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Bureaucratic Structure and Performance: First Africa Survey Results

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Abstract

This paper present first results from a new survey on bureaucratic structure in Africa. The aims of the survey were to gain quantitative data on incentives and structures of the African bureaucracies and to ensure comparability of the new data with existing data sets, in particular the data sets provided by Rauch and Evans (1999) and World Development Report (1997). First we study the evidence on bureaucratic structure across Africa. We find quite large differences in structure and performance between country's in the region and also between Africa and other regions of the world. *Second* we incorporate the African data into the larger sample of developing countries which allows us to estimate whether meritocratic bureaucracies perform better, have lower corruption and higher efficiency in their service delivery and provide better framework for the private sector. We find that the African countries in general are not "a case of their own" but are described reasonably well by the same incentive structures as other countries: Better bureaucratic performance is associated with greater power and autonomy of agencies to formulate policies, good career opportunities in the public sector, good pay of public servants and little shifting between public and private employment.

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Introduction

Bureaucratic institutions have long been seen as important for economic performance.³ In particular, there is a long-standing argument that weak bureaucratic institutions have contributed to low economic performance in Sub Saharan Africa.⁴ However, studies of bureaucratic performance in Africa have been largely limited to case studies, which makes it difficult to test this argument systematically. This paper presents first results from a project that attempts to provide comparable data on bureaucratic structure and incentives in Africa.

This study is related to two strands of the literature: The first is the literature that relates institutional and bureaucratic performance to economic growth. This literature has shown that institutions, i.e. rules of the game, matter for explaining differences in growth performance across countries. High corruption and red tape, inefficient public services, low reliability of services and in general low bureaucratic quality lower investment and growth. A theoretical exposition is given by North (1981, 1986) and empirical estimates of the relationship between bureaucratic quality and economic performance were conducted by Mauro (1995), Knack and Keefer (1995) , Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1998) and the World Bank (1997). They all show a rather consistent picture of the negative effects of weak bureaucratic performance on investment and growth.

Having established that differential bureaucratic performance impacts on economic growth, a second strand of the literature turns to seeking the institutional characteristics that are associated with better bureaucratic performance, lower levels of corruption or red tape. This literature is interested in explaining the causes of bureaucratic performance by exploring the underlying incentives and organizational structures of bureaucracies. There are a number of ways in which bureaucratic incentives and structures are thought to affect bureaucratic performance.⁵ The main argument, developed further in

³ see for instance Weber (1968)

⁴ see for instance Hyden (1983); World Bank (1989); Brautigam (1996)

⁵ see for instance Evans (1992, 1995), who developed a set of hypotheses stemming from the original work of Weber, 1968 [1904-1911]

Rauch and Evans (1997) is that “replacing patronage systems for state officials by a professional bureaucracy is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for a state to be ‘developmental’”. They outline a number of ways through which bureaucratic structure is thought to affect performance. (i) Having certain entry requirements and (ii) paying reasonable wages should lead to a pool of talented officials entering the bureaucracy, and (iii) internal promotion can lead to benefits associated with stability, particularly the formation of stronger ties (Evans, 1992, 1995). (iv) Internal promotion, if based on merit, should also lead to incentives to perform well (Rauch, 1995). Interest in the consequences of different bureaucratic structures increased after the publication of the "East Asian Miracle" (World Bank 1993), a study that suggested that the institutional setup of Asian bureaucracies contributed to explaining their superior performance.

There is a growing empirical literature that tests these theses. Rauch and Evans (1999) collected data on bureaucratic structures in 35 less developed countries and proceeded to test whether bureaucracies with the main “Weberian” characteristics perform better. Their evidence suggests that they do; particularly on issues of meritocratic recruitment, but also of internal promotion and career stability. A related literature attempts to explain reasons for differences in corruption across countries. For instance, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) show that relative wages of public servants are associated with lower corruption. Ades and Di Tella (1999) investigate the role of competition in lowering rents and corruption. Finally, a broader literature explores the determinants of differences in the quality of government. La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) explain differences in the quality of government mainly using existing socio-cultural indicators. Brunetti and Weder (1999) show that open economies tend to have better governments.

The present project builds upon the findings of several previous studies by collecting data for African countries and adding it to existing data sets. The issues from the Rauch and Evans survey were the main building block of the Africa survey. Some specific components from the World Development Report 1997 provided a second building block.

The paper has two aims. *First* we present evidence of bureaucratic structure across Africa. We

find quite a large diversity from one country to the other and also in the comparison with other regions of the world. *Second* we incorporate the African data into a larger sample of developing countries which allows us to estimate whether meritocratic bureaucracies perform better, and have lower corruption and higher efficiency in their service delivery. We find that the African countries in general are not “a case of their own” but are described reasonably well by the same mechanisms as other countries.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces the African Bureaucratic Structure Survey (ABSS), the survey methodology and the data set. Section 2 presents preliminary results for African countries. Section 3 shows regression results and section 4 concludes.

1. The African Bureaucratic Structure Survey (ABSS)

Survey Methodology

The idea of this survey was to gain systematic data on bureaucratic structures in African countries. However, from the outset it was clear that not only would comparisons within Africa be interesting but so would comparisons with other parts of the world. Therefore, rather than “reinventing the wheel”, we based the survey on existing instruments and tried to ensure as much compatibility as possible in the data with earlier surveys. The main instrument used was a questionnaire designed by James Rauch and Peter Evans, which had been implemented in 35 countries (but only 4 African countries). This was used as a basis for questions 1-20.

The second survey instrument was designed for the World Development Report 1997, WDR. The WDR survey contained a number of questions relating to bureaucratic structures that were incorporated as questions 21-25 in the ABSS. The new questionnaire was pre-tested with African scholars and civil servants and slightly adapted, mainly by adding questions or by refining the scales where additional precision seemed helpful. An important constraint in adaptation of the questionnaire was that the new data should be readily comparable with existing data.

The questionnaires were filled in by country experts that were identified with the help of the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC). The experts had to be well known persons, with a reputation at stake and with long experience in senior positions of the civil service or with a very close knowledge of it. See Appendix 4 for the guidelines for selecting experts.

Table 1 shows the country coverage and number of experts that were consulted in each country.

Table 1. Country coverage and number of experts (in brackets)

Botswana (5)	Mauritius (5)	Tanzania (5)
Cameroon (5)	Mozambique (4)	Togo (4)
Eritrea (4)	Namibia (6)	Tunisia ⁶ (6)
Ghana (4)	Niger (4)	Uganda (5)
Kenya (4)	Nigeria (5)	Zambia (4)
Malawi (4)	Senegal (4)	Zimbabwe (4)
Mali (6)	South Africa (4)	

The survey was conducted in the second half of 1998 with the explicit instructions that responses should relate to the period 1970-1998 and that any major changes in this period should be indicated.

One difference between the ABSS and previous studies was in the kind of respondents. Rauch and Evans used mostly international experts, while we used exclusively local experts. Both systems have potential advantages. Outside experts are probably in a better position to compare different civil service systems across countries. “Inside” experts may be in a better position to answer the questions. Given the very specific nature of the questions in this study we believe that using insiders provides a more

⁶ Tunisia is the only country not belonging to the Sub-Saharan group.

accurate reflection. Regarding the final section, whereas the WDR was conducted by surveying the private sector directly, for the African survey we chose only questions from the WDR questionnaire that could be answered by bureaucracy experts as well as by entrepreneurs.

Structure of the questionnaire

The questionnaire (see Appendix 2) was intended to be easy to answer and involve mostly multiple choice questions. It covers 5 main issues:

1. The relationship between the government and the core economic agencies of the bureaucracy (Questionnaire Part A)

This section looks at (i) Existence of elite economic agencies; (ii) Stability of elite agencies - impact of changes in government on core agencies (Question 1c); (iii) Degree of responsibilities of core agencies and insulation from political pressures (see Question 2 and 3); (iv) Political appointments (Question 6 -9).

2. The structure of the Core Agencies (Questionnaire Part A.1 and A.II)

The key issues here are: (i) Appointment and advancement based on meritocracy; (ii) Salary scales equivalent to responsibility; (iii) Adequate wages; (iv) Real career structure; and (v) Transparency and accountability.

3. The structure of the bureaucracy as a whole. (Questionnaire Part B)

The key issues are: (i) Appointment and advancement based on meritocracy; (ii) Salary scales equivalent to responsibility; (iii) Adequate wages; (iv) Real career structure; and (v) Transparency and accountability.

4. The interaction between the bureaucracy and the private sector (Part C)

Key questions concern the: (i) Relationship between the private sector and bureaucracy; (ii) Degree of consultation prior to policy shifts (information sharing is a key issue from the East Asian literature); (iii) Importance of bribery to get things done; (iv) Extent of the culture of bribery; and (v)

Time that bureaucrats spend in the private sector during or after careers (Question 11 and 12).

5. Indicators of bureaucratic performance

In addition to the questions about relationship with the private sector, there are several other key issues covered in different parts of the questionnaire, including: (i) Role of the bureaucracy in policy formulation (Question 2); (ii) Amount corruption adds to wages (Question 15a); and (iii) Efficiency of service provision (Question 25).

From these questions we construct 5 summary indicators, which are described in detail below. All questions data were coded according to the same codebook used by Rauch and Evans and the WDR. All indicators were normalized on a scale from 0-10, with 10 indicating the best option, according to our prior assessment. However, as will be seen below, this could not be established unambiguously for all cases.⁷

2. First Results for Africa

Although the survey analysis is still at a preliminary stage, the findings already raise a number of interesting issues related to the literature on the nature and effectiveness of political institutions in Africa. The section below first highlights a few specific points that emerged most clearly from the analysis. It then outlines a couple of broader implications of the findings.


“Ownership” and Role in Policy Formulation

There has been concern about the level of about aid dependency in Africa and the lack of ownership of development strategies in the region. Virtually all donors have been emphasizing the importance of ownership and the concept was enshrined in the OECD paper “Shaping the 21st Century”

⁷ The indicator *private sector career* systematically has a negative sign, indicating that activity of civil servants in the private sector reduces bureaucratic quality.

(OECD, 1996). The ABSS investigated the different roles played by core agencies on the continent in formulation of economic policy. The most striking finding was that bureaucrats across the continent felt that economic policy is formulated outside the country, particularly by the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs). Chart 1 below indicates that 35% of all the African bureaucrats interviewed agreed with this proposition. This represents a lack of ownership (or certainly a perceived lack of ownership) in terms of economic policy formulation.⁸ The implications are worrying for the sustainability of BWI-led reform packages and more generally for the long term development prospects of countries in the region.


Chart 1: Policy Formulation in African Bureaucracies



The lack of ownership is particularly striking in regional comparison (using the data from the ABSS and Evans/Rauch 1997). Chart 2 below indicates that, compared to their Asian and Latin American counterparts, African bureaucrats do not initiate many new policies.⁹

⁸ The country findings indicated that Eritrea was the only country characterized by having many new policies developed in the bureaucracy, whereas Mauritius was an example of the bureaucracy playing a filter role. Particularly in Uganda, Senegal, Cameroon and Togo, bureaucrats believed policy was formulated outside the country.

⁹ Note that Chart 1 uses the single answers to build averages. Chart 2 however dealt for every country barely with the median. This strategy is necessary given that we do not have the non-aggregated Rauch and Evans data. Resulting



Relationship with the Private Sector

After independence, stemming from the thinness of the private sector and the prevailing development consensus, the state assumed a central role in economic development in many African countries. This came to be seen as over-central by the 1980s and reducing government's excessive intervention in the economy was a central tenet of structural adjustment programs. There is now much more widespread agreement on the role of the private sector as the engine of growth and the need for a cooperative relationship between the public and private sectors.


The figures in the survey (see Chart 3 below) indicate that bureaucrats across the region as a whole feel their relationship with the private sector has become steadily more cooperative over the last 20 years. This reflects existing evidence that the relationship between the private and the public sector has improved in the region. The World Bank (1997) found, for example, that over the decade ending in 1997, the proportion of managers in Africa who consider the state helpful did not change (19 percent), but the share of those who viewed the state as their opponent dropped from 35 to 28 percent.

The data for some specific countries (also shown below) indicate diversity in performance as well as some interesting results. Mauritius and Zimbabwe (and others) have improved steadily - in many

from this change in methodology, outer answers as "many new policies" get less weight and the percentage value of

cases from a relationship characterized by “opposition”. The dramatic improvement in former-socialist Tanzania seems particularly noteworthy. However, bureaucrats in Malawi and South Africa believe that the relationship with the private sector has become less cooperative. The South African situation is particularly worrying given its position as the dominant economy in the region.

Chart 3: Relationship between the Bureaucracy and the Private Sector




However, despite the perception that the public-private relationship is improving in the region, other indicators in the survey present a more nuanced picture. In particular, in only a very few countries do bureaucrats discuss *major* policy changes with the private sector prior to implementation. No countries “always” discussed policy changes and only Mauritius, Botswana and Tanzania out of the twenty countries “mostly” gave opportunities for the private sector to voice concerns. In addition, comments by the experts suggest that bureaucrats in some countries still remain suspicious of the private sector.

this answer falls from 21 percent in Chart 1 to 9 percent in Chart 2.

Corruption

The survey for the 1997 World Development Report found that entrepreneurs in Africa identified corruption as the number one barrier to business. The ABSS survey certainly found that in many countries it is common that private firms have to pay some irregular “additional payments” (bribes or tips) to get things done. However, there was a great degree of disparity; ranging from Namibia, where bribery was felt to be virtually “non-existent” to Kenya, Nigeria and Togo, where bribery was felt to be “mostly” needed to get things done (see Chart below).

Chart 4: Corruption - The Need for Tips and Bribes to Get Things Done




The ABSS also investigated the amount tips and bribes add to basic salaries over the last twenty years in the twenty African countries. The findings for the Africa sample as a whole as well as some specific cases are presented in Chart 5 below.

The level of bribery seems to have increased for the Africa sample as a whole and it is a serious issue in some countries. Bribery has become endemic in Kenya and Nigeria - it now is perceived to almost double bureaucrats' salaries. On the other hand, however, the preliminary results indicate that the

situation is less bleak in some countries than many perceive. There are a few countries where bribery adds very little to salary - Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and Tunisia. It is also worth noting that the situation has improved in some previously troubled countries, particularly the dramatic improvement in performance of Eritrea. This is an important case for further investigation.

Chart 5: Bureaucratic Corruption - Amount Tips and Bribes Add to Salaries in Africa, 1978-1998



Note: the scale 1 stands for “no tips and bribes”, 2 stands for “Tips and bribes add to base salaries up to 10 percent”, 3 “... between 10 and 50 percent”, 4 “... between 50 and 100 percent” and 5 means “Tips and bribes add to base salaries more than 100 percent”.


Efficiency of Service Provision

Aron (1996) argues that structural adjustment reforms designed to fiscally and politically squeeze the state in Africa resulted in a fragile state with reduced institutional capability to function. Aron concludes that the state in Africa has come full circle to the *small* government of pre-colonial days, but

with a seriously depleted and impaired institutional capacity to deliver social services and to build physical and social infrastructure. The ABSS investigated the efficiency of the state bureaucracy in delivering services over the last 10 years; some of the results are indicated in Chart 6 below. While we would need to investigate Aron’s hypothesis further, the survey findings indicate that, overall, service provision has deteriorated only marginally for the Africa sample as a whole.

Chart 6: Efficiency of Service Provision in Africa, 1988-1998

(1 = very efficient; 6 = very inefficient)



It is, however, the increasing variation and divergent trajectory between countries in the region that emerge most clearly. The performance, for example, of Kenya, Nigeria and Malawi have worsened. On the other hand, Mauritius and Eritrea have improved to become the only “efficient” countries. Eritrea in particular had apparently made remarkable progress over the last 10 years, prior to current conflict with Ethiopia, the causes of which stand out for further investigation.

Diversity

There has been a tendency in the literature to generalize about the weakness of political institutions in general in Africa as well as the bureaucracy in particular. Below are two quotes from the recent book by Chabal and Daloz (1999) that highlight this tendency:

“Forty years after the first independence, Africa remains bereft of political institutionalization necessary for the emerging of the modern state.” [..] “... there is no such civil service on the continent” (compared to the Weberian ideal). [need to give page numbers in direct quotation]

In a similar tone, Bayart (1993) notes:

“... the politics of the belly” has “crushed most of the strategies and institutions, in particular ... the civil service”

As outlined above, the findings in the ABSS indicate that such sweeping generalizations about the continent are very misleading. Although the findings do make for some grim reading in some cases, one clear point is that there is a great degree of diversity in bureaucratic structure and performance across the region. In particular, the survey highlights that certain countries, such as Mauritius, Botswana, Namibia and Tunisia, perform well, while others perform much less so. This diversity can be seen from the evidence regarding the relationship between the private sector and corruption as previously depicted in charts 3 and 5.

Divergent Trajectories

The findings of the survey also indicate very different trajectories for countries in the region. The situation there has deteriorated steadily for two of the most troubled countries in the survey - Kenya in particular, but also Nigeria. However, these countries have recently had potentially important changes; a new President in Nigeria and civil service reform in Kenya. It would certainly be valuable to carry out the survey again in the near future to assess whether the situation in these, and other countries, is changing.

The “BWI favorites” of Uganda and Ghana have improved slightly in some respects, but still do

not seem to perform particularly well. Botswana in particular, but also Tunisia and Namibia, have performed consistently and reasonably well. Mauritius should be considered a “steady improver.” At the other end of the spectrum, Eritrea has been a “dramatic improver” in a number of areas in recent years and this performance warrants further investigation.

This latter group also suggests that improvement in bureaucratic performance is not as impossible as would be suggested by the tone of much of the literature on Africa. These countries point to potential sources of lessons from within the region. This is notable because much of the literature has advocated looking to the high-growth countries in East Asia for lessons.

3. Estimates for Bureaucratic Structure and Performance

This section first discusses the empirical strategy and then presents results on the impact of bureaucratic structure variables on bureaucratic performance.

Empirical Strategy

Our aim is to explain differences in bureaucratic performance or bureaucratic quality across countries.

Indicators of Bureaucratic Performance (Dependent Variables)

Rather than using one summary indicator of bureaucratic performance, we prefer to investigate different aspects of the same phenomenon. Thus we use a number of indicators of bureaucratic quality that have been widely used in the growth literature. They are all subjective indicators, that is they are based on the perceptions of country experts or on private sector surveys. The indicators are from different sources which gives us additional confidence that they would not be biased for instance by an extreme view of any given expert.

We use five different measures:

- *bureaucratic quality*. This is a summary measure provided by Knack and Keefer (1995) who obtained ratings from a commercial risk assessment company, the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). High scores indicate “autonomy from political pressure” and “strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruption in government services”, also existence of an “established mechanism for recruiting and training”. It is scored 0 (lowest quality) to 6 (highest quality). The definition shows that this a summary variable which combines elements of autonomy as well as internal organization of the bureaucracy.
- *consultation*, which is constructed from the WDR survey question 3 and 4 and evaluates whether private sector is usually informed about important changes in rules and whether, in the case of important changes, the bureaucracy takes into account concerns voiced by the private sector.
- *corruption*, a measure provided by Knack and Keefer (1995) and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG): A low score means that “high government officials are likely to demand special payments” and “illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels” in the form of “bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, policy protection, or loans”. This variable is scored from 0 (high corruption) to 6 (low corruption).
- *efficiency*, a variable which comes from a question in the WDR survey: “How would you generally rate the efficiency of the government in delivering services?”. Possible responses range from: very efficient to very inefficient. Scores are 1 (lowest efficiency) to 6 (highest efficiency).
- *implementation*, from the WDR as well, a variable which measures the quality of policy implementation by the civil service. In particular it gauges whether the private sector expects the government to stick to announced major policies and whether it is frequently surprised by new laws and regulations that could seriously affect profitability.

The correlation between these variables is depicted in the Table in the appendix 3. For the entire and the non-African sample ¹⁰, the correlations between the indicators are all positive but mostly

¹⁰ The non-African sample corresponds to the Rauch and Evans data set without Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Morocco and

not very high, an indication that these variables are indeed measuring different aspects of bureaucratic performance. In the ABSS sample, the results are much more mixed. The negative sign of the correlation between corruption and efficiency implies that in these African countries, bribery adds to efficiency.

Summary indicators on bureaucratic structure (Independent Variables)

We construct five summary indicators of bureaucratic structure. As noted above there are various theories of how benign incentive structures can improve performance of civil servants and of the entire bureaucracy. The main proposition of the meritocracy is that promotion and employment should be based on merit rather than patronage. We attempt to capture this with the variables *career opportunities* and *autonomy*. Weber's call for an institutionalized and professionalized bureaucracy is described by *agency power* and *relative wage*. Finally, we add *private sector career* as explanatory variable.

- *Agency power*: This indicator describes the influence the core economic agencies have in formulating new economic policies. The exact question was how often these agencies initiate new policies.
- *Autonomy*. This indicator rates whether incumbents of top positions in the civil service are likely to be moved to positions of lesser importance when political leadership changes.
- *Career opportunities*: This indicator captures the extent to which meaningful career development is possible in the public sector. It is constructed from five questions. The first assesses the number of political appointees at bureaucratic top level, while the second asks how many of these appointees have worked in the higher civil service before. The third questions asks how many of the top public employees have made their career in one agency, while the fourth investigates how many years a higher level official typically has spent in an agency. The last question is on the

career expectations as perceived by a new employee.

- *Private sector career*: This indicator refers to the degree in which higher officials in the core economic agencies spend a substantial proportion of their careers in the private sector, interspersing private and public sector activity.
- *Relative Wage*: This indicator reflects the salary in the public sector as opposed to the private sector by combining, on the one hand, the question on how the income of higher civil servants compares to private sector managers, and, on the other hand, the question of whether over the last twenty years this comparison has improved in favor of the public sector.

Specification

We estimate equations using the following form:

$$\text{Bureaucratic Performance} = a_0 + a_1 * \text{agency power} + a_2 * \text{autonomy} + a_3 * \text{career opportunities} + a_4 * \text{private sector career} + a_5 * \text{relative wage}$$

where Bureaucratic Performance is proxied for by the set of 5 indicators described above (*bureaucratic quality, consultation, corruption, efficiency and implementation*).

The correlations between the right-hand side variables are relatively low for the whole sample, where they range between -0.375 and 0.285 . For the non-African sample, the correlations lie between -0.711 ¹¹ and 0.343 , and for the African set between -0.492 and 0.511 . These generally weak relationships make it possible to use the five variables in the estimation without measuring the same effect twice. Appendix Table 3 shows the correlation matrix for the three data sets.

¹¹ This is the correlation between career opportunities and private sector career. The negative relationship indicates, not very surprisingly, that good career chances in the public sector lower activity in the private sector. The next weaker correlation in the non-African set is -0.340 .

Bureaucratic Performance might also be influenced by other factors that are outside the bureaucracy. For instance it is conceivable that bureaucratic quality is a “luxury” good and richer countries have better bureaucracies. Thus, we add the logarithm of the initial GDP as a further right-hand variable that controls for all “developmental factors”. The results are discussed below in the section on “Regression Results”.

We also test for other external controls, proxied by the level of political rights, and finally for socio-economic factors such as ethnic fractionalization. For the first, we reach a significance level of one percent in the regressions for *bureaucratic quality* and *consultation*, and ten percent significance for *corruption*, for the latter a significance of five percent for *consultation* and ten percent for *bureaucratic quality*.

To check whether “Africa is different”, we run regressions with the non-African sample only and with the entire sample including an African dummy, which turns out not to be generally important (results discussed below).

Regression Results

Table 1 shows results of five regressions that use the entire data. Regression (1), the *bureaucratic quality* regression, shows that *agency power* and *autonomy* are significant at the one and ten percent level. High influence of the economic core agencies and little risk of being degraded after a political change thus seem to enhance bureaucratic quality. The sign for the *private sector career* is negative although the variable is not significant. The negative association between private sector career possibilities and public sector performance is obtained throughout most regressions. It seems that a low proportion of the civil servants’ careers spent in the private sector is favorable for bureaucratic performance. This result contradicts our first guess that private sector employment can help inform the public sector and make bureaucracies more productive. It appears that, at least on developing countries, the negative aspects such as “cronyism” prevail over possible advantages.

In the regression (2), the *consultation* regression, *agency power* and *relative wage* are significant at the one percent level, implying that the stronger the economic agencies are and the higher the relative wages in the public sector, the better the opportunities of private firms to voice concern over new policies.

Corruption (equation 3) is significantly associated with *agency power* and *autonomy* at a significance level of five percent. This indicates that corruption is lower the higher the economic influence of the core ministries is and the smaller the risk of being put into a position with less importance after a shift in political power.

Higher *Efficiency* (4) is associated at the ten percent level with *agency power* and at the five percent level with the *career opportunities* and *relative wage*, suggesting that a strong and attractive civil service increases performance.

Better *Policy Implementation* by the bureaucracy (5) is associated with fewer possibilities of a *private sector career* and with a higher *relative wage*. Hence, concentration of the public sector's employees on this one job and a good salary foster policy implementation.

Table 1 Bureaucratic Quality Estimates

OLS Estimates

	<i>Bureaucratic quality</i>	<i>Consultation</i>	<i>Corruption</i>	<i>Efficiency</i>	<i>Implementation</i>
<i>Constant</i>	0.965 (1.144)	2.021*** (4.537)	1.233 (1.509)	1.774*** (3.300)	3.020*** (8.623)
<i>Agency power</i>	0.191*** (3.414)	0.076*** (2.786)	0.110** (2.022)	0.065* (1.955)	0.018 (0.854)
<i>Autonomy</i>	0.148* (2.449)	0.013 (0.407)	0.145** (2.476)	0.004 (0.097)	0.004 (0.167)
<i>Career opportunities</i>	0.040 (0.457)	0.031 (0.646)	0.028 (0.326)	0.156** (2.634)	0.036 (0.932)
<i>Private sector career</i>	-0.055 (-0.892)	-0.029 (-0.828)	0.008 (0.130)	-0.047 (-1.090)	-0.047* (-1.719)
<i>Relative wage</i>	0.049 (0.702)	0.104*** (2.806)	0.108 (1.607)	0.101** (2.269)	0.100*** (3.435)
<i>Adjusted R2</i>	0.370	0.442	0.274	0.462	0.492
<i>Number of observations</i>	49	31	49	30	31

Note: t-values in parentheses. * indicates significance at the ten percent level, ** at the five and *** at the one percent level.

Table 2 shows results for the specification that includes GDP per capita as a further control. This variable is significant in regression (1), (2), (3) and (5). At the same time, *agency power* loses its influence in regression (2) to (4), while *private sector career* becomes significant in the first two estimations.

Table 2 Bureaucratic Quality Estimates, Specification including GDP

OLS Estimates

	<i>Bureaucratic quality</i>	<i>Consultation</i>	<i>Corruption</i>	<i>Efficiency</i>	<i>Implementation</i>
<i>Constant</i>	-2.957** (-2.128)	-0.161 (-0.257)	-3.595*** (-2.970)	0.673 (0.703)	1.855*** (3.193)
<i>Agency power</i>	0.131** (2.464)	0.037 (1.585)	0.035 (0.752)	0.046 (1.291)	-0.003 (-0.123)
<i>Autonomy</i>	0.104* (1.880)	0.012 (0.461)	0.091* (1.862)	0.003 (0.076)	0.003 (0.146)
<i>Career opportunities</i>	0.044 (0.559)	0.010 (0.254)	0.033 (0.469)	0.144** (2.456)	0.024 (0.680)
<i>Private sector career</i>	-0.105* (-1.834)	-0.053* (-1.906)	-0.054 (-1.077)	-0.059 (-1.348)	-0.060** (-2.332)
<i>Relative wage</i>	0.031 (0.497)	0.067** (2.229)	0.086 (1.567)	0.083* (1.802)	0.080*** (2.879)
<i>Initial income</i>	0.643*** (3.387)	0.377*** (4.178)	0.797*** (4.775)	0.190 (1.378)	0.201** (2.405)
<i>Adjusted R2</i>	0.435	0.596	0.462	0.374	0.488
<i>Number of observations</i>	49	31	49	30	31

Note: t-values in parentheses. * indicates significance at the ten percent level, ** at the five and *** at the one percent level.

Table 3 shows results for the non-African sample only. Here, the results are less clear-cut than in the entire data set. *Bureaucratic quality* is influenced by the *agency power* and the *autonomy* variables at ten and one percent significance respectively. *Agency power* becomes insignificant in regression (2), (3) and (4). *Consultation* is not explained by the bureaucratic structure variables, while *autonomy* is significant at one percent significance for *corruption*. Hence, politically insulated employment in the civil service reduces corruption. *Efficiency* is significantly associated with more *autonomy* and a higher *relative wage*. This implies that job security and high relative wages inside the public sector enhance efficiency. *Implementation* is associated with ten percent significance on the

relative wage, while *private sector career* has become insignificant: a high wage compared to the private sector enhances policy implementation in the non-African set.

Table 3 Bureaucratic Quality Estimates, Excluding Africa

OLS Estimates

	<i>Bureaucratic quality</i>	<i>Consultation</i>	<i>Corruption</i>	<i>Efficiency</i>	<i>Implementation</i>
<i>Constant</i>	0.284 (0.278)	3.458*** (3.699)	1.490 (1.329)	0.763 (0.792)	3.713*** (5.311)
<i>Agency power</i>	0.142* (1.988)	0.002 (0.024)	0.011 (0.144)	0.002 (0.037)	-0.051 (-1.061)
<i>Autonomy</i>	0.184*** (2.907)	0.035 (0.702)	0.222*** (3.197)	0.129** (2.517)	0.038 (1.015)
<i>Career opportunities</i>	0.153 (1.391)	-0.057 (-0.617)	0.059 (0.493)	0.170 (1.770)	-0.026 (-0.381)
<i>Private sector career</i>	-0.006 (-0.085)	-0.061 (-0.964)	-0.020 (-0.254)	0.019 (0.296)	-0.061 (-1.288)
<i>Relative wage</i>	0.103 (1.281)	0.039 (0.542)	0.122 (1.389)	0.234** (3.165)	0.107* (2.016)
<i>Adjusted R2</i>	0.567	-0.047	0.345	0.727	0.526
<i>Number of observations</i>	28	14	28	13	14

Note: t-values in parentheses. * indicates significance at the ten percent level, ** at the five and *** at the one percent level.

The last group of regressions we run are on the entire data set enlarged by a dummy for Africa. With the exception of the *bureaucratic quality* and *implementation* equations, where *private sector career* is not significant, the findings match the regression results in Table 2, where we included the initial GDP. The African dummy thus seems to capture very similar information. It is significant only once, at the one percent level, in equation (2). Thus, the only bureaucratic performance indicator for which there seems to be something special about Africa is *consultation*.

Table 4 Bureaucratic Quality Estimates, With African Dummy

OLS Estimates

	<i>Bureaucratic quality</i>	<i>Consultation</i>	<i>Corruption</i>	<i>Efficiency</i>	<i>Implementation</i>
<i>Constant</i>	1.596 (1.582)	3.231*** (6.702)	1.692* (1.720)	1.974** (2.683)	2.986*** (6.244)
<i>Agency power</i>	0.155** (2.418)	0.008 (0.291)	0.084 (1.334)	0.054 (1.260)	0.020 (0.717)
<i>Autonomy</i>	0.156** (2.579)	0.035 (1.314)	0.151** (2.554)	0.007 (0.182)	0.004 (0.137)
<i>Career opportunities</i>	0.013 (0.138)	-0.045 (-1.015)	0.008 (0.086)	0.143** (2.083)	0.038 (0.862)
<i>Private sector career</i>	-0.086 (-1.279)	-0.059* (-1.990)	-0.015 (-0.226)	-0.052 (-1.136)	-0.047 (-1.596)
<i>Relative wage</i>	0.036 (0.515)	0.069** (2.120)	0.099 (1.447)	0.095* (2.002)	0.101*** (3.248)
<i>Africa dummy</i>	-0.381 (-1.132)	-0.625*** (-3.775)	-0.278 (-0.845)	-0.104 (-0.408)	0.018 (0.107)
<i>Adjusted R2</i>	0.302	0.563	0.184	0.327	0.365
<i>Number of observations</i>	49	31	49	30	31

Note: t-values in parentheses. * indicates significance at the ten percent level, ** at the five and *** at the one percent level.

Overall, the results we obtained for the entire data set are better than the non-African sample in that bureaucratic structure more often explains performance. We view the combination of this set and the new ABSS data as a success in confirming the underlying theory of bureaucratic structure and performance. Additionally, even though we are not able to perform reliable regressions in this subset, due to the low number of observations for Africa, the increase of significance achieved by including this continent's data is encouraging. The crucial conclusion from our estimations is that Africa's bureaucracy is not "a case of its own" but is described reasonably well by the recent economic literature which aimed to capture the causes of the "success stories" as in East Asia.

4. Conclusions

This paper has presented the first results and analysis from a survey of bureaucratic structure in twenty African countries. We found that bureaucratic structure and performance varies across the region, with a number of countries scoring well. The good news is that the relationship between the public and private sector seems to be improving across the region. More worryingly however, corruption is increasing and many senior bureaucrats feel they lack “ownership” of their development strategies.

The data for Africa was integrated into existing global datasets. The analysis indicated certain structural issues were significantly associated with cross-country differences in bureaucratic performance. Better bureaucratic performance is associated with greater power and autonomy of agencies to formulate policies, good career opportunities in the public sector, good pay for public servants and little shifting between public and private employment.

Future research will include a more thorough investigation of the African sample including the comments and remarks that experts volunteered outside the multiple-choice questionnaire. In the longer term the UNU is initiating a major empirical study of governance across countries starting in early 2000. The aim is to try to develop a practical way of comparing governance across countries in a way that is not ethnocentric. The data collection would center on an ‘executive survey’ for as many countries as possible. The survey would concentrate on governance indicators in five main areas - institutional dimensions, state legitimacy, economic management, participation and dispute resolution.

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Appendix 1

Country Rankings of Indicators of Bureaucratic Structure

<i>Agency power</i>	<i>Autonomy</i>	<i>Career opportunities</i>	<i>Graduate entrance</i>	<i>Private sector career</i>	<i>Relative wage</i>
Columbia	BOTSWANA	BOTSWANA	BOTSWANA	Dominican Rep	Singapore
KENYA	GHANA	Thailand	UGANDA	Colombia	ZIMBABWE
Singapore	Hong Kong	Taiwan	NIGER	Haiti	Hong Kong
Ecuador	Israel	Spain	SOUTH AFRICA	Ecuador	MALAWI
South Korea	MAURITIUS	Sri Lanka	KENYA	Guatemala	NAMIBIA
Brazil	SOUTH AFRICA	South Korea	MAURITIUS	Argentina	SOUTH AFRICA
Mexico	TANZANIA	Singapore	NIGERIA	Philippines	Mexico
Argentina	Thailand	TUNISIA	TUNISIA	Uruguay	UGANDA
Hong Kong	ZIMBABWE	Turkey	CAMEROON	Brazil	Haiti
India	Argentina	GHANA	GHANA	Chile	South Korea
Pakistan	ZAIRE	MALI	MALAWI	Costa Rica	MAURITIUS
Peru	TUNISIA	COTE D'IVOIRE	MALI	MOROCCO	Taiwan
BOTSWANA	EGYPT	CAMEROON	MOZAMBIQUE	MOZAMBIQUE	Colombia
Chile	Malaysia	SENEGAL	NAMIBIA	NIGER	MALI
SOUTH AFRICA	Singapore	Malaysia	SENEGAL	Peru	MOROCCO
Taiwan	Taiwan	India	TOGO	COTE D'IVOIRE	Costa Rica
TANZANIA	CAMEROON	Pakistan	TANZANIA	Israel	India
Thailand	Chile	MOROCCO	ZIMBABWE	Portugal	BOTSWANA
Turkey	COTE D'IVOIRE	Uruguay	ZAMBIA	Thailand	GHANA
Greece	MALAWI	NIGER		Turkey	Greece
Costa Rica	MOROCCO	MALAWI		CAMEROON	Malaysia
COTE D'IVOIRE	NAMIBIA	Israel		GHANA	TUNISIA
Malaysia	SYRIA	Mexico		Malaysia	Portugal
Philippines	UGANDA	Portugal		MALAWI	Spain
GHANA	Uruguay	Greece		MALI	Guatemala
Guatemala	Sri Lanka	TOGO		MAURITIUS	TANZANIA
MALI	South Korea	TANZANIA		NAMIBIA	TOGO

MAURITIUS	Greece	UGANDA	NIGERIA	ZAMBIA
MOROCCO	Colombia	EGYPT	SENEGAL	EGYPT
MOZAMBIQUE	Dominican Rep	Hong Kong	Spain	Brazil
NAMIBIA	KENYA	MAURITIUS	TANZANIA	Chile
NIGER	NIGERIA	NIGERIA	TOGO	Israel
NIGERIA	SENEGAL	MOZAMBIQUE	TUNISIA	Ecuador
SENEGAL	ZAMBIA	Costa Rica	UGANDA	Sri Lanka
Spain	Spain	SOUTH AFRICA	ZAMBIA	SENEGAL
TUNISIA	Pakistan	ZIMBABWE	ZIMBABWE	COTE D'IVOIRE
Uruguay	Brazil	SYRIA	Singapore	Dominican Rep
ZAIRE	Portugal	Peru	EGYPT	Philippines
ZAMBIA	Mexico	Philippines	Pakistan	Peru
EGYPT	Costa Rica	Guatemala	South Korea	CAMEROON
Dominican Rep	Guatemala	Brazil	SYRIA	Pakistan
Haiti	MALI	KENYA	ZAIRE	Thailand
Sri Lanka	MOZAMBIQUE	Chile	Greece	Uruguay
Israel	NIGER	Argentina	Mexico	Argentina
SYRIA	TOGO	ZAMBIA	Taiwan	KENYA
CAMEROON	Turkey	Ecuador	Sri Lanka	MOZAMBIQUE
MALAWI	India	Haiti	BOTSWANA	NIGER
Portugal	Peru	NAMIBIA	Hong Kong	NIGERIA
TOGO	Haiti	Colombia	India	SYRIA
UGANDA	Ecuador	Dominican Rep	KENYA	Turkey
ZIMBABWE	Philippines		SOUTH AFRICA	

Note: full data set, highest score listed first. Countries with identical score have the same shadow. In capital letters African countries.

Appendix 2: Country Rankings of Indicators of Bureaucratic Quality

<i>Bureaucratic quality</i>	<i>Consultation</i>	<i>Corruption</i>	<i>Efficiency</i>	<i>Implementation</i>
SOUTH AFRICA	Hong Kong	SOUTH AFRICA	Singapore	Hong Kong
Singapore	Singapore	Hong Kong	Hong Kong	Singapore
NAMIBIA	Malaysia	Costa Rica	South Korea	SOUTH AFRICA
Israel	SOUTH AFRICA	Israel	Spain	MAURITIUS
Spain	Turkey	Singapore	Malaysia	Malaysia
BOTSWANA	Mexico	Portugal	NIGERIA	MOROCCO
Brazil	MAURITIUS	Spain	TOGO	Spain
CAMEROON	Spain	Malaysia	MOROCCO	TOGO
Colombia	Brazil	Greece	SOUTH AFRICA	Mexico
COTE D'IVOIRE	India	NAMIBIA	Thailand	COTE D'IVOIRE
Hong Kong	Colombia	Taiwan	MALI	India
KENYA	Costa Rica	MOZAMBIQUE	SENEGAL	GHANA
Malaysia	ZAMBIA	BOTSWANA	MALAWI	MALAWI
South Korea	Ecuador	MALAWI	COTE D'IVOIRE	SENEGAL
Taiwan	Portugal	Brazil	CAMEROON	UGANDA
Thailand	ZIMBABWE	Argentina	GHANA	MALI
India	GHANA	NIGER	Colombia	Portugal
Portugal	MALAWI	COTE D'IVOIRE	MAURITIUS	Costa Rica
Chile	Thailand	ZIMBABWE	Mexico	KENYA
Turkey	South Korea	South Korea	KENYA	ZIMBABWE
Argentina	SENEGAL	TANZANIA	Turkey	South Korea
Dominican Rep	MOROCCO	Chile	Costa Rica	Turkey
Ecuador	UGANDA	Ecuador	UGANDA	NIGERIA
EGYPT	KENYA	Turkey	India	Colombia
GHANA	TOGO	Thailand	ZAMBIA	Ecuador
MOROCCO	MALI	Colombia	Portugal	CAMEROON
MOZAMBIQUE	COTE D'IVOIRE	Dominican Rep	MOZAMBIQUE	ZAMBIA
NIGER	NIGERIA	SENEGAL	ZIMBABWE	Thailand
SENEGAL	CAMEROON	Sri Lanka	TANZANIA	Brazil
Sri Lanka	TANZANIA	TUNISIA	Ecuador	TANZANIA
TUNISIA	MOZAMBIQUE	Uruguay		MOZAMBIQUE
ZIMBABWE		KENYA		

Costa Rica	Mexico
Mexico	Peru
Pakistan	India
Peru	CAMEROON
SYRIA	GHANA
MALAWI	MOROCCO
NIGERIA	SYRIA
TOGO	EGYPT
Uruguay	UGANDA
ZAIRE	ZAMBIA
ZAMBIA	Guatemala
Guatemala	TOGO
MALI	NIGERIA
Philippines	Philippines
TANZANIA	Pakistan
UGANDA	MALI
Haiti	Haiti
	ZAIRE
	MAURITIUS

Note: Highest score listed first. Countries with identical score have the same shadow. In capital letters African countries.

Appendix 3: Correlation Matrix for Bureaucratic Structure Indicators

Table 1 Correlations between the left-hand indicators

<i>Whole sample</i>	<i>Bureau</i>	<i>Consultation</i>	<i>Corruption</i>	<i>Efficiency</i>	<i>Implementation</i>
<i>Bureau</i>	1	0.596	0.615	0.434	0.417
<i>Consultation</i>	0.596	1	0.525	0.572	0.744
<i>Corruption</i>	0.615	0.525	1	0.355	0.480
<i>Efficiency</i>	0.434	0.572	0.355	1	0.710
<i>Implementation</i>	0.417	0.744	0.480	0.710	1

<i>Non-African sample</i>	<i>Bureau</i>	<i>Consultation</i>	<i>Corruption</i>	<i>Efficiency</i>	<i>Implementation</i>
<i>Bureau</i>	1	0.283	0.569	0.773	0.462
<i>Consultation</i>	0.283	1	0.636	0.613	0.896
<i>Corruption</i>	0.569	0.636	1	0.713	0.779
<i>Efficiency</i>	0.773	0.613	0.713	1	0.752
<i>Implementation</i>	0.462	0.896	0.779	0.752	1

<i>African sample</i>	<i>Bureau</i>	<i>Consultation</i>	<i>Corruption</i>	<i>Efficiency</i>	<i>Implementation</i>
<i>Bureau</i>	1	0.522	0.570	0.200	0.400
<i>Consultation</i>	0.522	1	0.302	0.348	0.723
<i>Corruption</i>	0.570	0.302	1	-0.269	0.214
<i>Efficiency</i>	0.200	0.348	-0.269	1	0.681
<i>Implementation</i>	0.400	0.723	0.214	0.681	1

Table 2 Correlation between the right-hand indicators

<i>Whole sample</i>	<i>Agency power</i>	<i>Autonomy</i>	<i>Career opportunities</i>	<i>Private sector</i>	<i>Relative wage</i>
<i>Agency power</i>	1	-0.092	-0.008	-0.043	-0.054
<i>Autonomy</i>	-0.092	1	0.271	-0.375	0.285
<i>Career opportunities</i>	-0.008	0.271	1	-0.510	0.040
<i>Private sector</i>	-0.043	-0.375	-0.510	1	-0.290

<i>Relative wage</i>	-0.054	0.285	0.040	-0.290	1
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<i>Non-African sample</i>	<i>Agency power</i>	<i>Autonomy</i>	<i>Career opportunities</i>	<i>Private sector</i>	<i>Relative wage</i>
<i>Agency power</i>	1	-0.020	0.025	-0.125	0.314
<i>Autonomy</i>	-0.020	1	0.343	-0.273	0.068
<i>Career opportunities</i>	0.025	0.343	1	-0.711	0.119
<i>Private sector</i>	-0.125	-0.273	-0.711	1	-0.340
<i>Relative wage</i>	0.314	0.068	0.119	-0.340	1

<i>African sample</i>	<i>Agency power</i>	<i>Autonomy</i>	<i>Career opportunities</i>	<i>Private sector</i>	<i>Relative wage</i>
<i>Agency power</i>	1	0.014	-0.036	-0.278	-0.390
<i>Autonomy</i>	0.014	1	0.170	-0.492	0.511
<i>Career opportunities</i>	-0.036	0.170	1	-0.048	-0.085
<i>Private sector</i>	-0.278	-0.492	-0.048	1	-0.163
<i>Relative wage</i>	-0.390	0.511	-0.085	-0.163	1

Appendix 4: Guidelines for country coordinators:

The survey

This survey has already been conducted in 30 developing countries outside of Africa and four within the region. It was designed to deliver indicators of bureaucratic capacity for many countries. Through the cooperation of the African Economic Research Consortium and the United Nations University, we are seeking to expand this research to as many African countries as possible. The new data will be extremely valuable because it will allow, for the first time, a cross-country analysis of bureaucratic capacity across Africa. It will also allow comparisons with other countries. This will lead to more informed recommendations on the kind of policy reforms that should be undertaken.

The full data set will be distributed to all researchers who participate in this survey.

Role of country coordinator

The country coordinators should be able to perform the following tasks:

- (1) Identify 4-5 experts
- (2) Conduct interviews and help fill in the questionnaire (about 1 hour each)
- (3) Fax a copy of the completed questionnaire to the UNU

(1) Identifying the Experts - Profile of experts

This research relies on a small number of expert opinions. Therefore, identifying the right persons is absolutely crucial. The profile of an ideal expert is somebody who can answer questions on the structure and incentives in the civil service of each country over the past 15-30 years. Such a person could be:

- A high ranking civil servant or ex-civil servant (e.g. at the level of Chief Secretary or within the Civil Service Ministry or equivalent).
- An academic, consultant or policy advisor who has, for example, worked on administrative reforms

This person should fill in the questionnaire in the presence of the country coordinator. In all cases we are aiming for a minimum of four experts per country. In some cases the country coordinator may themselves be very knowledgeable about the bureaucracy and be able to fill in one additional questionnaire.

(2) How to conduct the interview and fill in the questionnaire

You should try to familiarize yourself with the questionnaire before the interview. If there are

any questions regarding the content of the questionnaire please contact:

Mr. Julius Court - The United Nations University
Tel: 81 3 5467 1289; Fax: 81 3 3406 7346; Email: court@hq.unu.edu

The questionnaire is multiple choice, which will allow us to make comparisons across countries. It is important that the experts provide answers to all the multiple-choice questions. Even if the standard answers do not fit the conditions of your country please choose the option that fits best.

Of course, we are well aware that these standard answers cannot capture the full complexities of real bureaucratic structures. Therefore, please record any additional explanations provided by the experts. We will take these comments into account when we evaluate the multiple-choice answers.

The questionnaire comprises 25 questions and is divided into 3 parts

Part A: deals only with the core economic agencies, i.e. it refers only to the higher Officials in the bureaucracy. Please stress this point with the experts

Part B: deals with the civil service in general

Part C: deals with the relationship between the bureaucracy and the private sector

Time Period

We are interested in the period from 1970 until now. If there have been important changes within this period please indicate the sub-period to which your answers apply. Please add comments if there have been major changes, the date of the changes and the direction of these changes.

Return and Honorarium

We would be very grateful if you could return the attached reply sheet indicating whether you are willing to serve as the country coordinator or not as soon as possible.

If you accept, UNU will fax to you a contract and subsequently a copy of the questionnaire.

The honorarium of \$750.00 would be paid on receipt of the completed questionnaires.

Appendix: Questionnaire for Analyzing the Bureaucracy

This survey is a joint initiative of the African Economic Research Consortium and the United Nations University. The aim of the study is to gain comparable data on bureaucratic performance for a large number of African countries, which would then be the basis for informed policy advice in this area.

The questionnaire should be filled in by an expert who can answer questions on the structure and incentives in the civil service of the respective country over the past 15-30 years. The ideal profile of an expert is either a high civil servant, an ex-civil servant or a person who has had long-term experience with the bureaucracy.

Such an expert should be able to fill in the questionnaire in a maximum of 1 hour.

Country: _____

Country coordinator: _____

Name of Expert: _____

Present Position of Expert: _____

Experience of Expert with
the bureaucracy: _____

If you have any questions please contact:

Mr. Julius Court - The United Nations University
Tel: 81 3 5467 1289; Fax: 81 3 3406 7346; Email: court@hq.unu.edu

Country coordinators please return all completed questionnaires by fax to:

Africa Survey
The United Nations University
Attention - Julius Court
Fax: 81 3 3406 7346

Some remarks about the questionnaire:

Background: This survey is a combination of two surveys that have already been conducted in a large number of developing countries outside of Africa. The results of these earlier surveys have been published (Evans and Rauch) and (Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder) and are available on request.

Objectives: The aim of the study is to gain comparable data on bureaucratic performance for a large number of African countries. In order to make meaningful comparisons across countries we have provided some standard alternative answers to each question. But we are well aware that these standard answers cannot capture the full complexities of real bureaucratic structures. Therefore, we hope that in addition to indicating which standard answer comes closest to describing your case, you will offer a complementary, narrative description of the state bureaucracy in your country with regard to these issues.

Time Period: We are interested in the period from 1970 until now. If there have been important changes within this period please indicate to which sub-period your answers apply. We would also appreciate any commentary you could add on changes over time in your narrative responses.

Format: The questionnaire is divided into 3 parts

Part A: deals only with the core economic agencies

Part B: deals with the civil service in general

Part C: deals with the relationship between the bureaucracy and the private sector

Part A. Core Economic Agencies:

1. Please, list the four most important agencies in the central state bureaucracy in order of their power to shape overall economic policy. (e.g. Ministry of Finance; Central Bank; Ministry of Industry and/or Trade and/or Commerce; Economic Planning Board, Agency or Ministry; Office of the President; Office of the Prime Minister)?

1. _____ 3.

2. _____ 4.

-
- 1.a. Has this composition changed significantly over the past 20 years?

- (1) Yes •
(2) No • If you answer is *No* please skip to question 2
-

1.b. How many times would you estimate has the power shifted from one economic agency to another over the past 20 years? _____times

1.c. Which of the following statements best describes the situation within the core economic agencies when a new government comes to power?

- (1) New governments usually completely overturn the existing structures (both the organization and the personnel). •
 - (2) New government usually leave the existing structure intact but create new agencies which then take control. •
 - (3) New governments usually only change the top positions (e.g. deputy minister, department head, division chief). •
-

2. Which of the following descriptions best fits the role of these core agencies in the formulation of economic policy.

- (1) many new economic policies originate from within the agencies. •
 - (2) some new policies originate inside them and they are important "filters" for policy ideas that come from political parties, private elites and the chief executive, often reshaping these ideas in the process. •
 - (3) they rarely initiate new policies, but are important in turning policies that originate in the political arena into programs that can be implemented. •
 - (4) they rarely initiate new policies because many of the new economic policies originate outside of the country (e.g. with the World Bank, the IMF or other international donors) and the local economic agencies mainly have the role of implementing them. •
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3. How likely are ideas and policies initiated by these core agencies to prevail?

- (1) no more likely than ideas coming out of other parts of the state bureaucracy. •
 - (2) quite likely, even in the face of opposition from other parts of the bureaucracy, as long as the chief executive is neutral or supportive. •
 - (3) very likely, even in the face of opposition from other parts of the bureaucracy and sometimes even in the face of opposition from the chief executive. •
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A.I. Recruitment and Careers in the Core Economic Agencies

In answering the following questions, assume that "higher officials", refers to those who hold roughly the top 500 positions in the country and especially in all the core economic agencies you have discussed above.

4. Approximately what proportion of the higher officials in the most important economic agencies enter the civil service via a formal examination system?

- (1) there are no formal examinations •
 - (2) less than 30% •
 - (3) 30-60% •
 - (4) 60-90% •
 - (5) more than 90% •
-

5. Of those that do enter via examinations, what proportion have university or post-graduate degrees?

- (1) less than 30% •
 - (2) 30-60% •
 - (3) 60-90% •
 - (4) more than 90% •
-

6. Roughly how many of the top levels in these agencies are political appointees (e.g. appointed by the President or Chief Executive)

- (1) none •
 - (2) just agency chiefs (e.g. the minister) •
 - (3) agency chiefs and vice-chiefs •
 - (4) all of top 2 or 3 levels •
-

7. Of political appointees to these positions, what proportion are likely to already be members of the higher civil service?

- (1) less than 30% •
 - (2) 30-70% •
 - (3) more than 70% •
-

8. Of those promoted to the top 2 or 3 levels in these agencies (whether or not they are political appointees), what proportion come from within the agency itself or (its associated ministry(ies) if the agency is not itself a ministry)?

- (1) less than 50% •
 - (2) 50-70% •
 - (3) 70%-90% •
 - (4) more than 90% •
-

9. Are the incumbents of these top positions likely to be moved to positions of lesser importance when political leadership changes?

- (1) almost always •
 - (2) usually •
 - (3) sometimes •
 - (4) rarely •
-

10. What is roughly the normal number of years spent by a typical higher level official in one of these agencies during his career?

- (1) 1-5 years •
 - (2) 5-10 years •
 - (3) 10-20 years •
 - (4) entire career •
-

11. What prospects for promotion can someone who enters one of these agencies (e.g. through a higher civil service examination) early in his/her career reasonably expect?

(Note: Assuming that there are at least a half dozen steps or levels between an entry-level position and the head of the agency, how would you characterize the possibilities for moving up in the agency? More than one may apply.)

- (1) in most cases, he/she will move up one or two levels but no more. •
- (2) in most cases, he/she will move up three or four levels, but unlikely to reach the level just below political appointees. •
- (3) if performance is superior, moving up several levels to the level just below political appointees is not an unreasonable expectation. •
- (4) in at least a few cases, could expect to move up several levels within the civil service and then move up to the very top of the agency on the basis of political appointments. •

12. How common is it for higher officials in these agencies to spend substantial proportions of their careers in the private sector, interspersing private and public sector activity?

- (1) normal •
- (2) frequent but not normal •
- (3) unusual •
- (4) almost never •

13. How common is it for higher officials in these agencies to have significant post-retirement careers in the private sector?

- (1) normal •
- (2) frequent but not normal •
- (3) unusual •
- (4) almost never •

13a. Have there been any significant reforms in the career prospects within the core economic agencies over the past 20 years?

- (1) Yes •
- (2) No • If your answer is No please skip to question 14

If Yes, please briefly state the nature of the reforms, the date it took place

13b. How did the reforms change career prospects within the core economic agencies?

- (1) They improved significantly •
 - (2) They deteriorated significantly •
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A.II. Salaries

14. How would you estimate the base salaries of higher officials in these agencies *relative to those of private sector* managers with roughly comparable age, training and responsibilities?

Public servants salaries
relative to private sector
salaries are:

	Now	5 years ago	10 years ago	20 years ago
(1) less than 50%	•	•	•	•
(2) 50-60%	•	•	•	•
(3) 60-70%	•	•	•	•
(4) 70-80%	•	•	•	•
(5) 90-100%	•	•	•	•
(6) more than 100%	•	•	•	•

15. How much do fringe benefits (such as free housing, import privileges, cars etc.) add to basic salaries?

Amount fringe benefits
add to base salaries is:

	Now	5 years ago	10 years ago	20 years ago
(1) no fringe benefits	•	•	•	•
(2) up to 10 %	•	•	•	•
(3) between 10 % and 50 %	•	•	•	•
(4) between 50 % and 100 %	•	•	•	•
(5) more than 100 %	•	•	•	•

- 15a. How much do tips and bribes add to basic salaries?

Amount tips and bribes
add to base salaries is:

	Now	5 years ago	10 years ago	20 years ago
(1) no tips and bribes	•	•	•	•
(2) up to 10 %	•	•	•	•
(3) between 10 % and 50 %	•	•	•	•
(4) between 50 % and 100 %	•	•	•	•
(5) more than 100 %	•	•	•	•

16. How much is the difference in base salaries between an entry-level civil servant (for instance a clerk) and a high civil servant (for instance a division chief)?

High public servants
would earn about (x) times
more than entry level staff?

	Now	5 years ago	10 years ago	20 years ago
(1) about the same	•	•	•	•
(2) 1.5 times more	•	•	•	•
(3) 2 times more	•	•	•	•
(4) 3 times more	•	•	•	•
(5) over 3 times more	•	•	•	•

Part B: General Civil Service

These questions refer to the higher Civil Service more broadly, not just to the top 500 officials in the core agencies.

17. What is the importance of civil service examinations for entry into the bureaucracy?

- (1) There are no civil service exams • (go to question 19)
- (2) Civil service exams are of trivial importance •
- (3) Civil service exams are an important entry criterium •

If there are civil service exams:

18. Roughly what proportion of those who take the higher civil service exam pass?

- (1) less than 2% •
- (2) 2-5% •
- (3) 6-10% •
- (4) 10%-30% •
- (5) 30-50% •
- (6) more than 50% •

19. Among graduates of the country's most elite university(ies) and universities abroad, is a public sector career considered:

- (1) the best possible career option. •
- (2) the best possible option for those whose families are not already owners of substantial private enterprises. •

- (3) the best option for those who seek stable employment. •
 - (4) definitely a second best option relative to a private sector career. •
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20. Among members of the educated middle class who are not in a position to attend elite universities, is a public sector career considered:
- (1) the best possible career option. •
 - (2) the best possible option for those whose families are not already owners of substantial private enterprises. •
 - (3) the best option for those who seek stable employment. •
 - (4) definitely a second best option relative to a private sector career. •

Part C. Relationship between the Bureaucracy and the Private Sector

21. How would you characterize the relationship between the bureaucracy and the private sector on a scale from 1(=cooperation) to 6 (=opponents)?

	<i>cooperation</i>			<i>opponents</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Now	•	•	•	•	•	•
5 years ago	•	•	•	•	•	•
10 years ago	•	•	•	•	•	•
20 years ago	•	•	•	•	•	•

22. When there are important changes in laws or policies which could affect private firms, does the bureaucracy give an opportunity to firms and business associations to voice concerns? This is the case:

- (1) always •
- (2) mostly •
- (3) frequently •
- (4) sometimes •
- (5) seldom •
- (6) never •

23. How would you rate the following statement for the case of your country: "It is common that private firms have to pay some irregular "additional payments" (bribes or tips) to get things done." This is the case:

- (1) always •
- (2) mostly •
- (3) frequently •
- (4) sometimes •
- (5) seldom •

