The dark side of globalization
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Introduction: Globalization and transnational uncivil society

Jorge Heine and Ramesh Thakur

This changing world presents us with new challenges. Not all effects of globalization are positive; not all non-State actors are good. There has been an ominous growth in the activities of the drug-traffickers, gun-runners, money-launderers, exploiters of young people for prostitution. These forces of “uncivil society” can be combated only through global cooperation, with the help of civil society.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 1998

It has been said that being against globalization is like being against the sun coming up every morning, and about as fruitful. That may or may not be the case, but there is little doubt that globalization, that is, the increased flow of goods, services, capital, data and cultural products across international borders, has been one of the driving forces of international affairs over the past 30 years.¹ In the light of the 2008–9 world financial crisis, some questions have been raised as to whether this will continue to be the case – the World Trade Organization reported a 12.2 per cent drop in world trade in 2009 (WTO 2010) – or whether we will enter a process of “deglobalization”. However that may be, since the Third Industrial Revolution was launched in 1980, when the first personal computer and round-the-clock television news from CNN came on the market, information technology (IT) and telematics have been bringing the world closer together and deterritorializing it. We may not be living at a time of “the end of history”, as Francis Fukuyama famously argued (1992), but a case can be made that we are moving towards “the end of geography” as we had known it. The effective, “real” cost of a telephone call from New Delhi to Denver is no different from one made from New Delhi to Mumbai.

Many regard globalization as both a desirable and an irreversible engine of commerce that will underpin growing prosperity and a higher standard of living throughout the world. Others recoil from it as the soft underbelly of corporate imperialism that plunders and profiteers on the basis of unrestrained consumerism. From one point of view, globalization has been occurring since the earliest trade expeditions (e.g. the Silk Road). International trade, as a proportion of total production in the world economy, was about the same in the 1980s as in the last two decades of the Gold Standard (1890–1913) (Bhaduri and Nayyar 1996: 67). Thus the process itself is not fundamentally new. Nevertheless, the current era of globalization is unique in the rapidity of its spread and the intensity of the interactions in real time that result.

The primary dimension of globalization concerns the expansion of economic activities across state borders, which has produced increasing interdependence through the growing volume and variety of cross-border flows of finance, investment, goods and services, and the rapid and widespread diffusion of technology. Other dimensions include the international movement of ideas, information, legal systems, organizations and people, as well as cultural exchanges.

This volume is not a comprehensive book that reviews the scholarly field of globalization. Instead, it bridges the policy–scholarship divide and addresses globalization from many of its various sides. Yet there is the need to clarify and articulate our understanding of globalization for the purposes of this volume; to specify the different dimensions of globalization at different levels of analysis; to be explicit about the unattractive baggage that might come with the desirable elements of globalization (e.g. the threats to cultural and policy autonomy) in the uneven impact of globalization, on the one hand, and the elements that are regarded as harmful and undesirable by all parties, such as trafficking. This volume, then, examines globalization from various contexts: (1) as a project, (2) as a process, (3) as international and transnational processes, (4) through state responses to these different levels of globalization, and (5) civil society responses to them.

Globalization refers both to the process and to the results or end-state. By addressing the “dark side” of globalization, the benefits of the process/project can be realized with minimal negative impact with respect to consequences. As a project, moreover, it refers to the vision of an idealized end-state and the initiation of particular processes in order to hasten the achievement of that end-state by those who embrace the vision. The process/project debate will be bridged to demonstrate how globalization is characterized by elements of both: globalization is not a natural process, rather it is implemented by humans for specific aims.

Still, even in this age of globalization, the movement of people continues to be restricted and strictly regulated. Moreover, growing eco-
nomic interdependence is highly asymmetrical: the benefits of linking and the costs of delinking are not equally distributed among partners. Industrialized countries are highly interdependent in relations with one another; developing countries are largely independent in economic relations with one another; and developing countries are highly dependent on industrialized countries. Contrary to public perceptions, compared to the postwar period, the average rate of world growth decelerated during the age of globalization: from 3.5 per cent per capita per annum in the 1960s, to 2.1, 1.3, and 1.0 per cent in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, respectively (Nayyar 2006: 137–59, 153–4). And there has been a growing divergence, not convergence, in income levels between countries and peoples, with widening inequality among and within nations (2006: 153–6). Assets and incomes are more concentrated. Wage shares have fallen while profit shares have risen. Capital mobility alongside labour immobility has reduced the bargaining power of organized labour. The rise in unemployment and the increase in informal sector employment has generated an excess supply of labour and depressed real wages in many countries. In the developed countries, too, globalization came to be blamed for the destruction of the manufacturing base and a “scam” by corporations to exploit cheap labour. The widespread public anger against the top financial and banking executives in 2009–10 was rooted in a powerful sense of unfairness at the stringent austerity imposed on workers and retirees while the senior executives continued to award themselves lavish bonuses. The result was that at the January 2010 World Economic Forum gathering in Davos – the very symbol and bastion of globalization – some of the most powerful delegates challenged the basic tenets of globalization (Bremmer 2010; Ignatius 2010).

Thus globalization creates losers as well as winners and entails risks as well as provides opportunities. As an International Labour Organization blue-ribbon panel noted, the problems lie not in globalization per se, but in the “deficiencies in its governance” (World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization 2004: xi). The deepening of poverty and inequality – prosperity for a few countries and people, marginalization and exclusion for many – has implications for social and political stability, again among as well as within states (Nayyar 2002). The rapid growth of global markets has not seen a parallel development of social and economic institutions to ensure their smooth and efficient functioning, labour rights have been less assiduously protected than capital and property rights, and the global rules on trade and finance are unfair to the extent that they produce asymmetric effects on rich and poor countries.

This is why many countries, especially developing countries, were worried even before the financial crisis of 2008–9 that the forces of globalization would impinge adversely on their economic sovereignty, cultural integrity and social stability. “Interdependence” among unequals amounts
to the dependence of some on international markets that function under
the dominance of others. The 2008–9 crisis confirmed dramatically that, in
the absence of effective regulatory institutions to underpin them, globali-
ization and liberalization can cause weak civil society to be overwhelmed
by rampant transnational forces.

Globalization has brought many benefits. The proportion of people
under the poverty line in the world has dropped considerably since 1980.
This has been driven in part by the high growth rates in Asia – especially,
but not only, in the Asian giants, China and India. The emergence of these
and other emerging powers, like Brazil, South Africa, Turkey and Indone-
sia, is not unrelated to the capacity of these nations to navigate the treach-
erous waters of an increasingly globalized economy. There are countless
ways in which the internet and IT have facilitated access and made the
life of peasants and poor people across the developing world easier and
better.

The purpose of this book, however, is to deal with the dark side of
globalization – that is, the negative forces unleashed as a result of the
compression of space and time made possible by modern technology. The
forces of globalization have also let loose the infrastructure of uncivil so-
ciety and accelerated the transnational flows of terrorism, drug traffick-
ing, organized crime and diseases like AIDS. “Uncivil society” is a portman-
teau term for a wide range of disruptive and threatening elements that
have emerged in the space between the individual and the state and that
lie outside effective state control. It merges into “the dark side of globali-
ization” as it becomes transnationalized. According to former United
Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, networks of terrorism, drug traf-
ficking and organized crime are all forces of global uncivil society that
are rapidly growing as a result of the transnationalization of uncivil
forces. In the words of another UN official, Sandro Calvani, the dark side
of globalization is best thought of as the “unrelenting growth of cross-
border illegal activities . . . that threaten the institutions of the State and
civil society in many countries”. Calvani’s list of criminal activities on
the dark side of globalization included human, drugs and arms trafficking;
money laundering; and piracy (Calvani 2000).

What to do?

A key challenge for developing nations at the beginning of the twenty-
first century therefore is how to contend with globalization. Two extremes
can be found in this regard: one is the outright rejection of globalization
and the retreat towards a national cocoon of sorts (along the lines of
what Burma, i.e. Myanmar, has done); the other is the full embrace of
globalization and all it entails, somewhat along the lines of what coun-
tries like Ecuador and El Salvador did at one point earlier in this decade
by adopting the US dollar as their national currency and giving up a
monetary policy of their own. This challenge is not limited to nations of
the global South. As Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia found out to
their chagrin in 2008–9, the notion that all you have to do to foster eco-
nomic growth and investment is to open up your economy and do away
with all capital controls has proven to be quite wrong – as a result of
the global financial crisis the GDP of these small nations experienced
double-digit “negative growth” in 2009. This was followed in 2010 by the
severe debt crisis in Greece that threatened the viability of the entire
eurozone.

Most observers would agree with the proposition that to cope effec-
tively with the forces of globalization, developing nations need policies
that are somewhere in between those two extremes. Lowering all barriers
to the tides of the global economy may end up drowning much of local
production. Raising barriers that are too high may be counterproductive,
if not downright futile. Those countries that are able to find that golden
middle – like, say, Singapore, or, to a lesser extent, Chile – tend to thrive
and to make the most of their international environment, channelling
the enormous opportunities offered by an expanding world economy for the
benefit of their own citizens. Those unable to find that middle – like many
in West and Central Africa – end up being marginalized and left behind,
if not taken over by the “dark side” of globalization. The case of Guinea-
Bissau, described by some as the world’s first “narco-state”, is a good
example.

The challenge posed by globalization is a double one. On the one hand,
it is vital for nations today to harness the positive forces of globalization
for their own benefit. Many opportunities that were unavailable before
have now come to the fore. Micro-states like Antigua and Barbuda, for
example, have found a niche in such a specialized and even arcane ac-
tivity as internet gambling – something that did not exist as recently as 20
years ago. This entails finding the right balance between openness and
regulation, a balance often difficult to strike. On the other hand, it im-
plies keeping an ever watchful eye over that “dark side”, that is, the ille-
gal if not downright criminal activities that thrive in the interstices of
the national and the international, and that have been facilitated by
 technological progress. Facilitating trade can also be a way of facilitating
smuggling – of guns, illegal drugs or people.

According to some estimates, this illicit trade may reach anywhere
from 1 to 3 trillion dollars in value; some consider it may be as high as 10
per cent of the global product, and it is growing at seven times the rate of
growth of legal trade (see Naím 2005). This growth in transnational flows,
in turn, has not been matched by an equivalent growth in global governance mechanisms to cope with them and what they entail. In addition to the challenge posed by globalization to individual states, then, there is a “collective action” problem. No single state can hope to deal successfully with global warming or with international crime syndicates. And this leads us to the broader issue of the link between the great powers, globalization and empire.

Globalization and imperialism

It is easy for Westerners to ignore or downplay the lingering shadows of colonialism on the memories and policies of the countries that were colonized. Afro-Asian countries achieved independence on the back of extensive and protracted nationalist struggles. The parties and leaders at the forefront of the fight for independence helped to establish the new states and shape and guide the founding principles of their foreign policies. The anti-colonial impulse was instilled in the countries’ foreign policies and survives as a powerful sentiment in the corporate memory of the elites. In their worldview, the European colonizers came to liberate the “natives” from their local tyrants, yet stayed to rule as foreign oppressors. In the name of enlightenment, they defiled lands, plundered resources and expanded their empires. Some, like the Belgians in the Congo, left only ruin, devastation and chaos whose dark shadows continue to blight. Others, like the British in India, left behind ideas, ideals and structures of good governance and the infrastructure of economic development alongside memories of national humiliation. This is why the formerly colonized countries still look for the ugly reality of geostrategic and commercial calculations camouflaged in lofty rhetoric in the actions and policies of many Western countries.

On the occasion of the Great Recession of 2008–9, there was much talk about “the end of the neoliberal era”, the 30-year period that started with the elections of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Ronald Reagan in the United States and ended with the inauguration of President Barack Obama. A strong belief in the need to roll back the power of the state and in the mantra of what came to be known in the 1990s as “the Washington Consensus” (described by others as “the Washington Contentious”) was its hallmark. Though there is some dispute about the paternity of this neoliberal revolution (the supporters of General Augusto Pinochet in Chile claim that it was launched earlier – by Chile’s military government in 19737), there is, in any event, an interesting overlap between this neoliberal programme based on deregulation, privatization and the opening up of economies, and the onset of globali-
zation, which many would posit was launched in 1980 with the Third Industrial Revolution.

And that is the gist of William Coleman’s argument in the lead chapter of this volume, “Globalization, imperialism and violence”. Coleman describes an increasingly interlinked world based on networks of global finance, trade and business, whose key pivot is the absolute mobility of capital, something that goes hand in hand with ever greater constraints on labour. In this perspective, globalization is framed as an extension of neoliberal ideals. Underpinning this neoliberal expansion is an imperialist endeavour supported by a network of US military bases across the world. Militarism and imperialism coexist, and “globalization creates the material and cultural basis for permitting imperialism to become globally more extensive and intensive”. Globalization is driven by communications technologies, which allow the creation and maintenance of elaborate worldwide networks, but do not allow for an unequivocal leader. The very nature of the structure of globalized networks, which intertwine global actors and interests, ensures that no single power – including the United States – is able to maintain its position within this newly emerging global order without making compromises with other global players.

Imperialism and colonialism have, of course, left their imprint in the global South. Although many countries in Latin America greeted the bicentennial of their independence from Spain in 2010, this does not mean that the colonial legacy of the Spanish conquista has vanished. In the course of the first decade of the twenty-first century, Latin America has undergone a process of radical political change that has left many foreign observers puzzled as to its meaning and implications, as it questions the very basis of the premise that the post-Cold War era would also be the one of the End of Ideology.8

In a fascinating essay centred on these processes of change in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, Edgardo Lander traces the origins of the movements behind this trend. Far from those who categorize them simply as populist throwbacks to an earlier era of the region’s history, he identifies the significant sectors of the population – in the case of Bolivia and Ecuador, mostly the indigenous peoples, in Venezuela the popular sector at large that had been largely excluded from the political system and the official discourse – that have now come into their own. The fact that Bolivian President Evo Morales, elected in 2005, is the first elected head of state in Latin America of Amerindian origin (he is a native Aymara) speaks volumes about this exclusion (see Van Cott 2005).

The dark side of colonialism, a precursor of contemporary globalization, was the treatment meted out to colonial subjects, something which, amazingly, persists in Latin America even today. For the colonial enterprise was framed by Eurocentric lenses and categories, within which the
aboriginal populations did not fit. The exclusion of and discrimination against the Amerindian population was thus kept alive long into the Latin American republics’ independence. It was formalized in their legal and constitutional structures, thus freezing in time social hierarchies that privilege the social classes and ethnic groups associated with Northern elites. The new constitutions in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, whatever their shortcomings, set forth a radical re-evaluation of the role and nature of the state that seeks to address, if not overcome, these historical inequalities. The enormous changes we are witnessing in Latin America, where a former metal worker and trade union leader, who lost one of his fingers on the factory floor, has become president of Brazil, where women have been elected to the presidency in Argentina and Chile, and where an Aymara high-school dropout has become president of Bolivia, are as much cultural as they are political. They are helping to leave behind one the darkest legacies of colonialism: the exclusion of vast sectors of the population from public life.

Africa, on the other hand, home to 36 of the 50 least developed states, is in many ways a paradigm of how state weakness opens the door to transnational crime and terrorism. Arguing that weak states are particularly prone to illegal transnational ventures, Garth le Pere and Brendan Vickers highlight six areas that are prevalent in the continent: the illegal exploitation of natural resources, terrorism, the drug trade, illegal migration and human trafficking, gunrunning and money laundering. They posit that transnational criminal activity as well as terrorism have “become inextricably interwoven in the fabric of globalization”. The three chapters in this introductory part lay out the changes and consistencies demonstrated between contemporary globalization and the legacy of colonialism and imperialism. Historic relationships between states and civilians are being altered in a contemporary landscape that is increasingly interconnected, leading to new challenges that transcend national boundaries and authorities.

The nature of the challenges

Part II of this volume explores many of the varying challenges facilitated by the dark side of globalization. While not an exhaustive list of the complications arising from globalization, these chapters serve as a representative sample of the pressing issues emerging today and shed light on the factors that facilitate them. How do the various expressions of what has been called “uncivil society” manifest themselves? How do they take advantage of the opportunities offered by globalization? What is it exactly that they do to make the most of the “global village”?
Much of the killing that takes place throughout the global South is inflicted by guns, many of them of illegal origin. West Africa, an area where some of the most brutal civil wars in the past two decades have taken place, has been especially afflicted by the thriving business undertaken by gunrunners, often operating on a continental basis. In a tragic twist, guns are not only produced in several of these countries and imported from abroad, but also recycled from one African conflict to another. Weapons thus find their way seamlessly from the Congo to Liberia and Sierra Leone, and back. Weak African states, unable to patrol their porous borders, are thus at the mercy of arms traffickers. Dorcas Ettang argues that sustainable security sector reforms are key to putting an end to this tragic predicament, a venture in which, in addition to the state, civil society must be enlisted.

Moving from West to Southern Africa, Charles Goredema assesses how the most prosperous region of the continent has witnessed the rise of elaborate transnational crime organizations. The illegal trafficking in narcotics, mineral resources, ivory, counterfeit products and stolen property (particularly automobiles) is thriving. International crime syndicates exploit government weaknesses to make huge profits. Illegal migration and money laundering rob the state of valuable human and material resources, in a region that desperately needs them.

A different kind of challenge is posed by insurgencies that often thrive as a result of the inequalities created by globalization. One of the countries that has made the most of the opportunities offered by IT and telematics technology has been India, a world leader in IT-enabled services, and whose 5 per cent yearly growth rate in the 1980s climbed to 6 per cent in the 1990s and to 7 per cent in the course of the first decade of this century. Yet this progress has gone hand in hand with an ever greater gap between the prosperity of urban, middle-class Indians (estimated to have reached some 300 million) and the squalor still seen in many of its 600,000 villages, where the majority of Indians still reside. In the 12-year period 1997–2008 inclusive, a total of 199,132 suicides of farmers were recorded by the National Crime Records Bureau, or an average of 16,594 per year (Sainath 2010). One reason is the vicious debt trap caused by the removal of quantitative restrictions under the WTO regime which has left the country’s small and marginal farmers exposed to the volatility of international markets and prices. With no access to crop insurance, they are easy prey for usurious moneylenders.

It is this “development dichotomy” that has allowed the Naxalite movement, originally founded in West Bengal in the late 1960s, not only to persist in much of northern and central India, but to grow as it proclaims its oddly out-of-date Maoist ideology, a belief system left behind even by the People’s Republic of China, where it originated. Ajay Mehra
frames this “old” revolutionary movement in a new context. The contrast between those states and areas where the “New India” shines and those where the “Old India” remains, exacerbating the differences between high-level consumption and prosperity patterns, on the one hand, and extreme deprivation, on the other, has generated discontent and resentment to fuel these guerrilla movements. It has also often been the aboriginal populations (the Adivasis), or scheduled tribes, and the members of the lowest caste or Dalits (the oppressed) that have suffered the most as a result of the population displacements induced by major development projects like dams. Uprooted from their ancestral lands and unable to adapt to the demands of a modern economy, they often see revolutionary redemption as the only way out of their predicament.

The Indian Naxalite insurgency does have parallels in neighbouring countries. In Nepal, the Maoist guerrilla movement was so successful that it gained power, abolished the monarchy, established a republic, and installed its leader, Prachanda, as prime minister, albeit for only a brief period. In Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) waged a savage civil war against the Sri Lankan state for a quarter of a century (from 1983 to 2009), a war that cost 70,000 lives (including those of one Sri Lankan president, one foreign minister, and that of a former Indian prime minister), but was ultimately defeated. As S. D. Muni points out, these insurgencies differ in that the Nepalese was driven by essentially political reasons, and the Sri Lankan by ethnic ones (by the Tamil minority, which comprises some 13 per cent of the population against the Sinhala majority, which reaches 80 per cent), but also in the manner in which they interacted with global forces.

Although originally linked up with the Indian Naxalite movement, the Nepalese Maoists ended up cutting those ties so as not to alienate India, a country on which Nepal heavily depends, and waging a much more traditional, nationally based guerrilla war against the Nepalese monarchy. The latter was defeated as much because of the political ineptitude of King Gayendra as because of anything else.

The LTTE, on the other hand, may well have been one of the most globalized terrorist movements anywhere. Part of the reason for its considerable, if temporary, success was the effective way it relied on the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora both to obtain resources and to marshal political support for its cause. It is estimated that it was able to raise somewhere between US$200 million and US$300 million a year for its operations, all collected from the Tamil diaspora, largely in Europe and North America. It made effective use of the latest IT and telecommunications technology, and has been the only terrorist movement to date with its own navy and air force. Ironically, much as its deployment of global networks ensured its success, while it lasted, it was also global forces that spelled its end.
After 9/11, the existence of a terrorist movement relying on global financing, however nested it might be in an island state off the Indian coast, became unacceptable to the international community. The LTTE was banned in 32 countries, many states became ready to supply arms to the Sri Lankan government to fight it, and it became only a matter of time before its time was up.

On the other hand, Rekha Chowdhary warns against the ahistorical conception of terrorism and terrorist movements that has emerged after 9/11. Focusing on Kashmir, she argues that Kashmiri militants (the word of choice in Kashmir to refer to the insurgents there, some of whom fight for an independent Kashmir and others for one that would join Pakistan) employed various tactics before resorting to violence. Of special interest is the tension she examines between local Kashmiri militant groups and foreign jihadists. The efforts of the latter to impose the Wahabi conception of Islam on Kashmiris found stiff resistance among the population of the Valley. Once again, the complex dialectic of the global and the local, a recurrent theme in this volume, plays itself out in unexpected ways in the province that has been at the heart of the simmering conflict between India and Pakistan for six decades now.

A valuable insight into the mind of jihadis is given to us by Nasra Hassan, who has been interviewing them for many years now. Hassan draws a parallel between globalization and jihad, arguing that both are focused on opening borders and on bringing about progress. Jihadists have excelled at using contemporary IT and telecoms technology to promote their cause and foster their objectives – from websites to satellite phones. Transnational crime – often in the illegal drugs trade – provides the financial resources that allow them to continue to build their networks and bring about their terrorist attacks. As Mahmoud Mamdani has observed, this link between the drug trade and terrorism is, of course, one pioneered by the CIA (see Mamdani 2004). First in South East Asia during the Vietnam War, then in Central America to finance the Contras against the Sandinistas, and then in Afghanistan to raise additional resources for the mujahedin in their fight against the Soviet Union, it was always seen as a welcome, off-budget mechanism to raise funds to help US allies. Jihadis have also perfected into an art form the international transfer of funds in ways that are essentially untraceable, by relying on ancient mechanisms that replicate the old-fashioned way Osama bin Laden gets his information – through pieces of paper brought to him by hand by loyal messengers – which is one reason he remains at large.

One product of the so-called “global war on terror” was the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Many wondered how an attack on the most secular of all Arab states was supposed to contribute to the struggle against a fundamentalist Islamic group like Al Qaeda. Moreover, the
notion of “bringing democracy to Iraq”, in a country in which 60 per cent of the population is Shia, would logically imply the establishment of a Shia majority government – and thus one in close alignment with Iran. Predictably, this is exactly what happened, as M. J. Akbar, one of India’s leading Muslim public intellectuals, argues in the final chapter of this part of the volume. By bringing to an end Saddam Hussein’s regime, the traditional “balancer” of Iran’s power in the broader Middle East, the United States has unwittingly enhanced the power of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a country it once denounced as part of the so-called “axis of evil”.

Coping with the dark side

Faced with the many challenges facilitated by contemporary globalization it is easy to lose sight of the possibilities for response. Globalization per se is not the problem – rather it is the lack of effective mechanisms of transnational governance and cooperation that provides spaces for illicit transnational organization to exploit. Responding to these actors and filling these spaces with good governance tools is essential to ensure security and stability.

One response to the global governance gaps that have made these illegal activities possible has been regionalism. In their chapter, Luk Van Langenhove and Tiziana Scaramagli argue that the transfer of state functions to supranational forms of regional governance enhances the capacity of individual states to combat the endeavours of uncivil society. This would be especially valid for neighbouring countries sharing similar security concerns, such as those associated with smuggling and other cross-border illegal activities. The sharing of expertise, institutions, policy tools, personnel and other resources can go a long way in stemming the tide of these activities. Van Langenhove and Scaramagli examine the cases of the European Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Pacific Islands Forum, the Andean Community and the Organization of American States. They focus on the normative goals of the integration movement and highlight how and why intraregional security is paramount to protect the interests of society at large and of its individual members.

A key tension often arises between intraregional cooperation and claims of state sovereignty. Yet, one of the paradoxes of contemporary globalization is how civil society organizations can use the tools of transnationalism to further seemingly old-fashioned notions of national sovereignty. One such case is that of the Hemispheric Social Alliance (HSA), analysed by Marisa von Bülow. The HSA took on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and mobilized labour and other civil society organizations across the hemisphere to stop the project. In so doing, it of-
ten brought together parties from the opposite ends of the political spectrum. The experience of the HSA demonstrates the difficulties inherent in harnessing the energies of disparate organizations and uniting them in a common cause. However, it also shows that such seemingly motley groups can succeed even when taking on a pet foreign policy project of the world's last remaining superpower. The FTAA, whose deadline for completion was 2005, was effectively dead long before that.

Another fascinating aspect of globalization is “glocalization”, that is, the interaction between the local and the global. A key challenge for local activists with a stake in an international issue is to generate sufficient interest from the national government to garner its support. In theory, conflicting issues of an international nature that involve two or more member states of a regional integration scheme should be resolved by whatever conflict resolution mechanisms that particular scheme has chosen for itself. Yet that is not always the case, as the conflict between Argentina and Uruguay over the Uruguay River paper mills shows. Although both countries are founding members of MERCOSUR, the Southern Common Market, the latter entity was unable to resolve the issue, which ended up at the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Ricardo Gutiérrez and Gustavo Almeira show how local environmental protests in the Argentine province of Entre Ríos managed, through a variety of imaginative techniques, to induce a change in Argentina’s foreign policy. A deft use of the media and of “public diplomacy” was part of the reason they succeeded, creating the most serious rift in decades between two countries that have had historically very friendly relations. The communications technology that drives globalization can also be deployed to counteract global forces by local communities – in this case a Finnish foreign direct investment project in a paper mill in Uruguay challenged by environmental activists in a small town in Argentina.

Human trafficking is one of the darkest aspects of the dark side of globalization, turning human beings into commodities that are bought and sold in the international marketplace. In so doing it inflicts untold suffering on some very vulnerable people. Women and children are among the most exposed to it. How can it be countered? Undertaking a thorough survey of websites campaigning against human trafficking, Kirsten Foot explores the myriad ways non-governmental organizations from all continents attempt to cope with this nefarious activity, and report on those involved in it.

The dark side of globalization

It remains to be seen whether the 2008–9 global financial crisis has brought to an end not only the neoliberal era that was kick-started by
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan around 1980, but also globalization as we have known it during these three decades. The collapse of the Doha Round, the first time a multilateral trade round had failed, and the 12 per cent drop in global trade in 2009 would seem to indicate, at the very minimum, a slowing down in the tempo and rate at which global flows will grow in the near future. But there is little doubt that the “dark side” of globalization, the subject of this volume, will remain with us. A better understanding of this “downside” of the transnational forces that are pulling the world together is imperative if we want to manage this complex process better. That is the purpose of this book. The chapters lay out a variety of the challenges affecting states and citizens. Though geographically and topically diverse, the challenges and responses illustrate that the dark side of globalization raises both domestic and international issues. Though facilitated by transnational and global forces, the effects are most often felt by the citizens of sovereign states. There are ample ways in which civil society can fight the negative aspects of globalization and the emergence of uncivil society at the local level. Transnational governance reforms must go hand in hand with responses from civil society.

Notes

1. A standard source on globalization is Held et al. 1999.
2. Doing so falls outside of the scope of this project. For various examinations of globalization from such a perspective, see Castells 2004; Meyer 2000; 2007; Robertson and Khonder 1998; Lechner 2009; Holton 1998; 2005.
3. For an informed perspective on this and other aspects of the economic impact of globalization, see Stiglitz 2002.
4. For a study of how organized crime syndicates have become increasingly interconnected and interdependent on a worldwide basis, see Glenny 2008. See also Naim 2005.
5. Both Annan and Calvani are cited in Rumford 2001: para. 2.2.
6. At the time, Calvani was the UN Representative in East Asia and the Pacific for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, based in Bangkok.
7. See Büchi 1993.
8. On this, see Journal of Democracy (2006), with a dossier entitled “A ‘left turn’ in Latin America?”. See also Cooper and Heine 2009; Silva 2009.

REFERENCES


Mamdani, Mahmoud (2004) Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War and the Roots of the War on Terror. New York: Pantheon.


Seen by some as a desirable and irreversible engine of prosperity and progress, globalization is resisted by others as the soft underbelly of a corporate imperialism that plunders and profiteers in the global marketplace. Globalization has brought many benefits, including the reduction of poverty in several countries. But it also has a dark side: the unleashing of negative forces as a result of the compression of time and space made possible by modern technology. Examples include the transnational flows of terrorism, drug and human trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, and global pandemics.

From arms trafficking in West Africa through armed insurgencies in South Asia and the upsurge of jihad in the age of globalization, this book examines the challenges that the dark forces of globalization pose to the international system and the responses they have triggered. Written largely by authors from developing countries, the book’s goal is to help maximize the beneficial consequences of globalization while muting its baleful effects.

“This remarkably fine book constitutes the elegant bridge between academic theorizing about globalization and the inspired anecdote of Thomas Friedman.”

Tom Farer, University Professor and past Dean, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver.

“Indispensable reading for anyone who wants to understand the full range of contents and discontents caused by globalization.”

Thomas G. Weiss, Director, Ralph Bunche Institute of International Studies, CUNY and past president, International Studies Association.

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