonintervention and the preservation of sovereignty. However, the authors are quick to point out that for peace to be sustainable, the external actors and transitional administrations must give more thought to the nature of “participatory governance.” Chopra and Hohe are highly critical of Western-imposed paradigms of state building which seem mostly preoccupied with instituting national elections and building western style forms of governance. There is a noticeable tendency to exclude local people from the intervention and peacebuilding processes. This “asocial” form of alienation may have been tenable for limited types of intervention, but they are disastrous when intervention for longer-term peacebuilding is contemplated. Given that the notion of participation amongst the peacebuilding cognoscenti appears to lack clarity at the levels of concept and strategy, the
authors, drawing on lessons from Afghanistan and East Timor, offer a number of steps to ensure that local people are properly included in every stage and aspect of the state-building engineered by external actors.

Following on from the policy prescriptions of Chopra and Hohe, Satya Das proposes a number of recommendations for improving prospects for sustainable peace. Learning lessons from the culture of violence that seems to have pervaded the latter half of the twentieth century in such places as Central Africa, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and the Balkans, Das suggests that to build the peace may require violating the sovereignty of states, ignoring territorial integrity, and acting aggressively against states that blatantly violate human rights standards. He argues that investing in peacebuilding is tantamount to taking out an insurance policy. Das is concerned with the question of who should pay for that insurance plan, how the money should be collected and who should control the collected funds. He offers a number of solutions to this problem, including the highly controversial suggestion of a global tax on defense spending and the arms trade, and a novel idea of creating a new post—the UN High Commissioner for Peacebuilding and Postconflict Reconstruction.

Carolyn Lloyd tackles another issue that is a major stumbling block to the development of sustainable peace. Her analysis of the prospects for constructing an effective small arms regulatory regime is significant in that it demonstrates how the excessive flow and indiscriminate use of small arms and light weapons, if left unchecked, can undermine attempts at building sustainable peace. Yet establishing international norms in this area has been difficult for a variety of reasons. Lloyd poses the question: what are the prospects of developing an international regime that will bring small arms and light weapons under control when major states like the US appear not to be interested in establishing such a regime? She addresses her question by exploring the conditions under which states decide to abide, or not, by emerging international norms and rules. Lloyd arrives at a central hypothesis that posits that
three variables (knowledge, power, and interest) are indispensable for such regime formation. These variables are present during the creation of other arms control regimes but are not yet in place for small arms and light weapons (SALW). Few measures exist to govern the flow of SALW. They have been, in essence, the “forgotten” weapons in international arms control. However, with increased knowledge of the problems small arms pose, we may be witnessing significant movement towards the creation of a set of global controls. Beyond the immediate interest in focusing on a matter foremost amongst the issues that have frustrated the envisioned “agenda for peace” of the post-Cold War era, Lloyd contributes as well to the broader debate about how and when we can expect global actors to cooperate in sustainable peace projects.

Howard Adelman and Joseph Masciulli provide critical reflections on the importance of moving beyond the norms that result in a culture of war to those that support a culture of peace. Adelman examines the work of scholars who analyze cultures of violence and offers a particular vision of how peace can be constructed as well as an antidote lest we think that we have definitive answers. For as critical as we must be of those processes that have already been developed in the search of better and more comprehensive solutions, we must remain wary of the solutions we propose and be aware of the importance of being self-critical. Adelman’s contribution is akin to the story Sören Kierkegaard tells in his Journals of a man who sees a sign in a store window that says, “Pants Pressed Here” and then takes in his trousers to be pressed—only to discover that the store sells signs. Adelman does not offer to press the pants of those concerned with peacebuilding but rather to “sell the signs” that urge us to be more critical when we are analyzing cultures of violence and offering lessons on how to develop a better peacebuilding model.

Masciulli’s cosmopolitan and ethical position does not allow him to hold out too much hope for a complete elimination of violent conflict. As far as he is concerned, war cannot be “uninvented” because
the ability and knowledge to make war persist in the minds of human beings. Nevertheless, he suggests that partial peace is possible if it is built on decent politics that are inspired by a global cosmopolitan culture and world polity. Unlike breathing, eating and sex, war is not a requirement of the human condition. Thus, there is a chance that human beings might at some point eliminate it as a prominent practice in the same way that slavery and human sacrifice are no longer widespread.

On the hopeful note that building a sustainable peace is possible, we now turn to the critical analyses offered by our contributors.

Notes

5 Richmond, “Genealogy of Peacemaking,” 330.
6 It should be noted, however, that Javier Perez de Cuellar, from the time when he represented the UN on the Cyprus issue in the late 1970s to his work as Secretary-General after succeeding Kurt Waldheim in 1982, laid the foundation for the development of the concept of peacebuilding. Certainly his strong advocacy of assertive peacekeeping and his involvement in negotiating the ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq war, in facilitating the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, in negotiating a peace pact between the El Salvadorian government and rebels, and in brokering the 1991 Cambodian peace accord, laid the foundations for the doctrine of peacebuilding. One might say he prepared the soil for, and planted the seeds of, UN peacebuilding. The actual document under Boutros-Ghali’s name that advocated peacebuilding was written largely by a Finnish acolyte of de Cuellar’s—Tapio Kanninen—when he was Chief of the Policy Planning Unit in the Department of Political Affairs at the United Nations.
As the world turns its attention to the reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq following recent conflicts in these countries, the issue of post-conflict peacebuilding takes centre stage. The precise elements in peacebuilding, as envisioned by Boutros-Ghali, include disarming warring parties, restoring order, decommissioning and destroying weapons, repatriating refugees, providing advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, de-mining and other forms of demilitarization, providing technical assistance, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming and strengthening institutions of governance—including assistance in monitoring and supervising electoral processes—and promoting formal and informal participation in the political process. Building Sustainable Peace presents a timely and original overview of the field of peace studies and offers fresh analytical tools that promote a critical reconceptualization of peace and conflict, while also making specific reference to peacebuilding strategies employed in recent international conflicts.

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