The United Nations and Nuclear Orders

Edited by Jane Boulden, Ramesh Thakur and Thomas G. Weiss

With a Foreword by Jayantha Dhanapala
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Since the end of the Cold War, the status of nuclear weapons has been in constant flux, an extension of a longer pattern of changes relating to the existence of such arms in world politics. This collection of essays sheds light on the subject of the past, present, and future roles of the United Nations and the nuclear challenges that confront the planet as well as the world body. To that end, our chapter acts as both introduction and conclusion. We begin by outlining the context framing the book, then offer a brief discussion of the provisions of the UN Charter that are central to the problématique. Next, mirroring the book’s structure, we briefly examine the actors, tools, and issues that form the backbone of our study. A final section looks at future threats looming on the horizon. In addition to establishing the rationale and the framework for analysis, we conclude by drawing together key themes and ideas that emerge from other chapters in order to highlight the resulting conclusions and questions about the role of the United Nations and where the world organization might, and should, be headed.

The context

On what basis do we argue that the status of nuclear weapons is so constantly variable? A few examples help to provide the context for this generalization. Three former Soviet republics became nuclear weapons
states (NWS) on achieving independence and then relinquished that status. South Africa announced its renunciation of a nuclear weapons program that few knew existed. India and Pakistan arrived and consolidated themselves as NWS a decade ago. Libya pursued nuclear weapons programs only to pull back from the brink. Its reversal and re-entry into the international community contributed to the revelation that a Pakistani government official, Abdul Qadeer Khan, had been selling nuclear weapons information and technology to a variety of clients over a considerable period of time. North Korea has pursued a policy of nuclear brinkmanship, including testing, for a decade or two, while Iran continues to test the limits of its credibility and the world’s patience by arguing that it is pursuing peaceful uses of potentially fissile materials.

Moreover, in 1995 the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was made permanent, although the five-year Review Conference in 2005 ended without an agreed document. Nor has the world been any more successful in the pursuit of a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and verifiable convention banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, which would greatly strengthen the non-proliferation regime. On top of these developments, the United States removed one of the cornerstones supporting the bilateral nuclear arms control edifice by withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty.

Meanwhile, globalization has been gathering momentum, fueled by the accelerating technological capabilities of states and instantaneous communication. On the supply side, a major proliferation challenge is the globalization of the arms industry, the flooding of the global arms market, and a resultant loosening of supplier constraints. These changes have increased the number of states that may potentially have the capability to develop a nuclear weapons program should they choose to pursue one. Leaving aside weapons aspirations, the number of states that might be able or may choose to pursue peaceful nuclear energy programs is now considerably larger than it has ever been. Along with the increased pressure for cleaner and less expensive energy sources, the combined effects of these trends undoubtedly will increase the level of trade in nuclear material and equipment as well as the number of nuclear-capable powers generally.

A further factor compounding the complexity of the situation is the rise of terrorism and the associated fear that a terrorist group might succeed in obtaining some form of nuclear material. Many see the advent of al-Qaeda, especially since the attacks of 11 September 2001, as an indication of a particularly lethal new form of terrorism. In addition to their willingness to commit suicide as part of an attack, the newest generation of terrorists seek not just to make a political statement through violent acts, but to do so while maximizing the level of destruction and instability
involved. For them, therefore, access to nuclear materials of any kind, but especially weapons-grade, is assumed to be an important goal. The combined effects of these developments led to an arms control regime under deep stress. The global consensus underpinning the normative architecture of arms control is itself being strained. The 2004 UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (HLP) warned bluntly: “We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.”

Examining the UN role in this context reveals a paradox. On the one hand, the unique legitimacy of the organization, deriving from its universal membership, makes it the normative center of gravity either for reaffirming the existing consensus or for refashioning a new one. On the other hand, the world organization’s balance sheet is unimpressive in this regard. Symptomatic of this, in September 2005, over 150 heads of state gathered to consider the proposals of the Secretary-General’s HLP on the occasion of the United Nations’ sixtieth anniversary. Billed as the “World Summit” – the largest gathering ever of heads of state and government – the meeting sought to establish a new path for the world organization. The final outcome document addressed issues ranging from terrorism to human rights to UN reform, but made no mention of arms control and disarmament, a gap that Secretary-General Kofi Annan called a “disgrace.” Nor is the idea that the United Nations has a role to play a natural one. There is little tradition of the United Nations as a key player on nuclear weapons issues. The Charter was developed before the potential of atomic weapons was understood or demonstrated, and thus it has no provisions directly geared to dealing with them. Early UN-based efforts to develop and negotiate controls on atomic materials and weapons were almost instantly stymied by the politics of the Cold War. This early failure was symptomatic of the long struggle to come between East and West. The decades-long superpower stalemate that would infect the newly formed world organization was accompanied by the attendant argument that nuclear-weapons-based strategic deterrence was a key pillar supporting the “long peace” until 1989. A number of arms control and disarmament agreements and actions, resulting from negotiations conducted outside the United Nations, both resulted from, and also in turn contributed to, the ending of the Cold War. One of the best examples is the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces agreement between Moscow and Washington.

On the other side of the equation, however, the United Nations – whose foremost purpose is the maintenance of international peace and security – has played a significant and varied role in this area from its inception. Of course, it has not been the central forum for decisions
relating to nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, the Security Council has been a setting for discussions about crises over nuclear weapons (e.g. in Cuba and Iraq), the source of decisions relating to how states respond to other potential nuclear states (e.g. the Israeli bombing of the Osirak reactor), and a standard-setter for member states seeking nuclear weapons and materiel (e.g. Security Council resolution 1540). Perhaps even more pertinently, the strong, if unsuccessful, efforts made in early 2003 to secure a second Council resolution explicitly authorizing war in Iraq demonstrated just how powerful the United Nations’ legitimizing role remains.\(^4\)

Then, as the war was waged anyway, the desperate but unrewarded search for non-existent weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proved conclusively the success of UN inspections in disarming Saddam Hussein of all such weapons.

Critics and proponents alike often overlook the fact that the General Assembly’s very first resolution on 24 January 1946 established a commission to deal with “the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy.” From the 1950s and into the 1960s, the Assembly was the forum for a series of proposals on general and complete disarmament. Since then, the Assembly has passed scores of resolutions on nuclear weapons and has held three special sessions on disarmament. In 1996, in an Advisory Opinion requested by the General Assembly, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave its views on the legality of nuclear weapons.

At the center of, and in many ways the most consistent actor in, the UN family is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), formed in 1957. The IAEA’s role has evolved and expanded in response to the changing environment and its requirements. Its mandate involves monitoring, verifying, and reporting on nuclear programs in a large number of states, making it the central UN actor in an increasingly complex and politicized environment, as experience with Iraq, North Korea, and Iran has demonstrated.

This brief survey suggests that, although the United Nations may not be the central forum for negotiations and discussions concerning nuclear weapons, and it may not be living up to its full potential, it would be wrong to count the United Nations out of the nuclear weapons picture. Two critical questions remain: Is the United Nations a credible or desirable actor in this realm? And, if so, to what end? These queries provide the analytical framework of this book.

There is little in the way of sustained or focused research on the United Nations’ role in this area, which further complicates the reality that numerous previous predictions about nuclear weapons and nuclear power have been so wrong – aptly called “the sky-is-still-falling profession.”\(^5\) To the extent such work exists, it relates to specific cases or to specific tools. Research on the Council or the Assembly, for example,
might include reference to their role on nuclear weapons as one of a number of issues with which they deal, but certainly not as a central factor. There is a wealth of work on the United Nations’ role and experience with Iraq, but it focuses primarily on questions specific to that experience. Similarly, work on the NPT or other arms control efforts might mention the UN role, but the focus is the arms control efforts in question, not the United Nations. In addition to the fact that little exists on the subject, an added push comes from the fact that the United Nations is considerably changed from its Cold War days. The world organization, especially in the form of the Security Council, has demonstrated a greater willingness to use the international peace and security tools at its disposal to deal with situations in new and creative ways. Much of the literature dealing with that shift, however, is focused on issues such as the use of force, terrorism, and an ever-broadening definition of threats to international peace and security – ranging from human rights and humanitarian disasters to HIV/AIDS.

There is, therefore, a gap to be filled in taking on this kind of study, which is why we assembled a richly diverse team of analysts to help us illuminate this issue. The assumptions that form the foundation of analyses in this volume are:

- There is an increased desire on the part of key actors and of member states generally that the United Nations, and in particular the Council, play a greater role in dealing with nuclear issues.
- There are Charter grounds for such a role as well as some past experience, including the concrete case of Iraq, to build upon.
- The current political, legal, normative, and military contexts, however, are considerably different from those in which many of the previous UN goals were established and experiences accumulated. Indeed, many precepts once taken as givens are now openly questioned.
- Many of the questions relating to how, when, and in what context the United Nations plays a role in, or might make a contribution to, the nuclear issue require far greater research and reflection.

In hoping to evaluate the past and look toward the future, we asked contributors to keep in mind common considerations. Thus, the analytical framework here was focused on finding better answers than previous ones to three interrelated questions:

- What is the nature of the current environment in which the United Nations is operating on these issues?
- Who and what are the actors and tools the United Nations has available to it with respect to questions about nuclear weapons?
- What do the answers to those two questions tell us about whether and how the organization could, or should, play a role in these issues, as well as the kind of role that it might assume?
The foundation: The UN Charter

The framers of the UN Charter began their task with a shared sense of two key objectives: the desire to prevent a third world war and the need to avoid the pitfalls of the League of Nations. The result was a determination that the new organization would have an effective system of enforcement with military teeth to ensure compliance with its decisions. To that end, the Charter framers had already agreed that states would be required to provide military forces to the organization for the purposes of undertaking enforcement operations, and that the great powers would shoulder the brunt of this burden. They also agreed that the organization should play a role in establishing a system for the regulation of armaments, although the need for regulation had to be balanced against the need for states to maintain a level of armaments sufficient to allow them to fulfill their duty to provide troops for the implementation of the planned collective security system. Another critical lesson learned from the interwar experience was that the allies had not rearmed sufficiently strongly and sufficiently in advance of Nazi aggression. This too dampened interest in general and complete disarmament.

Although the Charter’s framers saw the control of national armaments as fundamentally tied to the envisaged system of mandatory enforcement, they judged it sufficiently important to keep it separate from the broader Article 24 Council responsibilities for maintaining international peace and security. Thus, Article 26 requires the Council to establish a plan for regulating arms as a special and specific function, in addition to its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security:

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

Consideration of arms regulation and disarmament was also established as a specific function for the General Assembly. Article 11(1) states that:

The General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.
The explosion of atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the onset of the Cold War not long thereafter fundamentally altered the environment in which the United Nations found itself operating. Both the ideas that member states would provide troops for the enforcement of Council decisions and that the Council would develop a system for regulating armaments fell by the wayside. As has been the case in other issue areas, however, the absence of a willingness to use the Charter machinery as originally designed has not stopped the various actors within the system from playing a role, developing proposals, or designing new mechanisms for addressing the issue.

UN arms control and disarmament machinery

The machinery and the program of action for disarmament were established at the first UN Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-I) in 1978. The final document established the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as the “single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum.” Its origins lie in the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament of 1959 (five members each from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact). Just as the Security Council’s and the Economic and Social Council’s numbers were increased to reflect the changing UN membership after decolonization, so too the CD was expanded to include eight neutral and non-aligned countries and then further enlarged to its present strength of 65. The CD is not a true UN body and it has its own rules and procedures, but the links are intimate: its budget is included in the UN budget, its meetings are serviced by the UN Secretariat, its Secretary-General is the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, and its Deputy Secretary-General is the head of the Geneva Branch of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs. Moreover, it submits its annual report to the Assembly.

The consensus rule for making any decisions in the CD, originally designed to help states find agreement, is now providing a convenient cover for countries that want to block progress. Since the completion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, the CD has been unable to begin negotiations on banning fissile materials or any other issue. Apart from a few weeks in August 1998, the CD has been unable to agree even on a program of work. This dreadful state of affairs has been due to a few countries (sometimes only one or two) thwarting the majority. In the process, the CD is bringing the whole of the multilateral disarmament process into disrepute.

Another body, the First Committee of the General Assembly, is charged with considering disarmament and international security. Its
resolutions cover the gamut of disarmament and security issues: landmines, small arms, terrorism, biological weapons, information technology, and nuclear weapons. Many resolutions are mere repeats of previous years’ resolutions, but new ones are introduced every year and serve as a litmus test of progress or lack thereof, and as weathervanes of current international thinking on disarmament and international security. Voting is by a simple majority. Resolutions may be adopted by acclamation, without objection or without a vote, or the vote may be recorded or taken by roll-call. After the Committee has completed its consideration of items and submitted draft resolutions, all issues are voted on through resolutions passed in plenary meetings of the Assembly, usually towards the end of the regular session each December.

The UN Disarmament Commission is one body where all member states can come together to examine the framework for disarmament and set a discussion agenda. It is a deliberative body mandated to make recommendations in the field of disarmament and to follow up the decisions and recommendations of SSOD-I. Unlike the First Committee, the Commission does not pass resolutions. Instead, it focuses on a limited number of agenda items each session to allow for in-depth discussion. However, its work too has become moribund owing to the politicization of all its discussions amidst the prevailing distrust and suspicions of one another’s motives, intentions, and agendas by the various groups of member states.

Several international bodies are linked to the UN framework as part of the implementation mechanism for disarmament – for example, the IAEA in Vienna and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) at The Hague. In addition, there are the mechanisms established with specific mandates associated with Council decisions in the aftermath of the UN-authorized action in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. In 1999, the Council created the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM). The Council mandated UNMOVIC with verifying the disarmament of the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq under Security Council resolutions 687, 1284, and 1441. Previously, UNSCOM had succeeded in determining the extent of the Iraqi WMD program and in disarming Iraq without the cooperation of the Iraqi government. It also oversaw the destruction of missiles and Iraq’s chemical warfare agent arsenal. But an attack on Iraq by the United States with cruise missiles and damning revelations about the use of UNSCOM by US intelligence brought about its downfall. UNMOVIC was established with a clean slate, but it was not until the 2002 showdown with Washington and the threat of massive military action by the United States that Iraq allowed Execu-
The international inspection record in Iraq prior to 2003 has important implications for the United Nations and future efforts to foster disarmament. UNSCOM did a very good job. Despite all the cat-and-mouse games, obfuscation, subversion, and evasion by Iraq, UNSCOM succeeded in mapping large parts of Iraq’s WMD programs between 1991 and 1998. UN sanctions and national export controls worked better than expected. The painstaking analysis of all the UNSCOM data that UNMOVIC carried out in the period 1999–2002 paid off. However, UNMOVIC found little new evidence of weapons of mass destruction in the few months of in-country inspections that it carried out because it had very little useful and original intelligence information and only partial cooperation from the Iraqi government. However, the post-invasion Iraq Survey Team was not able to achieve more, even without those constraints.

The actors

The political science literature informs us of the fallacy of the rational actor model of state decision-making. This is even truer of the United Nations. It is not a unitary actor. There is no such thing as the United Nations. Instead, there are several United Nations, each with its own balance of composition and political interests. We recall Inis Claude’s classic twofold distinction between the world organization as an intergovernmental arena and as a secretariat, and the more recent distinction of a “Third United Nations” consisting of certain non-governmental organizations (NGOs), external experts, scholars, consultants, and committed citizens who work closely with the United Nations’ intergovernmental machinery and secretariats. The psychology and logic of these networks and groups are distinct yet relatively unknown, another topic for future research.

Our discussion of the nuclear challenges involves mainly the First United Nations, an arena where states make decisions, with due consideration of the Second United Nations. The Charter establishes a rough division of labor between the two principal organs associated with the United Nations’ core functions relating to international peace and security (the Council and the Assembly) and the third principal organ (the Secretariat, headed by the Secretary-General). Each has distinct advantages and disadvantages in its respective roles, as well as in the issues that arise in areas where those roles cross paths. We discuss them in this chapter in reverse order.
Of the three actors discussed here, the Secretary-General and the Secretariat are the least obvious choices as key actors for the nuclear weapons agenda. Yet, as Randy Rydell establishes in Chapter 4, there is ample ground for the Secretary-General to play an important role. He is the chief administrative officer of the organization and as such able to restructure the Secretariat; and the unit dealing with disarmament has been a particular target with successor secretaries-general. In addition, however, the Secretary-General is the chief symbol of the international interest, advocate of law and rights, general manager of the global agenda, and a focal point in setting the direction of world affairs.

The status, authority, and powers of the Secretary-General are derived chiefly from the Charter, but his success depends also invariably on the skills and personality of the incumbent and on relations among the major powers of the world. The political role of the Secretary-General in turn is a function of the interplay between Charter functions and powers, personal attributes, and the political equations among the member states. Charter Article 99 authorizes the Secretary-General to bring to the attention of the Council “any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.” This article and other Charter provisions can be interpreted expansively by an incumbent Secretary-General under the doctrine of implied powers. The single most important political role of the Secretary-General is to provide leadership – that elusive ability to make others connect emotionally and intellectually to a larger cause that transcends their immediate, perceived self-interests.

Because the Security Council and the General Assembly are often split, the Secretary-General can sometimes maneuver to advance his own priorities by indicating possible points of agreement. He has the right to be present and take part in the debates in the political organs, and often does. He provides the logistical and intellectual basis for many Council and Assembly resolutions and may urge particular courses of action. He is expected to implement the most controversial of decisions with the most scrupulous impartiality, exercising political judgment while avoiding the twin temptations of inflating or deflating the role of the office. He is also at the nerve center of a sensitive communications network. He can, and generally does, speak directly to governments, civil society representatives, and business leaders. He is asked to submit reports and analyses on a vast range of topics. As well as using the budget as a vehicle for inserting his priorities into the organization’s work agenda, he submits an annual report on the work of the organization that gives him a guaranteed instrument for outlining his vision for the
United Nations. All these avenues allow the Secretary-General to shape the institutional context and normative milieu within which he must wield influence.

The General Assembly

The most significant advantage of the Assembly is its universality. Every member state has a voice and a vote, which lends considerable legitimacy to Assembly efforts. That universality is also a disadvantage. With 192 members (not to mention many observers), the Assembly is unwieldy. Its sheer size makes it an unlikely source for efficient or effective negotiation, and consensus almost guarantees sinking to the lowest common denominator. In addition, as M. J. Peterson argues in Chapter 3, the nature of the debate in the Assembly has shifted from one characterized by discussion and consensus-seeking to one where divisions are articulated and reinforced. In spite of the discord and stalemate that have characterized the debate in recent years, the Assembly has been the source or motivator for some important developments in the efforts to control nuclear weapons.

The Assembly was the first UN actor to move on the issue of nuclear weapons and, as mentioned, devoted its very first resolution to creating the UN Atomic Energy Commission. The Assembly was the forum in which the major proposals for controlling atomic material and weapons were put forward and debated during the early years of the atomic age and the US monopoly. Perhaps the most ambitious instance came in 1946. Financier Bernard Baruch devised a plan to place the entire nuclear fuel cycle under the control of the United Nations while the United States still possessed the monopoly on atomic weapons. Many believed that it signaled an American willingness eventually to disarm its nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union refused to sign the proposed agreement. The Assembly also provided the stage for President Dwight Eisenhower’s historic “Atoms for Peace” address to the United Nations in 1953. Eisenhower used the speech to highlight the dual nature of atomic energy: catastrophically dangerous in the form of weapons, potentially productive as a peaceful power source. “Atoms for Peace” provided the blueprint for the creation of an international agency charged with managing the world’s stockpiles of fissionable materials, consistent with the United Nations’ mission of maintaining international peace and security. Four years later, Eisenhower’s call was realized with the establishment of the IAEA.

Since then, the Assembly has continued to consider the question of nuclear weapons in various ways, mainly through resolutions and three special sessions on disarmament. The Assembly has played an important role in setting standards for the development of nuclear-weapon-free
zones, and in advocating greater progress on key issues such as the CTBT. Nevertheless, this level of activity obscures the erratic and limited nature of the progress that this represents. A fourth special session on disarmament was approved in 1995, for example, but 13 years, many debates, and two open-ended working groups later, there is still no agreement on establishing its objectives.

As the only authentic and truly representative body of the international community of states, the General Assembly functions as the normative center of gravity and can set and articulate standards of conduct and norms of appropriate behavior. Judgment about the Assembly’s record should be balanced against its overall functions. Its resolutions are non-binding and represent recommendations only. Nonetheless, the Assembly’s inability or unwillingness to harness the power inherent in the universality of its membership towards basic common goals may have left open an opportunity for the Security Council to play a greater role on this front than in the past. This could be one of the reasons we now see a shift in the balance of activity towards the Council.

The Security Council

For a body able to establish binding requirements and the ability to enforce them, we must look to the Security Council. Although international agreements and treaty negotiations are conducted in other forums, Ernie Regehr recalls in Chapter 2 that violations and transgressions can be brought to the Council. Its activity on issues relating to nuclear weapons was quite sparse during the Cold War. Perhaps the most notable action was resolution 487, passed unanimously by the Council in 1981, soundly condemning the Israeli attack on an Iraqi nuclear research facility located in Osirak.\footnote{15}

A decade later, with the Cold War clearly over, the Council entered more fully into the nuclear weapons realm. Beginning with resolution 687, which ended the Gulf war in 1991, it initiated a long, complicated effort to deal with Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs. Those efforts have been joined by Council action in response to the arrival of other actual or potential nuclear weapons states. So, it has taken action of varied intensity and impact in response to developments in India, Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea, as Amitav Acharya details in Chapter 12 on cases in Asia.

At the level of process, Council activity on nuclear weapons can be divided into two streams: reactive case-oriented action and proactive thematic efforts. The development of a thematic or issue-oriented approach is a general trend in Council work, seen most clearly in its response to terrorism. The thematic efforts on nuclear weapons occur in the 2004
resolution 1540, in which the Council built on concerns about terrorism and established a set of minimum standards for member state action on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Echoing the novel approach in resolution 1373 on terrorism, in 1540 the Council directed, rather than merely recommended, states to take measures at the national level in order to ensure the security of any material, equipment, or weaponry relating to nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.

The overall record of Council case-oriented action on nuclear weapons is mixed. Although the possibility that Libya was pursuing a nuclear weapons program was never dealt with head-on, there is little doubt about the impact of the sanctions that the Council imposed in response to Libya’s unwillingness to hand over suspects in the Lockerbie bombing. This stance contributed to Libya’s eventual decision to re-enter the international community of states as a full-fledged member in good standing. Doing so meant coming clean on its nuclear program, and then forfeiting it. Similarly, there are positive signs with respect to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. But here again, it seems likely that it is pressure in the form of Council-imposed sanctions in conjunction with separate regionally based negotiations on the status of the program that has contributed to steps in the right direction. In other words, the Council has been a key player in some of these situations, but certainly not the only one.

On India and Pakistan, the Council’s approach has little to commend it. It suffered from a triple handicap. First, neither India nor Pakistan had signed the NPT. Any attempt to penalize them for violating a treaty that they had explicitly rejected would constitute so revolutionary a departure from the widely accepted norms of sovereign statehood that it would run tremors of apprehension up the spines of most states. Second, and very much by contrast, the continued possession and deployment of nuclear weapons by the NPT-licit five nuclear weapons states (the N-5) are considered by many to violate their NPT Article 6 disarmament obligations, which all five have voluntarily signed. They thus had little moral authority to lecture and censure India and Pakistan. And third, it is difficult to apply moral and economic coercion on two states while ignoring Israel as the singular exemption with respect to de facto NWS status, as opposed to nuclear testing.

In 1998, Security Council resolution 1172 condemned the weapons tests by India and Pakistan and called on both to cease their weapons programs and to join the NPT. That initial effort was undermined, if not completely abandoned, by the lack of any follow-up. Moreover, a de facto acceptance of both states’ nuclear weapons status has been in evidence through the policies of all of the permanent members, especially the United States. No better example can be found than the agreement reached between the United States and India in March 2006. The deal
grants India US nuclear power assistance and expertise in exchange for New Delhi’s acceptance of international monitoring of its civilian nuclear power program. At the same time, however, India’s military nuclear programs remain unmolested. The Council’s actions have similarly worked against it with respect to Iraq. Although the Council did not approve the use of force against Iraq in 2003, the fact that the United States and the United Kingdom violated the provisions of the Charter under the guise of responding to Iraqi violations of Council resolutions relating to WMD had an enormous impact on the perception of the Council’s authority. All in all, the many instances of double standards frustrate most member states and undermine the Council’s claim to be a legitimate actor.

Compared with the Assembly, however, we see much in the Council’s actions to demonstrate an evolution and responsiveness to the changing nature of the international environment and new threats. The Council’s overall approach might be characterized as one focused on denial, prevention, and pressure rather than direct action. The Council has done this by making use of the tools available to it through the Charter, sometimes very creatively.

Tools

Of all the UN tools available, sanctions represent one that has considerable potential for adaptation. Indeed, to the extent that we might identify success stories in UN efforts to deal with nuclear weapons, David Cortright and George Lopez argue in Chapter 5 that sanctions have been the explanation. Yet barriers remain that prevent any blanket endorsement of sanctions as the tool of choice in dealing with all aspects of the nuclear challenge. The ongoing expansion of technological capabilities, and the extent to which states might vary in their susceptibility to sanctions as a tool, stand out as key obstacles that need to be addressed – not to mention the negative humanitarian consequences of sanctions.\(^{17}\) What is clear is that, in order to work, sanctions must be consistently applied, be coupled with inducements, and involve other forms of engagement. Using sanctions effectively also draws in a variety of other actors. Increasingly, for example, sanctions are targeted at the financial assets of states and individuals, drawing in financial institutions as key players in this equation. And sometimes they are used in situations where the lead political role is being taken by states outside of the UN umbrella, such as the Six-Party Talks on North Korea.

Inside the First United Nations, the use of force as a response to nuclear weapons situations is the most contentious and most problematic tool for individual states and groups of states. The use or misuse of the
threat and use of force has the potential to undermine the organization as a whole as it goes to the very heart of the United Nations’ collective security bargain. The Charter provides that force may be used only in self-defense or in pursuit of the collective interest contingent upon Council authorization. Therefore, it is difficult to underestimate the impact of the unauthorized war launched against Iraq in 2003. Despite the fact that it was waged under the banner of Iraq’s non-compliance with UN provisions calling for the elimination of its weapons of mass destruction,18 this act confirmed for some the perception that the United Nations remains an organization based on a double standard. In the eyes of the most severe critics, the Iraq war confirmed that permanent members, in this case the United States and the United Kingdom, can violate the terms of the Charter with impunity.

Recent experience, and not just in Iraq, raises broad questions about the use of force in response to nuclear weapons. Ian Johnstone takes on these issues in Chapter 6, focusing in particular on questions relating to self-defense and the grounds for preventive and pre-emptive use of force. In many ways this is the source of the most profound potential dilemmas for the United Nations, especially in the years to come. At what point is it appropriate to authorize the use of force when considering nuclear weapons? On what basis should the Council make decisions about nuclear weapons? Where does its information come from, and what kinds of judgments are Council members able to make based on that information? As noted by the Secretary-General’s HLP, “The maintenance of world peace and security depends importantly on there being a common global understanding, and acceptance, of when the application of force is both legal and legitimate.”19 In his chapter, Johnstone forges into this debate by suggesting a list of factors the Council might take into account when considering its reaction to situations involving nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons proliferation.

Questions about information lead us to the issues surrounding the United Nations’ role in verification and compliance. As with Council activity generally, we can identify two streams here: case-based approaches and those that are preventive and issue oriented. This is a potential growth area for the world organization. In order to ensure Iraqi compliance with its resolutions, the Council established UNSCOM and UNMOVIC. As Harald Müller argues in Chapter 7, the IAEA is the central and critical body, the only existing organization with an institutional foundation and experience in this field that are sufficiently robust to take on these tasks. It has the added benefit of being outside of the politicking of the United Nations, but with a large enough membership, through its board of governors and its international staff, to offer a high degree of legitimacy in its efforts. That legitimacy will begin to
erode commensurately with efforts to politicize its technical tasks and challenges.

Of course, no discussion of tools to meet the nuclear challenge is complete without a consideration of international law. As mentioned above, Security Council resolution 1540 mandated, rather than recommended, that states secure any weapons-related nuclear material. This is a critical international legal development. This resolution crossed a conceptual and legal Rubicon of sorts in directing sovereign states to enact non-proliferation legislation. The Council called WMD proliferation a threat to international peace and security, and expressed concern over the threat of WMD terrorism and of illicit trafficking in WMD material, weapons, and delivery systems. Resolution 1540 called on all states to enact and enforce laws to prohibit non-state actors to develop, acquire, transfer, or use WMD; to take and enforce effective domestic control, physical protection, accounting, and border control measures to prevent proliferation; and to set up a committee of the whole to oversee implementation of the resolution.

Its very existence may provide a foundation for broader (rather than case-specific) non-proliferation action. The unprecedented intrusion into national law-making authority can be read as the toughened new determination by the international community of states to take effective action. But it certainly was not without controversy. A former member of the Joint UN/Organisation of African Unity Group of Experts on the Denuclearization of Africa noted that “by arrogating to itself wider powers of legislation,” the Council was departing from its Charter-based mandate, and that excessive recourse to Chapter VII could signal a preference for coercion over cooperation. Many NGOs too criticized the resolution’s silence on the role of disarmament in promoting non-proliferation, as well as the Council’s effort to transform itself into a world legislature.

There is some important historical background in the linkage between the Security Council and international legal limits on nuclear weapons. In 1968, Council resolution 255 backed the NPT by committing the Council, “above all its nuclear-weapon state permanent members,” to take action in any instance of aggression involving nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon state. The NPT requires that any state withdrawing from the NPT provide notice to the Council outlining the “extraordinary” events that prompt this decision. In addition, the IAEA Statute requires that the Council be notified if any issues falling within its competence or non-compliance arise. Lori Fisler Damrosch examines several legal issues around the NPT in Chapter 8. In addition to the longstanding debate about the precise nature of the Article VI requirements placed on the nuclear weapons states, these issues range from questions about the
exact scope of the obligations to cooperate in pursuing civilian nuclear use, to issues associated with the provision for member state withdrawal from the Treaty, and the legal standing of NPT Review Conference decisions. The extent and number of the legal debates surrounding the Treaty reflect the changing landscape of nuclear weapons states, and the state of flux of the proliferation regime more broadly.

As indicated in several of the book’s chapters, in 1996, the International Court of Justice, another principal organ, set forth a legal opinion that impinges upon our treatment of nuclear weapons. Charter Article 96 authorizes the Assembly or the Council to seek Advisory Opinions of the ICJ “on any legal question.” Advisory Opinions, although not binding, are considered to be authoritative interpretations of the law at the time that the opinions are delivered. The World Health Organization in 1993 and the Assembly in 1994 asked the World Court to render Advisory Opinions on the legality of the use or threat of nuclear weapons.

Delivering its opinion on 8 July 1996, the Court found that there is neither a specific authorization (unanimously) nor a comprehensive and universal prohibition (11–3) of the threat or use of nuclear weapons in customary or conventional international law. On the central question before it, it was split 7–7. The ICJ President, Judge Mohammad Bedjaoui of Algeria, cast the deciding vote in favor of the opinion that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law, and in particular humanitarian law. However, the Court could not conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense in which the very survival of a state was at stake. As Damrosch points out in Chapter 8, the outcome of the decision raises as many questions as it answers. Although the ICJ opinion affirmed that any threat or use of force involving nuclear weapons must comply with the provisions of the Charter, the fact that the justices left open the possibility of nuclear weapons use in self-defense prompted some analysts to worry that the ICJ had in effect undermined arguments for complete disarmament. Others, however, concluded that the ICJ opinion gave new impetus to efforts to pursue disarmament.

Changing environment

At the outset of this chapter we indicated that the changing nature of the international environment, with respect to both nuclear weapons and the United Nations itself, was a key factor in prompting this study. The idea that this is a time of new threats and challenges has been implicit in this discussion and explicit in everything from the innovations that we have
witnessed in Security Council action, to the adaptation and evolution of the tools the United Nations has available, to the lack of action in forums such as the General Assembly and the NPT Review.

As Brian Finlay and Rita Grossman-Vermaas argue in Chapter 9, there is a level of unpredictability in the current changes associated with globalization and shifting power hierarchies that accentuates the nature of the current and especially future challenges. One of the main changes in the environment in which the United Nations operates is the advent of a variety of new actors, including many different types of non-state actor. Resolution 1540 anticipates the continued development with specific reference to and concern for non-state terrorists. But as W. P. S. Sidhu asserts in Chapter 10, we need to expand the non-state envelope to include a whole range of entities. He paints a spectrum of non-state actors ranging from terrorists and economically motivated individuals and groups at the threat end to private and public economic actors (e.g. banks and industry) to NGOs and other civil society actors at the responsive end of the continuum. For the United Nations as a state-based organization, therefore, the challenge includes non-state actors not just as a threat to international peace and security but also as potential partners or potential sources of additional tools in responding to those threats.

Other types of non-state actor, namely many members of global civil society, have brought to bear more beneficent influences. Although NGOs typically have the least influence on matters of high politics – and what could be higher than nuclear weapons? – they have been important players at a number of stages in a number of negotiating contexts, as several chapters hint. This must be balanced against the fact that there are a number of state-based actors and mechanisms that have taken on a nuclear weapons role outside the United Nations – for example, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Group of 8 – consolidating and reaffirming the initial disconnect between concrete action and the United Nations established at its origins.

This is an area of potentially significant growth and strength for the United Nations. There is a large pool of non-state actors that could be drawn into support of UN goals on nuclear weapons if the United Nations so chooses. This could be done directly by actively working to engage key actors through information-sharing mechanisms. Elsewhere – for instance, especially in the realm of the environment and global climate change – groups of experts have played an essential role in moving a threat to the forefront of intergovernmental attention. Although we do not have an answer at this juncture, we should certainly ask ourselves to what extent the burgeoning epistemic community of nuclear disarmament specialists can be mobilized. At a time when former US secretaries of defense and state are writing op-eds in the *Wall Street Journal* that
call for disarmament.\textsuperscript{22} There should be creative ways to build on resolution 1540 and counter-terrorism efforts to pull these actors into the equation through state action and legislation. Indeed, no less than two-thirds of all living secretaries of state support this general orientation. This “remarkable bipartisan consensus,” note Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal, provides a framework “to make the elimination of all nuclear weapons the organizing principle of US nuclear policy” during the new administration of the forty-fourth president of the United States, Barack Obama.\textsuperscript{23}

Another set of challenges and potential threats rests in the international nuclear trade. As Nicole Evans makes clear in Chapter 11, the nuclear trade should have two overarching objectives: to harness nuclear technology for the benefit of all people, on the one hand, and to stem the tide of nuclear proliferation, on the other. Two main dangers threaten these goals, however. In the first place, illicit networks have emerged to deal in the illegal trade of nuclear technology. This threat highlights a second problem, namely the possibility of unauthorized access to weapons-grade nuclear material and highly radioactive substances. Compounding these concerns is the so-called “nuclear renaissance.” Whether real or perceived, this renaissance presents further challenges, whether in the form of nuclear weapons theft or the increasing odds that states will divert their nuclear materials to the enhancement of military capability. Evans argues that only a triumvirate of cooperation between the United Nations, member states, and industry can formulate solutions to combat these various threats and dilemmas.

The dovetailing of responsibilities between the United Nations and regional organizations is another variable of a viable future international approach to controlling and regulating nuclear weapons. As Amitav Acharya indicates in Chapter 12, regional organizations often have room for maneuver and can act where the United Nations has great difficulty or actually cannot. His examination of the Iran and North Korea cases emphasizes the importance of the regional dimension in working towards addressing the potential and actual nuclear developments in those states. However, his analysis also reveals the extent to which no two regions can be considered alike. The nature and extent of a regional role will, therefore, vary depending on the circumstances. In the North Korean situation, for example, the Six-Party Talks played an important role in developing an agreed path out of the crisis. In Iran’s case, however, the absence of a strong regional entity able to play a role and the differing regional dynamics of the Middle East make the situation there quite different. Nonetheless, Acharya argues that the United Nations should make a far greater effort to draw on regional entities in its nuclear weapons initiatives. As we go to press, the election of Barack Obama to the
US presidency on 4 November 2008 perhaps opens the door for renewed talks with the remaining two members of the “axis of evil” immediately following the January inauguration. Indeed, both Tehran and Pyongyang made public overtures for possible talks with Washington in the future.

Concluding thoughts

The Manhattan project was well under way while Charter negotiations were ongoing. However, knowledge of the program and its potential was very tightly held and played no role in the public discussions in 1945. How different would the Charter be if the framers had known of what was to come? Arguably, if inadvertently, by establishing very broad provisions for regulation and avoiding more specific guidance on the question of arms regulation, the framers of the Charter created a system sufficiently flexible to withstand the advent of fundamentally different and devastatingly more destructive weapon systems.

At the same time, it is not too much of a stretch to argue that the advent of nuclear weapons altered the political and military landscape in fundamental ways. Nuclear weapons surely played a role in consolidating, fueling, and stabilizing the Cold War. The depth and scope of the superpower antagonism virtually paralyzed the United Nations, and certainly contributed to disempowering the enforcement apparatus established in Chapter VII of the Charter and considered so vital to the success of the collective security system. As a result, the world organization suffered a profound loss of legitimacy and confidence in the early years that affected every aspect of its work. The repercussions still reverberate today.

The challenges posed by nuclear weapons extend across the United Nations’ international peace and security mandate. Although the Charter has the benefit of inherent flexibility in the general nature of its terms, that malleability has never been used to establish effective controls on nuclear weapons or to make the world body a leader in decision-making about them. The disconnect established at the very origins of the United Nations, between the goals and structure of the collective security framework and the fundamental change in the nature of military power in the international system, established a pattern that has yet to be broken. The United Nations still follows the first footsteps that the infant organization took at its birth – one or two behind the military and political dynamics set in motion by the advent of the nuclear age.

There is an alternative interpretation of that last image. It is possible to argue that the United Nations began and continues to be a few steps
behind in dealing with the implications of the nuclear age precisely be-
cause this suits the interests of the five permanent members of the Secu-
ritry Council (the P-5). For many, there is no coincidence that the P-5
eventually all became nuclear weapons states, and that they then locked
in their status through the NPT. For those who see the situation in this
way, the challenge is not in how or whether to make the United Nations
more effective in dealing with nuclear weapons. The challenge lies in the
very nature of the power structure of the Council and the way in which it
undermines the principle of universality that is, in every other way, the
foundation stone of the world organization. Viewing the issue from this
vantage point affirms the importance of the United Nations in the nuclear
weapons equation but not necessarily in a positive way. As editors we
chose to frame the debate in the context of the idea of “nuclear orders”
in recognition of the fact that the structure of the current environment
with respect to both nuclear weapons states and the United Nations is
not value neutral and also is not fixed.

This alternative perspective also drives home the point that legitimacy
is not divisible. The roles and responsibilities of the P-5 and the N-5 are
linked, as is the legitimacy of the orders that they uphold. Further pres-
sure on that power structure comes in the form of the two fully declared
nuclear powers that exist outside both the N-5 and the P-5: India and
Pakistan. In setting the context at the beginning of this chapter we spoke
of the situation as in constant flux. Of all the factors outlined, the exis-
tence and de facto acceptance of India and Pakistan as nuclear powers
touch on every possible fault-line associated with the United Nations
and the various nuclear weapons control regimes. This factor reveals the
fundamental disjuncture between the formal structures under discussion
here and the shifting nature of the balance of power occurring outside
those structures.

This returns us to our initial questions – can or should the world orga-
nization play a role here, and if so to what end? The United Nations has
played three linked but analytically distinct roles as a funnel, forum, and
font for norms:

- A funnel for processing ideas into norms and policies and for transmit-
  ting information from national sources to the international community
  of states
- A forum for discussion and negotiation of common international posi-
  tions, policies, conventions, and regimes
- A font of international legitimacy for the authoritative promulgation of
  international norms, appeals for adherence to global norms and re-
  gimes, and coercive measures to enforce compliance with them

From one point of view, it could be argued that the United Nations has
not been the chief architect of nuclear arms control and disarmament.
The bilateral treaties signed by Moscow and Washington during the Cold War on intermediate range and strategic forces were all negotiated and implemented outside UN auspices.

At one level, this is of course true. At another level, the literal truth masks a deeper underlying reality. The ideas behind many of the existing regimes were often first funneled through the UN system. Thus the idea for a total cessation of nuclear testing was proposed by India at the General Assembly in December 1954, although not put to a vote. In January 1957, the United States submitted a five-point plan to the General Assembly proposing an end to the production and testing of nuclear weapons. Throughout the 1980s and the mid-1990s, pressure for a comprehensive test ban was funneled through the General Assembly. Similarly, the idea of negotiating a South Pacific nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) was submitted to the Assembly for endorsement in 1975 under the joint sponsorship of Fiji, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea; and the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty links the regional verification system for the South Pacific to the global IAEA inspections regime within the UN system. Indeed, the closest approximation to a widely acceptable definition of nuclear-weapon-free zones was contained in criteria identified in 1975 by a group of experts commissioned by the Assembly. The origins of the NPT are also within the United Nations. Early proposals to curb proliferation, for example, were submitted to the Disarmament Commission, the Disarmament Committee, and the General Assembly in the late 1950s and early 1960s. These were the foundation for the negotiations that led to agreement on the NPT.

The United Nations has thus historically been the funnel for processing arms control and disarmament proposals and this role continues today. Two recent initiatives to generate ideas are worth keeping in mind. In 2008, a follow-up commission to the earlier Canberra Commission and Tokyo Forum was announced with the joint sponsorship of Australia and Japan, co-chaired by former foreign ministers Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi. The International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament aims to strengthen the NPT, which is up for review in 2010, but it will also focus explicitly on nuclear disarmament as well as non-proliferation. The New Agenda Coalition, building on the Eight-Nation (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa, and Sweden) Initiative of June 1998 (following the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May), has used the United Nations essentially as the funnel through which to advance the twin agenda of non-proliferation and disarmament. The basic policy positions are agreed to among coalition countries directly, and then taken to the international community of states through UN structures. As with many other examples in the past, the final treaty may well be negotiated in
forums outside the United Nations. Nevertheless, this reality should not take away due credit from the world organization for its invaluable funnel role.

The Assembly, with universal membership, houses the divided fragments of humanity and, when united, speaks with the collective voice of the international community of states. This is what makes it the arena where contested norms can be debated and reconciled, the unique forum of choice for articulating global values and norms. It is to the Assembly that civil society actors look and member states go when they wish to proclaim and reaffirm arms control and disarmament norms. This is the chief explanation for so many declarations and resolutions first being adopted by the world organization before producing conventions and treaties – norms followed by laws – in UN as well as non-UN forums.

There is no substitute for the United Nations as a font of international authority and legitimacy. This was reflected in the manner in which the campaign to ban landmines was careful to keep in touch with the UN system. The four countries most active in the Ottawa process – Austria, Belgium, Canada, and Norway – are members of the CD. The October 1996 Ottawa conference developed a resolution that was adopted by the General Assembly in December by a vote of 156–0 (with 10 abstentions). In the final conference a year later, negotiators were careful not to quarantine themselves from the world organization, but to integrate their process with the UN system with regard to review, reporting, and depositary functions. Treaties, even if negotiated outside UN forums, are often submitted to UN machinery for formal endorsement, which has no bearing on the legal standing of the treaty but does substantially enhance its moral weight. This has been true, for example, of the various regional NWFZs. India’s protestations notwithstanding, probably the clearest example of the United Nations as a font of authority for global arms control treaties came with the CTBT in 1996. When India vetoed the final product in the CD in Geneva, Australia initiated to use a constitutional maneuver to move the text from the CD in Geneva to the Assembly in New York.\(^3\) On 10 September 1996, the Assembly approved the text of the CTBT by a vote of 158–3. Only Bhutan and Libya supported India in rejecting it.

Calling on the moral authority of the United Nations to ensure compliance with global norms is especially relevant when behavior considered to be normatively unacceptable is not in fact proscribed by any treaty to which a state may be party. Such was the case with India and Pakistan’s successive nuclear tests in May 1998. At the same time, the United Nations’ ineffective response to the India and Pakistan tests shows that the world organization’s moral authority is not a very effective substitute for legally binding treaty obligations.
As for compliance, the core of the international law enforcement system with respect to non-proliferation and disarmament, as with everything else, is the Security Council. Faced with a challenge to the norms and laws governing the acquisition, production, transfer, and use of arms, the P-5 may have to resort to measures of coercion ranging from diplomatic and economic to military action. With the Assembly having little substantial power and the Council often deadlocked, the weight of UN decision-making frequently falls on the Secretary-General. He may be ignored, but he is not easily de-legitimized. However, on the issue of armaments and weapons platforms involving national security, the Secretary-General is not in the best position to issue judgments and edicts against member states, unless perhaps they have violated specific and binding obligations.

The chapters in this book confirm one of the starting assumptions of this study – namely, that this particular point in the evolution of the United Nations comes at a critical moment of transition in the current nuclear weapons regime. In providing a forum of universal membership, the United Nations can overcome what Ramesh Thakur in Chapter 13 calls the “NPT anomalies” – the fact that three of the world’s nuclear weapons states are not signatories to the NPT. There is thus an opportunity for the United Nations to play a role in trying to establish a new and desperately needed path forward for the non-proliferation regime, by pulling the actors and tools of the regime together. The division of labor among the three principal international peace and security organs established under the Charter provides cross-cutting mandates that leave the door wide open for action on nuclear weapons using a variety of tools and drawing in any number of outside actors. The chapters of this volume outline the key issues and challenges that need to be addressed and offer a number of different ideas of how to do so.

There are significant obstacles to overcome, to be sure. As the chapters also indicate, nuclear weapons expose the numerous pitfalls in the UN structure and the propensity for discord and dissonance in difficult times. These tendencies are not exclusive to nuclear weapons but apply to UN action across virtually every issue area. But none of the obstacles discussed here is, as yet, insurmountable. At the outset, we sought to determine if the United Nations does and should have a role to play on nuclear weapons, and, if so, what kinds of challenges and issues the current environment poses.

The question we did not ask is whether the United Nations will play that role, whatever it might be. As always, progress will ultimately depend on member states wanting to make the system work, not just for their own purposes but for those of the collectivity. Here a particular burden falls most crucially on the permanent members of the Council. The
Charter grants and enshrines for them a leadership role – it is up to them to take it.

Notes

15. The Council took the opportunity to note that Iraq was a member of the NPT and to call on Israel to put its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.


24. In 1945 the US Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, was one of the few to articulate this possibility. In a note to US President Truman he stated: “To approach any world peace organization of any pattern . . . without an appreciation by the leaders of our country of the power of this new weapon, would seem to be unrealistic. No system of control heretofore considered would be adequate to control this menace. Both inside any particular country and between the nations of the world, the control of this weapon will undoubtedly be a matter of the greatest difficulty and would involve such thorough-going rights of inspection and internal controls as we have never heretofore contemplated.” Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1947), 636.


32. For additional information, see <http://www.icnnd.org/> (accessed 30 October 2008).

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations University.

United Nations University Press
United Nations University, 53-70, Jingumae 5-chome, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 150-8925, Japan
Tel: +81-3-5467-1212 Fax: +81-3-3406-7345
E-mail: sales@hq.unu.edu general enquiries: press@hq.unu.edu
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United Nations University Office at the United Nations, New York
2 United Nations Plaza, Room DC2-2062, New York, NY 10017, USA
Tel: +1-212-963-6387 Fax: +1-212-371-9454
E-mail: unuona@ony.unu.edu

United Nations University Press is the publishing division of the United Nations University.

Cover design by Joyce C. Weston

Printed in United States of America

ISBN 978-92-808-1167-4

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-9280811674 (pbk.)
JZ5675.U53 2009
341.7/34—dc22 2009006980
The United Nations and Nuclear Orders
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Recent tensions surrounding the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, as well as the shocking revelations of A.Q. Khan’s atomic bazaar, have drawn attention to the role of the United Nations in addressing a host of nuclear challenges. Yet the world organization’s role has largely been absent from both scholarly and policy research. *The United Nations and Nuclear Orders* fills this void by shedding light on the past, present and future roles of the UN in responding to the threats and challenges posed by nuclear weapons.

This book brings together a world-class team of authors to examine UN actors, tools and issues associated with the changing nature of the environment in which it operates; the ways in which it has and might respond to technological and political problems; and the questions and difficulties that arise for the world organization. Issues covered in the book include doctrinal questions on the use of force, the regional dynamics of nuclear proliferation and the growing concern that the nuclear order established by the Non-Proliferation Treaty may collapse or simply be overtaken by events.

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ISBN 978-92-808-1167-4
300p US$34.00

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