Security Sector Reform *and* Post-Conflict Peacebuilding

Edited by
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and Hans-Georg Ehrhart

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Contents

1

Post-conflict societies and the military: Challenges and problems of security sector reform

Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart

In post-conflict societies, the remnants of wartime military and security apparatuses pose great risks to internal security: inflated armies with little or no civilian control; irregular and paramilitary forces; an over-abundance of arms and ammunition in private and government hands; weak internal security forces; and a lack of trust in and legitimacy of the government's control over police and military forces.[1] Peacekeeping troops from other nations, regional organizations, and the United Nations attempt to support political and economic transition processes and the transition of wartime security systems. Without a secure environment and a security system that ensures security even after the departure of international peace operations, political, economic, and cultural rebuilding are impossible. The latter can take place only in an environment where the local security sector is subjected to a rigorous democratization process, putting the security forces in the service of society's safety, not its destruction, and where both internal and external security forces are contributing constructively to the rebuilding of process.

Reflecting on the experiences and analyses of an international group of academics and practitioners from various educational and professional backgrounds and diverse cultures of analysis and reflection, this book examines the role of local and external actors – with a focus on military forces – in meeting the challenge of sustainable post-conflict security sector reform.[2] Following analyses of the key challenges of security sector reform and the roles particularly of international peace operations in addressing the security needs of post-conflict societies, case studies

from Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America put these discussions in a regional and global context.

Post-conflict peacebuilding and the military

In a historic perspective, people directly concerned in violent conflict had to bear the consequences and the burden of reconstruction primarily on their own. In the post-international world a new understanding is emerging that it is in the very interest of the world society – for moral reasons, but more so for strategic and security reasons – to care about violent conflicts and their devastating consequences for regional, international, and human security. Not only the termination of war but also the rebuilding of post-war societies have become both livelihood and security issues. It was former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali who, in his *Agenda for Peace*, introduced the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding as an important step in the sequence of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping.[3] He briefly defines post-conflict peacebuilding as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict".[4] The concept has become an inherent component in the UN's efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts, and to preserve peace. According to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan:

By post-conflict peace-building, I mean actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation. Experience has shown that the consolidation of peace in the aftermath of conflict requires more than purely diplomatic and military action, and that an integrated peace-building effort is needed to address the various factors that have caused or are threatening a conflict. Peace-building may involve the creation or strengthening of national institutions, monitoring elections, promoting human rights, providing for reintegration and rehabilitation programmes, and creating conditions for resumed development. Peace-building does not replace ongoing humanitarian and development activities in countries emerging from crisis. It aims rather to build on, add to, or reorient such activities in ways designed to reduce the risk of a resumption of conflict and contribute to creating the conditions most conducive to reconciliation, reconstruction and recovery.[5]

Post-conflict peacebuilding is a complex and multidimensional, genuinely political process of transformation from a state of war or violent conflict to one of stability and peace, requiring, according to Kofi Annan, "a multifaceted approach, covering diplomatic, political and economic factors".[6] It embraces security, political, social, economic, and psycho-social dimensions, and it aims at the installation of both

negative and, in the longer run, positive peace. While it is necessary to define appropriate measures and timetables (including exit strategies) and, in the interest of sustainability, to ensure transfer of ownership to local actors, this becomes a particularly difficult and cumbersome undertaking when the required multifaceted approach is not paralleled by "high-level strategic and administrative coordination" among the different actors involved in post-conflict peacebuilding tasks.[7] Moreover, in the interest of sustainability, coordination with local partners has to lead towards transfer of responsibilities. As the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) notes, "the long-term aim of international actors in a post-conflict situation is 'to do themselves out of a job'... by creating political processes which require local actors to take over responsibility both for rebuilding their society and for creating patterns of cooperation between antagonistic groups".[8]

The roles of security forces – external and internal – and the process of security sector reform are key ingredients of the post-conflict peacebuilding agenda. Among the primary conditions for starting a process of conflict transformation and the rebuilding of political institutions, security, and economic structures is a secure environment.[9] That is the point where external military forces must be at hand to cope with such diverse tasks as the reinstallation of order, support for local security forces, disarmament of combatants, facilitation of security sector reform, protection of elections, demining, and securing the repatriation of refugees and protection of human rights. This is only possible if the activities of external military forces are integral parts of the overall transformation process of the post-conflict society concerned.

Military forces in even the most advanced democracies are themselves in a process of change. We are witnessing the emergence of a postmodern military that is characterized by six challenges. First, the traditional values of honour and fatherland are increasingly challenged by universal values such as freedom, democracy, and justice. Second, although fighting capacities remain important, other tasks – so-called missions other than war – are gaining relevance. The postmodern soldier is not only a fighter but also a peacekeeper, policeman, diplomat, social worker, and Peace Corps worker. Third, the example of the 2003 Iraq war and the wider war on terrorism notwithstanding, there is growing pressure for international legitimization of any kinds of external intervention. Fourth, the military is increasingly becoming internationalized. Multinational forces such as NATO's Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, the EU's Eurocorps, and the UN Standby High Readiness Brigade are examples for this process. Fifth, an ongoing "revolution in military affairs" is changing the way of war fighting and of intervention. Sixth, post-

modern soldiers are confronted with a growing privatization of violence and the looming security dilemma this produces.[10]

The military is an institution of the state, and as such primarily an instrument to assure external security for the state and its society. Since the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the UN Charter, international law prohibits states from using the military as an aggressive instrument to exert state power within or outside of its borders. Since then two main concepts circumscribe the role of the military: defence (of national territory) and deterrence (of potential aggressors). Although these concepts will continue to play a significant role in military planning, they are becoming less relevant in a changing security environment in which, as already mentioned, international security threats are increasingly defined by intrastate, not interstate, conflicts. Internal conflicts have the potential to destabilize entire regions. In some regions (including Africa) such conflicts have become a permanent feature, similar to military dictatorships and *coups d'état* in the past. More developed, supposedly more peaceful regions of the world, such as Europe, are certainly not excluded from such threats. Ethnic and territorial conflicts have become commonplace events since the end of the Cold War. The disastrous consequences of these conflicts, including humanitarian catastrophes, massive refugee movements, regional destabilization, and organized crime and terrorism – and particularly the latter – have triggered not only political but increasingly military responses by the international community.

Leaving the legitimacy of the international war on terror aside, the success of humanitarian interventions (or, according to the ICISS, "interventions for human protection purposes") and complex peace operations in the post-Cold War years has been mixed. The UN's report on reforming UN peace operations offered a wide range of proposals to plan, implement, and train for future peace missions.[11] In general, the United Nations and regional groupings are beginning to show serious concern as to how to prepare for improved and more effective operations that support both negative peace (i.e. the absence of direct violence) and positive peace (i.e. the creation of political, economic, and social conditions to support sustainable justice and security).[12] Moreover, since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 (9/11), the international war on terrorism has left a strong imprint on international involvement in post-war peacebuilding engagements, given the fear that unstable states and post-war societies provide an ideal breeding ground for terrorist training and activity.[13]

Militaries of troop-contributing countries to peace operations are faced with the following challenges. Traditional functions of national defence and deterrence give way to, or are complemented by, capacities to engage in conflict prevention, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and the

restoration of security and order. The main goal of military activities is no longer exclusively the defeat and elimination of an adversary, but the creation of a safe environment for a comprehensive and inclusive post-conflict political and social order. The deployment of intervention forces is often the first step towards the consolidation of peace. Soldiers must not think and act primarily in military categories, but must consider the political consequences of their actions and act as mediators and negotiators. Military personnel must cooperate intensively with both police and civilian components of today's complex peace operations.[14] Nevertheless, in the case of post-Taliban Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) supports the consolidation of peace while – on a different front – Operation Enduring Freedom engages in military combat against remnant Taliban forces as part of the war on terrorism. Thus separating the tasks of defeating and eliminating an adversary and creating a safe environment for the consolidation of a comprehensive and inclusive post-conflict political and social order – as mentioned above – confronts both internal and external military and other security forces with a difficult challenge: to establish and maintain "in the security sector institutions and procedures that are both effective in carrying out their missions and consistent with democracy and the rule of law".[15]

Intervening troops operate in an environment of fragile peace and order. They are confronted by military and paramilitary troops who must be integrated into post-conflict society after months or years of engagement in violent struggles against each other and the civilian population. In most post-conflict societies political institutions are absent or greatly weakened, there is an overabundance of war ordnance and weaponry, there is little or no civilian control over military and police, and mistrust and economic scarcity determine political and social relations. Both external and domestic actors are expected to cooperate in an effort to transform this delicate and fragile environment into sustainable peace. The gradual creation of democratic and legitimate state institutions and a functioning civil society is a key task on this road towards stability. And so are efforts to ensure that civil-military relations are restructured and are based on democratic principles, so that military and police forces enhance, not threaten, the security of state and society.

We are faced with a twofold transformation process. On the one hand military forces of troop-contributing third-party countries must address and meet the new challenges of peacekeeping, peace support, and peace-building tasks. On the other hand military, paramilitary, and police forces in war-torn societies must be transformed and integrated into acceptable, legitimate, and democratic security structures and actors. This book addresses these challenges as they concern both external and internal mili-

tary forces, as well as their interaction, in the creation of an enabling environment for broader and sustainable peacebuilding performance.

The role of the military in security sector reform: Providing and receiving assistance

As noted in the preceding section, militaries have a crucial role to play in post-conflict peacebuilding. External militaries help facilitate the political, economic, and social transformation from a society that has been at war to a society that is able to follow a path towards long-term peace. The sheer presence of military forces might discourage the return to violence. Also, troops are engaged in active rebuilding tasks. Yet local militaries must continue to provide these security tasks on the ground once external forces return home; thus inadequate security sector reform will put post-conflict societies back on the slope towards violence and disintegration.

Effective peacebuilding requires a thorough reform of a society's security sector – a process that requires active involvement of military, economic, and political actors.[16] The "security sector" includes "all those organizations that have the authority to use, or order the use of, force or threat of force, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management and oversight".[17] It includes military and paramilitary forces; intelligence services; police forces, border guards, and custom services; judicial and penal systems; and respective civil structures that are responsible for their management and oversight.[18] The OECD DAC Guidelines on Security System and Governance Reform define the broader security system, "which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework" as consisting of the following key elements.[19]

- Core security actors: armed forces; police; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards; intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coastguards; customs authorities; and reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, militias).
- Security management and oversight bodies: the executive; national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, and foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit and planning units); and civil society organizations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).

- Justice and law enforcement institutions: judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; and customary and traditional justice systems.
- Non-statutory security forces with whom donors rarely engage: liberation armies; guerilla armies; private bodyguard units; private security companies; and political party militias.[20]

In post-conflict situations internal and external actors must cooperate in mutually reinforcing the socio-economic, governance, and security dimensions of a highly fragile environment. The result must be an integrated approach to development, the strengthening of structures that allow for the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the prevention of violent conflict. Thus security sector reform has to be seen within the larger, multidimensional, political, economic, and societal framework of post-conflict peacebuilding. While the contributions to this book refer to this broader context, the focus is on the role and challenge of security sector reform as a contribution to peacebuilding. Furthermore, while the studies realize that the security sector (or security system) encompasses a much wider range of actors that are necessary to sustain successful reform efforts, the focus in the case studies presented in this book is on what the OECD Guidelines consider primarily the "core security actors" within the security system. The same applies to the role of external actors: the focus is on military contributions, as well as civilian partners in military peace support operations.

What are some of the key tasks for internal and external actors when reforming a society's security sector?[21]

- The peacetime capacity of military forces must be strengthened. There is a need for clear mechanisms for accountability; for a shift from being a threat to society to being a provider of security, and balancing resources spent on military compared to overall security sector spending; for reorientation of the military away from domestic politics; for overcoming ethnic and other divisions within the military; and for adjustment of training and education.
- The peacetime capacity of police forces must be strengthened. Police forces are important for community security, and thus economic and social development; they must overcome their bias towards certain parts of the population; police must serve the entire population, without preferences; human rights abuses by police forces must be checked and eliminated; and there must be support for border guards and customs services to prevent corruption, criminalization, and illicit trade.
- The peacetime capacity of judicial and penal systems must be strengthened. There is a need for investment in courts and prisons; prevention of the politicization of judicial appointments, delays of trials, and corruption; and the creation of an effective and impartial judicial system.

- Civilian management and review and evaluation must be strengthened. The goals here are to strengthen civilian expertise in defence, justice, and internal ministries; to establish independent audit offices; to establish civilian review boards for police forces and penal institutions; and to create parliamentary committees to cover defence, policing, and internal affairs.
- Respect for human rights and the rule of law must be promoted and guaranteed. It is important to instil respect for fundamental human and legal rights of citizens; to strengthen public legitimacy by making security forces trustworthy; and to make security forces focus on their central task, which is provision of security, not involvement in the political process and governance.
- Monitoring of security sector policy must be implemented and maintained. There is a need to build and strengthen a well-informed and independent civil society sector (NGOs, professional associations, independent media, and research and advocacy institutions); to review accountability and efficiency of the security sector; and to ensure that security sector monitoring is maintained after external assistance has been withdrawn.
- Transparency must be strengthened. It is crucial to strengthen effective oversight of the security sector by making their activities more transparent; to develop and publish regular official statements on security policy; to increase transparency in budgeting, accounting, and auditing; and to reduce corruption and waste in security sector programmes and activities.
- Regional confidence-building mechanisms must be promoted. It is important to encourage the establishment and strengthening of sub-regional organizations; to encourage external commitment to funding these organizations and strengthening their conflict prevention and mediation and resolution mechanisms; to include civil society in regional dialogues; and to promote and support regional civil society development and dialogue.
- Demobilization and long-term reintegration must be prioritized. This includes demobilization and disarming; reintegration of ex-combatants; reintegration of child soldiers; job training and creation; and long-term reform programmes to ensure security for ex-combatants and their families.
- Proliferation of small arms must be limited. In this context it is important to collect arms; to initiate buy-back programmes; and to enhance border control and internal security mechanisms to avoid the spread of small-arms.
- Finally, security sector reform must be integrated and mainstreamed into political dialogue and cooperation. This includes mainstreaming

security sector reform in development schemes and programmes,[22] and mainstreaming security sector reform in military and political post-conflict presence, including protectorates and quasi-protectorates. It also requires the provision of financial assistance conditional on successful security sector reform; the provision of external assistance limited to non-military use, or limitation of such spending on military forces; and the provision of clearly accounted, transparent, and audited defence budget requirements for political dialogue and development assistance.

Many of these tasks are part and parcel of post-conflict peace settlements and operation mandates (for example, the General Framework Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina). The challenge is to integrate them in all peace operations *and* to create mechanisms to ensure their functioning beyond the presence of foreign/international troops. All of these tasks are crucial components of a peacebuilding mission; crucial for short-term stabilization and long-term conflict prevention. All of these tasks highlight the interphase between human security principles; the social, economic, and political dimension of post-conflict peacebuilding; and security sector reform. The focus on the security needs of individuals and communities in post-conflict peace missions requires the linkage of political, economic, legal, social, and security sector reform. None of them can be advanced in isolation of the others.

External actors are tasked with two important issues. First, putting security sector reform on the right path during the period of external presence; and second, ensuring that local actors are efficiently trained and resourced to continue that work. At the same time, internal actors must collaborate with external security providers and deliver noticeable results – otherwise external actors lose interest and political and financial backing. Key obstacles in this process are that internal élites are often not interested in transparency, accountability, and legitimacy, while external actors are often not interested in long-term commitment.

As primarily non-military actors provide political, economic, and social assistance, military actors must respect the ''do no harm'' principle; that is, avoid making things worse than they already are.[23] They provide internal security to facilitate economic and political normalization (such as the return of refugees or preparation for elections). They disarm warring parties and neutralize peace spoilers who threaten to reignite the flames of war and intergroup hatred. External militaries secure the post-conflict environment; assist in reforming the security sector; and contribute to reconstruction. This is the main domain of their post-conflict activities, which, at the pre-conflict stage, affect the key sovereign rights of states and are virtually impossible to address without the consent of a reform-oriented government.

Structure and contents of the book

In summary, the aims of the book are to assess the role and place of military forces in post-conflict peacebuilding activities. This is done through thematic and country case studies that draw on primarily post-Cold War experiences in different regions of the world, and assessments of the opportunities, flaws, and challenges for internal and external militaries involved in post-conflict situations. The book concludes with an assessment of general and case-specific recommendations for improved performance in security sector reform.

The contributors to this volume agree that military forces have critical roles to play in the short- and long-term success of post-conflict peacebuilding, while they can be highly counterproductive if not tied into overall peace processes. External militaries must create a basic security environment to allow other peacebuilding efforts to succeed and to prevent internal forces from spoiling the fragile stability created in most post-conflict environments. Internal forces must be put under democratic control, and restructured and retrained to become an asset, not a liability, in the long-term peacebuilding process. The contributions to this book explore these issues by analysing the role of external forces (as part of peacekeeping/peace operations); of internal forces (in the context of security sector reform efforts); and of the interaction of external and internal forces.

The first part of the volume focuses on the record and challenges of security sector reform, as well as training requirements for peace operations in the post-conflict environment. In Chapter 2, "Security sector reform and donor policies", Dylan Hendrickson and Andrzei Karkoszka offer a comprehensive account of the challenges of security sector reform, with a particular focus on the role of the international donor community. They note that the importance of security sector reform for not only national but also regional and international security has only slowly been appreciated by international security assistance providers and recipient societies. Still, recipients of such assistance are sceptical concerning the conditions attached to reform efforts, and attempts by external actors to force their own institutional and structural preferences on societies in post-conflict transition. As Hendrickson and Karkoszka argue, "Past security assistance programmes were often ill-conceived and poorly implemented." Successful security sector reform ensures that weak, fragile states will not descend into violence and disorder. In addition, it helps consolidate good, responsible, and accountable governance. They emphasize that close cooperation between local stakeholders and the international donor community is crucial in ensuring successful reform efforts, irrespective of who has initiated and pressed them. They also caution us

about the potentially detrimental effects of the war on terrorism on security sector reform in countries where state compliance is needed to suppress terrorist elements. In some such cases, repressive states and security apparatuses will be strengthened as their authoritarian grip on power is considered to be useful in fighting terrorism.

In Chapter 3, "African armed forces and the challenges of security sector transformation", Rocky Williams discusses the broader concept of security sector transformation in the African context. He shows that while in some cases externally encouraged and driven security sector reforms have increased political stability, in other cases the exact opposite happened. Security sector transformation can only be accomplished if it reaches far beyond the military security context: an entire array of institutional, economic, social, and political factors affect the impact that security sector reform might have on a country's internal and external stability. Thus, assistance strategies have to be highly contextual, "thoroughly indigenized and imbued with practical, local content", otherwise they will merely result in ill-suited imitations of non-African systems.

In Chapter 4, "Military forces training for post-conflict peacebuilding operations", Fernando Isturiz focuses on the particular training requirements for military personnel participating in multinational peace support operations. He notes that peacebuilding entails tasks that are not adequately addressed by conventional military doctrine and training. While he acknowledges that some troop-contributing nations are wary of the negative impact that peacebuilding might have on the combat-readiness of their troops, he also emphasizes that peacebuilding missions offer unique opportunities to expose military troops to varied in-theatre environments that generate useful skills even for conventional warfare. Moreover, participation in multinational operations offers direct experience with the challenges inherent in coalition warfare efforts. Thus, participation in post-conflict peace support operations is in fact a win-win situation – for the contributing troops and their militaries, as well as for the receiving societies whose security can be maintained in part only by the presence of international military forces. However, as Isturiz cautions, the unique challenges posed by post-conflict peace operations have to be recognized in national military training. Not doing so, and sending troops unprepared for peacebuilding environments, would be irresponsible, as post-conflict societies deserve, in Isturiz's words, "much more than amateur peacekeepers".

The remainder of the book engages in many of the issues raised in the preceding, primarily conceptual, chapters and reflects on these in the context of specific cases of post-conflict transition societies. The second part of the book focuses on experiences from Europe: the chapters reflect on post-conflict experiences in Macedonia, Bosnia, Russia, Georgia, and

Northern Ireland. In Chapter 5, ''Ethnic-military relations in Macedonia'', Biljana Vankovska shows that security sector reform in Macedonia has been driven largely by ethnic-military relations, as opposed to democracy building and civil-military relations. Interethnic reconciliation processes were thus initially more important, as they created the basic foundation on which to build security sector reform. In Chapter 6, ''Democratization in Bosnia: A more effective role for SFOR'', Allison Ritscher discusses the role of SFOR, and particularly American forces, in democratization efforts in Bosnia. When ''post-conflict peacebuilding is no longer a charitable act but a strategic necessity'', the military's role must be redefined not only to secure a negative peace but to build a positive peace. It is this expanded role that should, according to Ritscher, guide American approaches to future peacebuilding missions. In Chapter 7, ''The use of Russia's security structures in the post-conflict environment'', Ekaterina Stepanova examines the roles that non-military security components, such as the Ministry of the Interior's troops and special units, played in post-conflict missions within Russia. She argues that, while there is much that can be done to reform the Russian security sector, Western models and approaches are not always applicable. While external support and advice are welcome, they would resonate more effectively with Russian decision-makers if they came from the United Nations, rather than NATO in particular. In Chapter 8, ''Civil-military relations and security sector reform in a newly independent transitional state: The Georgian case'', David Darchiashvili analyses Georgian efforts towards security sector reform. Similar to Vankovska's findings, he argues that long-standing issues of national security and internal conflicts are crucial prerequisites to meaningful reform. At the same time, external support and encouragement cannot replace the need for societal consensus and widespread internal agreement on the structure and nature of the country's security structure. The final European case study is offered by Stefan Wolff. In Chapter 9, ''The politics of fear versus the politics of intimidation: Security sector reform in Northern Ireland'', he shows that in the case of a peace process hampered by what he calls the politics of fear and intimidation, security sector reform has little chance to take firm hold. Two issues have been particularly important in this context for Northern Ireland: the importance of broadly accepted peace agreements that address both security needs and political aspirations of all conflicting parties; and the presence of positive and strong leadership capable of generating a broad consensus on the peace process and efforts to marginalize spoilers set on derailing such public support.

The third part of the book features experiences from Latin America, including El Salvador, Guatemala, Columbia, Chile, and Haiti. In Chap-

ter 10, "Civil-military relations in Latin America: The post-9/11 scenario and the civil society dimension", Andrés Serbin and Andrés Fontana discuss the challenges of building a consensus on the role of the military within and among Latin American countries, and on their relations with the USA, particularly in the context of redefined regional security priorities after 11 September 2001. Their chapter highlights the regional and international dimensions of domestic security sector reform, and the importance of close and interactive dialogue between the military and civil society to preserve Latin America's young and fragile democracies despite the USA's sudden shift of focus away from democratization to the promotion of strong security structures. In Chapter 11, "The military in post-conflict societies: Lessons from Central America and prospects for Colombia", Thomas C. Bruneau analyses post-conflict El Salvador and Guatemala and draws lessons for the current situation in Colombia. The former two have experienced relative peace and relative success in democratization, although El Salvador's progress in reforming its security sector has been by far more positive than the experience in Guatemala. Despite Columbia's much longer experience with democracy, its society has not been able to secure basic domestic peace. Bruneau would agree with Vankovska and Darchiashvili that ongoing conflicts must be resolved before security sector reform can be pursued with a modicum of success. Thus, first military might has to create peace, which will then allow the renegotiation of a less prominent role of the military in society. In Chapter 12, "Civil-military relations and national reconciliation in Chile in the aftermath of the Pinochet affair", Nibaldo H. Galleguillos shows that national reconciliation (in the form of the arrest of the former dictator Augusto Pinochet in 1999) was a basic prerequisite for political negotiations on civil-military reform. Nevertheless, although the chance existed to capitalize on this opportunity to come to terms with the past, including the armed forces' role during Pinochet's oppressive regime, continuing protection of the armed forces by national political and judicial élites has so far prevented meaningful reconciliation and thus meaningful and popularly supported and acceptable security sector reform. In Chapter 13, "The role of the military in democratization and peacebuilding: The experiences of Haiti and Guatemala", Chetan Kumar argues that, drawing on observations from those two case studies, post-conflict peacebuilding cannot take place – or succeed – without the military and supportive social classes, particularly if they have been highly dominant political actors during much of these countries' histories. Similar to Wolff's assessment of Northern Ireland, Kumar argues that "there is a need to bring the traditional backers of the military into a wider intersectoral consensus on the broad parameters of peaceful change".

The final part of the book offers experiences from Asia, with case studies from Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan. In Chapter 14, "Security sector reform in Cambodia", Sophie Richardson and Peter Sainsbury offer their account of a mostly mixed security sector reform effort in Cambodia. Along the lines of Kumar's assessment, they come to the conclusion that the military has to be integrated into the broader reform process, otherwise the former military élite will sabotage reforms. In addition, security sector reform alone is a mute exercise without further political and social reforms. In Chapter 15, "International force and political reconstruction: Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan", William Maley shows that one size definitely does not fit all when it comes to external peace support operations. He argues that, in the cases of post-conflict Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan, mistakes were made based on the assumption that a common approach to security sector reform would yield equally positive results. He argues that "the wider character of the state, the nature of the conflict which led to international action, and the character of local actors will need to be taken into account in designing assistance measures". He identifies commitment to sustainable peacebuilding as the single most important factor that separates potential for success from potential for failure in post-conflict peace operations. In the final chapter of this volume, "Post-conflict societies and the military: Recommendations for security sector reform", Hans-Georg Ehrhart and Albrecht Schnabel take stock of the analyses presented in the book's case-study chapters and offer a series of recommendations to improve the effectiveness of security sector reform in post-conflict societies.

While lessons across various case studies are particularly useful to regional and international actors which are involved in numerous post-conflict theatres simultaneously, local, regional, and national actors are better served with case-specific experiences and advice. This book attempts to satisfy both of those needs, and thus focuses on general, thematic, and cross-regional challenges as well as case-specific experiences. The editors hope that readers will find value in each individual chapter, as well as in the volume as a whole, for their own analysis and practical work.

Notes

1. Newman, Edward and Albrecht Schnabel. 2002. "Introduction: Recovering from civil conflict", in Edward Newman and Albrecht Schnabel (eds) *Recovering from Civil Conflict: Reconciliation, Peace and Development*. London: Frank Cass, pp. 1–6.

2. Throughout the volume the terms "security sector reform" and "security sector transformation" are occasionally used interchangeably. In line with Rocky Williams's definition in his chapter, "security sector reform" is the more widely used and recognizable term, yet in some parts of the world the word "reform" depicts a top-down approach. In contrast, the word "transformation" signifies a more holistic approach that more appropriately defines reform efforts in the security sector as those that are driven and implemented by both government and society (a simultaneous top-down and bottom-up approach).

3. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. 1992. *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, A/47/277–S/24111. New York: United Nations.

4. *Ibid.*, para. 21. For Boutros-Ghali's more detailed description of post-conflict peacebuilding tasks, see paras 55–59.

5. United Nations. 1998. *The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa*, Report of the UN Secretary-General, A/52/871–S/1998/318. New York: United Nations, para. 63.

6. *Ibid.*, para. 64.

7. *Ibid.*

8. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. 2001. *The Responsibility to Protect*. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, para. 5.31.

9. See, for instance, Tschirgi, Neclâ. 2004. "Post-conflict peacebuilding revisited: Achievements, limitations, challenges", background paper for the WSP International/IPA Peacebuilding Forum Conference, 7 October, New York, p. 9.

10. Ehrhart, Hans-Georg. 2002. "Militärische Macht als außenpolitisches Instrument im 21. Jahrhundert," *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, No. 6, pp. 683–690.

11. United Nations. 2000. *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305–S/2000/809. New York: General Assembly/Security Council, 21 August. See also Blagescu, Monica and Albrecht Schnabel (eds). 2002. *Reforming UN Peace Operations: New Challenges for Peacekeeping Training*, Proceedings of the 2001 Annual Meeting of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres. Tokyo: United Nations University.

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13. See the presentations at the panel entitled "Combating Terrorism and its Implications for Security Sector Reform", Seventh Annual Conference of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, Bucharest, 15 June 2004. A selection of these presentations is forthcoming in the consortium's quarterly journal *Connections*, Vol. IV, 2005.

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Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding

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Military and police forces play a crucial role in the long-term success of political, economic and cultural rebuilding efforts in post-conflict societies. Yet, while charged with the long-term task of providing a security environment conducive to rebuilding war-torn societies, internal security structures tend to lack civilian and democratic control, internal cohesion and effectiveness, and public credibility. They must be placed under democratic control and restructured and retrained to become an asset, not a liability, in the long-term peacebuilding process. External actors from other nations, regional organizations and the United Nations can be of assistance in this process, by creating a basic security environment, preventing remnants of armed groups from spoiling the fragile peacebuilding process, and by facilitating reform of the local security sector.

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