National Interest *and* International Solidarity

Particular and Universal Ethics in International Life

Edited by **Jean-Marc Coicaud** and **Nicholas J. Wheeler**

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Introduction: The changing ethics of power beyond borders

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This book has its origin in the intellectual and political climate of the 1990s, in the geopolitical and normative changes that followed the end of the Cold War.[1] During this period, humanitarian interventions in particular became one of the key features of international and multilateral life, and the analysis of their motivation and implementation the topic of heated debates.

Few were left indifferent to the suffering of millions of people, which international interventions were meant to alleviate. Yet, since helping meant challenging the mainstream conception of international order – a conception associated with the traditional and somewhat narrow understanding of the principle of national sovereignty (entailing non-interference in the internal affairs of other states) and of national interest – the issue of humanitarian intervention came to divide policymakers, academia and public opinion. Taking a clear and well-thought-out stand on humanitarian intervention, weighing the positive against the negative aspects, proved to be a demanding exercise.

What this book is about

Although this book originated from the issue of humanitarian intervention, it was never meant to be limited to that. Rather, from the outset the idea was to examine the relevance of the debates (arguments and

counter-arguments) generated by the question of humanitarian intervention at a more general level. Extrapolating the discussions around humanitarian intervention to a broader international environment, the aim was to gain a better understanding of the motivations of actors who intervene in areas of crisis, and their evolution. Being understood, also, that intervening actors are usually from the top echelons of the international hierarchy of power, and that the areas where the interventions take place tend to be at the weaker end of the international distribution of power.

It is in this perspective that the extent to which national interest and internationalist, or solidarity, considerations enter actors' rationale to get involved in international crises became a primary concern of the editors of and contributors to this book. Focusing on crises in the context of which it is not obvious from a traditional national-interest point of view why international actors would choose to intervene, or how committed they are to solving the crises, the goal was to evaluate the respective weights of national interest (including security) on the one hand and internationalist (solidarity) considerations on the other.

Since they are part of the framework of analysis, it may be helpful to first clarify what is, by and large, meant in this book by the notions of national interest, solidarity in general and solidarity at the international level, especially in relation to democratic values.

The question of national interest

The use and understanding of the term ''national interest'' is relatively straightforward. It refers to the self-interest of nations, how states envision their defence and projection of power beyond their borders. In this regard, traditionally, national interest has been divided into those interests that states consider core or vital, such as security, and those that relate to the promotion of more secondary interests. Moreover, the notion of national interest has historically been associated with a geopolitical understanding of international relations. Indeed, it has been felt that the pursuit of the national interest is closely linked to geography – the locations where acts unfold (for economic, energy, military or other reasons) and which constitute potential fault lines that have to be carefully watched.[2] While this geographic anchoring remains significant,[3] it has been balanced in recent times by the changes brought about by the deterritorialization of politics at the national and international level[4] – a deterritorialization that includes normative factors such as identification with human-rights imperatives, the influence that it has on individual and collective interests and values and their interaction, as well as on policies at home and abroad.

Solidarity, generally and at the international level

Considering that the initial impetus for this book was to look into the meaning of the emergence of the norm of humanitarian intervention for the greater context of the evolution of international life, the idea of solidarity was destined to be a significant signpost. Here, this idea is conceived and used first and foremost in connection with the protection of human rights. Put simply, it is a notion that invokes the need to help people who are beyond one's own borders. In this perspective, based on the internationalization of the democratic idea of human rights,[5] solidarity has a universalist character. The idea being that, whilst human beings live in a plurality of cultures, which exhibit a range of particular moral practices, all have basic needs and rights that have to be respected. These basic needs and rights, constituting the core commonality of individuals across the world, are also what bring them together and impel them to identify with, and care about, each other's suffering. Violation of these needs and rights calls for a sense of international solidarity. Failing to respond to the plight of the other, failing to show solidarity, diminishes the humanity of all. As such, international solidarity points to the international community's responsibility and obligation toward victims of conflict regardless of their personal circumstances and geographical location. This is how the idea and practice of international humanitarian intervention can be viewed as one expressing an ethics of international solidarity.

This being said, the notion of solidarity is problematic in the field of international relations. Some elaboration is therefore necessary to unpack it a bit more, in order to stress its importance in the context of this book and reveal how it lies at the core of the current dilemmas of international action.

In traditional forms of social organization, solidarity connotes a tight bonding among people (kinship) that renders it imperative for the group to look after its members. This sense of solidarity runs deep and permeates the group's internal relations. Another dimension of this "thick" solidarity is its sharply exclusive character. The translation of the "us versus them" divide into the deep "in versus out" divide, to which traditional societies are prone, has a heavy bearing on who benefits from solidarity and who does not.[6]

Compared to traditional solidarity, the modern form of solidarity that springs from democratic values and rights is wider and more diffuse.[7] Rather than being locked into forms of membership that tend to be narrow and exclusive, modern solidarity seeks the broadest inclusion possible. The values and rights of universality and equality, at the core of democratic culture, introduce and call for a certain connectedness among

people, which initiates an experience of community that goes far beyond the boundaries of immediate society. This modern solidarity-driven process entails three facets.

First, democratic values of universality and equality, and the rights associated with these, celebrate the basic process of identification between people. From this derives, second, a sense of obligation. Because "the other" (whoever and wherever he/she is) is not foreign, his/her fate triggers responsibility. People – the members of one's human community – are the repository of everyone's rights. Responsibility makes them accountable to help ensure that the rights of others are respected. Third, the spread and embrace of the values and rights of universality and equality, by recognizing individuals in their variety as members of one world, provide tools to build a case for the rights of all and, consequently, to fight for improved inclusion.

Historically, these three facets have worked in favor of a widening and deepening of solidarity at the national level and, subsequently, at the international level.[8] To some extent, international law is a product of this state of affairs. The spectacular development, after World War II, of the universalization of human rights is a real articulation of international solidarity as exercised in favor of individuals.

Yet, the values and rights of universality and equality, which trigger international solidarity, are also part and parcel of what accounts for its limitations.

From a general standpoint, to begin with, solidarity is based on key democratic values and rights that are constrained at three levels. Modern democratic solidarity, although wider than traditional solidarity, tends to be thinner. This is the first problem. Arguably, universality and equality introduce a distance among people that lessens the level of social solidarity among them. In other words, as solidarity widens, it becomes attenuated. What brings people together is also what keeps them apart.[9] A second problem is that values and rights of universality and equality do not get rid of the ideas of priority and hierarchy, and they do not dispense with the need for these ideas. How could they, considering that prioritizing and establishing hierarchies is essential to human life, partly because without them there is no particular direction, and partly because the limited resources at hand ask for choices in their allocation? The result is that the values and rights of universality and equality cannot impede the hierarchy of priorities from playing a selective, and therefore restricting, role in the projection of solidarity. Third, as the circle of human community expands under the influence of the values and rights of universality and equality, the ability to relate to people becomes more and more abstract and fragile. As such, the extension of democratic solidarity

tends to give a renewed importance to traditional bonds of proximity, including kinship ties.[10]

The cumulative effects of these constraints on solidarity have the largest role at the international level. Because it is the widest circle of humanity, the international realm does not benefit from the level of identification and participation that is characteristic of the national realm, at least in unified and developed countries. The ''pull'' power of international solidarity is weakened further when considerations of self-interest enter into the calculus, as they often do. The inconsistency that comes with self-interest prevents international solidarity from being a universal imperative. Under these conditions, compared to national solidarity, and despite the rhetoric of universality and equality, it is hard to see how international solidarity could be considered other than secondary.

National interest, solidarity and the dilemmas of international action

Indeed, solidarity beyond borders is not a primary concern for the projection of power at the international level. The national bent of international life, that is, the fact that international politics centres around the national perspective, explains this state of affairs. This focus on the particular as opposed to the univeral tends to give solidarist projects such as the protection of human rights a relatively marginal status.

To be sure, in the aftermath of the Cold War, at least until 11 September 2001, the pressure of globalization and progress in international governance, along with the lessening of global security competition, boosted the internationalization of social reality.[11] But these forces did not fundamentally alter the structure of international life, which is still based on the primacy of the nation-state. As a result, the national political community remains the principal context of socialization. People continue to identify and participate, to form expectations and obligations – four key elements of socialization, at first and foremost the national level, in spite of the parallel local and international affiliations that they may have.

Ultimately, this translates into tensions between the national interest and solidarity in the context of the international projection of power, from which dilemmas also spring. In this perspective, the notion of dilemmas of international action is another one that readers should keep in mind while going through the chapters. As a whole, the concept has to be understood in relation to the multilayered character of international life and to its impact on international decision-making and action. It refers to the trade-offs (costs and benefits) entailed in choosing one course of action over another. Despite the continued primacy of the national

realm, the increasing intertwining of rational interest and international solidarity that characterize the post–Cold War era gives much relevance to dilemmas. But it also makes them a source of difficulty: deliberating and acting in the midst of the dilemmas that ensue becomes a constant juggling act. To address the dilemmas successfully calls for keeping several balls of political reality in the air at the same time. Surely, when hard choices have to be made, what is owed to the national realm tends to prevail over what is owed to the international realm. Nevertheless, since the demands of international solidarity affect the ways in which national interest is fulfilled and how it evolves, what defines national interest and the best way to serve it is not a clear cut proposition – and certainly not one that simply requires a focus on a particularist vision of ethics in the international realm.

As an examination of the extent to which the balance between national interest and solidarity shapes the projection of power at the international level, and of how such a balance is evolving, this book amounts to being an analysis of how the ''us versus them'' divide structures international life. It ends up being a study of how this divide influences the conception and projection of national interest at the international level, and how they interact with internationalist considerations.

The book is of course not the first to reflect on the nature and role of the ''us versus them'' divide at the international level. In fact, this divide has preoccupied international relations from the outset. It is a tradition that this book continues, but with the difference of trying to conduct an analysis that avoids the ''either/or'' approach (with, in particular, the inclination to endorse the divide as an absolute – realism – or to call for its elimination – radicalism) around which the main schools of International Relations have a tendency to rally.

International relations and the ''us versus them'' divide

The ''us versus them'' divide is not specific to international relations. It begins at the most basic human level, that of the self. While the self and the other are ontologically linked (it takes the other to experience the self, as there is no self without the other), the inseparability between the self and the other creates a distance that cannot be eliminated. The instinctive primacy of self-preservation is a by-product of this reality. Beyond the level of the self, this basic reality shapes the relations of the collective. This happens at the national level, where gaps between, for instance, social, economic and ethnic groups have historically kept people apart, along ''us versus them'' divides; and it does even more

so at the international level. With international life being largely structured around a national bias, the ''us versus them'' divide constitutes a defining element.

Against this background, it does not come as a surprise that the various schools of International Relations,[12] to a large extent, address and position themselves in relation to this divide. The ways in which these schools have come to interpret and handle this divides reflect their respective intellectual and political agendas.

Realism and the confrontation between ''we'' and ''they''

Realism has evolved over a long period of time and exhibits many different strands. Perhaps the most significant divergence between its various strands is how realist thinkers treat the origins of international instability, and how states should act to avoid that instability. For example, Hans Morgenthau argues that international instability and power politics are rooted in human nature and, as human nature will not change, international politics will always remain characterized by a struggle for power.[13] Kenneth Waltz takes a different approach to explain conflicts.[14] He points to the anarchical nature of the international system, rather than to human nature. As for what has been at times called the liberal realism of Hedley Bull, as exhibited by *The Anarchical Society*,[15] here it is also claimed that interstate relations are characterized by a state of anarchy. But, in contrast to Waltz, Bull sees it possible for states to mitigate anarchy through the development of an international society built on common rules and norms.[16]

Beyond the differences that exist between the various strands of realism, there is, however, a common feature regarding how they relate to the ''us versus them'' problem. Indeed, whatever their cause, struggles for power and conflicts rest upon, and stage, a confrontation between ''we'' and ''they'' that constitutes the ''horizon indépassable'' of the realist philosophy of power and relations among states.[17] It is based on this philosophy that realists articulate three central beliefs: statism, survival and self-help. Statism refers to the idea that states are, if not the only, then at least the main actors of the international system. Any other actor, such as the United Nations, is of secondary importance, to be evaluated on the basis of whether or not it is useful for the national interest, and on the extent to which it is so. As the central actor of the international system, the principal goal of the state is to ensure its survival and that of the citizens over which it purportedly stands guard. It does so by elevating the defence of the national interest to a primary purpose a defence of the national interest that takes precedence over the national interest of other countries. And since all states aim for the same objective, international

politics tends to be characterized by distrust and competition, which makes self-help a key tool for survival.

As we can see, the realist depiction of international affairs as a struggle between ''we'' and ''they'' leads to rather pessimistic prospects for eliminating international tension. This also explains the realist thinking that states call upon international cooperation and international law only when it advances their interest. Moreover, considering that political realities constrain the commitments that states accept, and that the interests of more powerful states set the terms of cooperation, international rules and institutions have little, if any, independent effect on state behaviour. All this means that, for realists, reaching out to others is no more than a self-interested act, conditioned and limited by the primacy of the national interest. This applies to the ways in which realism envisions solidarity vis-à-vis other states, as well as to solidarity geared toward international human rights.

Liberalism and the mitigation of the divide

Liberalism, which also has a long history and various strands, is distinct from realism namely in the sense that it developed as a response to the realist view that conflicts are natural and can be contained only by balance-of-power strategies. In addition, it is different in its conception and handling of the ''us versus them'' divide. Unlike realism, liberalism tries to tame this divide. Its taming approach unfolds in three related ways.

First, most liberal theories of international life, while acknowledging the duality of ''us versus them'', attempt to limit it by giving much importance to international cooperation. This is in line with the value that liberal theories of society see in cooperation among individuals in general. Second, liberalism is open to recognizing a plurality of actors in the international realm (especially since the 1980s). In this regard, although states are still by and large considered central players in international affairs, non-state actors are viewed as occupying a significant role. This makes interstate politics in the liberal perspective more complex and fluid than realists assume. For instance, the liberal approach takes into account both domestic (including the preferences of individuals and private groups) and transnational politics (including global entities or networks). In the process, the divide between ''us'' and ''them'' tends to be blurred. Although the existence of competition is acknowledged, it is also recognized that actors are connected by relations of interdependence – that create some sort of continuum of fate and interest among them. In other words, the ways in which they interact is not conceived as a zero-sum game. Third, the most progressive liberals see the individual as a subject

of international law. This echoes the fact that, as the inclusive character of democratic values is part and parcel of liberalism, equality and the universality of rights of individuals constitute crucial aspects of the liberal creed. As such, liberalism cannot easily overlook the commitment to human rights of the solidarist message. Projecting a sense of international solidarity in the name of human rights becomes one of the constitutive elements of liberal legitimacy at the international level.[18]

Liberal theories, nevertheless, are limited to, and by, the ''us versus them'' divide. The commitment of liberalism to human rights does not structure it enough to allow in practice a harmonious dovetailing of its particularist ethics with its universalist orientation. It does not allow the primary value given to the pursuit of the national interest to be reconciled with defending seriously the fate of individuals beyond borders.[19] When all is said and done, liberalism tends to condition the latter to the former. It tends to fail to conceive the former within the latter, to integrate the former into the latter. Hence the difficulty that it faces in envisioning and implementing a socially inclusive view of the world that is based on full international reciprocity of rights and duties.

Re-engineering and widening the sense of community

It is largely as an attempt to go beyond this state of affairs that the various strands of the radical (left) tradition of International Relations developed. They made it one of their key goals to describe how international life might, and should, be transformed to improve the sense of justice, within and among states. In this regard, Kant's ideas did not contribute only to the development of liberalism in international politics. His views that international politics is about relations among the human beings who make up states, that the ultimate reality of international affairs is the community of humankind and that, on this basis, all individuals should work for human brotherhood, were picked up, built upon, and radicalized by successive waves of revolutionist conceptions of international politics, especially Marxists.[20]

Where realism and liberalism take the state system for granted, Marxism offers a different explanation for international conflict and a blueprint for how to fundamentally transform the existing international order. As Michael Doyle puts it: ''From Marx and Engels's work we can follow a distinct dialogue through the democratic Socialists to Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and current-day interpreters of the canon. For them world politics is intraclass solidarities combined with interclass war waged both across and within state borders. . . . Despite an analytic tradition that (as do the Realists) explicitly describes normative questions as ideological, Marxists also rely upon an idealist commitment to human welfare that makes the

determination of international progress an essential feature of both their scientific explanation and their plan for revolutionary liberation."[21] Although developments within international politics in the 1970s contributed to enhancing some of the Marxist ideas, not least Immanuel Wallerstein and his world-system's theory,[22] in the end, the ways in which communism unfolded in reality, domestically and internationally, weakened its intellectual standing beyond repair.

This does not mean that the critical stance toward reality, including international reality, that is put forward by Marxism totally vanished from international studies. As a matter of fact, some of its key characteristics, among which is the idea that reality is an historical and social construct that consequently can be changed and improved,[23] came to be the pillars of critical approaches to international affairs.

Critical social theory, which emerged in International Relations in the 1980s,[24] casts itself mainly as an alternative to positivist and empiricist epistemology. Instead of being purely observational or explanatory, this type of theorizing seeks to be emancipatory. In the process, it aims at unveiling and overcoming the exclusionary effects of the ''us versus them'' divide.

Postmodernism,[25] another critical approach, pursues this agenda by emphasizing the power relationships and dominations that underlie what is seen as natural. In doing so, its goal is to reveal the marginalized and the excluded other, and put an end to marginalization and exclusion.

Another perspective, feminism, stressing that gender is socially and culturally constructed, argues that it is important to recognize gender bias, not just in social relations at large, but specifically within the study of International Relations.[26]

Constructivism is perhaps most successful when it comes to encapsulating theoretical and liberating aims. Springing from a variety of approaches[27] and offering a plurality of strands,[28] it gives an explanation, or a set of explanations, of international life meant to close the analytical gaps of realism, liberalism and Marxism, without rejecting their contribution altogether. Constructivists are most concerned with understanding the behaviours and institutions of international life as social constructs, and how these human constructs have come to be taken for granted.[29] The exercise of denaturalization that the conception of international life as a social construct brings leads constructivism to have history, and historicity, built in as part of its approach. This means that much attention is given to contingency, and change.[30] It also means that the understanding of international life as a social reality implies not only that history is to a large extent a human-made reality subject to contingency and change, but also that it will continue to evolve in the future. Combined with peo-

ple's ability to learn (part of what Emanuel Adler calls "cognitive evolution"[31]), this approach opens the gate to the idea of the plasticity of international life.[32] It is here that the explanatory programme of constructivism becomes part of an emancipatory agenda, promoting, at least implicitly, a progressive and inclusive vision of the "us versus them" divide.

Take, for instance, what constructivism has to say on identity and national and transnational interests, and what it signifies for the rearrangement and mitigation of the sense of "we" and "they" in the context of security communities and human rights discourse. Constructivists argue that states' identities and interests evolve from the dissemination and convergence of normative understandings across national boundaries, a high level of communication, economic interdependence and cooperative practices.[33] This shows that the "we-feeling", or identities of national groups, may expand across national borders. For example, building on Karl Deutsch's concept of security communities, Emanuel Adler argued that the importance of security communities is that they provide their members with compatible core values, deriving from common institutions, mutual responsiveness and a sense of mutual loyalty – a sense of "we-ness", or a "we-feeling" among states.[34] Crucially, they make possible a situation where interstate relations are not shaped by the threat or use of force.

In a complementary manner, Kathryn Sikkink has shown how collective beliefs about human rights contribute to the construction of Western identities, with a significant role played by non-governmental actors. In this perspective, human rights norms become not only regulative injunctions designed to overcome the collective-action problems associated with interdependent choice, but also constitutive elements of the identity and self-understanding of actors. In the process, changing interests and values, as part of an evolving identity, transform the notion of national interest. As human rights become part and parcel of national identities, they end up shaping national interests and how they are conceived and (best) pursued in the international realm in the handling of issues and interactions with other nations.[35] The transformation of identity and national interest associated with the rise of human rights is of particular importance to leading democratic powers, such as the United States. In principle, these states more than others are meant to identify with human rights values. Their ability to take human rights seriously internationally determines not only the legitimacy of their foreign policy but also, to the extent that they contribute to underwrite international order, the overall legitimacy of the international system.[36] As Kathryn Sikkink points out, to overlook this aspect is to misunderstand current political realities and, essentially, not to serve well the national interest.[37]

Situating this book in the traditions of international relations

Obviously some of the concerns of this book are not foreign to international relations studies which favour a critical approach. For example, evaluating how in the post–Cold War era national interest and solidarity considerations motivate states to get involved in international crises is a way to address the three following questions that are of major interest to constructivist scholars. First, to what extent do the political realities of international life now have a hybrid character, made up of traditional national interest and internationalist considerations? Second, to what extent does the alleged hybrid character of the political realities of international life blur the line between national and international (internationalist) demands? And, third, where and how does the blurring of that line invite national interest (especially that of key states) to be less particularist and exclusionary, and more inclusive and universalist?

At the same time, however, the contributors to this book do not intend to put forward an emancipatory agenda per se. They probably all hold "progressive" views regarding the directions in which international life should go (favouring, for example, human rights and the minimization of the "us versus them" divide). But emancipation is not at the centre of the chapters. As mentioned earlier, the book has a rather straightforward purpose, that is, mainly to analyse case studies to acquire some sense of the respective weights of national interest and internationalist considerations in current international life.

The book shares two other ideas with constructivist approaches to International Relations. First, the idea that the national interest is not fixed and that the progressivist evolution of international politics calls for moving away from a traditional conception of the national interest. In this perspective, although the analysis provided by the chapters tends to show that realist self-interested motivations continue to be a decisive factor in states' rationales for international action, they also indicate that such motivations can not afford to be "raw". It is more and more difficult, especially for the big powers, to present as legitimate international interventions that are initiated only for self-centred reasons, ignoring or even undertaken at the expense of other countries and people.

This is all the more the case, considering that the findings of the chapters go against another realist idea, the idea that the foreign policy of a country can to a large extent be conducted in an asocial manner, as if the interests and rights of other states and their citizens did not have to be taken into account.[38] The chapters show that the pursuit of national interest is likely to be self-defeating when it ignores altogether the security and rights of other countries and their citizens. In other words, while solidarity is about doing the right thing, through the recognition and im-

plementation of rights and duties, it can also bring the international realm closer to enjoying security. Conversely, to overlook solidarity is to invite resentment, if not violence. Hence, recognizing the mutual interdependence between the ideas of solidarity and security helps to "secure security", both materially and psychologically.

These findings help understanding of how the book situates itself vis-à-vis liberalism and its values. On the one hand, the chapters illustrate that in the contemporary political context democratic values have acquired much importance in defining the normative guidelines of legitimacy and good governance, at home and abroad.[39] As such, liberal values are one of the winners of the time. On the other hand, the analyses of the contributors caution against an international instrumentalization of liberalism and its values. The "unilateral" use of them, which disregards the need to recognize the rights of others (countries and people), undermines the possibility of justifying involvement beyond borders and of establishing security at home and abroad.

Organization of the volume

As a whole, the book is organized into three main parts. These parts correspond to three versions of interstate and intrastate relations, in the context of national interest and international solidarity, and their interplay.

Solidarity versus security

Part I, "Solidarity versus security", focuses on the balance between security and solidarity considerations in relation to states locked into tense relationships with a real risk of conflict. In this perspective, transborder solidarity is quite minimal, although not necessarily completely nonexistent. The security tensions at work among actors do not exclude the development of cross-border solidarity with potential benefits at the intrastate or even at the interstate level, or the emergence of security communities between countries. This is linked with the need to seriously manage tensions to avoid them degenerating into open conflict. This is a role that partly accrues to powerful external actors, particularly when they have a strong presence in the region and have relations, in one way or another, with the antagonists. To examine these themes, this section focuses on two case studies: the India–Pakistan dispute over Kashmir and the quest for mitigating tensions; and US–China relations, especially in connection with the Taiwan dispute.

In Chapter 1, on India and Pakistan, Samina Yasmeen explains why Pakistan and India have maintained such a negative relationship. Are

they guided by a single-minded adherence to a logic of relations according to national interest, or do alternative views that favour solidarity exist within these countries? If present, what role do these alternative views play in determining the nature of Indo-Pakistani relations? How can these voices be strengthened and what is the likelihood of India and Pakistan moving into an era of mutual cooperation and solidarity in the future? Finally, what is the role played by external actors or, rather, what is the interplay between the dynamics of the India–Pakistan relations and the input from external actors? In other words, the chapter seeks to highlight the tense interaction between national interest and solidarity beyond borders in the relations between India and Pakistan, as well as the changing regional and international context, including the evolving attitude of external actors (especially the United States, as ''facilitator'') who are particularly interested in the India–Pakistan dispute. Samina Yasmeen argues that developments in Indo-Pakistani relations after 11 September indicate that the relationship is unlikely to move in the direction of shared goals and common understandings in the foreseeable future.

Alan Collins's chapter on Sino–US relations examines what underpins the relationship between the United States and China. In particular, Collins tries to determine if the relations between the United States and China are shaped by a pursuit of national interest where the core assumption about the other is constant and unlikely to change, or if there are changes that indicate a growing sense of communality. For Collins, these questions are essential, not only for the actors directly involved, but also because Sino–US relations are fundamental to the likelihood of peace or conflict in East Asia. Ultimately, his prognosis is mixed. On the one hand, though remote, war between China and the United States is still a possibility. On the other hand, the relationship is not on the verge of conflict; the two countries have, particularly since 11 September, engaged in dialogue to manage a series of crises, most notably North Korea and Taiwan. Sino–US relations lie therefore somewhere between enmity and amity. Yet, and more positively, Collins sees promising signs for the emergence of a security regime between the United States and China – a regime that suggests a level of cooperation in which members are not concerned solely about their individual short-term interest.

Solidarity, national interest and great power interventionism

Part II, ''Assessing the logic of solidarity and national interest in great power interventionism'', concentrates on cases in which powerful external actors are deeply involved in conflict management. Here, the case studies demonstrate that external actors' motivation displays a combina-

tion of national interest and international solidarity considerations. As a matter of fact, in some cases, it is not easy to distinguish and rank which considerations are behind great powers. This is partly due to the complexity of the crises and their political and normative ramifications, particularly when it comes to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The case studies examined in the section are the following: Russia's foreign policy and its attitude toward the idea of international solidarity championed by Western powers since the end of the Cold War; the reconfiguration of interests vis-à-vis Central Asia in the post–Cold War and post–11 September contexts; the role of the United States and the European Union in the search for a solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict; and American policy toward the Colombian conflict.

Ekaterina Stepanova's chapter on how Russia relates to the issues of national interest and international solidarity unfolds in the context of what separates the developed countries from the rest of the world. She notes that for the developed world (composed mostly, but not exclusively, of the Western world, as the interesting positioning and role of Japan's development aid policies exemplifies), the increasing prevalence of behavioural patterns motivated by a combination of moral considerations and self-interest brings the issue of complementarity and competitiveness between the national interest and solidarity paradigms to the forefront. She goes on to say that, "while there is no question that the world's most-developed democratic states are frequently guided by solidarity culture in shaping their behaviour toward one another, and demonstrate elements of international solidarity in addressing selected issues of global concern, in their relations with states that do not share some or most Western values, national interests and geostrategic considerations . . . often prevail". According to Stepanova, this to a large extent explains the West's relations with Russia. But the dual use of national interest and international solidarity that Stepanova detects in (powerful) Western nations' foreign policies is also a trait that applies to Russian foreign policy itself. According to her, the case of Russia is perhaps most exemplary in demonstrating that the two main theoretical approaches described above present a spectrum/continuum rather than being mutually exclusive. For Stepanova, the continuum between national interest and international solidarity in Russian foreign policy is largely shaped by Russia's own national and cultural identity, as well as its subsequent relations with the rest of the world, in particular the West.[40] She argues that from this identity a synthesis of both cooperative (extroverted, internationally oriented) and geostrategic (geopolitical, self-centered) paradigms has emerged. Stepanova stresses the fact that in the post–Cold War era, Russian foreign policy has undergone several shifts. It went from the relative infatuation with the democratic solidarity discourse of the early 1990s (which,

according to Stepanova, occurred at the expense of Russia's strategic interest) to disillusionment with Western policies (fuelled by the NATO enlargement process and the resurgence of geostrategic thinking by the mid- and late 1990s) and, finally, to the more balanced approach of the early 2000s (with international cooperation embedded in a formulation of Russian national interest). Stepanova's chapter tests, as well as illustrates, these ideas, first in the context of Russia's recent involvement in conflicts within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); second, in the context of its involvement in conflict management outside the CIS; and, third, in the context of the post–11 September "war against terror", including the war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the war against Iraq.

In Chapter 4, Parviz Mullojanov analyses the renewal of interest in Central Asia. He lists the variety of interests that Russia has had over time in Central Asia, and examines competing views inside the Russian bureaucracy throughout the 1990s on how Moscow should relate to Central Asia. His analysis confirms and completes Stepanova's chapter. Mullojanov shows how the model of evolution put forward by Stepanova concerning the various shifts of Russian foreign policy in the past 15 years applies to Central Asia. But Mullojanov also analyses the challenge that Russia now faces as a multiplicity of new actors arrives in the region. Indeed, it is not only the United States that is trying to be more present in the various countries of Central Asia. It is also China, Iran and Turkey. Most of these external state-actors that are taking a renewed interest in Central Asia are animated less by solidarist motivations than by national-interest considerations. In this perspective, the multilateral efforts deployed to address the humanitarian needs of the region, as well as to aid in its development, are likely to be overshadowed by the games of power politics. This is all the more the case, argues Mullojanov, considering the fact that multilateral initiatives are themselves not free of national-interest calculations. Mullojanov recognizes that the West's growing involvement in Central Asia has positive aspects, such as helping to undermine persistent authoritarianism. But he concludes that Central Asia is likely to continue to also be one of the key fault lines of international politics.

In Chapter 5, Mira Sucharov analyses the attempts by the European Union and the United States to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Sucharov begins by saying that the attempt to uncover the determinants of external involvement in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (specifically, whether actors are motivated by geopolitics or a sense of international solidarity) is particularly salient in the context of this crisis, as well as in the broader context of the Middle East. Sucharov's overall assessment is that a sense of solidarity generally shapes the outlook of the European

Union and the United States, but that it is intimately tied to the national interest in connection with polity identities. Sucharov argues that this is in line with the thesis "that the degree to which a state understands its fate to be intertwined with that of others (a stance that represents a culture of solidarity) emerges from the overall identity of the state.... That identity in turn leads to particular conceptions of the national interest". Regarding the United States, Sucharov indicates, for example, that President George W. Bush's decision to call for a Palestinian state in October 2001 largely derived from an ethics of solidarity toward people's desires for self-determination as much as from intrinsic geopolitical imperatives. As for the European Union's motivations for involvement in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Sucharov tells us that it involves some elements of geopolitics (particularly the consolidation of the organization's foreign-policy machinery and checking the global power of the United States), but also includes a sense of international solidarity, in assisting Palestinian self-determination (an evening out of the international playing field in favour of those who appear to have been neglected). Ultimately, Sucharov indicates that this "suggests not only that the national interest can derive from identity, but that the moral question posed by the Babylonian Jewish sage Hillel may indeed hold resonance for global politics in the new millennium: 'If I am not for myself then who is for me, but if I am only for myself, then what am I?'"

Doug Stokes's chapter looks into US foreign policy toward Colombia in relation to drug trafficking, insurgency, terrorism and other elements endangering the viability of the Colombian state and contributing to the region's instability. This chapter represents a critique of the logic of solidarity at the international level. It illustrates the limits of the concept by adopting a critical/radical, and somewhat Marxist, interpretation. Although Stokes indicates that there are some solidarist considerations animating the ways in which the United States relates to Colombia, he stresses the fact that the United States, dating back to the Cold War, views the Colombian crisis first and foremost in terms of national interest and geopolitics. Stokes's thesis is that American involvement in Colombian affairs is a form of "transnational class solidarity designed to insulate the Colombian state and ruling class from a wide range of both armed and unarmed social forces" that threaten the mutual interests of US and Colombian capital. On this basis, he argues that the purpose of involvement is the preservation of Colombia as a pro-US state and "the effective incorporation of Colombia as a stable circuit within the global circulation of capital". As such, Stokes's chapter is an analysis of a great power actor's rationale for intervention combined with a sociological analysis of Colombia's economic dynamics and the positioning of elites within. This focus allows him to show that the discourse and practice of

solidarity at the international level can be very selective (geared toward the few rather than the many), self-serving (for the benefit of the national interest of the United States, regardless of the interests of the Colombian people as a whole) and, consequently, oblivious to the inclusive and distributive justice demands meant to be at its very core.

Ethics of human solidarity

Part III, "Toward an ethics of human solidarity" focuses on cases in which the projection of power is principally geared toward helping people caught in the midst of intrastate (humanitarian) crises. Three examples are investigated: US foreign policy toward Africa and its variety of crises; the involvement of the international community in the attempts to resolve the Yugoslav wars of succession; and the international community's handling of the East Timor crisis.

US foreign policy toward Africa and the extent to which it is shaped by national interest and international solidarity considerations is the focus of Timothy Docking's discussion in chapter 7. According to Docking, the end of the Cold War led to a re-evaluation of the realism that had guided American policies toward Africa for forty years. Initially, the prospect of a changed US foreign policy calculus toward Africa was greeted with enthusiasm by American activists, scholars and policymakers alike, many of whom were hoping that the end of the Cold War would usher in an era of enlightened US foreign policy toward the African continent – an enlightened policy based on new, creative thinking and principles, including international solidarity. But, in practice, post–Cold War American policy vis-à-vis the region has had a mixed impact. The withdrawal of support for former US clients often contributed to the unleashing of the destructive forces of civil war in which the US was unwilling to engage. According to Docking, the US proclivity to "cut and run" from Africa's problems came to characterize most US policy decisions toward the continent throughout the 1990s. This led a number of analysts to label America's Africa policy as one of "cynical disengagement". The glimpses of international solidarity that could be seen in Somalia at the beginning of the 1990s and in Bush's pronouncements on AIDS in Africa in the early 2000s are not enough to change this impression. Docking notes that the Bush administration has over time strengthened its policy of international solidarity toward Africa (he mentions in particular the 2002 announcement of the Millennium Challenge Account). But he concludes that the fact that Washington continues to see Africa as a foreign-policy backwater does not help make the case for international solidarity toward the continent.

In Chapter 8, Alex Bellamy focuses on the wars of succession in the Balkans. In this chapter, Bellamy charts the shift in the relationship between interest and solidarity from 1991 onwards. He charts how perceived geopolitical considerations overrode concerns over the emerging humanitarian disaster in Yugoslavia until the post-Kosovo era, when interest and solidarity appeared more closely aligned. He argues that, by the end of the 1990s, the international community and European states had come to recognize that in the Balkans both humanitarian concerns and national interests would be satisfied by policy responses aiming to end humanitarian emergencies and create more democratic societies. Bellamy makes the point that this significant shift began to take place in the immediate aftermath of Srebrenica in 1995 and was based on a growing acceptance, as the war unfolded, that there was an intimate link between respect for basic human rights and long-term geopolitical stability. At the same time, he stresses the fact that the display of solidarity at work in the Balkans by the end of the 1990s did not bring about a triumph of solidarism. Solidarism remained very constrained, in particular by domestic politics, including the reluctance of intervening powers to place their citizens in harm's way.

Geoffrey Gunn, writing on East Timor, begins Chapter 9 by showing how a culture of national interest (demanded by Indonesia and blessed by Australia and the United States) derailed East Timor's quest for decolonization for decades. He underlines the point that not even the end of the Cold War brought immediate redress to the sovereignty question. The weight of Indonesian national interest might have continued to deny East Timor's access to independence had it not been for the political juncture produced by Indonesia's economic collapse, the resignation of President Suharto and the domestic instability that followed in the late 1990s. A push from the United Nations and Portugal, manifested in the tripartite talks held between the UN, Indonesia and Portugal on the future of East Timor, led Jakarta to accept (though reluctantly) the idea of independence for East Timor. Gunn goes on to show that the analysis of the successive UN involvements in East Timor, starting in May 1999, starkly demonstrates that, provided that a number of procedural steps have been met, a full-blown ethics of solidarity at the service of humanitarian concerns can emerge, notwithstanding the most severe geopolitical limitations. As such, the case of East Timor stands in sharp contrast to the refusal of the international community to get involved in Rwanda's even more horrific situation just a few years earlier. Gunn's conclusion is somewhat positive. He argues that the willingness of ASEAN members and China to overcome a prevailing logic of non-interference by accepting the idea of humanitarianism dressed up as universalism (even if some

reservations remained), goes a long way toward illustrating how the ethics of international solidarity progressed in the 1990s.

The lessons drawn in the concluding chapter lead to a call for an enlargement and deepening (to use European integration vocabulary) of the international rule of law. Nevertheless, this is not to say that universalist considerations may turn into a sense of global public policy, or a form of thick international solidarity similar to the one existing in the best-functioning democratic polities or at the regional level as in the case of Europe. The enduring particularist tendencies of international life are one of the reasons that will probably prevent this from happening. Yet, as legitimacy constraints increasingly weigh on foreign policies, as it becomes less and less manageable for the unilateral or exclusively self-interested international projection of power to make might right, it is essential that the international rule of law be significantly strengthened. The enhancement of international solidarity is indeed one of the best ways to respond to demands of national and international security.

Notes

1. This chapter has benefited from the comments and suggestions of Louise Bergström, Jibecke Jönsson and Lamis Abdel-Aty.
2. Lucien Poirier (1994) *La crise des fondements*, Paris: Economica. For more on the link between national interest and geography, and therefore on geopolitics, refer to John Agnew (1998) *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics*, New York: Routledge.
3. Yves Lacoste (2006) *Géopolitique: La longue histoire d'aujourd'hui*, Paris: Larousse.
4. John Gerard Ruggie (1998) *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*, London: Routledge, pp. 172–197; David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton (1999) *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, pp. 27–28. For a more philosophical, as well as speculative and radical, understanding of deterritorialization, see Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1987) *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Brian Massumi, trans., Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press.
5. Any society that is not exclusively based on force, and that is mindful of its own people's well being, embodies a sense of human rights, which can be different from a sense of individual rights. (On this later issue, refer for example to Daryush Shayegan (1992) *Cultural Schizophrenia: Islamic Societies Confronting the West*, John Howe, trans., London: Saqi Books, pp. 27–28.) But what is quite specific to Western democratic culture, and therefore links international solidarity to the idea of international democratic culture, is the idea that human rights are universal, that is, that all human beings ought to have access to the same basic rights, whoever and wherever they are. For more on this, see Philip Allott (2001) *Eunomia: New Order for a New World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
6. On these questions, see, for instance, Georg Simmel (1964) *Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations*, Kurt H. Wolff and Reinhard Bendix, trans., New York: The Free Press.

7. See Emile Durkheim (1997) *The Division of Labor in Society*, W. D. Halls, trans., New York: Free Press; and Ferdinand Tönnies (2002) *Community and Society*, Charles P. Loomis, trans. and ed., Mineola, N.Y.: Dover. For more on the notion of solidarity, its history and application at the national and international levels, refer to Serge Paugam, ed. (2007) *Repenser la solidarité*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

8. The movement toward a wide and profound sense of the realization of justice, fueled by democratic values and rights, is one of the defining vectors of modernity at the national and international levels. But this is not one that is free from struggle. Despite the declarations of principles, the beneficiaries of democratic universalism and equality initially formed and, to some extent, continue to form an exclusive club. And it is around the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion that the battles for political, economic and social justice have focused throughout the evolution of modern democratic culture. On this question, see Andrew Linklater (1998) *The Transformations of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era*, Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, pp. 117–118.

9. The seriousness of this issue has been a constant concern in the study of modernity. In this regard, Anglo-American scholars have been particularly apt at identifying mechanisms of rational choice that ensure the cohabitation of self-interest and social cooperation. See Jane J. Mansbridge (1990) ''The Rise and Fall of Self-Interest in the Explanation of Political Life'', in Jane J. Mansbridge, ed., *Beyond Self-Interest*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 3–22. On the other hand, continental European analysts tend to explore a sense of community that is able to reconcile the autonomous agent and the social being by insisting on the role of shared culture and history, in which the reciprocity of rights and duties is embedded.

10. Although much of the scholarly literature on modern democratic culture focuses on its atomization, modern democratic culture remains inhabited by elements of kinship. This culture's decisive contribution to the organization of collective life in connection with the distribution of goods (be they political, economic, social or intellectual) based on talent and merit (hence the importance of access to education for a fair competition for goods) does not eliminate the remnants of kinship's influence. For instance, familial social relations can prove to be, in one way or another, a crucial determinant.

11. See, for example, Thomas M. Franck (2000) ''Legitimacy and the Democratic Entitlement'', in Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth, eds, *Democratic Governance and International Law*, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 25–41.

12. These traditions and their various versions have deep historical and political roots beyond the contemporary era, and the differences among them can be rather blurred at times. For a more general analysis of these traditions, refer, for example, to Martin Wight, Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter, eds (1992) *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, New York: Holmes & Meier; and Michael W. Doyle (1997) *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism and Socialism*, New York: W. W. Norton. See also Stephen M. Walt (1998) ''International Relations: One World, Many Theories'', *Foreign Policy*, No. 110, Spring: 29–46; and Kenneth W. Abbott (1999) ''International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts'', *American Journal of International Law* 93(2), April: 361–379.

13. Hans J. Morgenthau (1978) *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York: Knopf.

14. Kenneth Waltz (1979) *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.

15. Hedley Bull (1995) *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press.

16. James C. Hsiung, writing in the neorealist tradition, takes an interesting view on the anarchical state of international society. He argues that in direct connection to human nature, it is in fact the anarchical nature of international society that is the primary motivation for multilateral cooperation and global governance. It is therefore in the interest of multilateral cooperation to keep the anarchical nature of international society, as without it there would be neither a need nor a desire for states to cooperate. James C. Hsiung (1997) *Anarchy and Order: The Interplay of Politics and Law in International Relations*, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

17. Jean-Paul Sartre used to say that Marxism is the ''horizon indépassable'' of humanity.

18. Allen Buchanan (2004) *Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-determination: Moral Foundations for International Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

19. Value and interest tend to be seen as at odds. Yet they are not by definition antithetic notions. After all, one has to value something (or someone) to take an interest in it (or him/her). Also, the existence and pursuit of an interest (survival, for example) is what gives value to the object (or action or person) that is seen as needed to satisfy this interest. Furthermore, ethics, which can be described as the organization of relations among actors based on an exchange of mutually recognized rights and duties, is not only on the side of value. It is also on the side of interest. If the value of ethics lies in not ignoring the other (and the other interest), it also requires not ignoring oneself (and one's own interest). For, although ethics brings upon the self the burden of looking after and feeling responsible for the other, it is as much in need of the self as it is in need of the other: unless one does well for himself/herself, it is difficult to do good for others.

    It is worth adding that the tension that can exist between interest and value is echoed by the difficult relationship between power and principle (specific neither to liberalism nor to political action). More often than not, the gap separating the concrete exercise of power and principles is on display. In this perspective, power is apt to be seen on the side of interest and of its self-serving temptations, while principles are prone to be placed in the camp of values and of their socializing aims and effects. But, as with interest and value, power and principle are not opposed by definition. In a win-win situation, they work together. For instance, the implementation of principles of conduct in a social setting requires a sense of agency, that is, power.

20. Hedley Bull (1992) ''Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations'', in Martin Wight, Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter, eds, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, New York: Holmes & Meier, p. xii.

21. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace*, p. 20.

22. Immanuel Wallerstein (1989) *The Modern World-System*, San Diego, Calif.: Academic Press.

23. See, for instance, Roberto Mangabeira Unger and Zhiyuan Cui (1997) *Politics: The Central Texts, Theory against Fate*, London: Verso.

24. For example, Yosef Lapid (1989) ''The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era'', *International Studies Quarterly* 33(3): 235–254.

25. The heading ''postmodernism'' comprises a great number of scholars with diverging views (who may not all agree to one definition of postmodernism). This approach is described here in only the broadest of terms. For an indicative debate on what postmodernism is and is not, see the exchange between Øyvid Østerud, Steve Smith and Heikki Patomäki in *Journal of Peace Research* 33(4), 1996, and 34(3), 1997.

26. See J. Ann Tickner (1997) ''You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements between Feminists and IR Theorists'', *International Studies Quarterly* 41(4): 611–632. Lamis Abdel-Aty makes the point that while radical approaches call into question and can help surmount the ''us versus them'' divide through their faith in change and aspiration for liberation, they also solidify this divide by emphasizing and espousing

difference, particularism and plurality. The interplay between these two tendencies is especially interesting in the case of feminism. On the one hand, feminism tends to encourage empathy and empathetic involvement to learn from subjects, signaling a form of inclusiveness. On the other hand, feminism emphasizes the relational and oppositional categories of masculine and feminine.

27. Emanuel Adler indicates that four currents of thoughts have strongly influenced constructivism in international relations: neo-Kantian ''objective hermeneutics'', linguistic ''subjective hermeneutics'', critical theory and pragmatist philosophy of science. See Emanuel Adler (2002) ''Constructivism and International Relations'', in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, eds, *Handbook of International Relations*, London: Sage Publications, pp. 96–97. As a whole, international relations constructivism lends much to continental European critical sociology and its unpacking of the social character of reality at the national level. Considering how relatively weak the study of International Relations is in continental Europe, particularly when it comes to theoretical questions, it is ironic that one of the currently most vibrant approaches to International Relations has some of its main roots in a modern European continental intellectual tradition.

28. Emanuel Adler lists four strands of international relations constructivism: a modernist type of constructivism, modernist linguistic constructivism, radical constructivism and critical constructivism. See ''Constructivism and International Relations'', pp. 97–98.

29. Emanuel Adler (1997) ''Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics'', *European Journal of International Relations* 3(3): 322: ''Constructivism shows that even our most enduring institutions are based on collective understandings; that they are reified structures that were once upon a time conceived *ex nihilo* by human consciousness; and that these understandings were subsequently diffused and consolidated until they were taken for granted.''

30. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001) ''Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics'', *Annual Review of Political Science* 4: 393: ''Understanding how social facts change and the ways these influence politics is the major concern of constructivist analysis''.

31. Adler, ''Seizing the Middle Ground'', pp. 342–343.

32. On the notion of plasticity applied to social reality, refer to Unger and Cui, *Politics: The Central Texts, Theory against Fate*.

33. Emanuel Adler (1997) ''Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations'', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 26(2): 252.

34. Ibid. See also Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, eds (1998) *Security Communities*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; and Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett (1996) ''Governing Anarchy: A Research Agenda for the Study of Security Communities'', *Ethics & International Affairs* 10(1): 63–98.

35. ''The emergence of human rights policy is not a simple victory for ideas over interest. Instead, it demonstrates the power of ideas to reshape understandings of national interest. The recent adoption of human rights policies did not represent the neglect of national interests but rather a fundamental shift in the perception of long-term national interests. Human rights policies emerged because policy makers began to question the principled idea that the internal human rights practices of a country are not a legitimate topic of foreign policy and the causal assumption that national interests are furthered by supporting regimes that violate the human rights of their citizens.'' Kathryn Sikkink (1998) ''Transnational Politics, International Relations Theory, and Human Rights'', *PSOnline*, Washington, D.C.: The American Political Science Association, p. 519, September, available from www.apsanet.org. Refer also to Martha Finnemore (1996) *National Interests in International Society*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, and

(2004) *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

36. For more on this, see Jean-Marc Coicaud (2007) *Beyond the National Interest: The Future of UN Peacekeeping and Multilateralism in an Era of U.S. Primacy*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

37. Kathryn Sikkink (2005) "Mixed Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy and Practice", paper presented at the Center for Democracy and the Third Sector, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 18 April, unpublished.

38. See, for instance, Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner (2005) *The Limits of International Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

39. At the most general level, legitimacy is the recognition of the right to govern. It tries to offer a solution to the fundamental problem of simultaneously justifying power and obedience. Translated to the international level, this understanding of legitimacy amounts to justifying the way in which international order is organized, including why and how power is projected beyond borders. On the question of legitimacy in general, see Jean-Marc Coicaud (2002) *Legitimacy and Politics: A Contribution to the Study of Political Right and Political Responsibility*, David A. Curtis, trans., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. For legitimacy in the international context, refer to Ian Clark (2005) *Legitimacy in International Society*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

40. On the question of Russia's identity and its relations with the (modern) West, see Martin Malia (1999) *Russia under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum*, Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; and Orlando Figes (2002) *Natasha's Dance: A Cultural History of Russia*, New York: Picador.

National Interest and International Solidarity: Particular and Universal Ethics in International Life

Edited by Jean-Marc Coicaud and Nicholas J. Wheeler

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Taking as its point of departure the perennial tension between particular and universal ethics in international society, this book seeks to explore and understand the motivations of actors in different international contexts where national interests and international solidarity concerns intersect. Focusing on a range of regional cases, where it is not evident from a traditional national interest point of view why outside actors would choose to intervene, the book evaluates the respective weight of national interest and internationalist (solidarity) considerations.

Ultimately, while classical national interest considerations remain to this day a powerful motivation for power projection, the book shows how an enlightened conception of national interest can encompass solidarity concerns, and how such a balancing of the imperatives of both national interest and solidarity is the major challenge facing decision-makers.

"Coicaud and Wheeler have assembled a remarkable collection of essays that probe when and where national interests and more cosmo-politan solidarity actually matter. The ethical, and sometimes political, imperative to help people who live outside of one's own borders is the issue of our times."
Thomas G. Weiss, Presidential Professor and Director, Ralph Bunch Institute for International Studies, The CUNY Graduate Center

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